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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines a regional enterprise support network in the UK - Connect 
Scotland. There are several conceptual and theoretical gaps regarding the creation, 
evolution and effectiveness of formal support networks to stimulate technology-
based entrepreneurship and new enterprise creation. One is the need to establish 
more clearly when and why such networks really matter in the exploitation and 
commercialisation of technology-based opportunities. This clarification is made 
difficult by the evolving nature of networks over time and lack of definition of units 
of analysis - e.g. network, region, enterprise, entrepreneur and knowledge creator. 
Few studies have examined how regional support networks have helped create 
'successful' technology regions similar to Silicon Valley by informing practice and 
policy decisions. Finally, it is not clearly understood what the roles and activities of 
various public and private agents are and how they enable or constrain technology-
based innovation exploitation and enterprise creation in a regional context. A study 
of a regional enterprise support network - Connect Scotland - during its formative 
years (1997-2002) provided the research case. A methodology was developed from 
process evaluation guidelines, Molina's socio-technical constituency model and Van 
de Ven' s social system framework in order to evaluate a regional support network 
over time. The methodology used the network and its primary stakeholders - private 
sponsors, universities and technology companies - as units of analysis to examine the 
evolution of network support processes and effects on all active stakeholders of the 
network - rather than simply new enterprises. Empirical research included 
assessment of network event and participation data over 5 years (1997-2001); two 
value surveys, in 1999 and 2001 of 116 stakeholders; 6 cases studies of early-stage 
technology companies, interviews with over 50 stakeholders between 1999 and 2002 
and examination of 5 other regional mechanisms that influence Connect's impact and 
effectiveness. In summary, over half of the Connect network was assessed. Findings 
showed key factors in building a national network including strong evidence of 
intervention need, early support from key private and public sector leaders, 
identification of clear benefits for stakeholders and a formal, integrated set of 
recurrent events with targets to ensure event quality and stakeholder mix. High levels 
of sponsorship renewal were found to result from a combination of altruistic support 
for Scottish technology and specific benefits being realised through network 
participation while retention of young technology companies in the network was 
more affected by sectoral and market conditions. Perceived social, knowledge, and 
financial value derived by stakeholders was found to evolve between 1999 and 2001 
and supported literature that knowledge and financial value becomes more important 
as social interactions develop among active network participants. Intangible social 
and knowledge benefits are more immediately realised by Connect stakeholders, 
whilst tangible investment benefits are traced to those enterprises with clearly 
superior technologies that are allowed to present at Connect's investment events. 
Case studies indicated that Connect's benefits to these companies are most 
pronounced in their formative years. Findings indicate that Connect's 2001 transition 
to a private company and new network management model challenges facilitation of 
extensive intangible multi-stakeholder benefits regionally and university-industry 
stakeholder exchange as more tangible benefits to private sponsors and to 'high-
potential' technology enterprises take precedence. 
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1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
In recent years, entrepreneurship has emerged as a key driver for invigorating 
business, regions and countries facing the transformation of the world economy and 
is acknowledged as a fundamental factor in the exploitation of technological 
innovations and creation of new enterprises. 
The desire to stimulate entrepreneurship has lead to a myriad of programs and 
policies from awareness and education to active market intervention. Market 
intervention, it is argued, is required to stimulate the identification and interaction of 
supportive agents that assist in creating a critical mass of competitive enterprises that 
can make an impact on the regional economy. Initiatives to stimulate industrial 
clusters, business incubators and science parks are among the public policy tools 
used, often in partnership with industry, to create supportive conditions for 
technology-based enterprises. 
One conspicuous area of endeavour has been that of regional enterprise support 
networks. Creating regional conditions in support of new enterprises draws on a 
large body of research showing that the spread of innovations and commercial 
success is a function of the support that innovators and entrepreneurs can draw from 
the larger community as well as industry conditions (Pfeffer and Salancik 1977; 
Vaughn 1983; Ruttan and Hayami 1984; Saxenian 1994; Van de Ven 1993; Porter 
1990, 1998). 
The extensive literature on agglomeration economies, national and regional systems 
of innovation and studies of technology clusters and regional innovative milieu also 
provide the relevant context at this 'regional networks' level (Lundvall 1994; Cooke 
1996). Research on entrepreneurial networks identifies the importance of personal 
and business networks to the entrepreneur in accessing resources, knowledge and 
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other capabilities and gaining legitimacy for the new company (Birley and Stockley 
2000; 10hannisson 2000). 
Although support networks are an increasingly common intervention strategy, the 
application of an extensive literature on network theory to the study of regional 
support networks is underdeveloped. Literature suggests further research on how 
support networks are created, where and how networks provide value and how 
networks evolve and change. Further studies are suggested on the management 
dimension and 'intermediation' of networks and how formal networking activities 
develop and change over time. 
Limited research has examined the commercialisation processes and related 
difficulties faced by new technology companies and compared these with original 
intervention objectives and actual network effects. One question is whether 
company benefits deriving from a formal network-based program are similar to 
benefits from informal networks identified in the research. 
Few studies have looked at networks among other intervention initiatives attempting 
to develop a region's technology-based commercial and entrepreneurial capabilities. 
Although literature suggests difficulties in isolating attribution effects of support 
activity, poorly understood is how beneficiaries as well as initiative managers 
perceive the value and delivery of multiple intervention initiatives operating within a 
regIon. 
Research on networks is challenged by the primary social or informal nature of 
networks and difficulties in tracking how local supportive mechanisms allow new 
companies to assemble resources and capabilities (Johannisson 2000). Another 
challenge is the need for a longer evaluation time frame to identify network effects 
on enterprises (Segal et al 1990; North and Smallbone 1996). Methodological 
difficulties for evaluating intervention programs in general include attribution of 
cause with effect, lack of available primary data and monitoring of results, program 
effectiveness and 'success', value for money and cost-benefits and accommodation 
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of program changes (Patton 1990; Gregory and Martin 1996; Lalkaka and Abetti 
1998). 
The focus of this thesis is to examine and evaluate a regional support network to 
stimulate technology entrepreneurship and to support the formation of new 
technology-based companies in the United Kingdom - Connect Scotland. 
Justification for choosing Connect Scotland as a research case is its applicability to 
explore many of the evaluation issues just described and the need for Connect to 
demonstrate to external bodies its relevance and impact. Although anecdotal 
evidence suggests that Connect is making a difference in supporting technology-
based entrepreneurship since it began operations in 1997, this has not been 
established empiricall y. 
Informing practice on regional support networks is highly appropriate and applicable 
in the case of Scotland, a country with a strong science and technology base but 
identified low levels of entrepreneurship and enterprise creation. A further research 
justification is the opportunity to study an evolving network program and the 
influences of a changing regional policy and market environment from a participant 
observation perspective. 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Three sets of research questions are proposed from the above background. The first 
set of questions is focused on network theory and practice as it relates to regional 
support networks. What is a regional support network, how is it created (Grandori 
and Soda 1995) and what are its management and operational characteristics (Gibb 
and Davies 1991; Casson 1997)? How do networks make a difference (Chu 1996; 
Rangan 2000), more specifically - what benefits do a regional enterprise support 
network provide to network participants and to what extent? How does this network 
change over time as suggested by evolutionary network theories (Butler and Hanson 
1991; Larson and Starr 1993; Gulati et aI2000)? 
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The second set of research questions relates to network effects on new technology 
companies - the primary targeted beneficiary of most intervention initiatives and for 
Connect Scotland. What specific commercialisation difficulties are faced by new 
technology companies that justifies the need for support and what benefits are 
attributed to involvement within the network? Are benefits of a network-based 
support initiative similar to network benefits identified in other studies, e.g. social 
capital effects, knowledge transfer, business credibility, access to resources not held 
internally, etc (Dubini and Aldrich 1991; Iohannisson 2000). 
The third set of research questions is focused on the role of the Connect network 
among other regional support initiatives. What is the role of Connect with 
universities, seed funding schemes and other initiatives and how are these 
complementary elements perceived by network stakeholders and used by technology 
companies? How does the Connect network function as an element of a regional or 
national system of innovation (Malecki 1997, Freeman 1995, Nelson 1993, Lundvall 
1992, 1994; Rosenberg 2002)? 
In addition to the three levels of research identified above, practical insights 
regarding support networks and the Connect program are expected to emerge as 
research results unfold. 
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research takes Connect Scotland as the focus of inquiry, incorporating an action 
research design identified as most appropriate when studying change, when the 
researcher is a participant in the change process and when an intervention technique 
is being evaluated (Foote Whyte 1991; McKernan 1991). An explicit objective for 
the research is to develop a 'practical methodology' that feeds evaluation insights 
back to Connect on an ongoing basis. In so doing, the evaluation acts as a 'learning 
factor', contributing to the development of the Connect program by making explicit 
achievements, difficulties, challenges and weaknesses, with the results fed back into 
the evolving Connect constituency. 
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The research incorporates complementary units of analysis to address the three sets 
of research questions, as Figure 1.1 shows: 1) the network; 2) its stakeholders; 3) the 
primary intended beneficiary of network efforts, technology companies; 4a) 
complementary support initiatives; and 4b) external factors affecting the network and 
support for technology entrepreneurship. 
Figure 1.1: Integrated Levels of Analysis: An Action Research 
Approach to Evaluating Connect Scotland 
1) Network Creation, 
Evolution and ...-" 




Evolution and Value 
Attribution 
3) Cases: .... - ...... --~a) Complementary 
Network Value at Support Initiatives Firm Level .--___ L-__ --, 
4b) Regional Factors 
affecting Network 
Network analysis examines the origins and development of the Connect program and 
describes its events, activities and management mechanisms, the evolution of the 
network and consequent effects and benefits. Empirical date includes network 
membership and event attendance data (1997-2001) and interviews with Connect 
management, board and stakeholders (1999-2002). 
Stakeholder analysis exarrunes stakeholder engagement in the network and the 
evaluation of social, knowledge and financial value benefits identified as explicit 
objectives of network activities. A total of 20 indicators were chosen for the three 
value dimensions, with each indicator rated using a Lickert scale. The objective of 
the survey is to evaluate where Connect has been beneficial to all stakeholders, not 
simply technology companies, regarding social and business contacts, gaining or 
giving relevant knowledge, and attracting or providing financing for member 
companies. A further intention of the value survey is to assess whether or not this 
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value is changing over time. Empirical date includes stakeholder membership data 
(1997-2001) two value surveys from 116 stakeholders, 52 stakeholder interviews 
(1999-2002) and an investment survey from 35 presenting companies (1997-2001). 
Case study analysis exanunes SIX company members of Connect chosen from a 
cross-section of technology sectors to capture evidence of commercialisation 
challenges, actual effects of the Connect program on early-stage fonnation processes 
and provide some cross-industry validation of network effects. 
The final level of analysis examines other complementary support initiatives and 
regional factors that affect Connect's role in supporting technology entrepreneurship 
and effects on stakeholders. Empirical research examines survey feedback, case 
studies and interviews with directors of identified complementary initiatives. 
The development of Connect is seen as a process of constituency-building targeted 
on specific stakeholders and intent on achieving defined targets through the 
implementation of an integrated set of mechanisms and activities. Integrating the 
above levels of analysis is a 'constituency building model' or 'conceptual lens', 
developed to accommodate the development, value, weaknesses and potential for 
improvement in the Connect constituency-building process (Figure 1.2). 
In Figure 1.2, the centre represents Connect as the unit of analysis, namely, the entire 
process of Connect constituency-building for the purpose of supporting the creation, 
development and growth of technology-based enterprise throughout Scotland. The 
first layer around the core shows the main activities, events and mechanisms through 
which the Connect constituency-process is realised. 
The second layer around the core shows the key constituents or stakeholders, either 
present or targeted by the activities, events and mechanisms of the Connect 
programmes. The third and final layer around the core shows the target results 
expected to lead to the ultimate mission of growth of Scottish technology ventures 
and industry. 
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Figure 1.2: Network 'Constituency-Building' Process 
1.4 
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The thesis is divided into two parts that firstly discusses background literature 
(Chapters Two to Six) and then presents the research undertaken (Chapters Seven to 
Twelve). Chapter Thirteen concludes the thesis and discusses its vanous 
contributions. 
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1.4.1 Literature Review 
Chapter Two introduces key concepts for this thesis that include perspectives on 
corporate, academic and regional entrepreneurship, innovation regions and enterprise 
support. Theories of innovation and technology are then discussed that include 
exploring linear models of innovation development, market explanations of 
exploitation, technology transfer and commercialisation strategies, followed by 
theories on the social shaping of technology and social structure explanations of 
commerci ali sati on. 
Chapter Three discusses Schumpeter's views of innovation and entrepreneurship and 
socio-economic perspectives on the role of the entrepreneur, theories of enterprise 
and enterprise formation. A multi-theoretical approach discusses key factors 
affecting entrepreneurship and the configuring, attracting and managing of resources 
for enterprise creation. External factors discuss market demand and sectoral 
conditions affecting enterprise survival, formation and growth. Social explanations 
of entrepreneurship discuss collective action, risk-sharing and entrepreneurial teams 
that lead into discussions of social and business networks in Chapter Four. 
Chapter Four discusses network theories, types of networks, structures and 
dimensions and evolutionary theories. Literature includes the role of networks as a 
determinant of economic action and as a supportive mechanism for new enterprises. 
Perspectives of network management and network evolution discuss the 
intermediation of social relations and resource exchange and how network benefits 
and the relevance of networks to entrepreneurs change over time. 
Chapter Five discusses the specific characteristics and challenges of technology-
based enterprises and markets that distinguish them from more conventional 
enterprises and markets discussed in Chapter Three. The chapter discusses support 
structures, institutional linkages and engagement processes that include national and 
regional systems of innovation, clusters, knowledge spill-overs and transfer, 
networks and their relevance to technology entrepreneurship. 
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Chapter Six discusses market intervention mechanisms for stimulating 
entrepreneurship, justification for intervention in Scotland and the vanous 
intervention mechanisms in practice there. The chapter then examtnes support 
networks as an intervention mechanism and evaluation recommendations and 
challenges. 
1.4.2 Empirical Research 
Chapter Seven discusses research objectives, approach and methods undertaken in 
this thesis. It builds an argument to justify the research design and development of a 
constituency-building model and describes the initial pilot study of Connect Scotland 
that fine-tunes the research approach. The chapter then describes the design 
framework and empirical data collection activities. 
Chapter Eight discusses factors affecting the creation, formation and growth of the 
network, factors affecting stakeholder engagement and retention in the network and 
levels of social, knowledge and financial value flows among sponsors, universities 
and technology companies and recommendations for improving network benefit 
delivery. 
Chapter Nine provides an entrepreneurial process analysis of common themes of case 
company development that identifies regional enablers and constraints to 
commercialisation. Case companies describe network benefits, those of other 
initiatives and forward recommendations to improve the support environment in 
Scotland. 
Chapter Ten discusses the role and effects of Connect among complementary support 
initiatives. The role of universities in supporting technology entrepreneurship is 
examined along with perspectives from one of Scotland's most high-profile research 
institutes - the Roslin Institute - on how they exploit their science and their views on 
the support environment in Scotland. Complementary initiatives include Scottish 
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Enterprise programs, university technology transfer offices, Edinburgh Technology 
Fund (ETF) , Scottish Institute for Enterprise (SIE), the Entrepreneurial Exchange 
and Global Connect. 
Chapter Eleven discusses Connect's evolution from a public-private program to an 
independent company and identifies changes to network events and activities, 
governance and communication mechanisms, value delivery to stakeholders and 
Connect's role among complementary support initiatives. The chapter also examines 
changes to Scotland's business environment during the timeframe of the Connect 
evaluation (1997-2002) to qualify network achievements and effects. 
Chapter Twelve synthesises the research results from Chapters Eight through Eleven 
and establishes insights and key findings as they apply to the three sets of research 
questions. 
Chapter Thirteen summarises the contributions to knowledge from the thesis and 
identifies research limitations and recommendations for the future. Contributions 
inform the application of network theory to regional support networks, network 
management and practice and inform the debate on intervention effects on new 
technology companies and the role of support networks within a regional system. 
1.5 DEFINITIONS 
Although the term 'new technology-based finn' (NTBF) is widely used in the 
literature, debate continues over its characteristic elements and a move towards an 
exclusive definition. For simplicity, the thesis will consider the use of the term 
'enterprise' as appropriate and interchangeable with the terms new company, new 
finn or new venture, all used in various literatures to describe an entity established to 
trade in the market. 
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For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to establish a consistent understanding 
of what the term 'network' is meant to imply when describing Connect Scotland. 
The term <regional support network' eludes a unifying definition with various 
definitions of innovation, business and entrepreneurial networks describing their 
distinctive traits, elements and dimensions (e.g. Granovetter 1992: 32; Yeung 1994: 
476; Ebers 1997; Blundall and Smith 2001). 
This thesis forwards a definition that refers to its primary elements; therefore the 
regional support network Connect Scotland will be defined as Han integrated and co-
ordinated set of formal network activities that stimulate fee-paying institutional and 
individual actors to socially engage and develop ongoing economic and non-
economic relations that contribute to their own development, that of new companies 
and a sense of mutual obligation to regional development". 
1.6 THESIS DELIMITATIONS 
The problem of attribution remaIns III measunng Connect's direct impact on 
stakeholders and new companies. A key factor is that the causal relations for these 
types of outcomes are influenced by factors beyond the direct impact of the Connect 
constituency-building process. Market conditions and economic factors are 
acknowledged as key factors influencing the creation and growth of technology 
companies, and factors such as business policies, taxation conditions, interest rates 
etc. have not been studied in this research. Already identified is the challenge of 
isolating attribution effects. However, network benefits and the influence of other 
support is an explicit objective of the case study analysis. 
Personal traits, motivations and behaviour of stakeholders have not been measured as 
underlying factors in the research, although insights into individual and institutional 
behaviour are discussed when they appear. It is conceded that the personal traits, 
motivations and abilities of individuals will affect network engagement patterns, 
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knowledge and resource sharing behaviours and business relations that cumulatively 
affect network and regional support processes and outcomes. 
1.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter has laid the foundations for the thesis. A background to the topic, 
justification for undertaking research and overview of literature introduced the thesis 
in general terms. The research problems were identified, the methodology was 
briefly described and justified, definitions clarified and the limitations were given. 
On these foundations, the thesis will proceed with a detailed description of the 
research, beginning with a review of literature - Chapters Two through Six. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY EXPLOITATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins with recent developments in the exploitation of innovations and 
technologies and their significant commercial importance for private and public 
sectors that introduce the concepts of corporate, academic and regional 
entrepreneurship. Included is the concept of intervention that describes the use of 
support mechanisms by policy-makers in particular to stimulate this exploitation. 
The chapter then establishes a theoretical basis for the concepts of innovation and 
technology to explore key factors contributing to their commercial application. Most 
appropriate is a socio-economic perspective that accommodates the role of the 
market in selecting appropriate technologies as well as the social shaping of 
technology and various socially mediated factors contributing to successful 
exploitation and commercialisation outcomes. 
2.2 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
2.2.1 'Corporate' Entrepreneurship 
The seeking and exploitation of new market opportunities by existing business is 
described as corporate entrepreneurship or 'corporate venturing' (Birkinshaw 2000). 
Drucker (1985: 35) refers to this search as "systematic innovation ... the active role 
by a firm's leadership in looking out for market opportunities". Drucker suggests 
that these opportunities include a search for the unexpected; incongruities in what is 
and what ought to be; changes in market structures and industry structures; new 
knowledge; demographic changes and changes in perceptions, moods and meanings. 
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According to The Economist, "innovation has become the industrial religion of the 
late 20th century" ("A Survey of Innovation in Industry", Economist, Feb 28~ 2002: 
28). Innovation creates continuous market threats and opportunities arising from the 
speed of new products entering the market, short product lifecycles and global 
market access (e.g. D' Aveni 1994~ Hamel and Prahalad 1994). Hitt, Ricart and 
Nixon (1998) suggest that threats are represented by the arrival of new competition 
and the increased uncertainty in previously protected domestic markets, while 
opportunities are available in new opened markets to exploit economies of scale. 
De Wit and Meyer (1998: 237) describe the pressure on existing companies, stating 
that "in a world of changing technologies, transforming economies, shifting 
demo graphics and dynamic competition, it is not an issue whether companies must 
change, but of where, how and in what direction they must change". They suggest 
that companies are increasing their focus on operational flexibility and speed to 
deli ver faster and better products and services at lower prices. 
However, Porter (1998) argues that quality, speed and flexibility will, in the long 
term, not be enough to create prosperity, enterprise growth and employment. These 
changes to how businesses respond to competitive pressures have become, according 
to Porter, "entrance factors" in the market place or conditions that must be met 
simply in order to survive. Porter argues that the source of competitive advantage for 
companies of today, whether at national, regional or enterprise level, is in the 
capacity to 'do things differently' and to continuously reinvent products and services. 
Distinctive strategic challenges facing compames In an 'age of innovation' are 
suggested that differ significantly from the 'industrial age': continuous change from 
stability, empowerment from control, collaboration from competition, diversity from 
uniformity and knowledge and people centred from product and process centred (e.g. 
Drucker 1985~ Hamel and Prahalad 1994). 
Harvard Professor Clayton Christensen (1997) in his book "The Innovator's 
Dilemma" argues that the failure of existing companies to stay atop their industries 
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when they confront technological change is often explained either by poor 
managerial, organisational or cultural responses or by the inability of companies to 
deal with radically new innovations. But Christensen proposes another explanation 
for competitive failures - the value network. He describes the value network as the 
context within which an existing firm identifies and responds to the market, gains 
knowledge and experience and develops capabilities, organisational structures and 
cultures tailored to their value network's distinctive requirements. 
Christensen asserts that firms must continually identify the eventual flattening of 
their technologies while identifying new opportunities and addressing the needs of 
known actors within their value networks. Furthermore, he stresses that firms must 
consider whether the performance implications in the new innovation will be valued 
within the networks already serviced by the firm and whether other networks must be 
addressed or new ones created in order to realise value for the innovation. 
A strong social dimension to corporate entrepreneurship has been identified in earlier 
work by Kanter (1982, 1985). Kanter (1982) suggests that a typical innovation 
produced within the modem business goes through several stages: 1) idea generation; 
2) coalition and support building; 3) development and completion of finished 
product; and 4) transfer or diffusion. These stages are facilitated by organisational 
factors that includes experts with close links to experts in other fields, multiple 
communication links, small interdisciplinary business units and diversity and breadth 
of experience. 
Kanter (1982) suggests that the development of an innovation requires three things: 
resources (materials, investment, space and time), information (technical knowledge, 
data, political intelligence and expertise) and support (legitimacy, approval and 
endorsement). These things are required, Kanter argues, because people initiating 
innovation compete in a number of markets: economic markets for resources, a 
marketplace of ideas for information, and a political market for support or legitimacy 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1977). 
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Kanter suggests that intervention at any of her four proposed innovation stages can 
enhance the success and speed of the innovation process. Intervention facilitates 
contact and communications across boundaries within the existing structural patterns 
and social arrangements. Kanter's views relate to the notion of 'communication 
integration', close interpersonal contact and communication channels that are shown 
to be positively related to the rate of innovation (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971; 
Tushman and Nadler 1986). 
Studies emphasise the importance of value-added provided by intervention and the 
various mechanisms and roles that move an innovation forward to the market (Quinn 
1979; Maidique and Patch 1982). Delbecq and Mills (1985) found that innovation 
failures are characterised by ambivalent support, inadequate resources during the 
critical early stages of development, constant efforts to sell and justify the innovation 
and personalised infighting over resources. 
Galbraith (1982) distinguishes between the roles of sponsor, those who discover and 
fund the development and testing efforts that shape an innovation, and orchestrator, 
those who manage the politics surrounding a new idea. Similarly, Van de Ven 
(1986), using multi-sector case studies of large innovations, found that a common 
need for new innovations is good management of transactions or deals over time, 
requiring various roles from others that secure major decisions about the project in 
addition to securing necessary resources. 
Attainment of resources, information and support from others in innovation 
development is seen to lead to interdependencies between and among people and the 
emergence of networks of people joined through complementary interests to trade 
resources (Burt 1987). Burt states that networks not only lead the actor to certain 
resources but also suggests that networks themselves are a resource. 
In his paper entitled "The Network Entrepreneur", Burt (1987) stresses that a 
network is a form of social capital which he defines as something owned jointly by 
the parties to a relationship and involving a rate of return realised by what is ventured 
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and gained by these parties. Social capital, Burt claims, is at once the structure of 
social associations and contacts in a network and the resources they each hold. Burt 
adds that social capital provides better access, better timing and an improved chance 
for referrals for the entrepreneur. The creation of networks, Burt suggests, often 
occurs to counter formal institutional rigidity and to create new types of 
interconnections between organisations and people. 
2.2.2 'Academic' Entrepreneurship 
Increasing levels of innovation exploitation are also observed in universities and 
research institutions across the globe, creating new products, new enterprises and 
new markets that contribute to economic growth (Howells et al 1998; AUTM 1999). 
The growing expectation among public policy makers that universities are engines 
for economic prosperity often cites the example of the US, where it is estimated that 
total university research adds more than US$33.5 billion to the economy and 
supports 280,000 jobs annually (AUTM 1999). 
The term academic entrepreneurship has been used to describe the commercial 
application of university-based research (Smilor et al 1993). Another term, 
entrepreneurial university, suggests the more direct involvement in the 
commercialisation of research activities and a more proactive approach to the role of 
academic research in the market place (Chrisman et al 1995). 
Universities, it is suggested, are facing increasing pressures by governments and 
funding agencies who are seeking greater returns on their investment in research 
based on their own resource limitations (Downes and Eadie 1996; Howells et al 
1998; Cripps et al 1999). Increasing financial pressures have resulted in expansion 
of commercialisation activities in many universities and the set-up of technology 
transfer offices (Gulbrandsen 1997: 128). One result is that scientists and 
technologists are under growing pressure to seek commercial applications for the 
results of their research. 
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At the same time, it is widely accepted that most university research is not 
immediately applicable in an industrial context (Howells et al 1998). Evidence 
suggests that it is an unrealistic assumption that universities function as "knowledge 
centres" around which innovative enterprises will cluster and where commercial 
success will be high (Massey, Quintas and Wield 1992). 
Successful commercialisation of university-generated innovations reqUIres other 
elements according to Malecki (1997), who cautions that the presence of a local 
university is not enough to offset shortcomings in entrepreneurial climate. Similarly, 
Walshok (1994) argues that university-industry exploitation partnerships cannot 
achieve their intended consequences without parallel and reinforcing knowledge 
linkages which assure a policy environment supportive of economic growth, a 
regional infrastructure ready to support new and renewing industries and an 
appropriately competent, informed professional and technical labour force. 
2.2.3 'Regional' Entrepreneurship 
The concept of regional entrepreneurship is based on research showing that the 
spread of innovations and commercial success is a function of the support that 
innovators can draw from the larger community as well as industry conditions 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1977; Vaughn 1983; Ruttan and Hayami 1984; Saxenian 1994; 
Van de Ven 1993; Porter 1990, 1998). As noted earlier, it is acknowledged that a 
university is but one of the elements in the support structure to create and develop 
new enterprises (Walshok 1994; Maleki 1997; Botham and Eadie 1997). 
Regional factors include access to investors and those funding technology-based 
enterprises, small to medium-sized enterprises that may collaborate with universities 
in new company formation, service providers of marketing, management and 
technology verification, or due diligence services and others that exist in the region 
to promote and support the development of start-up enterprises. Further evidence 
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suggests that regional factors strongly influence the creation of successful start-ups 
enterprises (Cook and Morgan 1993; Porter 1990; Malecki 1997). 
Research on successful high technology regions, such as Silicon Valley, Cambridge, 
UK and Cambridge, Massachusetts points out the critical importance of a supportive 
infrastructure for new and growing firms (Saxenian 1990, 1994; Segal et al 1985, 
2000). These elements include tax incentives, the provision of business parks and 
programs that facilitate supportive agents that understand the needs and requirements 
of emerging and existing firms. As well, the notion of networks and the benefits of 
participation and associated competitive advantages is identified in regional 
economic development policy literature (Ritsila 1999). 
2.2.4 Market Intervention and Enterprise Support 
Technology-based innovations and sectors are viewed by policy-makers as having 
the greatest potential to generate future economic benefits. High technology 
companies are thought to have greater growth potential than conventional firms as 
well as to be better 'converters' of science into marketable products than larger firms 
(Lalkaka and Abetti, 1998; Deakins et aI, 1998; Gregory and Martin, 1998). 
Government intervention, it is argued, is required that stimulates creation of 
supportive agents and thus a critical mass of competitive firms can be established 
that make an impact on the regional economy. Regional economic development 
agencies all over the world have invested public money into schemes to facilitate and 
strengthen particular kinds of local networks in the belief that these support local 
competitive advantages and give rise to additional capital investment, employment 
and higher new business birth-rates. 
David Rosenberg, in his book "Cloning Silicon Valley" (2002), provides evidence 
that virtually every developed country in the world today is building or aspires to 
build its own innovation region using California's Silicon Valley as an example. The 
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Silicon Valley region provides one of the first 'ideal models' with high levels of 
technology-based enterprises underpinning a dynamic, high-growth regional 
economy that other regions sought to emulate. 
According to the Commission of the European Communities (OECD 1998), 
intervention initiatives in Western Europe have focused on three principal objectives: 
1. reduction of the economic, social and political cost of widespread 
unemployment; 
2. increase in activity in the SME sector leading to economic development, 
technological innovation and industrial restructuring; and 
3. creation of an enterprise culture and the widening of entrepreneurship. 
More recent regional initiatives, such as the Regional Innovation Strategies of the 
European Union, are focused on creating conditions that facilitate new enterprises 
and contribute to economic growth and prosperity. 
2.3 DESCRIBING INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY 
This section describes the concepts of innovation and technology to establish the 
elements, processes and factors contributing to commercial exploitation. Innovation 
is defined by Afuah (1998) as the sum of invention plus the commercialisation of 
that invention and by Collins (1997) as 'something newly introduced, such as a new 
method or device'. Innovations are also described as representing additions to 
existing knowledge, but are more broadly defined than inventions to include 
processes or new ways of doing things (Blaug 1963; Martin, 1994). 
Invention as a sub-set of innovation has been defined as 'something new that is 
thought up or created' (Collins 1997), and as a sequence of acts of insight, which 
lead to a cumulative synthesis of many items that were originally independent (Usher 
1955). Casson (1982: 375) asserts that invention, as the precursor of innovation, "is 
a field of imaginative activity outside the province of the entrepreneur". Casson's 
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assertion is supported by the fact that the foundation for many inventions is scientific 
know ledge derived through applied or basic research acti vi ties 1• Casson argues that 
entrepreneurs may transform the invention into a commercial entity but may not be 
involved in its creation. 
Many opportunities to exploit technological innovations begin with scientific 
advances (Nelson and Winter 1982; Dosi 1988) and from scientific knowledge that 
includes the production of facts or data observed in reproducible experiments and 
theories or relationships between facts (Nelson 1959). Nelson points out that 
advances in scientific knowledge are often not directly and immediately applicable to 
the solutions of practical problems, and he asserts that social gains arising from 
advances of knowledge are primarily from basic research efforts. Nelson suggests 
that because applied research is constrained to the solution of a specific practical 
problem, it is relatively unlikely to result in significant breakthroughs in scientific 
knowledge save by accident. 
Not all inventions lead to innovation, as many inventions become a valuable input 
for other research projects (Usher 1955; Nelson 1959). According to Nelson (1959: 
301), this is why many academics argue for free and wide communication of 
research results, [as] new knowledge is of greatest value as a key input of other 
research projects which, in turn, may yield results of practical and patentable 
I " va ue . 
'Technology' is also a related concept to innovation, described as a social construct 
that relates to its interpretation and use by people (Liebeskind 1996; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990) and as a product of human ingenuity, with changes in technology 
representing changes in knowledge (Mokyr 1990). Technology is also referred to as 
a 'cultural system concerned with the relationships between humans and their 
environment' (Tepstra and David 1985: 148). 
1 Scientific research is commonly categorised as basic, in referring to activities involved in generating new knowledge, and 
applied, referring to research geared toward solving particular problems (Nelson 1959; 8urgelman et aI1996). 
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Coombs and Richards (1991) describe technology in terms of its commercial 
application, as 'units' of knowledge and expertise that influence product 
development in a variety of ways that are, more or less, specific to a commercial 
application. Similarly, Autio views technology as a social construct created by 
people to gain commercial success (Autio 2000). 
2.3.1 Economic Perspectives 
Neo-classical economists generally view the development of scientific knowledge 
into technological innovations as a production function involving the transformation 
of inputs into outputs, with this transformation following a linear progression from 
invention to application (Crew 1975; Hunt 2000). Faulkner and Senker (1995: 26) 
suggest the linear model commences at the 'springhead' - the creation of new 
knowledge - and leads to technological innovations and economic growth. 
Undertaking innovation development for commercial gain, economists argue, will 
occur only if favourable macro-economic and product market conditions are present 
(e.g. Audretsch 1993; Karlsson et al 1993). Prices provide the information necessary 
to undertake effort but only if the expected revenue of the effort exceed the expected 
cost (Nelson 1959; Blaug 1963; Schmookler 1962). 
Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) argue that three kinds of resources are critical to the 
development of most technologies: 1) basic scientific or technological research; 2) 
financing mechanisms; and 3) a pool of competent human resources. They suggest 
that basic knowledge is very costly to produce relative to the cost of diffusion and 
imitation and typically public organisations such as universities and research centres 
playa key role in creating and providing this knowledge. In contrast, financing 
requirements to develop technologies usually arise from the market rather than public 
sources (Van de Van 1993). 
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Indeed, economists such as Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) assert that social returns 
to research investment exceed any private returns to the market, creating a common 
problem of under-investment by firms in research and development. For example, 
Arrow proposes a development profitability function that provides the initial 
motivation to proceed with innovation development, (expressing profitability in 
production conditional on development expenditures) that is affected by how much is 
known regarding the market for the innovation. According to Arrow, demand or 
market pull requires the existence of markets for innovations that provides 
differential incentive structures for undertaking research commercialisation. 
Evidence suggests that determining the costs and benefits of potential commercial 
application first require an understanding of the nature of technological development. 
Burgelman et al (1996) suggest three different types of 'technological innovations'. 
Incremental innovations involve the adaptation, refinement and enhancement of 
existing products; radical innovations involve entirely new product categories; and 
architectural innovations are configurations of systems of components that constitute 
a product. 
Casson (1982) suggests that an entirely new innovation, or radical innovation, incurs 
a set-up cost which is a fixed cost independent of output, or opportunity cost. This 
involves synthesising technical information with information about the scarcity of 
factors of production in order to assess whether the new innovation, besides its 
technical virtues, will also reduces costs of production. A differentiated innovation 
or version of an existing product infers that the demand for the new variant at any 
price is governed by the prices of the existing variant. In this case, Casson argues 
that the entrepreneur needs to synthesise information about buyer preferences for 
product quality with information about costs of the new design. Other information 
costs can include the search for contractual partners, contract costs, and monitoring 
technical production and quality (Foss, 1994). 
Various arguments are forwarded to counter the demand pull theory of innovation 
development and linear models. White identifies that a problem in anticipating 
33 
future profits is the creation of new innovations, arguing that existing prices in the 
market cannot explain new 'innovations' " ... for the notion of discovering price 
discrepancies is severely strained in a situation where no prices of any kind (let 
alone future prices) exist for the new-and-different commodities under 
consideration" (White 1976: 95). 
Mowery and Rosenburg (1979) suggest a balancing act in exploiting a technological 
innovation and dismiss outright arguments that innovations arise from market 
demand. They accept that expectations of future profits are based on a market 
demand sufficiently large enough to justify expenditure. At the same time, they 
argue that the range of actions that are available and their respective costs are 
continually being altered by the course of technical progress and thus the costs of 
alternative actions for investment are always changing. 
An alternative view of successful innovation development is their emergence through 
the combination of identified market opportunity and suitable technological 
development (Freeman 1982; Coombs et al 1987). For example, literature suggests 
that an identified market need occurs more often in applied research involving 
industry partners and less so in the case of a scientific discovery arising out of basic 
research (Kline and Rosenberg 1986; AUTM 1999). Cripps et al (1999) argue that 
academic research mayor may not be focused on finding technical and commercial 
solutions to existing or often unforeseen market opportunities, and thus they dismiss 
conventional linear models of product innovation as not so relevant to universities. 
They also assert that research behind the innovation is only the first and usually the 
least expensive stage in commercialisation of technology innovation. 
A model by Yong Lee and Gaertner (1994) in Figure 2.1 suggests that 'market pull' 
from an identified market need not be the starting point for innovation development 
and commercialisation. Rather, the starting point may be from basic research, with 





Figure 2.1: University Model of Technological Innovation 














Further research-problem solving 
Design, redesign, further testing 
Quality improvement, economising 
This model shows that each of the four stages of the process mayor may not 
continue (wide arrows) to progress to the right depending on results of the feedback 
mechanisms. Contributions of the market end user (number 1 &7 above) III 
technological development acknowledge the variation by industrial sector of 
producer and user input in innovation development. 
Sectoral conditions, noted in the Yong Lee and Gaertner model, have been identified 
in earlier research as an important factor affecting innovation development. Von 
Hippel (1978) found new industrial product development is characterised by a much 
high level of customer activity than consumer products. He suggests that the 
appropriateness of the innovation benefits will determine the level of user or 
producer interaction in innovation development. Levin et al (1984: 33) find that for 
most industries, factors such as learning curve advantages and lead times, combined 
with complementary marketing efforts, provide the principle mechanisms of realising 
returns on investments in product innovations. Similarly, Dosi (1988) argues that 
some sectors and technologies may rely on informal processes of leaming-by-doing 
and design improvements while others rely more on formal search activities in 
research laboratories. 
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Dosi (1988: 222) further argues that innovation development is more application-
focused in suggesting that innovation concerns the search for, and the discovery, 
experimentation, development, imitation and adoption of new products, new 
production processes and new organisational set-ups. Dosi suggests that the 
technical and commercial outcomes of innovative efforts are difficult to know ex 
ante and thus innovation involves a fundamental element of uncertainty - the lack of 
all relevant information about known events and the existence of techno-economic 
problems whose solutions are unknown. 
2.3.2 Exploitation and Commercialisation 
The suggested risk and uncertainty of science-based innovation development is often 
synonymous with protection of an innovation's intellectual property (IP) and is 
normally one of the first commercial activities in attempting to exploit private or 
public sector research. Securing IP is based on the argument that profit cannot be 
secured unless the introduction of the new knowledge or invention can be controlled 
through patent privileges (Usher 1955; AUTM 1999; Howells et al 1998). 
According to Casson (1982), securing IP is the reward for entrepreneurial judgement, 
providing the entrepreneur with monopoly power and guaranteeing first-advantage 
and a level of privileged information that others do not possess. Protection of IP is 
also based on the premise that many innovations are hard to produce but easier to 
copy (Chidamber and Kon 1994). 
Figure 2.2 synthesises previous perspectives on knowledge, invention and innovation 
by showing the flow of research activity leading to an innovation being identified as 
having potential commercial value through the protection of its intellectual property. 
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Figure 2.2: Flow of Research Activities to Marketplace 
(adapted from Usher 1955; Nelson 1959; Schmookler 1962; 







According to the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM 1999), an 
international association promoting academic technology transfer practices, 
commercialisation commences with the research idea as it relates to commercial 
potential, and moves through to market entry, when products, processes or services 
based on the research are sold. A UTM proposes seven stages of the 
commercialisation process: 
• Identification of potential commercial applications of research 
• Recognition by the market (industry) of the potential of research in a specific 
application; verifying the significance of the research 
• Development of technology to 'proof on concept' in the field of application 
• Assessment of market potential, which may feed back inforn1ation on 
required performance criteria 




Commercial-scale manufacturing and market entry strategies, including 
access to appropriate distribution channels 
Further development and refinement 
AUTM suggests that research may already exist that is identified as being 
commercially viable, characterising a product-led rather than a market-led 
innovation. Product-led innovation has been described as the p~ocess of converting 
science and technology, new research or an invention, into a successful marketable 
product or industrial processes (Scottish Enterprise 1996: 2). This objective, Scottish 
Enterprise states, is concerned with all the transfer routes and all stages of the 
process from research through to the marketing and manufacturing of products. 
However, Mowery and Rosenburg (1979) suggest that not only do most patents 
never reach the stage of commercial exploitation, but many commercially successful 
innovations are unpatented. They argue that the production of new knowledge, 
information flows and processes that underlie, shape and contribute to success or 
failure in the production of an innovation are inadequately served by market forces 
and the incentives of the marketplace. In their assessment of post-war American 
technical dynamism, Mowery and Rosenburg assert this has been the direct 
outgrowth of scientific and technical research (often funded and justified by defence 
requirements) rather than a response to sudden shifts or increases in market demand. 
Process innovations grounded in theoretical and technical developments, they 
suggest, have been fundamental to product innovations. 
Technological opportunities, according to Dosi (1988) depend on the nature of each 
techno-economic paradigm and the economic and institutional context of each 
country. Dosi explains that technological advances normally draw upon the 
availability of some sub-set of publicly available knowledge that is improved upon 
by highly selected scientific and technological knowledge intent on solving specific 
problems or applications. Dosi suggests that the 'public' characteristics of 
technology relate to the untraded interdependencies between technologies, 
enterprises and sectors that provide a structured set of technological externalities 
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within a collective and regional context. Thus, the technology itself and the external 
context detennine both the opportunities and the boundaries for technological 
progress. 
In line with Dosi's insights, Tait and Williams (1999) argue that the linear model 
ignores key innovative contributions by commercial organisations in the conversion 
of knowledge into marketable products and processes and their role as creators of 
know ledge in their own right. 
2.3.2.1 Technology Transfer 
Previous arguments lead to questions on the processes most appropriate and effective 
for commercial exploitation. For many universities and research institutions world-
wide, commercialisation is synonymous with technology transfer. 
AUTM defines technology transfer as 'a fonnal transferring of new discoveries and 
innovations resulting from scientific research conducted at universities to the 
commercial sector'. Technology transfer processes within this definition include: 1) 
the disclosure of innovations; 2) patenting the innovation's intellectual property (IP) 
concurrent with publication of scientific research; and 3) licensing the rights to 
innovations to industry for commercial development. 
Rogers et al (1999) suggest that success of technology transfer is measured in a 
variety or ways that include number of patents filed, license agreements executed and 
new companies formed as well as royalties paid to the academic institutions from 
companies that commercialise their inventions and the numbers of products 
successfully introduced to the market. AUTM suggests simple models for 
calculating the public benefits of their activities, including induced investment, 
return to licensee/investor, taxes, and jobs. Non-numerical measures of success 
include a university's capability to retain entrepreneurial faculty and attract 
outstanding graduate students; its reputation for innovation; the enhancement of 
39 
university research through interaction with the private sector; and, its reputation for 
providing highly trained students for the industrial workforce. 
Studies suggest a number of factors why most university research is not immediately 
applicable in an industrial context. A report by Howells et al (1998) surveyed 109 
UK universities on their linkages with industry and found that many universities are 
limited to licensing their IP because of issues with industry affecting technology 
transfer. These issues included the role of research, institutional traditions, 
university competencies and resources and former experiences in co-operation and 
depth of previous linkages that can constrain the potential diffusion of technology 
and co-operation between universities and industrial partners. Another factor cited is 
that many universities do not have the resources or capabilities to fully 
commercialise intellectual property (Howells et a11998, AUTM 1999). 
Although returns are expected from a variety of strategies - royalty streams, licensing 
fees or science park rents, for example - starting new enterprises are seen by 
university administrators and policymakers in the UK and other western countries as 
having high economic value (Lalkaka and Abetti, 1998; Deakins et aI, 1998; Gregory 
and Martin, 1998; Oakey and Rothwell, 1986). Exploitation of IP through the 
creation of a new enterprise, it is argued, can provide higher returns but also requires 
a longer time horizon to realise. 
2.3.3 Sociological Perspectives of Innovation Development 
Various arguments and theories counter the neo-classical notion that technology 
follows a simple linear progression from invention to application, with economic 
agents applying rational and maximising behaviour and actions. Technological 
innovations and their applications are known to co-evolve in unpredictable ways, 
influenced by social and cognitive factors and by the nature of the technological 
system (Nelson and Winter 1977, 1982; Rosenberg 1969; Sahal 1985). 
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Various theories provide the argument that technologies are socially shaped (Coombs 
et al 1992). At one level, the sociological debate challenges the linear argument of 
innovation development. For example, Mowery and Rosenburg (1979) argue that 
while one may rely upon the ordinary forces of the marketplace to bring about a 
rapid diffusion of an existing innovation with good profit prospects, these same 
forces cannot account for the initial generation of such innovations. Kline and 
Rosenburg (1986: 275) argue that commercialisation of a technology innovation is a 
more complex and challenging proposition, stating that: 
"Models that depict innovation as a smooth, well-behaved linear process 
badly misspecify the nature and direction of the causal factors at work. 
Innovation is complex, uncertain, somewhat disorderly and subject to 
changes of many sorts ... The systems used ... are among the most complex 
known (both technically and socially), and the requirements for successful 
innovation vary greatly from case to case". 
The concepts of technological trajectory (Nelson and Winter 1977; Dosi 1982) and 
techno-economic paradigm (Freeman and Perez 1988) suggest the strong influence 
of the technology itself - on cumulative knowledge and technological competencies 
of economic agents - and organisational procedures of agents that limit certain 
activities and choices. Innovative learning as well may be paradigm-bound and 
occur along particular trajectories. 
Nelson and Winter (1982) suggest innovation as new knowledge is affected by the 
common store of beliefs held by the technological community on what can or should 
be attempted. Their notion of technological regime acknowledges that, while there is 
a cumulative nature to technological development, this development follows a 
trajectory influenced by the body of knowledge and expectations held by a 
community of practitioners. They further argue that innovative performance and 
technology development are strongly path-dependent, resulting in different ways of 
responding to the same external changes, resulting in variations in profitability and 
growth. The notion of path dependence suggests that existing capabilities are built 
up over time, providing a starting point from which new developments proceed . 
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Chidamber and Kon (1994) suggest that neo-classical innovation models ignore the 
importance of existing technological capabilities and the need to defend them. In 
addition to these social and cognitive factors affecting innovation development, 
highlighted by Nelson and Winter, the size and structure of the technological system 
itself affects innovation development by generating guideposts along which 
development is constrained (Rosenberg 1969; Sahal 1985). 
Georghiou et al (1986) point out that innovations seldom emerge fully fonned, and 
that success or failure of a new development depends on the sequence of interrelated 
innovations that diffuse though the economy following the initial introduction of the 
innovation. They interpret the concept of technological regime as a basic set of 
design parameters along with a related body of knowledge regarding the potential 
physical characteristics, materials and processes that will contribute to the final 
product. What design configuration actually emerges from a number of possible 
options will be detennined by ongoing evolutionary developments within a particular 
configuration or by the emergence of new design configurations. 
The notion of exploitation uncertainty noted by Mowery and Rosenburg is also 
explained according to the ability of those attempting to exploit. Taking technology 
transfer, it is suggested that social factors - i.e. the role of other people and 
influences of strategic intent, among others - affect the mechanisms and intentions 
that will influence developmental and exploitation processes. 
Rosenberg (1976) argues that the collective context may enable or constrain 
technological progress in countries, regions or organisations. Whether it is the 
unintentional outcome of decentralised processes in a regional context or the result of 
explicit strategies by public and private institutions, different incentives and 
constraints may arise given a set of economic signals. All the economic agents 
operating on a particular technology, for example, may be constrained by what they 
have been capable of doing in the past. 
2.3.3.1 Actor Network Theory 
Actor network theory, based on work by CalIon (1987, 1992) and others, expand the 
collective context suggested by Rosenberg to provide a more holistic account of 
multiple agents and institutional factors affecting innovation progress. 
CalIon (1987) suggests that technological change cannot be reduced to autonomous 
social, economic or technical influences, but rather must account for an array of 
heterogeneous actors that are mobilised in technological development. These include 
social, individual, institutional and other actors that together constitute a 'seamless 
web' that derives its influences from these actors and the interrelationships between 
them. Interrelationships are reflected in intermediaries, defined by CalIon as those 
entities, people, knowledge, skills, financial resources, or combinations that can be 
attributed to these actors. 
CalIon describes the concept of Techno-Economic Network (TEN) that links all the 
intermediation activities of all actors who are collectively involved in the 
development of technological knowledge and innovations (CalIon 1992). He 
describes the notion of the long network that comprises scientific, technical and 
market poles, and the short network that only includes the technical and market 
poles. An ongoing function within the TEN are the acts of definition and translation 
among actors and intermediaries to provide an inter-definition of roles and activities 
and a level of alignment of entities when translation is successful. 
An important consequence of definition and translation within the TEN is that rules 
and procedures may emerge to co-ordinate these activities. When co-ordination and 
alignment are strong, the network may reflect formal norms that in tum establish a 
more predictable and identifiable network, said to be convergent. A further 
characteristic of the network may be its irreversibility that provides network stability 
by standardising identities, relationships and routines with the network's boundaries 
that are identifiable by those within as well as without the network. 
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Implications of actor network theory on innovation and technological development is 
suggested by the ability to predict, model or quantify the processes within the 
network that can lead to them being 'black-boxed ' and used as inputs into other 
networks. At the same time, a holistic emphasis on all actors and intermediaries 
suggests that if the association of an actor changes, then the translation is no longer 
predictable, and the network becomes less convergent and more reversible. 
2.3.3.2 Sociotechnical Constituencies 
Similar to actor network theory, Molina's (1990, 1995, 1997, 1998) concept of 
sociotechnical constituencies describes technological development as the result of a 
combination of people skills and knowledge, physical and financial resources and the 
interactions between these elements. Molina proposes a model that places greater 
importance on the constituencies - the institutions, social groups and people that 
shape technological development (Figure 2.3). 
Figure 2.3: Sociotechnical Constituency Model Representation 
Other Sociotech. constituencies 
Technical-market trends 
(Adapted from Molina 1990: 311) 
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The model emphasises that interactions, within as well as external to the specific 
technical constituency, occur at three levels - technical, resources and social-
institutional. A two-way flow of exchange occurs among these levels and between 
these levels and external factors influencing the constituency, e.g. other 
constituencies, technical and markets trends, competition, regulations and historical 
circumstances. 
Molina's model recognises the limitations of actor network theory by considering the 
importance of non-technical factors that shape technological development. These 
factors include the role of individuals, institutions, government policies, commercial 
and economic activity that affect and are affected by activities within each technical 
constituency and among constituencies. For example, literature suggests that a 
variety of government regulations and institutional arrangements facilitate or inhibit 
the emergence of new technologies and industries (Nelson and Winter 1982; Van de 
Ven 1993). 
A key element of Molina's model - collective technological development - reinforces 
earlier research emphasising that most innovations are collective achievements of the 
efforts of many actors working over an extended period, possibly in parallel or 
independent locations (Usher 1954; Rosenberg 1983; Dosi 1988; Van de Ven 1993). 
New technologies, it is argued, are seldom if ever developed by a single finn alone in 
the vacuum of an institutional environment, with many complementary technical and 
organisational arrangements necessary before a particular technology can be applied 
commercially. 
Similar to Molina's perspective, Van de Ven (1993) argues that the inter-
organisational community or network is a relevant unit of analysis if one aspires to 
understand the infrastructure for entrepreneurship that includes functions such as 
basic knowledge, financing mechanisms, competent labor as well as institutional 
governance structures that legitimize, regulated and standardise the activities of 
members. Van de Ven and Garud (1989) suggest that analysis of a social system 
framework include the opportunistic and collective efforts of various independent 
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actors in common pursuit of technological innovation. These actors include not only 
the developers of innovations but also the many other public and private sector actors 
who perfonn critical functions to develop and commercialise a new technology. 
Dosi (1988: 234) also argues that any interpretation of innovative processes must 
also account for the evolutionary environment within which these processes are 
situated and the evolving nature of activities by economic agents that will contribute 
or constrain innovative outcomes. Dosi states that the uncertainties of the innovative 
process is based upon problem solving and search activities of varying combinations 
of public and private people and institutions - encompassing knowledge science, 
experiences, procedures and competencies. 
Dosi goes on to suggest that innovative opportunities and their economic exploitation 
co-evolve in ways that are at least partly endogenous to the process of discovery, 
development and production. He adds that entire communities of economic and 
technological actors imply different opportunities for innovation exploitation and 
economic benefits based on differences among countries, sectors, institutions and 
actors that create asymmetries in product technologies, production and search 
efficiencies as well as in knowledge, experiences and competencies. 
A similar evolutionary VIeW by Mowery and Rosenburg (1979) asserts that the 
economic argument of 'inputs in - innovations' out fails to account for the growth 
and evolution of a given organisational fonn involved in the research and innovation 
processes. This includes the interface between successful public and private 
development efforts and efforts and policies that encourage the interaction of users 
and producers and between more basic and applied research enterprises. 
Mowery and Rosenburg suggest that appropriate public policies can increase both the 
frequency and intimacy of interactions among these separate participant groups. 
This involves not only expanding the network on which information may flow 
among these groups but includes measures that increase the incentive to participate 
in such interactions. 
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Returning to earlier descriptions on corporate entrepreneurship, it was suggested that 
it is the entrepreneur or innovator whose role is to obtain the desired support and 
contribution from others that include offers of financial incentives, resources, 
information, policy promises, learning experience and personal development (Burt 
1987; Kanter 1982). Indeed, a more informed description of factors affecting 
innovation development and exploitation benefits from contributions of 
entrepreneurial literature. The role of the entrepreneur and processes of 
entrepreneurship as factors in innovation exploitation are explored in Chapter Three. 
2.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter has highlighted the growing emphasis placed on innovation exploitation 
and how a range of capabilities and market conditions are necessary for successful 
exploitation. Economic arguments emphasise the market as the main selection 
criteria that 'pulls' innovation development towards a market application, although 
this argument is less relevant to basis research activities. Social theories counter 
linear and market demand accounts of innovation development to market by 
suggesting trajectories, path dependencies and constraints to processes and strategies 
affect the frameworks in which innovation development can occur. Learning 
processes among actors and between users and suppliers will also affect not onl y the 
patterns of decision selection but also the availability of choices in development and 
exploitation. 
Literature suggests that capabilities to exploit innovations are different than those to 
develop innovations for commercial application. Actor network theory and Molina's 
'sociotechnical constituency' perspectives emphasise the importance of social and 
cognitive, technical and non-technical, actors and their interrelationships. 
Contributions from corporate entrepreneurship literature and social systems 
perspectives describe innovation exploitation as processes requiring access to 
resources and capabilities held by various actors and organisations often external to 
the source of innovation development. 
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Descriptions of academic entrepreneurship suggest that universities provide a 
number of initial exploitation functions, such as IP protection. However, most 
universities rely on external support from public and private sources to secure 
investment, provide due diligence of technology, secure professional management 
and supply channels among others. 
These socio-economic perspectives of innovation development and exploitation 
emphasis successful innovation exploitation as collective achievements, influenced 
by the body of knowledge and expectations held by technical and economic agents 
involved with the innovation. This wider community is described in the literature by 
various terms: the 'evolutionary environment' (Dosi 1988), the 'infrastructure for 
entrepreneurship'(Van de Ven 1993), the 'sociotechnical constituency' (Molina 
1990), the 'techno-economic network' (CalIon 1987) and the 'value network' 
Christensen (1997), among others. A common feature of these concepts is their 
emphasis on the context within which those attempting to develop and commercially 
exploit innovations gain support, knowledge and experience and develop capabilities, 
resources and exploitation strategies appropriate to the innovation's distinctive 
requirements. 
Implications from this literature to the research intent of the thesis emphasise the 
individual and collective actions of technical and economic actors and the regional 
socio-economic context in which these actors are active and certain market 
conditions prevail. For regions where collective action and regional conditions to 
successfully develop and exploit innovation have not developed 'naturally', 
intervention efforts have attempted to create an enabling context. Indeed, the 
creation of a regional support network to stimulate these actions and create a support 
context lies at the centre of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORIES AND PERSPECTIVES OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores theories of entrepreneurship, beginning with Joseph 
Schumpeter, who discusses innovation, entrepreneurship and their effects on 
economic development. The role of the entrepreneur, processes of enterprise 
creation and growth are discussed through various 'theories of the firm' and 
evolutionary growth theories that describe how resource and capability requirements 
change during start-up, formation and growth periods. 
The chapter discusses the social structure of markets, societal attitudes to 
entrepreneurship and the role of networks of individuals and institutions that 
influence entrepreneurial activities and outcomes. The chapter then discusses 
external factors, sectoral conditions and their effects on enterprise and 
enterpreneurial strategies. Further discussion of technology-based entrepreneurship 
will be undertaken in Chapter Fi ve 
3.2 INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Entrepreneurship is commonly associated with innovation when describing the 
processes, behaviour and decisions in taking innovations to the marketplace. 
Mowery (1985) describes entrepreneurship as a staged process of transforming 
technological knowledge by private enterprises into proprietary innovations that can 
become commercial monopolies. Van de Ven (1993) describes the micro-level 
actions of entrepreneurs - those individuals in private firms, research institutes, 
government departments, etc. - that are instrumental in enacting and changing the 
social system to exploit innovations. 
The social system perspectives described earlier suggest that processes of innovation 
are collective achievements requiring key roles from numerous actors, often from 
both the public and private sectors. At the same time, economic perspectives 
emphasise that market forces and external factors characterising an economy or 
industrial sector significantly affect opportunities for economic gains from 
innovation exploitation and consequently affect innovation development -
particularly the role of private sector actors who provide investment and take on risk 
in conditions of high uncertainty. 
The relationship between entrepreneurship and innovation, in particular - the 
creation of new market opportunities through the introduction of new innovations - is 
largely from the work by Joseph Schumpeter (1934, 1951, 1954). Schumpeter 
emphasises the formation of new businesses as the single most important indicator of 
entrepreneurship (Foreman-Peck 1985). This formation is the primary responsibility 
of the entrepreneur, who is expected to co-ordinate resources that depend on the 
entrepreneur's privileged access to information. Schumpeter's entrepreneur plays a 
central role in initiating economic change and engaging in 'creative destruction' by 
enacting states of disequilibrium through innovative activities. 
Schumpeter introduces an economIC model of circular flows in which the 
entrepreneur disrupts markets and causes new markets to be formed with new 
combinations he calls 'innovations' (Schumpeter 1934). He defines innovations in 
terms of transformation of the organisation of the enterprise, or the composition of 
forces within a sector or market, rather than technical invention or technical change. 
Five entrepreneurial activities that characterise innovations are the introduction of a 
new good, a new method of production, the opening of a new market, a new source 
of supply of raw materials and the carrying out of a new form of organisation. 
For Schumpeter, innovative activities destabilise markets and destroy the advantages 
of established enterprises. These actions are imitated by other enterprises, and 
finally markets return to equilibrium until the next wave of innovations begins the 
process again (Schumpeter 1934). Entrepreneurship lifts the economy from one state 
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of equilibrium to another, by entrepreneurs who are motivated in seeking above-
average returns that are expected to result from innovations. 
Schumpeter (1934) VIews the separation of the entrepreneur, acting as an 
independent agent, with entrepreneurship, seen as a process of activities leading to 
economic development. This separation has provided a vacuum in Schumpeter's 
account of innovation and entrepreneurship that has provided the stimulus for others 
perspecti ves. 
According to Baumol (1990), one limitation of Schumpeter's theory is the absence of 
an explanation on factors that determine the allocation of entrepreneurial inputs 
among Schumpeter's five entrepreneurial activities. Baumol alludes to resource co-
ordination that is not specified but assumed to include both the process of creating 
'new combinations' and acquiring necessary resources for a new enterprise. 
Similarly, De Vecchi (1995) suggests that Schumpeter does not identify the 
'processes' leading to innovation opportunity identification, the procurement of 
resources that include outside capital and the alignment of resources to innovation 
requirements. 
3.2.1 Further Descriptions of Entrepreneurship 
Drawing from Schumpeter's definition and those of others, 'entrepreneurship' is a 
multi-disciplined phenomenon that encompasses contributions from economics, 
sociology, psychology, cultural studies, and strategic management and organisation 
science, among others (Herron et al 1992; Venkatraman 1997). Schumpeter also 
stresses the importance of insights from both theory and practice and suggested that 
understanding entrepreneurship includes the actual activity of the entrepreneur, 
rather than simply preconceived notions by economic theorists (Swedberg 2002: 17). 
Entrepreneurship is described as a multi-faceted factor that includes the behaviour 
that transforms innovation into market opportunities (Drucker 1985; Venkatraman 
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1997; Hitt 2000) and commercialisation processes, described by Hitt (2000:4) "[as a 
way of] thinking and doing things that transforms innovation into market 
opportunities or competitive advantage". Schumpeter's definition of innovation - as 
new resource combinations - is similar to Hitt's description of commercialisation 
processes. 
In the absence of a unifying definition, entrepreneurship is described as a 
predisposition towards proactive and risk-taking behaviour (Birkinshaw 2000); a 
'clear departure from existing practices' (Damanpour, 1991: 561), and use of 
resources beyond the individual's direct control (Penrose 1959; Stevenson and Jarillo 
1990). Entrepreneurship is also described as a pattern of management behaviour 
(organisational routines, processes and management styles) that has an innovative 
outcome. 
New perspectives and theories continue to expand the realm of entrepreneurship 
research; in particular, social theories and theories arising from economic geography. 
For example, more recent literature emphasising the importance of considering 
entrepreneurship and enterprise in a local as well as global context places importance 
on theories of collaborative entrepreneurship, industrial clusters and networking 
(Venkatraman 1997; Malecki 1997; Barney 2000; Hitt 2000). 
More explicit in enterprise literature are evolutionary perspectives of development 
and growth as competencies and resources are built up within organisational 
structures, with the innovation becoming one of a number of 'enterprise 
competencies' . 
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3.3 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 
Entrepreneurship is described - particularly in neo-classical terms - as the search for 
profit opportunities in the market, with profit providing the necessary prerequisite to 
motivating economic behaviour, stimulating activity and providing direction for 
entrepreneurial market activities (Mises, 1976, Schumpeter 1934; BaumoI1995). 
Identifying profit opportunities is guided by the price mechanism (e.g. Binks and 
Coyne 1983; Foss 1994). Better prices require those in the market to adjust their 
allocations, for example, buyers would switch to lower prices, and sellers would shift 
their sales to those bidding higher prices. Changes in the market or disequilibrium 
conditions are seen to cause changes in demand and supply that bring new resource 
deployment by economic agents and result in the difference between constellations 
of prices and quantities moving back to market equilibrium (Mises 1976; Samuelson 
1947; Baumol 1977). 
Entrepreneurship is described as a process of co-ordinating and configuring 
resources to exploit the market opportunity (e.g. Menger 1871; Penrose 1959; 
Barney 1991; Adizes 1996). Casson (1982) describes market co-ordination as the 
economic problem, and suggests it is the entrepreneur who is faced with difficulties 
in organising a market opportunity. This problem includes setting up a transaction: 
i.e. the buyer has to be put in contact with the seller, prices have to be negotiated, 
physical custody of goods has to be exchanged. Casson argues that transaction costs 
involve significant resource costs, with entrepreneurial success depending on 
minimising transaction costs that represent the opportunity costs of the market-
making services that are required to overcome obstacles to trade. 
Entrepreneurship is further described in terms of the entrepreneur - the agent that 
identifies market opportunities and co-ordinates and configures the necessary 
resources (e.g. Schumpeter 1934; Kirzner, 1973; Barney 1991; Adizes 1996). In 
response to the economic problem, entrepreneurs are expected to focus on combining 
53 
existing resources in a rational, profit-maximising way given prices and the neo-
classical assumption is that resources are taken as given (Coase 1937). 
The neo-classical VIew also suggests that resource co-ordination requirements 
include division of labor that allows for economising on dispersed information that 
cannot be co-ordinated by the entrepreneur alone (Foss 1994). Lack of knowledge is 
seen to distinguish one entrepreneur from another; making knowledge a valuable 
resource that can be acquired from others through division of labor that is enabled by 
the price mechanism (Kirzner, 1973). This division of labor also leads to the 'co-
ordination problem' described earlier by Casson, that results from sharing dispersed 
information in pursuing a market opportunity. 
Austrian school economists argue that it is the entrepreneur's ability to know the 
market, access better information or interpret differently the same information, rather 
than simply the price mechanism, that is a key factor affecting entrepreneurial profit 
(e.g. Winter 1964; Lachmann 1976; Casson 1982; Foreman-Peck 1985; Meyer and 
Heppard 2000). Kirzner (1973) asserts that the learning factor must be considered as 
a vital contribution by entrepreneurs to market mechanisms. He suggests that 
learning and experience are necessary to profit from 'entrepreneurial errors', adding 
that one entrepreneur's error is another's opportunity and that an entrepreneur gains 
knowledge from mistakes. 
Casson (1990) asserts that entrepreneurs actively synthesise technical information 
with information about factors of production to assess potential costs and benefits. 
This role requires that many diverse types of information are synthesised, including 
technology, market preferences, factor supply, transport services, tariffs and potential 
restrictions on the reallocation of resources. This need to consolidate diversity of 
information, Casson argues, requires that the entrepreneur be a generalist, capable of 
assimilating a wide range of information. 
Individual ability and initiative of the entrepreneur are thus considered to be a critical 
force in the economy and result in different outcomes to entrepreneurial activities 
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(Starr and MacMillan 1991; Casson 1998; lohannisson 2000). According to 
lohannisson (2000:379) 'what makes a difference between entrepreneurs is their 
varying ability to scan and select information about the environment and then 
interactively impose their image of reality, their vision, on the market'. 
3.3.1 Entrepreneurial Risk 
A key element of entrepreneurship is the notion of risk, and neo-classical arguments 
suggest that a pre-risk activity is to assess costs of the potential venture in 
anticipation of future profits (Schumpeter 1934; Knight 1921; Prahalad and Bettis 
1986). Casson (1982) suggests that the entrepreneur is the central character in this 
process that includes identifying the market opportunity, being a specialist in making 
judgmental decisions and being a specialised bearer of risk. 
Schumpeter argues that others bear the risk rather than the entrepreneur. Schumpeter 
suggests that entrepreneurial judgement and risk can be a shared process that places 
greater emphasise on entrepreneurial behavior and activities rather than on a singular 
entrepreneur. Schumpeter suggests that the role of the entrepreneur is to identify and 
acquire commitments from others for funding and that this requires the development 
of a relationship between the entrepreneur and those providing risk capital to finance 
innovation. 
Innovation for Schumpeter is a process requiring large expenditure previous to the 
emergence of any revenue, making credit an essential element of the process. 
Schumpeter claims that there is a cyclical nature of credit in financing innovation 
because he suggests that entrepreneurship does not occur constantly; thus risk capital 
for innovation will not be obtained from creditors when production combinations are 
unchanging. Entrepreneurship for Schumpeter involves the continual series of 
innovations, accompanied by rounds of new profits won, with each of them being 
eroded by competitors (Kirzner 1989). The profit motive and credit are thus seen 
together as a key process of entrepreneurship that provides, according to Schumpeter 
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(1934: 31) a 'regulatory principle for the unregulated business activity [of 
entrepreneurs]' . 
Schumpeter argues that it is not unreasonable to have resistance in obtaining risk 
capital in the early stages when entrepreneurial innovations are new and uncertain. 
However, once the process of change is started and entrepreneurship spreads through 
the economic system, he suggests that resistance to change in financing innovation 
weakens and it is easier for the entrepreneur to obtain financing. 
Knight (1921) in contrast to Schumpeter, vIews the entrepreneur as risk taker, 
emphasising the importance of confidence in judgement by entrepreneurs, reflected 
in a disposition to back up their own judgement with personal capital. Knight argues 
that various market factors affect entrepreneurial judgement that challenges the 
ability of individual entrepreneurs to manage the exploitation of opportunities for the 
market. 
Entrepreneurship according to Knight is subjective in nature and characterised by 
uncertainty, resulting in a level of speculation in decision-making, a view similar to 
Schumpeter, who suggests that the entrepreneur needs to rely on intuition rather than 
on rational reasoning (Swedberg 2002). Similar to Schumpeter as well is Knight's 
assertion that entrepreneurial risk can be reduced through 'consolidation', the 
pooling of individuals best equipped to make decisions under uncertainty. 
The sharing of business risk is identified by Casson (1990) as an opportunity to 
reduce uncertainty arising by the judgmental nature of entrepreneurial decision-
making, but this sharing activity may increase the co-ordination problem mentioned 
earlier. Casson distinguishes between a co-ordination problem and a co-ordination 
process; the problem involves individual preferences, resources, the environment and 
the state of technical know-how, while the process is concerned with who makes 
each decision and how different decision-makers interact with each other. 
Difficulties in administration can arise in ownership and control and agreeing on the 
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valuation and pncmg of resources. The 'co-ordination problem' is handled by 
various social institutions that include the enterprise, discussed in the next section. 
3.3.2 Theories of the Enterprise 
Enterprise creation is identified in the literature as the outcome that most uniquely 
distinguishes entrepreneurial behaviour and market activity (Foreman-Peck 1985; 
Shaver and Scott, 1991; Gartner et al 1992). Explanations of factors contributing to 
enterprise success are numerous and adopting a multi-dimensional approach to 
understanding the enterprise is generally accepted in the literature (Westhead et al., 
1993; Birley and Westhead, 1990; Storey, 1994). Certain factors of the entrepreneur, 
as well as of the enterprise, are seen to influence the level of new enterprise creation 
and performance (Miles and Snow 1978; Storey, 1994; Malecki 1997). 
Various theories are forwarded to justify and explain the existence of the enterprise 
in the market, that include 'nexus of contract', 'institutional' and 'neo-institutional' 
and 'resource-based' perspectives. Nexus of contract theorists suggest that the 
enterprise is a response to counter the 'co-ordination problem' associated with 
separate production functions or division of labor (Casson 1982; Langlois 1991; 
Jensen and Meckling 1992). Contractual arrangements are seen to minimise the 
incentive problems arising when separate production functions require identifying, 
measuring and monitoring, often the case with manufacturing industries (e.g. Coase 
1960; A1chian and Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Institutional theory is based on earlier work by Coase (1937) that supports the 
creation and existence of the enterprise as a rational and necessary substitute for 
markets when the transaction costs of using markets becomes large relative to the 
costs of managing markets. The enterprise is seen as a market mechanism that 
minimises management transaction costs such as team production relati ve to the 
market (A1chian and Demsetz 1972) and minimises costs of co-ordinating the 
movement of goods and services relative to property rights costs through the price 
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mechanism (Williamson 1991). The enterprise is also seen as a mechanism to 
minimise transaction costs through rational allocation of resources to their most 
highly valued uses (Demsetz 1988). 
Neo-institutional theory broadens the institutional theory focus on the enterprise as a 
market institution to acknowledge the role and power of social institutions in general 
in the market (Langlois 1986). The basis of neo-institutional theory derives from 
generalised neo-classical property rights theory and conceptualises the economy as a 
dynamic process, where entrepreneurial gain exists for agents who adopt institutions 
that economise on the costs of information and transaction (Foss 1994). Neo-
institutional theorists also suggest that institutions are themselves potential objects 
for economic explanation because specific rules, norms and activities may enable 
and constrain economic activity (Langlois 1986). 
Literature suggests that the role and rules of certain types of institutions, such as 
credit institutions, have a significant effect on the level of entrepreneurial activity in 
the economy (Schumpeter 1934; Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Blanchflower and 
Oswald 1991; Baumol 1990). Entrepreneurs apply for credit according to their 
prospective profit and this is conditioned by monetary and credit policies of credit 
institutions. 
As Evans and Jovanovic (1989) forward, liquidity constraints of the entrepreneur 
allow credit institutions to ask for and receive collateral that engages the 
entrepreneur in bearing risk. The credit institution creates collateral requirement for 
loans to avoid problems of moral hazard and adverse selection among entrepreneurs 
resulting from asymmetric information between the lender and the entrepreneur 
(Blanchflower and Oswald 1991). Schumpeter in fact suggests that the entrepreneur 
and the enterprise have a function that must be considered jointly with that of the 
credit institution. 
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3.3.3 Resource-based Theories 
Resource-based theory, credited to Penrose (1959), describes the enterprise as a 
collection of physical and human resources that are co-ordinated by an administrative 
organisation. Resources are described as tangibles (financial capital, products, 
information systems) and intangibles (human skills, knowledge, brand power) (Amit 
and Schoemaker 1993; Chandler and Hanks 1994; Dean et al 1998). Advancement 
beyond the new enterprise stage requires the enterprise to become proficient at 
identifying and developing products and markets, as well as integrating resources, 
operationalising systems and managing an organisational culture (Framholtz 1995). 
The term 'capabilities' has been incorporated into resource-based theory. The 
distinction between capabilities and resources is noted by Amit and Schoemaker 
(1993), who define resources as the stock of available factors owned or controlled by 
the enterprise, and capabilities as a firm capacity to deploy resources, usually in 
combination, using organisational processes. Capabilities are expected to develop 
over time as a function of the resource base of the firm and as a function of the 
activities it undertakes to fulfil its mission. Both resources and capabilities may be 
continuously evolving both in anticipation of and in reaction to changes in the 
business environment. 
Katz and Gartner (1988) suggest a mix of properties (intentionality, resources, exchange, 
and boundaries) that they consider as both necessary and sufficient to constitute a new 
enterprise. Intentionality appears as entrepreneurs begin to seek information that could 
be applied toward achieving the goal of founding a new enterprise. During this time, 
entrepreneurs begin to engage in cycles of social exchange to secure the use of resources 
such as information, property, capital, and credit. At some point, boundaries are 
established (full-time employees are hired, office space is occupied, etc.) and business 
operati ons are commenced. 
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3.3.4 Growth Theories 
Previous theories - e.g. nexus of contract, institutional and neo-institutional and 
resource-based - discussed why the enterprise is identified as the primary and 
appropriate market mechanism to co-ordinate resources and exploit a market 
opportunity. This section now discusses models and related theories that describe 
how the enterprise is formed, evolves and develops. 
A large body of literature describes the enterprise in terms of a sequence of stages for 
growth through which each enterprise develops (e.g. Greiner 1972; Kroeger 1972; 
Churchill and Lewis 1983; Mount et al 1993). Some of these growth models are 
based on the 'linear' product lifecycle model, beginning with birth or start-up, initial 
development and through to growth, maturity and decline. Other growth models 
have considered technological innovation, management evolution and financing 
stages (Timmons 1999). 
Figure 3.1 synthesises contributions from the literature on stages of enterprise 
growth. In general, growth models seek to offer predictions on how enterprises 
develop by providing research insights into the factors affecting the successful 
transition of the enterprise from one stage to the next. These models describe the 
state of the enterprise according to a number of its attributes: the product and market 
state, the focus of the entrepreneur and management and competencies required, the 
organisational structure as well as the cash flow and funding requirements. 
The first phase of enterprise growth is described as the inception or start-up phase 
and is characterised by testing or proving the idea or innovation as a viable business 
strategy. Here, the entrepreneur must qualify the market potential before 
commitment of resources and then outline the resource requirements in terms of the 
technology, production, marketing, financial management and leadership skills 







Figure 3.1: Synthesis of Growth Theories of Enterprise 
(Greiner 1972; Kroeger 1972; Churchill and Lewis 1983; 
Mount, Zinger and Forsyth 1993; Bhide 2000) 
Management Enterprise Financing Intellectual 
Focus Structure Property 
Innovation and design Informal Self-financing, None - build 
public grants, intellectual 
limited private property (IP) 
funding 
Planning, selling Hierarchical Business angels, Build and protect 
Development business plan some venture 
capital 
Growth Sales, marketing and Bottom-up, Venture capital Protect and 
cash flow delegation harvest 
Maturity/ Cost control and Function, IPO Harvest and build 
Expansion operations strategic business newIP 
units 
Decline/ Organisational Matrix; Harvest strategy Lose IP or build 
Innovation innovation collaboration - or investment in new IP 
conflict innovation 
Mount et al (1993) state that this phase is dependent on the founder's technical skills 
rather than general management skills. Kroeger (1974) cites technological 
development as the primary functional emphasis in start-up and suggest a possible 
'exit-revert' option at this phase should the launch of the enterprise be unsuccessful. 
For Bhide (2000) success in this early stage of the venture depends on an 
individual's capacity for 'opportunistic adaptation' that reinforces the need for 
flexibility and entrepreneurial inspiration to inspire others to invest in the venture. 
Timmons (1999) suggests that new ventures spend two to three years in the start-up 
phase. 
The second phase is described as the development or survival phase and is 
characterised by first sales and increasing sales volumes that require the founder to 
empower other employees, and the creation of a simple but more formal hierarchical 
management structure. Bhide (1996) claims that many enterprises during this time 
fail to attract critical skills from the outside and perform most of the crucial tasks 
themselves. Kroeger (1972) suggests that key managerial qualities during this phase 
are associated with financial planning. 
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The third phase is described as the growth phase and is characterised by substantial 
increases in sales and turnover. Cash flow problems are seen as the most common 
reason for enterprise failure, often because of the time lag between the costs of 
production and payment receipt. Further external investment is commonly 
associated with the introduction of changes to management and future strategy, 
particularly if venture capital is introduced. 
During the growth phase, Greiner (1972) suggests that successful ventures must 
move away from a hierarchical structure and authority and delegate to lower levels. 
However, de Vries (1985) suggests that entrepreneurs have a preoccupation for 
control and find it difficult to delegate authority while Mount et al (1993) argue that 
the need to delegate more of the decision making powers to subordinates may be 
difficult for enterprises with a strong central locus of control. 
Organisations that survive the crucial growth stage, Kroeger suggests, need to create 
internal stability in order to maintain their new market positions, resulting in the 
creation of new layers of management and specialist business functions. Kroeger 
emphasises co-ordination and interpersonal relations as key managerial skills. 
The fourth stage is described as maturity and is characterised by an enterprise 
attempting to reduce costs as sales growth tapers off. During this time, the enterprise 
is likely to have achieved minimum efficient scale (MES), acquired greater access to 
internal or external sources of financing or demonstrated an ability to innovate. 
Timmons (1999) suggests that successful ventures will experience the maturity stage 
ten years after start-up and that the key issue is no longer survival but one of steady 
and profitable growth. 
A common strategy is to achieve economIes of scale, whereby the enterprise's 
greater output achieves lower average costs and allows the enterprise to charge lower 
prices. As average costs fall with greater output, the MES and optimal firm size 
increases. Related to this strategy is the attempt to build up barriers to entry that can 
significantly increase profits. 
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The final stage of growth reflects the industry in decline and the need for innovation. 
This stage is characterised by competitors squeezing margins and market share, and 
unless the enterprise can find new and innovative products or processes to enhance 
their revenues, it will enter a decline phase. According to Day (1997), the enterprise 
should be aware of early warning signals for decline that include entry rates and the 
amount of excess capacity in the industry. 
Reich (1987: 80) suggests that continuous innovation at this stage can capture 
changing market opportunities. Reid states that innovation can be attained through a 
number of ways: stripping out middle level managers, profit sharing, encouraging 
greater communication and co-ordination and refinement of a variety of ideas. 
3.3.4.1 Further Descriptions of Enterprise Growth 
For many of these growth models, the entrepreneur is a central figure that can both 
enable and constrain enterprise development and growth. De Vries (1985) refers to 
the 'dark side of entrepreneurship' by noting "an entrepreneur's attention to detail 
that is such a virtue in the start-up phase can be truly crippling if he or she continues 
to exert such control when the organisation grows". 
Earlier research by Miles and Snow (1978) suggest strategies to create and grow the 
new enterprise are often determined by an entrepreneurial spirit deriving from 
personal traits and characteristics, and claim that individual personalities, their 
antecedents and consequent attitudes and motivations play an important role within 
the organisational structure. 
Bhide (1996) emphasises the central role of the entrepreneur in persuading other staff 
to accept the transitions in enterprise evolution but acknowledges that many 
enterprises do not evolve smoothly or steadily through each phase of growth, stating 
that "ventures evolve in unpredictable, idiosyncratic ways that do not conform to 
one-size fits all models of development (Bhide (2000: 245). He argues that growth 
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models do not account for the fact that enterprises vary In progressing through 
evolutionary stages and may in fact skip stages. 
Rather than describing a stage model of growth, Bhide (1996) compares the critical 
issues of three possible firm statuses (promising start-up, fledging or transitional 
firms, and large corporations). Bhide identifies a gap between start-ups and more 
mature firms in terms of assets, co-ordination mechanisms and capacity for growth. 
In order to bridge this gap, the entrepreneur must formulate and implement a longer 
term strategy rather than relying on what Bhide terms 'opportunistic adaptation'. 
In Bhide's view, entrepreneurs must perform three 'critical tasks': the articulation of 
purpose and goals, the formation of strategy, and the implementation of the previous 
tasks. Entrepreneurs must also possess some 'exceptional qualities' related to these 
tasks, such as the ambition in setting purpose and goals or the ability to envision the 
firm's future in strategy formation. The level of entrepreneurial skill and managerial 
competence is considered crucial to success and needs to evolve with the firm (Bhide 
2000). 
Bhide argues that entrepreneurs should develop their skills and competencies to 
strategic levels and evolve themselves if they want to grow. He states that 
"entrepreneurs who aspire to operate small enterprises ... never have to change their 
roles ... transforming a fledgling enterprise into an entity capable of an independent 
existence, however, requires founders to undertake new roles" (Bhide 1996: 120). 
Similarly, Timmons (1999) suggests that the key to achieving longer-term sustained 
growth is the entrepreneur's ability to possess or develop competencies as an 
entrepreneurial manager. 
Churchill and Lewis (1983) suggest enterprise growth is a response to the dynamics 
of the business that is strongly influenced by entrepreneurial behaviour and actions. 
At each of their five stages, the factors necessary for growth must be balanced with 
the abilities of the entrepreneur. For example, the entrepreneur's ability to innovate 
and sell the product is vital in the enterprise's early stages, but as the enterprise 
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grows, managerial skills and delegation of growing responsibilities are more 
important factors for the entrepreneur. They suggest that the entrepreneur's failure to 
acknowledge skill limitations is a major reason why many enterprise fail at the 
success phase. 
An earlier enterprise growth model by Greiner (1972) establishes five phases of 
growth (creativity, direction, delegation, co-ordination and collaboration) that are 
punctuated by explicitly defined crises that include issues of leadership, control, red 
tape and other managerial problems. For the enterprise to make the transition to the 
next phase, Greiner argues that obtaining additional resources - financial, expertise, 
control systems, for example - will challenge autonomy and control of the 
entrepreneur. The main point of Greiner's approach is that it is unlikely that the 
entrepreneur or creator will have the necessary resources or skills to develop the 
enterprise through the later phases of growth. Greiner believes that enterprise growth 
occurs as a result of the response to these crises. 
Kroeger (1974) suggests, similar to Greiner, that as the enterprise grows, its founders 
are forced to perform roles that may be beyond their abilities and require additional 
resource acquisition. However, Kroeger's model provides the notion that not all 
enterprises will willingly grow. He suggests that as the enterprise is faced with 
growth challenges, the entrepreneur or founder might make the decision to remain at 
the current position, take steps to grow the enterprise or exit the business. Kroeger 
believes that if enterprises perform satisfactory at each phase they will progress to 
the next phase of the model. 
Mount et al (1993) place more emphasis on external factors and the organisational 
complexity that occurs as the enterprise grows that places an increased demand on 
managerial and financial resources. Growth, or the transition to the next phase, they 
suggest, is a response to a combination of both internal forces that include the goals 
of management, and environmental forces such as industry turbulence, competition 
or technological change. Increasing organisational complexity and possible 
enterprise instability makes it susceptible to internal operational crises in addition to 
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formidable competitors. Mount et al conclude that enterprise growth will occur 
through creativity, direction, delegation, co-ordination and collaboration respectively 
provided by the entrepreneur or management team. 
Growth models tend to focus on the internal environment within the enterprise, with 
the notable exception of Mount et al (1993) who stress the importance of continual 
assessment of the operating environment and the enterprise's position. Mount et al 
also acknowledge barriers to success such as financing, lack of resources, 
unwillingness to delegate or share responsibility and unfavourable econormc 
conditions. 
Day (1997) argues that enterprise success is not merely a reflection of the appropriate 
internal management of the enterprise but is related to the influence of external 
factors and the firm's ability to react. Day suggests key external factors that include 
sources of funding, the macroeconomic environment, political environment, market 
competition, firm location and the possibility of boom and bust. 
The type of financial structure is identified as a key variable in enterprise start-up 
and growth that challenges the sequential stages of growth models. Shulman (1997) 
argues that venture capital will often have implications in how the business is 
managed. Venture capitalists often invest their financial and managerial expertise as 
well as their capital to ensure required returns will be realised. Davis and Stetson 
(1984) found that new ventures receiving venture capital funding had significantly 
higher rates of success than those ventures that received funding from other sources. 
The difference was attributed to the industry expertise and managerial competency 
that venture capitalists brought to fledgling companies. 
At the same time, Sapienza and Timmons (1989: 74) suggest that management 
know-how and competencies are key to company establishment and that new 
management skills are necessary as shifting and new objectives occur during the 
evolution of the company. They state that "effective company building is much more 
than just a matter of providing money to fund research for a new innovation or to 
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pounce on a new opportunity". They further suggest that lack of the necessary 
management skills and networks at critical times in the company's life cycle is a key 
factor in limiting the rate at which the company grows. 
Determination of a market entry strategy is a considerable challenge for new 
enterprises, according to Bygrave (1997:61), as entrepreneurs must identify where a 
new product will fit into the market, as this will dictate how to enter the market. 
B ygrave states, "what it takes to start a company around a new product or service 
includes, most importantly, the discovery of an intersection between the market for 
that product or service and a way to create one". He stresses that, given limited 
resources and competitive strengths, the innovator or entrepreneur must focus on 
customers most likely to buy the innovation first and establish an early cash flow for 
the company. 
Indeed, Bhide (1994) argues that a low risk entry strategy for the entrepreneur 
includes a venture with low capital requirements, high margins for errors, simple 
operations and low fixed costs, significant payoffs, low exit rates and option to cash 
in by selling all or part of the equity. Intellectual property is also acknowledged as a 
key asset from which to form a new enterprise, as the right to such property is a 
powerful barrier to entry. 
3.4. SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 
Entrepreneurial actions and the creation of enterprise, it is suggested, cannot be 
interpreted without understanding entrepreneurial motivations and action within a 
social context (Burt 1988; Parson 1990). lohannisson (1993) suggests that the 
enterprise should be viewed as an integration of individual variables along with 
independent variables (resources, capabilities and external environment) because 
entrepreneurial capabilities may only partially reflect components of the 
entrepreneurial process involved in an emerging enterprise. 
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Social theories forward that certain variables of entrepreneurial behavior and 
activities affecting economic development are not accounted for in neo-classical 
economics (Burt 1988; Collins 1990; Parker and Stead 1991; Bowles 1998). In an 
attempt to address the economic significance of the entrepreneurial role, sociological 
theorists argue that individual and social-structural variables provide part of the 
explanation to the residual part of the aggregate production not explained by rates of 
growth of inputs2 (Samuelson 1983; Zafirovski 1999). 
Sociological theory takes the position that entrepreneurial actions, in the same way as 
behaviour, involve processes that are intertwined with structures of social relations. 
The social structure of the market contains networks of individuals and institutions 
that result in entrepreneurship being affected by 'institutionalised motivation' and 
subject to institutional variation. These include historically specific systems of 
meanings and other cultural patterns and broad social and political factors that can 
influence actions (Zelizer 1996). 
Max Weber's contributions to entrepreneurship include societal attitudes to the role 
of the entrepreneur, particularly attitudes toward moneymaking and commerce. 
Weber argues that once a society's attitude towards entrepreneurship becomes 
positive, the 'vocation to make money' is set free (Weber 1968). 
In line with Weber's work, Lipset (1990) argues that societal values characterised by 
various social institutions deeply affect entrepreneurship and the level of economic 
development. Lipset stresses that social structure conditions make economic 
development possible, and poses the question of whether one is involved in a 
network of social relations that sustain or negate a particular activity. In comparing 
two socially different regions - Latin America with North America - Lipset found 
that success based on fortune in business, an emphasis on science and engineering 
education and values that emphasise work and moneymaking in North America 
contrast Latin American success based on landed property, an emphasis on humanist 
2 Other variables, such as investment-specific technological change and 'imponderables' such as fortune or misfortune. 
punctuality or error. aggressiveness or indolence, among others (Zafirovski 1999) are seen to account for residual production 
growth. 
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education and values that downgrade manual labour as well as commerce and 
industry. 
At the same time, social theory does not negate the importance of the singular 
entrepreneur. Starr and MacMillan (1991) found that variations in entrepreneurial 
emotions and social values affect behaviour and consequently result in different 
outcomes to entrepreneurial activities. They suggest that individual initiative of the 
entrepreneur is a critical force in the economy as a whole; therefore, understanding 
the characteristics and behaviour of the individuals taking initiatives is necessary. 
Entrepreneurial success has been identified with entrepreneurs that have 
simultaneous involvement in a number of ventures and sequential or habitual 
entrepreneurs founding a number of businesses over time (MacMillan and Katz 
1992; Birley and Westhead 1990). Literature on knowledge transfer from previous 
employment shows that the new enterprise often serves the same market or uses the 
same technology as the organisations that the entrepreneur left (Cooper, 1985; 
Freeman 1982). 
Iohannisson (2000) argues that even entrepreneurs who can intellectually grasp 
opportunities have to restrict their field of action because of limited resources and 
time to nurture a personal network that can provide additional resources being 
sought. Iohannisson suggests that an 'organising context' is required by the 
entrepreneur to cope with ambiguity. This organising context can be used to launch 
new enterprises according to opportunity and to demobilise resources tied to obsolete 
ventures and to reallocate them to new emerging ventures. This organising context 
provides the functions required for successful venturing; creating legitimacy, 
resourcing inputs, and business intelligence. The organising context created by the 
entrepreneur is in contrast to the concept of the 'task' environment, in which the 
entrepreneur exercises little control. 
69 
3.5 EXTERNAL FACTORS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Opportunities for innovation and entrepreneurship, according to neo-classical theory, 
are affected by 'push,3 and pull' factors4 (Karlsson et al 1993). Low entry barriers to 
a particular industry sector are seen to attract an increased supply of entrepreneurs 
and enterprises, and the presence of a large number of small enterprises in an 
industry may be a priori evidence that barriers to entry are low and/or that the 
optimum size of enterprise is small (Foreman-Peck 1985). Westhead (1991) found 
that low entry barriers attract imitative rather than innovative entrepreneurs. 
Casson (1998) argues that conditions in the marketplace influence opportunities for 
market entry, how the enterprise is formed and its speed of development with each 
industry sector influencing considerable heterogeneity in how enterprises' develop. 
He asserts that enterprises also pursue independent paths as a result of different 
entrepreneurs forming different judgements about price, quality, output, investment 
based on dispersed sources of information. 
The ability of entrepreneurs to acquire and manage resources in growth transitions is 
moderated by the type of industry and relative strength of industry characteristics 
such as growth rate, competitiveness and technological development (e.g. Eisenhardt 
and Schoonhoven, 1990; Dean et ai, 1998). Research by Robinson and McDougall 
(1998) found industry characteristics, such as industry life cycle, industry 
concentration and product differentiation, all produced quite different influences on 
growth of a sample of 'high-potential' manufacturing ventures. 
3 Push Jactors involve creating a new market by introducing a new product. Audretsch (1993) found that in traditional 
industries, such as manufacturing, there is little support for the push thesis, arguing that new opportunities are related to 
conventional economic theory, with market entry in response to an increase in anticipated profitability. 
4 Pull/actors reflect the increased demand for new goods and services and characterise favourable market conditions and post-
entry profitability (Foreman-Peck 1985; Karlsson et al 1993). Pull opportunities are also influenced income or wealth of 
customers, the location of the enterprise, the size of the market, the tax system and exit rate of enterprises in that industry or 
sector (Binks and Coyne 1983; Foreman-Peck 1985). Karlsson et al (1993) suggest that the availability of local resources and 
managerial skills affect the ability to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities, and note that the creation of subsidiaries from large 
firms or the spinning-out of new firms from existing firms is an indication that favourable market conditions exist. 
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Problems of resource management are identified from contributions to resource-
based theory from the life-cycle model of enterprise growth that suggests that 
enterprises, like biological organisms, grow over time, increasing in size and 
complexity (Aldrich, 1990). In this model, the enterprise is able to grow with 
existing resources until the next stage of growth requires more resources, with 
ongoing enterprise restructuring often necessary during periods of rapid growth. 
Hannan and Freeman (1984) add that market factors that are subject to unpredictable 
and continuous change can create constraints in some resources and slack in others. 
Penrose (1959) claims that ever-changing conditions make configuration of resources 
for long-term gain especially difficult for entrepreneurs. One problem is the growing 
value and stock of resources that must be managed. The size, complexity and value 
of the resource bundle growing over time, where value is measured by the ability of 
the resources to generate economic rents. 
Determining the style and management structure best suited to the environment is 
seen as a key challenge for the new enterprise. Birley (1990) states that the growth 
and development of entrepreneurial companies can be viewed in terms of how 
quickly entrepreneur, management, organisation and ownership can adapt and learn 
from the experiences in the combination of internal and external environments. 
Birley notes that management is responsible for recognising the need for change, and 
as the capability of the enterprise changes, necessary resources will be often be 
required from outside the enterprise. 
Birley and Stockley (2000) argue that managmg growth and complexity can be 
understood by operational research that includes 'Ashby's law' of requisite variety. 
This law forwards that the variety (complexity) faced by an organisation or system 
can only be controlled by a system (e.g. management) of at least equivalent variety. 
Birley and Stockley suggest that greater complexity inherent in a high growth 
enterprise may be better managed by an entrepreneurial team. 
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The existing level of innovation in an industry has been found to affect new 
enterprise fonnation with opportunities for fonnation high in industry sectors where 
small-finn innovation is high relative to that of large finns (Acs and Audretsch 
1989). Similarly, research has established that where large-scale economies exist 
and where capital intensity and innovation rates are greatest, new enterprise 
fonnation will be relatively less frequent (Audretsch 1993). 
Audretsch (1995b) has found that industry-specific factors determined more variety 
in survival rates across sectors than in entry rates, suggesting that the ability of a 
venture to maintain competitive advantage is a greater challenge than recognising the 
profit opportunity in the first place. Audretsch points out the lack of consideration 
for the effects of rates of innovation, economies of scale and start-up size on survival 
rates across different business sectors. Audretsch argues that survival rates are lower 
in those industries characterised by a high level of minimum efficient scale (MES) 
and innovation. In such industries, Audretsch found that those finns that succeeded 
in surviving gained the MES or ability to innovate as required by the market and 
therefore showed high rates of growth. 
In each industry sector, Audretsch (1995b) points out that 'business shakeouts' can 
occur either through an oversupply of enterprises providing the same product or a 
change in MES. In economic down-turns as an example, enterprises would want to 
reconsider any growth strategy and attempt to reduce costs to survive. Another 
factor could be deregulation that provides the opportunity for growth by buying out 
competitors or fonning alliances or joint ventures. 
Government statistics lend support to Audretsch's business shakeout theory, showing 
the pattern of failure rates of businesses that have survived the start-up process itself. 
According to the UK's Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), approximately 90 
percent of all start-up businesses survive their first year, but less than two thirds 
make it past their third year based on 1998 data. In the US, the federal government's 
Small Business Data Base estimates that 60% of start-ups fail in the first six years 
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and over 70% in the first eight years. As well, it suggested that most of the start-ups 
that survive remain small (Storey 1994; Bhide 2000). 
3.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has identified the importance of entrepreneurship as a process in the 
exploitation of previously unidentified market opportunities and the introduction of 
new innovations into the market. Key elements of entrepreneurship are suggested -
searching and identifying market opportunities, co-ordination of resources and 
acceptance of risk. Schumpeter's description of the entrepreneur is as 'market 
innovator' in the creation of new markets and the disruption of existing ones by 
doing things different. 
Successful exploitation of market opportunities is credited to the superior judgement 
of entrepreneurs or others involved in risk sharing. Literature suggests that 
'collective entrepreneurship' allows for the sharing of exploitation risk and 
acknowledges the diversity of exploitation requirements that distinguishes between 
the role of the entrepreneur and manager. 
Neo-classical theories suggest that exploitation of market opportunities IS most 
economical through the creation of the firm or enterprise. Growth models, based on 
the product life-cycle concept, suggest that as an enterprise exploits profit 
opportunities and grows, there is a need for transition from one phase to another. In 
general terms, five phases are suggested: start-up, development, growth, maturity and 
decline. Growth models suggest that changing management needs are required 
through different phases. The addition of specialist resources as the enterprise 
increases in size, complexity and experiences competitive pressures are seen to 
challenge the early-stage skills of the entrepreneur in the requirement for more 
formal professional skills and management. 
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Similar to the previous chapter on innovation development and exploitation, this 
chapter emphasises the need to consider entrepreneurship within a socio-economic 
framework. Economic arguments emphasise the market conditions, industry 
lifecycles, and scale economies as key factors determining the potential success of 
new enterprises. Social theories emphasise broader social and political factors, 
societal attitudes to entrepreneurship and market structures that influence interactions 
among individuals and institutions in creating and supporting entrepreneurial activity 
and enterprise creation. 
Implications from this literature to the research intent of the thesis identify first of all 
the importance of entrepreneurial capabilities - traits, knowledge and actions - in 
identifying market opportunities or introducing innovations into the market. This 
suggests the need to incorporate and account for entrepreneurial activity in the 
exploitation process that will most likely be distinct from technical or public 
supportive agents and more evident in the case of exploiting the innovation through 
the creation of a new enterprise. 
Second, in identifying the enterprise as an exploitation mechanism that evolves 
through various growth stages, collective actions can be identified by examining the 
interactions between the enterprise as unit of analysis and the regional socio-
economic context that directly interacts in support of the enterprise over time. 
Indeed, for the purposes of the thesis, this socio-economic context will be delineated 
as the regional support network whereby support agents can be identified and their 
activities examined as they relate to supporting these enterprises attempting to 
exploit technology-based innovations. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NETWORKS: THEORIES AND PERSPECTIVES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins with theories, definitions, characteristics and dimensions of 
networks and discusses the importance of networks for entrepreneurs and new 
enterprises. The chapter looks at network processes that lead to interactions and 
exchange of tangible resources and capabilities, such as knowledge, investment and 
human resources and intangibles such as trust, relationships and learning that are 
critical formative elements of the new enterprise. 
The chapter then discusses the role of network intermediation, research on networks 
and suggested methodological difficulties in network evaluation. 
4.2 DEFINITIONS 
Multiple definitions have arisen to accommodate various types of networks and their 
characteristics, dimensions and functions. At one level, networks are defined 
according to actors and their interactions with one another. For example, an 
innovation network is defined as a loose-knit group of knowledge intensive firms and 
other organisations that contribute to the development of new products and services 
(Blundall and Smith 2001). A business network is described as 'an integrated and 
co-ordinated set of ongoing economic and non-economic relations embedded within, 
among and outside business firms' (Yeung 1994: 476). 
Ebers (1997) on the other hand, suggests that all networks are characterised by 
recurring exchange relationships among a limited number of organisations that retain 
residual control of their individual resources yet periodically jointly decide over their 
use. 
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The economic sociologist Granovetter (1973, 1985, 1995) argues that social 
networks are a key determinant of economic action, which he defines as action that is 
oriented toward the allocation of scarce resources to alternative uses. Granovetter's 
premise is that economic agents are embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social 
relations, and these relations facilitate and constrain agent's profits and rent seeking 
activities. He suggests that an economic agent is affected by the level of social 
capital available, defining social capital as the relationships and assets available in 
the network and characterised by structural and relational 'embeddedness' 
dimensions that will be discussed later in the chapter. 
Theories of social capital (Granovetter 1995; Burt 1992) argue that people invest in 
social opportunities from which they expect to gain or profit. Williamson (1985) 
suggests social investment is considered in terms of transaction cost economics 
where social activities are motivated by entrepreneurs and enterprises attempting to 
minimise communication, information search and other costs associated with seeking 
resources, capabilities and customers. On the other hand, Zajac and Olsen (1993: 
137) argue that transactions involve a 'joint value maximisation principle' whereby 
the focus is on exchange partners and the emphasis on collective value. 
Best (1990) suggests that networks are preferable to markets because they involve 
more social contact and encourage information to be shared, they are more co-
operative and less competitive and they reinforce the sense of mutual obligation on 
which society depends. 
Of particular interest for this thesis are perspectives discussing individual and 
organisational interdependencies in supporting technology exploitation and 
enterprise creation that draw on theories and perspective that describe the social 
structures of networks and social processes within these networks. 
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4.2.1 Entrepreneurial Networks 
Entrepreneurial network theory suggests that social relationships influence the 
entrepreneur's ability to acquire resources and that these resources playa key role in 
founding new enterprises (e.g. Birley 1985; Starr and Macmillan 1990; Dubini and 
Aldrich 1991; Butler and Hansen 1991; Larson and Starr 1993; Birley and Stockley 
2000; lohannisson 2000). These resources include financial, human and social 
capital. 
Entrepreneurial network theory also identifies the importance of the networking 
function, and Figure 4.1 shows lohannisson' s interpretation of the functions of 
entrepreneurial networking and the potential effects on the entrepreneur and the 
enterprise. lohannisson describes the creation of a new enterprise by an entrepreneur 
as the "institutionalisation of a part of the entrepreneur's personal network into a 
venture, subsequently confirmed as a legal construct" (Johannisson (2000:373). The 
entrepreneur uses their network as a generic tool for attracting financial, human and 
social capital into the new enterprise. 
Figure 4.1: Functions of Entrepreneurial Networking 











Figure 4.1 identifies the relationship between entrepreneurial activities and their 
effects on the enterprise. lohannisson describes the entrepreneur as the main actor 
that brings the resources from different actors and institutions together with per onal 
financial resources, their personal skills, and their social resources. 
77 
Figure 4.1 refers to 'entrepreneurial abilities' that differentiate entrepreneurs in how 
they identify, cultivate and manage a network partnership, their willingness to attract 
and recruit people who know the industry, and the commercial outcomes of these 
efforts (e.g Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Starr and MacMillan 1990; Vesper 1990; 
Sharman et al 1991; Cooper and Folta 2000). Legitimacy is seen as a necessary 
hurdle for a new enterprise to overcome in order to access resources and assets from 
others and networks can contribute positively to gaining legitimacy and to 
developing a desirable marketplace reputation. 
The abilities of the entrepreneur as a 'networker' has been studied through the 
processes used by entrepreneurs in creating and managing a network (e.g. Birley 
1985; Aldrich and Zimmer 1986; Aldrich et al 1987; Venkataraman 1989; Dubini 
and Aldrich 1991; Larson 1991; Larson and Starr 1993). Entrepreneurs identify 
product or service ideas, access to markets, information, cash and other resources in 
their environments, and they gain access to these resources through exchange 
transactions with various members of their social networks. This process has been 
called resource co-optation through social contracting (Starr and MacMillan, 1990). 
Entrepreneurial behaviours and actions are also described in the context of processes 
and structures of different networks that are being engaged (e.g. 10hannisson (1995; 
Moensted 1995). 10hannisson (2000) identifies three types of networks that are 
interdependent: 1) information networks that provide business intelligence such as 
business opportunities and information; 2) exchange networks that provide 
entrepreneur and enterprise with needed resources; and 3) networks of influence that 
create legitimacy for bounded activities and barriers for potential competitors. 
10hannisson argues that the three networks are difficult to separate within the 
personal network of entrepreneurs. 
Monsted (1993) distinguishes between three types of networks, with each serving a 
different function for the entrepreneur: 1) networks for service and assistance; 2) 
networks for information and structuring, particularly for knowledge about whom to 
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contact for a specific purpose; and 3) networks for entrepreneurship and product 
development. 
Sanberg and Logan (1998) suggest that an entrepreneur's network really comprises 
multiple networks as they are defined by the resources each network provides. They 
further argue that the entrepreneur who fails to make this distinction, directing 
energies toward developing an undifferentiated network, is less likely to acquire 
critical resources than is one who targets their most effective sources. One question 
they propose is not whether networks are required for co-ordination, but under what 
conditions they work best. 
The personal network of the entrepreneur is identified as a main resource for creating 
new enterprises with personal networks encompassing both business and social 
relationships (Birley 1985; 10hannisson 1988, 1996; Larson 1991; Aldirch et ai, 
1989). Birley (1985) asserts that entrepreneurs in the early stages of enterprise 
formation rely heavily on an informal network of local social contacts that include 
family, friends and acquaintances. 
Birley et al (1991) postulate that in later stages, the entrepreneur relies on formal 
networks of professional service providers - accountants, financial intermediaries 
and lawyers - as well as government organisations that provide access to relevant 
business resources and information. However, their cross-sector research did not 
demonstrate that older enterprises relied more heavily on business contacts versus 
social contacts. 
4.2.2 Network Structures and Evolution 
Networks are also described as social structures that are defined according to various 
dimensions. Network size is defined as the number of direct ties involving individual 
units, and the term structural embeddedness is used in referring to the overall 
structure of network relations that includes number of individuals and the density of 
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social ties between these individuals. (Burt 1983). Studies suggest network size is 
positively related to a higher birth-rate of new companies and initial performance 
(Burt, 1992; Johannisson, 1986; Nohria, 1992). However, Reese and Aldrich (1995) 
found no evidence to support the effect of network size on enterprise survival. 
Aldrich et al (1987) found that network density was associated with new enterprise 
profitability, while network accessibility was positively correlated with enterprise 
founding. 
Mixed empirical research results on structural embeddedness and its effects on 
enterprise performance lead to perspectives focused on social networks and their 
effect on the processes of founding new enterprises. The more appropriate measure 
of a network may be the size of the 'subset of people' who are somehow involved 
with the entrepreneurs in founding the new organisations. 
Sub-sets of people have been described as action sets that are characterised by the 
shared intentionality of those involved in founding a new enterprise (Katz & Gartner 
1988). Thus, when entrepreneurs decide to act in order to achieve the goal of 
founding a new organisation; and they activate an appropriate subset of their total 
network (and each activated member in tum activates his or her own appropriate 
subset, and so on, until the goal is either achieved or abandoned); the group of people 
involved in attaining the goal is called an entrepreneurial action set. Katz and 
Gartner (1988) and Hansen and Wortman (1989) have called these groups pre-
organisations. The entrepreneurial network literature generally associates their size 
with initial new organisation performance. 
Another network dimension - relational embeddness - refers to the extent to which 
economic actions are affected by the quality of actors' personal relations 
(Granovetter 1995). In contrast to structural embeddness, Granovetter suggests that 
relational embeddedness have more direct effects on economic actions and outcomes. 
Personal relations have been described as a set of nodes linked via a set of concrete 
personal relationships of a specified type (e.g., friendship, overlapping membership) 
that can influence the efficiency of economic actions. 
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Most network stakeholders will bring to the network a history of business transaction 
relationships and associated expectations with regard to future business transactions, 
referred to by Berger et al (1995) as ' temporal embeddedness'. As individual or 
institutional interests are presented and the potential for mutual exchange explored, 
stakeholders cannot help but consider the costs and benefits of exchange. The logic 
of collective benefits does not preclude those motivated by self-interest who do not 
invest resources in mutual gain. The free rider phenomenon may occur from a 
conscious decision not to contribute or the lack of resources to exchange (Olson 
1965). 
The importance of strong ties between those seeking resources and those providing 
resources is noted by Burt (1992: 272), who states "a person with a poorly 
structured network that includes just one well-placed contact can do well through 
that contact's sponsorship regardless of how well the person's network as a whole is 
structured". According to Uzzi (1997) strong ties within the network can enhance 
enterprise performance directly through trust building, information transfer and joint 
problem solving arrangements. A related concept is 'cognitive legitimacy' that 
allows the actor, in creating solid partnerships, to overcome legitimacy barriers 
(Aldrich and Fiol 1994). 
At the same time, weak ties are seen to also enhance enterprise performance, 
according to Burt (1992), who suggests the vaguely defined network relationships 
provide the freedom for entrepreneurs to act upon opportunities without being bound 
by obligations and expectations. Similarly, Granovetter (1985) suggests that 
information obtained from weak ties is more likely to be unique and less likely to be 
redundant. This diversity of infonnation from weak ties is used to explain the 
introduction of innovations into organisations. 
The economIC argument for networks identifies resource embeddedness as a 
dimension of social capital, with the network as a 'mechanism' to leverage resources 
from their owners. Casson (1997) suggests that economic rationalisation leads to the 
notion of the cost and benefit of network engagement and exchange that will be 
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affected by the resource needs of the entrepreneur and enterprise at a given point in 
time. 
10hannisson (1996) suggests that both calculated and social interest and a blending of 
commitments in individual network ties creates ongoing exchange within the 
network and a level of 'social embeddedness' (Granovetter 1985) that creates the 
energy that drives the network processes. 10hannisson suggests that the integration 
of social and business issues create individual ties between network participants that 
are unique; therefore, any addition or departure of individuals creates change in the 
network. Likewise, Walker (1998) suggests that ongoing entry and exit of network 
actors ensures that the evolution of the network does not follow a predictable path. 
The outcome of repeated interactions that over time and emerge into a complex tie 
leads to the concept of network evolution (lohannisson 2000). Network interactions 
will evolve not only through changes to members, but also due to both market 
changes and internal changes to each venture, thus contributing to technological 
development and innovation (Hakansson 1987). 
One model of entrepreneurial network evolution, by Larson and Starr (1992), 
suggests that network relationships evolve from simple single-dimensional personal 
exchanges to multi-layered inter-organisational relationships. This evolution of 
exchange, beginning from the personalised relationships of the entrepreneur, is seen 
to lead to the successful mobilisation of critical resources for the enterprise. A key 
assertion by Larson and Starr is the relationship between the network exchange, or 
'crystallisation of relationships', and the level of successful mobilisation of 
resources, such as the revenues that are realised via the network. 
Figure 4.2 shows another model of network evolution proposed by Butler and 
Hansen (1991:3) comprised of three stages: the entrepreneurial phase, the business 
start-up phase, and the ongoing business phase. 
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Figure 4.2: Model of Entrepreneurial Network Evolution 
(B utler and Hansen 1991: 3) 
Entrepreneurial 













Linking Enterprise to 
Others 
The model stresses the importance of informal social contact as a starting point to 
knowledge acquisition for the entrepreneur. Initial contacts from social networks 
evolve into business-focused networks, and then into strategic networks, which allow 
firms to innovate and to thrive by their links to other organisations (also Falemo 
1989; Dubini and Aldrich 1991; Aldrich and Zimmer 1986). 
The first phase of the Butler and Hansen model focuses on the entrepreneur's social 
network that provides an 'opportunity set' from which the entrepreneur can draw 
intangible and tangible resources. The second phase of start-up sees the network 
activities of the entrepreneur become more focused on those that serve the more 
immediate requirements of the new enterprise, although the entrepreneur maintains 
the social ties within the network. The third phase of network evolution is the 
strategic network that emphasises the active role of the entrepreneur in choosing 
network exchange according to the value of its contribution to the success of the 
enterprise. 
Hakansson and Snehota (1995: 271-77) view the network itself as a 'continuously 
organising process' that includes both continuous and evolutionary change. They 
argue that a network of business relationships is never stable and thus a business 
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network will possess inherently dynamic features. Specifically, they argue that it is 
the links, ties and bonds between network actors, developed in one relationship and 
connected to others, that provide the sources as well as effects of change. They 
further suggest that although networks may become more elaborately connected and 
more tightly structured over time, this is likely to slow down as incremental 
adaptations move the interaction towards a steady state. 
Literature describes certain factors affecting interaction and exchange over time. 
Garnsey (1998) views evolutionary network development as being influenced by the 
nature of the entrepreneur's social skills and motivation to seek out pre-selected 
business contact, among other factors. Garnsey suggests that successful mobilisation 
of critical resources through network contacts further allows the entrepreneur access 
to new resources and to establish new network ties that contribute to further growth 
of the enterprise. Falemo (1989) suggests that once enterprise formation and start-up 
are complete, the needs of the enterprise become more complex, required different 
types of networks. 
lohannisson (2000) suggests the importance of proximity to initiate and build 
personal ties is required for networks to be successful. He argues that the freedom of 
interaction, reflected in a lateral network structure that crosses over any formal 
structural predispositions brought into the network, is critical to entrepreneurial 
venturing. He adds that this is because the need for independence is a primary 
motive for business start-ups. 
Granovetter (1985) argues that trade relations become less personalised and 
embedded in evolving social relations the greater the geographical, social and 
cultural distance between the traders. Research by Bramanti and Ratti (1997) have 
found that short distance favour information contacts and exchange among economic 
actors and increase the opportunity to meet and consult, which is considered crucial 
in the early stage enterprise. 
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Proximal social networks are seen as collective repertories of prior experiences that 
provide learning and advice on the competencies of successful businesses to those 
seeking to operate a successful new venture (Vesper 1990; 10hannisson 1995). 
Previous entrepreneurs share business knowledge that includes business operations, 
regulations, taxes, accounting, suppliers, customers, and marketing and distribution. 
However, Hausmann (1996) argues that proximity in a physical sense is less limiting 
on inter-organisational linkages with the advent of modem modes of communication 
such as e-mail, mobile communication and facsimile. 
Lundvall (1992) suggests the importance of both proximity and time for networking 
success: proximity favours information contacts and exchange among actors and 
time favours long-term exchange and the creation of trust and shared understanding. 
4.2.3 Network Management and Intermediation 
Literature identifies an intermediary and management dimension to networks. Burt 
(1987) suggests the role of 'mediator' that can be taken up by those who will charge 
to facilitate exchange of resources between different groups within a network. This 
role is available because of the fact that innovators often provide inducements to 
obtain the desired support and contribution from others that include offers of 
financial incentives, resources, information, policy promises, learning experience 
and personal development (Kanter 1980; Pfeffer 1981). 
Similarly, Casson (1997) argues that transactional econOffilCS accommodates an 
'intermediary or co-ordinating role' that reduces the overall cost of managing the 
network for the participants. He suggests that intermediation between organisations 
that would not otherwise interact at a certain level and the facilitation of information 
flows legitimises a cost to participants. 
Steier and Greenwood (2000) identify a considerable challenge in organising and 
managing a network that is comprised of various actors, roles, expectations and 
perceptions. Gelsing and Nielsen (1996) note that the main reason why external 
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efforts to build networks often fail is because value-adding assets or capabilities are 
absent among external network builders. Pihkala et al (1999) found that value-
adding is crucial in a dynamic network, and that membership in a network is 
contingent on the value to other partners. Larson (1991) suggests that building a 
web of shared understanding, trust and pursuit of common goals is identified as a 
general objective of network intermediation and a general characteristics of 
successful networks. 
4.2.4 Research and Evaluation of Networks 
Various gaps in understanding entrepreneurial networks are suggested. Monge and 
Contractor (2000) suggest that literature on networks have focused primarily on the 
exchange and dependency relations within or between existing organisations or on 
structural characteristics such as network size, density and strength of ties. 
Rangan (2000) argues that although evidence supports the view that social networks 
influence economic action, researchers need to sketch more clearly when and why, 
even when economic objectives dominate non-economic ones, networks really 
matter. Chu (1996: 358) suggests a more general observation that the use of 
networks to explaining entrepreneurship has been 'limited'. 
Particular difficulties are identified in evaluating how networks make a difference to 
companies (Curran and Blackburn 1994; lohannisson 1995). Gulati et al (2000:199) 
state: "though we have many answers to the question: 'why do alliance and networks 
exist?' we have fewer answers to the question: 'Do alliances and networks really 
matter when it comes to firm performance? '" 
One problem is the conflicting nature of evidence regarding a causal relationship 
between networking and enterprise performance. Some studies have identified that 
features such as scope of the network and time invested by the enterprise do not 
increase venture pelformance (Johannisson, 1996; Reese and Aldrich 1995). Hansen 
(1995), on the other hand, found that first-year growth of new ventures was strongly 
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related to personal-network properties, such as interconnectivity and size, while 
Brown and Butler (1995) found that networking with competitors rather than 
upstream and down-stream business partners fosters finn growth. 
Attribution of network support effects to new enterprises IS made difficult by 
multiple factors explaining enterprise growth - that include random factors and those 
uncontrolled by the enterprise (chance, timing, macro-economic change, sectoral 
conditions) as well as various systematic factors such as capital investment, 
entrepreneurial skills and motivations, location, etc (e.g Birley and Westhead, 1990; 
Westhead et al., 1993; Storey 1994). 
Reynolds and White (1997) suggest that few researchers actually study enterprises 
going through the start-up process, since most research studies successful new 
ventures already founded. Similarly, Autio (2000) identifies a lack of research on 
technology-based new enterprises, the "spin-off stream" in their fonnation and 
growth phases. 
Another identified research challenge is the context of entrepreneurial learning and 
knowledge accumulation as a collective for the enterprise that is not easily traced as 
deriving exclusively from any specific network. Sanberg and Logan (1998) identify 
the challenge of isolating attribution effects in describing an entrepreneur's 
"network" as multiple networks defined by the resources each network provides. 
Barnett (1995) suggest that, with the emergence of virtual enterprises, the network 
itself is the primary actor, and member identity, whether enterprise or individual, 
dissolves. Sedaitis (1997: 142) claims that "the founding network reproduces itself 
in the organisation it creates, facilitating a different type of organisational structure 
. and strategy". 
Literature describes methodological difficulties in taking the network itself as unit of 
analysis. These include the social or infonnal character of many networks 
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(Johannisson 2000) and difficulties in tracking how the network facilitates the ability 
of new firms to assemble resources and capabilities (Malecki 1997). 
Grandori and Soda (1995:184) find that the understanding of the initial stages of 
network development is particularly lacking, despite their assertion that networks are 
at the core of organisation theory. Although models of entrepreneurial network 
evolution describe potential stages of network growth and characteristics, there is 
little information on how networks are enacted and formed and for what purpose. 
It is argued that most empirical studies on entrepreneurial networks are retrospecti ve 
in design and establish the network at one place in time, while networks are 
identified as dynamic entities, transforming through constant change to exchange 
relationships among actors (Butler and Hansen's 1991). Gibb and Davies (1991) 
suggest evidence is lacking as to how network evolution impacts business growth 
and their processes in gradually accumulating capabilities and resources. Other 
research identifies the need for longer research time horizons to capture network 
effects on actors that will not be immediately identifiable (Segal et al 1985; 
Smallbone and North 1996. 
The need for methodological improvements to evaluate networks is suggested by 
Tichey et al (1979:507): [the network] model of organising, if it is to move beyond 
the metaphorical stage, requires a coherent framework and accompanying methods 
of analysis that are capable of capturing both prescribed and emergent processes". 
4.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter has identified networks as social structures distinguished by their 
membership of actors, exchange relationships, purpose, level of formality and 
organisational structure, among other features. Entrepreneurial networks are 
described as an important social mechanism for gaining access to local resources and 
capabilities that is particularly for early enterprise formation. Literature suggests that 
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networks evolve over time not only through changes to members, but also due to 
market changes and resultant effects on network actors that can facilitate ongoing 
technological development and innovation that in tum feeds back into the network. 
Evolutionary models of networks suggest that networks build up over time through 
activity links, actor bonds and social and business exchange. 
The unit of analysis for network research can be the enterprise or the network itself, 
although research appears underdeveloped in accounting for the impact or value of 
networks on the resource acquisition processes of new enterprises. Research 
difficulties include the primarily social or informal character of many networks and 
difficulties in tracking how local supportive mechanisms allow new firms to 
assemble resources and capabilities. A further difficulty is tracking the interaction 
activities between network actors and the social processes leading to value exchange. 
Literature suggests considerable challenges in orgamsIng and managIng vanous 
network actors, roles, expectations and perceptions, although the management 
dimension of networks or network intermediation is described in the literature as an 
important role. Few studies are identified in the literature that have examined the 
management of regional networks and the intermediation of resources and 
capabilities that facilitate network membership, social engagement and business 
exchange. 
Implications from this literature to the research intent of the thesis identify first of all 
the relevance of networks as a social structure for organising the collective 
capabilities and resources for innovation exploitation and for facilitating the creation 
and development of new enterprises. Second, the characteristics of a regional 
support network - its structure, function, evolution and ultimately its benefits - is 
expected to be strongly associated with the interactions and activities of technical 
and entrepreneurial actors and supportive institutions sharing network affiliation and 
motivated by a common goal of successful commercial gain. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE TECHNOLOGY-BASED ENTERPRISE, TECHNOLOGY 
REGIONS AND NETWORKS 
"Networking leads to two phenomenon. One is the necessity for physical proximity 
because no technology, not even the internet, has yet to supplant the importance of 
face-to-face contact on a regular and routine basis. The other is the speed at which 
business is conducted. Silicon Valley is a ferment not just of start-up companies, 
which attract the most attention, but of mergers and acquisitions, tactical and 
strategic alliances, continuously evolving business plans, venture capital financing, 
public offerings and product roll-out - all operating at a pace many times Jaster than 
conventional industry. " 
David Rosenberg, "Cloning Silicon Valley (2002: 3) 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter narrows the focus from previous chapters to discuss technology-based 
enterprises, the regional context from which they emerge and the relevance of 
networks to their creation, formation and growth. The chapter first discusses 
characteristics of technology enterprises that distinguish them from more 'traditional' 
firms and discusses the market dynamics that challenge commercialisation activities. 
This includes discussion on the 'spin-out' or start-up' enterprise commonly 
associated with academic entrepreneurship and factors contributing to university-
industry collaboration in exploiting technologies. 
The chapter then explores regional factors affecting technology entrepreneurship that 
incorporates a broad base of theories and perspectives, e.g. national and regional 
systems of innovation, clusters, knowledge transfer and network theory. Factors that 
characterise 'successful' technology regions such as Silicon Valley describe the 
elements and conditions that facilitate knowledge transfer through collaboration and 
networking. 
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5.2 TECHNOLOGY-BASED MARKETS AND ENTERPRISES 
This section describes characteristics of technology-based markets and enterprises 
that distinguish them from conventional markets. Already suggested in previous 
chapters are the dynamics of technology-based market sectors that are characterised 
by rapid changes that affect entrepreneurial processes such as opportunity 
identification, investment, market entry and profitability (Foreman-Peck 1985; Porter 
1998; Birkinshaw 2000). 
Dynamic market factors relate to Schumpeter's notion that innovation and 
entrepreneurship revolutionise the economic structure from within through the 
processes of creative destruction where old methods are replaced by new innovations 
as entrepreneurs seek new profit opportunities. Kirzner (1973) points out that high 
levels of change and uncertainty in the market provides disequilibrium conditions 
that will produce differences in entrepreneurial activities and profits because of 
differences in knowledge among entrepreneurs, their perception of the market 
opportunity and ultimately how the resources for exploitation are configured. 
Technological innovations in particular can dramatically affect change and alter the 
market and competitive landscape of industry sectors in the economy (Schumpeter 
1934, 1943; Usher 1955; Coombs et al 1987; Mokyr 1990; Giget 1997). Using a 
historical perspective of technical invention, Schmookler claims that the interplay of 
advancing knowledge opens up new inventive opportunities for exploitation and 
consequent unfolding of new economic needs and opportunities arising out of a 
changing social order. 
Schmookler's argument that the introduction and use of a new technology provides 
opportunities as well as challenges relates to Schumpeter's assertion that new 
innovations create changes within the economy beyond the good's immediate 
commercial application (Schumpeter 1928, 1934, 1949; Usher 1955; Schmookler 
1962). Schumpeter refers to this recurring change in terms of 'gales of creative 
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destruction' that are brought about through new resource combinations that 
characterise innovation. 
Schumpter's assertion that innovation and technical change are key to economic 
development and growth can be linked to enterprise growth theories in describing 
technological opportunities and threats. For existing enterprises, increased R&D 
spending and alliances, joint ventures and mergers are strategies for coping with 
change and avoiding the decline stages of growth. But larger enterprises may 
respond slowly, subject to strategic and organisational inertia, in addition to 
protecting existing product lines and past R&D investments. These conditions 
provide market opportunities for new enterpreneurial ventures (Dosi et alI994). 
Under such conditions of market uncertainty, innovation is seen as an interactive 
learning process (Asheim and Cooke 1999). This process is associated with a 
complex and continually changing array of both technological opportunities and 
threats and market opportunities and threats, linked to patterns of new product 
development, commercialisation and adoption/diffusion. 
Usher (1955) introduces the notion of 'technology diffusion' and states that the 
consequences of diffusion of a new technology throughout the economy presents a 
set of economic problems that include growth from technical change and limitations 
due to scarcity of resources. Deriving from Usher's notion of 'technology diffusion', 
changes in technology and diffusion of technology is seen to require existing 
industries and enterprises in the economy to seek out new appropriate technologies, 
which, in tum, increase technological diffusion (Bettis and Ritt 1995). 
The high technology market is defined by Westhead (1994) as a general category 
actually comprising a wide range of sectors such as electronics, software and 
biotechnology and asserts that each may be completely different in terms of business 
needs and requirements. Differences between high technology sectors exist 
according to differences in markets, according to Autio (2000) who suggests that 
assuming a single high technology sector runs the risk of relegating the market into a 
92 
passive role. Blakely and Nishikawa (1992) have found that each technology sector 
will have it own support systems, noting that communications or networks are 
critical in realisation of economic gains. 
In describing the high technology enterprise, Segal et al (1985) found a number of 
dimensions common to all enterprises across a variety of technology sectors in their 
study of the 'Cambridge Phenomenon'. These include how an enterprise copes with 
risk; how their financing needs are met, and how this changes over time; how their 
product mix changes; and how their marketing and management systems develop. 
They suggest that the combination of these characteristics present a whole set of 
basic management problems for high technology compared with conventional small 
enterprise. 
Segal et al observed that high technology enterprises reqUIre substantial start-up 
investment for the required set up costs. They found that larger, established 
enterprises often have enough resources to invest in marketing, research and 
development (R&D) of new products, thus reducing the competitiveness of new 
entrants. Other advantages over new entrants include market knowledge, networking 
with customers and suppliers and practical business management skills. Advantages 
such as branding, advertising, packaging and signage were found to be especially 
important differentiating requirements for many enterprises competing in a global 
marketplace. They also found that creating customer awareness and building 
customer loyalty could be difficult for a new entrant because of lack of resources. 
Technology-based enterprises are identified with focused strategies for successfully 
competing in dynamic markets (Maidique and Patch 1982). They include: 1) niche: 
firm specialises on servicing narrowly defined customer or application niches; 2) 
cost-minimisation: firm attempts to gain advantage through development of cost-
efficiencies; 3) first-mover: firm is the first to introduce a new product to market and 
exploit a temporary monopoly as first entrant; and 4) fast-follower: firm relies on 
rapid imitation of new innovations introduced by competitor(s). 
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Literature emphasizes the importance of difference factors that contribute to high 
levels of failure among high technology-based enterprises. Malecki (1997) found 
that a key factor is shortage of resources, including capital, information and skills 
while Oakey (1994) suggests that mobilization of resources for new product 
development is the central focus for constraints on the firm. 
Storey (1994) finds that the survival of any business is in part a function of the 
management's ability to secure and gain access to finance and working capital. 
Similarly, Haswell and Holmes (1989) found that managerial inadequacy, 
incompetence, inefficiency and inexperience were found to be consistent themes in 
failures. Poor management was connected with poor financial conditions, inadequate 
accounting records, limited access to necessary information, and lack of good 
managerial advice. Gadenne (1998) finds that specific managementlbusiness 
practices are related to return on investment and are unique to industry groups; value 
for money in retail, employee relations in service industry, and competitive 
advantage in manufacturing. 
Part of the problem for growing firms, Bhide (2000) suggests, is to distinguish 
between the entrepreneurial function and the managerial function. Whereas the 
entrepreneur conceives the initiation of the enterprise, this is not the same as running 
a successful growing business that requires different and specific management skills. 
He states that the entrepreneur then must either incorporate the required skills within 
the enterprise either personally or via recruitment. 
Powell (1998) states that collaboration with others may speed up the innovation 
process and allow the enterprise to gain access to the emerging industry. Similarly, 
Lipparini and Lorenzoni (1993) note the importance of product innovation and 
accumulation of knowledge as a primary reason for ongoing networking. Other 
literature has found that innovative enterprises more often have co-operative 
relationships than enterprises without innovation (Johannisson 1996; Fritsch and 
Lukas 1999). 
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The need for a balanced venture team in the start-up process has long been 
recognised (e.g. Kroeger 1974; Cooper 1979; Kanter 1982; Drucker 1985; Cooper 
and Daily 1997). Glancey (1998) suggests that growth beyond the entrepreneur's 
capabilities can negatively affect profitability and growth, and supports the need for 
"collecti ve entrepreneurship" that he describes as those specific skills and 
competencies in addition to the entrepreneur that are required for enterprises in high 
technology industries. 
Segal et al (1985) suggest that the critical requirement In the early stages of 
development is assembly of the right team of key individuals. The emphasis that 
financial supporters places on formation of such a team is epitomised by venture 
capitalists, who often appoint the management team as a prerequisite to financing. 
The support through the critical start-up and formative phases may require new skills 
and competencies that are unknown to the entrepreneur at the time. 
At the same time, Segal et al found that building a new venture team is difficult and 
potentially expensive. The entrepreneur may not be qualified to manage or put 
together such a team, so an experienced manager may play and important role. 
Outside consultants has been a popular trend in specific roles, such as technicians 
and marketing, and in areas like strategic management. 
Bullock (1984) suggests a model, shown in Figure 5.1, for the start-up and growth of 
high-technology spin-off companies after studying such firms at Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology and Stanford. The key feature of his model is that there is a 
spectrum of risk, financial and technological, that faces a young high technology 
company. 
Bullock observed that there was a growing trend in US companies to skip the early 
stages and become fully 'hard' more quickly. This was due to the 'recycling' of 
technological entrepreneurs as they spin out to start again form the large companies 
that had acquired their first venture. A key feature of the soft company is the 
importance of early revenues to minimise cash flow problems and to build up cash to 
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assist later stage development. Another factor was the ability of the financial and 
business services community to understand and support young advanced technology 
enterprises. 
Figure 5.1: Bullock's Risk Spectrum for High Technology Start-ups 
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Segal et al (1985) found that shortage of capital was not a limiting factor in 
Cambridge on the start-up and development of new ventures they studied. They 
point out that most firms comprising the Cambridge phenomenon were made up of 
companies at the softer end of the Bullock risk spectrum. High proportions of these 
were concentrated on research-design-development activity. 
A large body of evidence suggests that technology-based enterprises are particularly 
challenged by the ability to access new and specialised knowledge resources, rather 
than traditional factors such as access to raw materials and transportation costs (e.g. 
Jain 1984; Rothwell 1990; Julien 1995; Almeida and Kogut 1997; Cooper and Folta 
2000). These include scientific and technical staff, capabilities for research and 
development, and increasing size and complexity of the enterprise requires an 
increasing need for a systematic scanning process. A study by Galbraith and 
DeNoble (1988) studied 226 high-technology firms and found that three of the five 
most emphasised factors relate to availability, productivity and retention of skilled 
labor. 
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Collinson (2000) suggests that small, start-up enterprises are arguably constrained far 
more by knowledge limitations than by financial limitations and that networks may 
act as the source of several kinds of critical knowledge or expertise, particularly: 
• strategic: helping them match technological and market opportunities 
• managerial: supporting the human-resourcing, organisation and financing of 
the new enterprise 
• technical: assisting with design and development or core products and 
relevant technical alliances 
Collinson (2000) suggests that in times of rapid change, networks are central to the 
development of successful ventures. Drawing on the notion of 'social capital', 
Collinson argues that the socially constructed and mediated nature of knowledge and 
expertise is a central question in understanding how entrepreneurs access particular 
kinds of specialist knowledge to support a new enterprise. Collinson suggests that 
this requires an understanding of more complex factors, such as the incentives for 
knowledge-sharing, as well as the relative ease or difficulty of knowledge transfer of 
benefit to the venture in its particular setting. 
5.3 ACADEMIC ENTREPRENERSHIP, 'SPIN-OUTS' AND 
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY COLLABORATION 
In recent years, there has been a growing trend towards integrated efforts involving 
government, universities and industry in commercialising scientific research (Giget 
1997; Howells et al 1998). Giget suggests this trend is driven by factors that include 
global interaction of a high level of research in technological innovations, high 
uncertainty and the need for greater economic returns from research. 
Literature describes the 'triple helix model' that involves university-industry-
government interaction toward research activities and exploitation (Etzkovitz and 
Leydesdorff 1997, 1999). A key premise of the 'triple helix model' is the interaction 
of support activities internally from within the university and externally from the 
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regional support system. The interactions between universities, industry and 
government are seen as providing a mutual interdependence and a foundation for a 
'regional advantage' often seen in the commonly cited successful high technology 
regions of Silicon Valley, Cambridge, Mass. and Cambridge, UK. 
It is acknowledged that a university is one of the elements in the support structure to 
create and develop new enterprises (Walshok 1994; Maleki 1997; Botham and Eadie 
1997). It is also acknowledged that various factors - market and industry forces, 
regional support, management and founder characteristics and enterprise product and 
market strategies - are critical factors relating to the new spin-out (Downes and 
Eadie 1996; Howells et aI1998). 
Evidence suggests that the assumption that universities function as "knowledge 
centres" around which innovative enterprises will cluster is unrealistic (Massey et al 
1992; Nijkamp and Mouwen, 1987). Malecki (1997) cautions that the presence of a 
local university is not enough to offset shortcomings in entrepreneurial climate. 
Walshok5 (1994) argues that university-industry partnerships cannot achieve their 
intended consequences without parallel and reinforcing knowledge linkages which 
assure a policy environment supportive of economic growth, a regional infrastructure 
ready to support new and renewing industries and an appropriately competent, 
informed professional and technical labour force. 
Much has been written about spin-out enterprises that have been successful in the 
commercial exploitation of innovations from US universities, such as Stanford and 
MIT (Monck et al 1988; Westhead and Storey 1994; Saxenian 1994; Walshok 1994; 
Downes and Eadie 1996; Malecki 1997; Howells et al 1998). Bank Boston (1997) 
for example, suggests that graduates of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) have founded some 4,000 currently active enterprises, with annual revenues of 
almost US$232 billion and 150 new MIT-related companies founded each year. 
5 Mary Walshok, as co-founder of Connect San Diego, argues that success of the university-industry program in operation since 
1985 is the result of a combination of factors: infrastructure support includes an interrelated production network of large and 
small enterprises, a thick layering of public and private industrial support institutions and skilled labour and risk capital. 
Regional services include tax incentives, high-grade labour-market intelligence and associated vocational training, rapid 
diffusion of technology transfer, a high degree of inter-firm networking; receptive firms well disposed towards innovation. 
demand for new knowledge-intensive products, entrepreneurial strategies and competition and a vibrant socio-cultural base. 
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Another cited example is Chalmers University in Gothenburg, Sweden. Over the last 
30 years, over 240 spin out companies have emerged directly from the university, 
creating over 2,700 jobs with over 75% of companies still in existence (Downes and 
Eadie 1996). Since 1970, Chalmers has adopted policies intended to minimise 
barriers to the establishment of spin-out enterprises, such as granting individual 
academics the rights to intellectual property generated by their research and 
providing part-time academic contracts to facilitate academic-commercial activities. 
Downes and Eadie suggest that this output of commercial exploitation is remarkable 
given Sweden's socio-economic background characterised by high tax rates, limited 
financing for start-up companies, aversion to personal risk and negative attitudes 
toward conspicuous personal wealth. 
By companson, a survey by the Financial Times (FT, April 9, 2001) on UK 
university spin-outs and start-up ventures found 258 spin-out companies and a 
further 138 start-up companies had emerged from 59 UK universities in the past 3 
years, with a combined value of £143 million. One difficulty in understanding how 
UK universities exploit technology-based innovations that exploitation processes and 
output are not standardised and monitored. Howells et al (1998) found limited data 
on the number of inventions disclosed, patents filed, licences granted and royalty 
income in addition to the research income generated. 
In comparison to the UK, universities in the US and Canada have their exploitation 
activity assessed and compared as members of the Association of University 
Technology Managers (AUTM) through a detailed survey over several years (ERI 
2000). Although a growing trend is UK institutional involvement in AUTM, the lack 
of standard technology transfer policies and monitoring increases the difficulty of 
identifying and evaluating and comparing commercialisation processes. 
An identified difficulty in understanding the role of universities in enterprise creation 
is confusion over what defines or constitutes a university company. The Financial 
Time for their 2001 survey defined a 'spin-out' as a company set up to exploit 
research from the university that had raised external finance from investors and 
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defined a 'start-up' as an independent company in which the university had taken a 
share of equity. 
According to Howells et al (1998) enterprises created and remaining under the direct 
and ongoing control of the university are termed 'umbrella' organisations or 'spin-
offs', while enterprises with no formal links with their former universities are 
referred to as 'spin-outs'. 
A further definition of a spin-off company is a new company that is formed (1) by 
former employee(s) of a parent organisation, (2) around a core technology that 
originated in, and then was transferred to, the new company (Carayannis et al 1998). 
In this definition, a university-related start-up company (essentially similar to a spin-
off) obtains a new technology by licensing it from a university's technology transfer 
office. 
Re-examination of MIT spin-off results from these definitions suggest that much of 
the publicised success of their university 'spin-outs' is referring to 'start-ups', those 
companies that have been created from previous graduates of the university, not 
companies that have been involved with university technology transfer services. 
Bank of Boston estimates of 'spinouts' includes all MIT-related companies, 
including those companies set up by any alumni of MIT (BankBoston 1997). 
Literature suggests a number of challenges in studying academic spin-outs. AUTM 
found that for most US universities there is an emphasis on disclosing and 
understanding the outputs of commercialisation activities and enterprise creation 
without a corresponding understanding of costs and inputs (A UTM 1999). 
In the UK, it is suggested that research on university commercialisation activities has 
focused mainly on effects of science parks and support programs (Monck et al 1988; 
Westhead and Storey 1994). High-profile English science parks at Oxford and 
Cambridge universities are held up as examples of successful models to create and 
develop high technology enterprises (Howells et al 1998). Oxford's science park 
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mission, for example, is to attract international calibre laboratories and to provide 
facilities for smaller, rapidly expanding enterprises that include spin-outs or start-ups 
from the university. 
A further problem for research on university enterprise, according to Autio (2000) is 
the lack of a theoretical basis in understanding formation and success factors. He 
states that this is the result of absent or poor theoretical frameworks, little or no 
attention to industry influences and sampling in research design not well established 
or guided by theory. 
Studies suggest that multiple factors influence and motivate academics to 
commercially exploit research opportunities and create new companies (Segal et al 
1985; Botham and Eadie 1997; Howells et al 1998; Cripps et al 1999). However, 
few studies have assessed the role of scientists - academics in starting up new 
compames and following them through the processes of company formation and 
growth. 
Howells et al (1998) identifies high growth in recent years across the United 
Kingdom in the scale, number and variety of linkages between higher education (HE) 
and industry. These linkages are manifested in research collaboration, provision of 
consultancy services, market transactions in the commercialisation of research, and 
industry's growing involvement as an interactive user of all types of teaching and 
training. 
5.4 REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON INNOVATION AND 
ENTREPRENEURSIP 
The concept of regional entrepreneurship derives from network studies and 
economic geography literature that examines economic and production structures, 
linkages between these structures and the relationships between productive 
enterprises (e.g. Cooke and Morgan 1993; Yeung 1994; Storper 1997). Much of the 
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economic geography literature has been concerned with agglomeration economies 
and the regional implications of networks (Malecki 1997; Oakey et al. 1999; Cooke 
et al. 1998, Cooke 1996). 
Complementing economic geography literatures are innovation studies that examine 
the distinctiveness of regional institutional infrastructures and mechanisms for 
interaction and co-ordination mainly through contrasting 'national systems of 
innovation' (Edquist 1997, Freeman 1995, Nelson 1993, Lundvall 1992). The notion 
that participants in effective and efficient innovation networks reap 'additional 
returns' from the associated competitive advantages is paralleled in the regional 
economic development policy literature (Huggins 2000, Ritsila 1999). 
Regional industrial districts, drawing on previous work by Marshall (1920, 1986) are 
described as networks of local independent firms that contribute to economic 
development with knowledge and organisation prerequisite success factors. More 
recently, Piore and Sabel (1984) suggest that geographically concentrated business 
networks have emerged as a consequence of restructuring in industrialised 
economies and pose a challenge to large-scale mass production. 
Innovation system and industrial district literature focus attention on regional 
institutions and organisations that facilitate knowledge development and learning. 
Lundvall (1994) stresses that "knowledge is the most strategic resource and learning 
the most important process of economic development, that successful innovative 
regions can be viewed as externalised learning institutions". 
Lawson. and Lorenz (1999) describe the notion of regional collective learning as 
involving both conscious and unconscious mechanisms. A conscious mechanism 
would be the deliberate collaboration between technology transfer personnel and 
scientists in creating a spin-out company, while an unconscious mechanism would be 
the 'spontaneous movement' of knowledge workers and experienced managers 
among existing and nee firms. They also identify collaboration and competition and 
the balance between the two as key success factors to regional economic growth. 
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Regional entrepreneurship also draws from the resource-based view of enterprise 
(e.g. Penrose 1959; Teece 1996) and clusters (Saxenian, 1994) to suggest that 
innovation, growth and competitiveness for enterprises are optimised by access to 
resource and capability 'assets'. These assets are often exclusive to the enterprise 
and the regions and clusters in which they operate. Within this literature, evidence 
suggests that regional factors strongly influence the creation of successful start-ups 
(Cook and Morgan 1993; Porter 1990; Malecki 1997). 
Other approaches have been suggested to examine these concepts describing regional 
entrepreneurship. For example, Johannisson (1993) found support for four 
alternative models that explain regional entrepreneurship: 
1. Market model: the demand for products/services in a region 
2. Resource model: availability of inputs needed to start a new finn 
3. Milieu model: a positive orientation towards entrepreneurial activity as an 
integral feature of the region's economic specialisation 
4. Career model: positive value placed on entrepreneurship as a career option 
The essential argument behind these descriptions of regional entrepreneurship 
suggests that the spread of innovations and commercial success as a function of the 
support that innovators can draw from the larger community as well as industry 
conditions (Pfeffer and Salancik 1977; Ruttan and Hayami 1984). Support factors 
include access to investors and those funding technology-based enterprises, small to 
medium-sized enterprises that may collaborate with universities in new company 
fonnation, service providers of marketing, management and technology verification, 
or due diligence services and others that exist in the region to promote and support 
the development of start-up enterprises. 
The Silicon Valley region provides one of the first 'ideal models' with high levels of 
technology-based enterprises underpinning a dynamic, high-growth regional 
economy that other regions seek to emulate. Research by Saxenian (1991, 1994) on 
Silicon Valley identifies certain characteristics of this region seen to enhance 
entrepreneurship. She emphasises the importance of deep, long-lasting and equal 
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relationships that has gIven nse to 'complementary innovation' that allows 
enterprises to focus on specialisation to be more competitive while providing 
suppliers the ability to develop into sophisticated and less labor-intensive companies. 
Expertise in Silicon Valley is spread across hundreds of specialist enterprises that 
continue to develop independent capabilities while simultaneously learning from one 
another. Complementary innovation through collaboration also spreads the costs and 
risks of developing new products while enhancing their ability to quickly adapt to 
changing markets and competition. Collaboration occurs through a proliferation of 
inter-firm networks, resulting in an ongoing dynamism of the region even during 
economic downturns according to Saxenian. 
Attempts to emulate the success of Silicon Valley have also drawn from the idea of 
the 'entrepreneurial infrastructure' (Vaughn, 1983; Porter, 1990) that describes the 
facilities and services present within a given geographical region which encourage 
the birth and development of new el)terprises. It is based on the premise that new 
enterprise creation will be affected by factors that include access to capital, 
specialised inputs, proximity to customers, specialised labor and psycho-social 
support (Porter 1998; Cooper and Folta 2000). For example, Bygraves (1988) found 
that, for venture capitalists, networks provide information on possible good 
investment opportunities and may be particularly appropriate In an environment 
where there is a need to generate a constant stream of new "deals". 
The ability to access knowledge and resources may be easier for enterprises located in 
'clusters' based in one geographical area (Prevezer, 1997; Almeida and Kogut 1997; 
Cooper and Folta 2000). Clusters are seen to occur for many types of industries and 
associated enterprises (Porter, 1990) but location in a cluster may be particularly 
relevant for start-ups and small enterprises (Almeida and Kogut, 1997). The concept 
of clusters as an intervention strategy for stimulating technology entrepreneurship 
will be further discussed in Chapter Six. 
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The growth of technology regions such as Cambridge UK identifies the need to 
maintain support infrastructures in the form of physical facilities. Segal et ai's 
follow up report, 'The Cambridge Phenomenon Revisited' (2000) suggests that 
Cambridge's infrastructure is not coping with its rate of growth6 and requires sizeable 
investments in roads and public transport. At the same time, regional policy-makers 
are challenged with balancing economic growth for regional and national prosperity 
with regional quality of life for regional residents. 
5.4.1 Knowledge and Capability Transfer and Networks 
A common theme identified in research on US-based technology start-ups is the 
benefits from spill-over effects in knowledge, capabilities and social contacts 
resulting from a high concentrations of dynamic enterprises and support businesses 
that combine to contribute to regional economic prosperity (Saxenian 1994; Walshok 
1994; Downes and Eadie 1996; Malecki 1997). Contributions of the end user in 
technological development acknowledge the variation by industrial sector of 
producer and user input in innovation development. 
The term 'knowledge spillover' describes interactions with others that may lead to a 
positive contribution to new technical knowledge (Lundvall 1988; O'Farrell, 
Hitchens and Moffat 1992). It is forwarded that through these interactions, 
enterprises are able to enhance their technological capabilities by learning from 
customers and from suppliers, by interacting with other firms, by searching for new 
technologies and by taking advantage of knowledge spillovers from other industries. 
The value of different kinds of knowledge in different contexts (Williams et a11998) 
and the long-standing link made between knowledge and power are important factors 
directing flows of knowledge in networks (Hislop et al 2000). Indeed, Steier and 
Greenwood (1995) suggest that 'financial capital' can also be directed in networks 
through venture capitalists, who can act as 'brokers' linking entrepreneurial ventures 
6 In 1998 there were 1.350 high-tech firms employing 32,500 people, three times the number of companies than in 1985. 
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with such players as marketing consultants and other financial sponsors. Similarly, 
Coombs and Hull (1997) examine knowledge accumulation mechanisms, interface 
mechanisms and deployment mechanisms in the context of innovation networks. 
Howells (2000) also connects innovation systems with knowledge systems. 
Various levels of knowledge transfer are identified in the literature. Badaracco 
(1991) identifies migratory knowledge as knowledge that is easily transferable within 
a region to various locations. Knowledge that is delivered consistently by the same 
individual or group can provide a representative linkage in the case of agency 
services and provision of standardised topics to similar audiences. Institutional 
linkages describe knowledge and information exchanged without the involvement of 
the same representative personalities, with institutional interests prioritised 
(Eisenberg et al 1985). Conversely, personal linkages describe knowledge transfer 
between people representing their own interests. 
Knowledge spillovers are seen to occur through formal and informal channels of 
networking (Cooper and Folta 2000). Networks are seen as most appropriate for new 
and hybrid models of enterprise forming in response to rapidly changing technology, 
high R&D costs, niche markets and electronic commerce among other factors 
(Shulman 1997). Formal mechanisms include technology partnerships, licensing, 
strategic alliances and supply contracts. Informal channels include social meetings, 
trade meetings and mobility of technical personnel. 
Pihkala et al (1999) argue that the conditions in new and emerging industries favour 
networking even when viewing the enterprise within traditional economical models 
as a rational entity where individuals are engaged within relative management 
structures. They define networking capability as an action-based capacity of an 
individual or firm to extra-organisational activities needed to transform resources 
into profitable use, and contend that highly specialised and transferable resources 
characteristic of high technology firms cannot be put into full use without the 
capability of networking. 
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5.5 SUMMARY 
Literature suggests that technology-based markets can be distinguished from 
'traditional' markets by higher levels of risk and uncertainty associated with higher 
development costs, intense global competition and short product lifecycles. 
Technology enterprises require rapid access to specialised knowledge and 
information resources in particular that have placed greater emphasis on locality for 
supporting technology-based entrepreneurs hi p. 
Lessons from successful regions such as Silicon Valley emphasis the specialised 
facilities and services present within a given geographical region which encourage 
and stimulate the rapid creation, development and recycling of new enterprises, 
entrepreneurs and technologists. Although universities are identified as one element 
of a successful technology region, literature suggests that a strong entrepreneurial 
climate, regional support infrastructure, skilled workforce, strong university-industry 
linkages, regional demand for products and services and supportive policy 
environment are required elements. 
Regional study literature identify the relevance of networks in these dynamic market 
conditions that provide access to investors, technical knowledge, experienced 
commercial managers and market orientation. Knowledge transfer and spill-over 
effects are also facilitated through formal and informal channels of networking, and 
networking capability is identified as a critical element in acquiring these specialised 
resources and capabilities for technology-based enterprises. 
Implications from this literature to the research intent of the thesis suggest the need 
to identify commercialisation difficulties facing technology-based enterprises in a 
particular regional context that expose deficiencies in the regional support 
infrastructure and justify the use of intervention mechanisms. EXaInining the role of 
local universities and research centres as commercialisation agents and elements of 
the regional support infrastructure is particularly relevant when a high level of 
enterprises are based on university-generated innovations. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
MARKET INTERVENTION MECHANISMS FOR TECHNOLOGY 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE SCOTTISH CONTEXT 
"The growth and survival prospects of new firms will depend on their ability 
to learn about their environment, and to link changes in their strategy choices 
to the changing configuration of that environment. The more turbulent is the 
market environment, the more likely it is that firms will fail to cope". 
(Geroski cited in Audretsch (1995): 442). 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter explores perspectives on market intervention and various mechanisms 
that include clusters, incubators and science parks that attempt to counter perceived 
commercialisation difficulties in technology-based entrepreneurship. The chapter 
then explores regional initiatives and support networks - the intervention mechanism 
at the centre of this thesis. 
Evaluation literature is examined that describes the methodological issues in 
establishing the effectiveness of these intervention mechanisms and the difficulties in 
measuring cause and effect, value for money and other common evaluation criteria 
that may not be appropriate measures for network evaluation. 
6.2 MARKET INTERVENTION 
Market intervention, according to Peterson (1988) can be described as a continuum 
that will reflect a particular public policy approach to small business development. 
At one end of the continuum is the laissez-faire approach, which view government 
activity as an impediment to spontaneous private, entrepreneurial activity by 
ventures. Peterson's middle of the continuum is the limited environmental policy 
approach, which presents the government's role as active stewardship of the 
economy, in creating the right climate for finns through policy instruments. 
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The other extreme of Peterson's continuum is the strategic interventionist approach 
that envisions government policy activism through direct aid to small businesses in 
the form of financial aid packages, counselling programs, procurement policies and 
business advocacy programs. 
Justification for intervention is commonly associated with increasing the number of 
successful start-ups to counter high failure rates. Research suggests that although 
there is strong support for the argument of a high rate of companies ceasing to exist 
over time, it is unclear whether they are failing or have been acquired, merged, etc. 
For example, Bruno and Cooper (1982) studied 250 high technology firms founded 
in Silicon Valley during the 1960s and found that by 1980 only 31 % were still 
surviving and independent. Other larger firms had acquired 32% of firms and the 
remaining 37% had ceased to exist. 
One argument used to justify regional support initiatives is that the individual firm is 
too weak an instrument around which to build change (Lalkaka and Abetti 1998). 
Innovation development and exploitation, it is argued, is closely related to the firm's 
external context and the ability to access to knowledge, exchange of experience and 
shared resources. The external context of the enterprise is seen to define the 
enterprise's ability to overcome internal limitations by developing collective 
solutions to common problems. This public sphere of knowledge in which collective 
learning occurs is expected to be facilitated by public intervention activities. 
Intervention provides a key focus of debate in public policy and econOffilC 
deVelopment theory in terms of the degree to which the market should be left alone 
as the primary selection mechanism for the emergence of new enterprises. 
Intervention efforts, it is argued, waste resources in support of companies that may 
otherwise not survive market forces. Bruch and Hiemenz (1984) warn that 
government action and public institutions cannot serve as a panacea for all 
deficiencies in the functioning of private enterprise or markets, as difficulties that 
entrepreneurs face may reflect the market selection processes taking place and not 
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necessarily bias in the system. Another criticism is that companies can become 
overly reliant on outside assistance. 
Trembley (1998) argues that, in advanced market economies, business enterprises are 
bathed in a plentiful supply of all the support services they need. Trembley notes 
that the sheer variety of organisations providing business support can appear to be a 
problem for any company seeking assistance. 
Blakely (1994) notes that a government's primary role in promoting advanced 
technology development should be supportive and not directive. He found from 
studies of several nations that direct government involvement results at best in 
mediocrity and more often in disappointment. He suggests that further study is 
required to identify the types and effectiveness of intervention mechanisms and their 
role in developing the 'requisite connectivity' to stimulate new business growth. 
6.2.1 Intervention for Technology Sectors 
The frequent target for intervention initiatives are technology sectors, viewed by 
policy-makers as having greater growth potential than conventional sectors that can 
lead to significant regional economic prosperity (Lalkaka and Abetti 1998; Deakins 
et al 1998; Gregory and Martin 1998). High technology sectors have also been 
viewed as corrective for unemployment caused by the decline in traditional industries 
(Oakey and Rothwell 1986). 
Intervention to support new technology-based firms (NTBFs) is often justified by 
high failure rates resulting from a myriad of commercialisation challenges that 
distinguish these firms from conventional new firms. For example, Blakely (1994) 
states that high technology firms have a complex and interrelated set of special 
requirements based on their stage of development, and including their size, 
technology base and global market position. 
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As described earlier, Segal et al (1985) found that high technology enterprises are 
characterised by high R&D intensity, short product life cycles, protection of 
intellectual property, rapid growth prospects, and early need for selling to global 
markets. The combination of these characteristics, they suggest, can present a whole 
set of basic management problems for high technology compared with conventional 
small firms. 
Intervention efforts are expected to increase the ability of new enterprises to survive 
and grow that contribute to economic growth. Malecki (1997) suggests that a high 
rate of new technology firm formation generally signal a thriving economy. 
Research on US start-ups in the 1970s found that patterns of firm births were the 
most significant determinant of regional prosperity (Jusenius and Ledebur 1977). 
Aldrich (1976, 1990) emphasises the importance of spill-over effect that can result 
from a growing number of successful start-ups in that, as new businesses are formed, 
others follow. His research found a positive economic impact of this formation, 
through job creation and wealth creation, particularly as more businesses move into 
the niche. 
On the other hand, Malecki (1997) argues that new firm formation is not the most 
appropriate policy goal - that the ability for businesses to grow and prosper may be 
more important. Research by Storey (1994) suggests that employment creation 
depends upon being able to realise the growth potential of all new firms. Storey 
identified multiple factors affecting firm growth, but cautions that none appear to 
offer a predictive technique for consistently determining the potential of a smaller 
firm to achieve a growth objective. Based on research from Scotland on birth rate 
levels (Scottish Enterprise 1993) and on employment trends in other European 
countries, Storey found evidence that significant employment creation takes place in 
relatively few but growing firms. 
Segal et al (1985), in their study of the Cambridge Phenomenon, caution that it 
should not be assumed that all new high technology firms have the potential to 
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become large. They note that in any economy the vast majority of businesses are 
small, and provide the example of Silicon Valley based on 1985 data, where some 
70% of the 3,000 plus electronics/computer hardware firms employed fewer than 10 
people and only some 50 firms employed more than 1,000 people. 
Segal et al (1985) further suggest that it takes a long time to build large successful 
technology businesses anywhere using the example of Cambridge, where high 
technology firms are known for their research, design and development and 
production of specialised products, not in high volume production. They point out 
that Oxford Instruments, one of Britain's best known technology businesses which 
employs some 2,500 people, is just over 30 years old. 
More recent attention has focused on creating the support conditions for new 
enterprises rather than on individual enterprises (e.g. Walshok 1994; Downes and 
Eadie 1996; Harrison and Leitch 1996; Malecki 1997). Research on successful high 
technology regions, such as Silicon Valley, Cambridge, UK and Cambridge, 
Massachusetts points out the critical importance of a supportive infrastructure for 
new and growing firms (Saxenian, 1900, 1994; Segal et al 2000). These elements 
include tax incentives, the provision of business parks and programmes that facilitate 
supporti ve agents that understand the needs and requirements of emerging and 
existing firms. Government intervention, it is argued, is required that stimulates 
creation of supportive agents and thus a critical mass of competitive firms can be 
established that make an impact on the regional economy. 
Intervention is also identified as a strategy to stimulate and promote entrepreneurship 
as studies suggest that certain cultures are more effective in promoting 
entrepreneurship that others (McClelland 1961; Lipset, 1990). McClelland argues 
that the 'urge to achieve' is the single most important psychological factor for 
entrepreneurial success and that this trait can be acquired through training and 
education. 
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6.2.2 Types of Intervention 
Market intervention can be observed at different levels through the provision of 
clusters, incubators, science parks and regional programs that are expected to 
contribute favourably to regional entrepreneurship. The importance of deliberately-
constructed mechanisms - driven primarily by public-sector agencies - lies in their 
potential for 1) accelerating the 'learning process' for emerging ventures, and 
thereby accelerating the emergence of fast-growing enterprises in new business 
areas, and 2) promoting 'innovative milieu' and regional benefits for a high-density 
of fast-growing enterprises. 
More direct support is identified in business incubators, defined by Shahidi (1998) as 
public-private- and university-sponsored business assistance organisations whose 
purpose is to support the development and growth of new enterprises through the 
provision of a variety of services. Incubators nonnally provide an array of logistical 
services that include office space, secretarial support and some networking 
opportunities, among others. 
The tenn 'cluster' is defined as groups of finns within one industry based in one 
geographical area (Prevezer, 1997; Almeida and Kogut 1997; Cooper and Folta 
2000). Clusters are seen to occur for many types of industries and associated 
enterprises (Porter, 1990) but location in a cluster may be particularly relevant for 
start-ups and small enterprises (Almeida and Kogut, 1997). 
Clusters may counter a key weakness of a new enterprise identified earlier; a lack of 
legitimacy that affects access to needed specialised inputs (Cooper and Folta 2000). 
Legitimacy is defined in general tenns as the ability to be viewed as credible by 
investors, suppliers and customers (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Starr and MacMillan 
1990). Much of legitimacy is based on a previous track record of perfonnance. 
Legitimacy facilitated within a region and developed within a cluster can assist the 
new enterprise in attracting key management and technical people at a time when 
credibility and visibility are low (Cooper and Folta 2000). 
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Entrepreneurs in clusters may have lower search costs in finding potential investors, 
as geographical proximity to those seeking investors and those seeking to invest may 
provide substantial advantages (Cooper and Folta 2000). They found that the 
venture capital industry is highly concentrated geographically. Cooper (1979) found 
that, in Silicon Valley, 'angel investors' were former founders who had sold their 
businesses and become full or part-time investors in the next generation of high 
technology firms. Cooper found that the investors often assist the new enterprise by 
using their established contacts in their immediate networks. 
Staber (1998) forwards three theories on why enterprises in an industry may decide 
to locate in the same geographical proximity. The first, transaction cost theory, 
forwards that locating near one's trading partners facilitates learning and more rapid 
response to customers and suppliers, and is important under conditions of 
uncertainty, such as those found in a highly competitive environment. The second, 
neo-institutionalism, suggests that geographical proximity can create a strong local 
culture that values one-to-one interactions and inter-firm resource sharing. The third, 
agglomeration theory, states that cost reduction can result from shared infrastructure, 
that include access to specialised human resources, equipment and transportation and 
communication facilities. Enterprises may be able to gain quicker knowledge on 
new market and technology opportunities. 
An alternative view by Cooper and Folta (2000) claims that some entrepreneurs are 
relatively constrained in where they decide to locate their new enterprises. 
Entrepreneurs that rely upon past friendships to persuade others to gain access to 
specialised assets may limit their mobility (Starr and MacMillan 1990). These social 
contexts of entrepreneurs are seen to channel and facilitate, as well as constrain and 
inhibit, entrepreneurial activities (Dubini and Aldrich 1991). 
According to Almeida and Kogut (1997), research reveals inconclusive evidence that 
new enterprises are more successful when located in clusters. They claim that only 
when there is sufficient technological opportunity do benefits of clustering outweigh 
the costs and note that a dense population of enterprises have greater rivalry for 
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resources and will cooperate less. Krugman (1991) forwards that clusters create a 
pooled market for human capital with specialised skills that benefit both workers and 
firms. But Krugman cautions that people with specialised skills may be lost to 
competitors if workers are part of a network whose members are aware of job 
opportuni ties. 
Conceptually, the term 'cluster' continues to be contested, with varying definitions 
emerging from specific locational and disciplinary contexts. In some cases, clusters 
are considered from a national, or 'top-down', perspective that explores industrial 
structures and concentrations (Porter, 1990). In others, specific, grounded, cases are 
examined in detail (Pyke and Beccattini 1992). Both approaches are useful in 
providing alternative, but complementary, insights into clusters and clustering. On 
the one hand, the 'top-down' approach produces a picture of the overall 
configuration of a cluster. On the other, detailed studies of specific clusters offer 
insights into the evolution and functioning of a cluster. 
For some universities and regions, science parks are presented as a key element of 
technology transfer policy. Howells et al (1998) defines 'science parks' as all 
property-led initiatives for research and high technology activities that include 
research parks and incubators. The science park as a strategy for commercialising 
university research is founded on the belief that the process of developing innovative 
technologies and products places special requirements on facilities, services and 
other resources that are often not available within the original environment (Bower 
1992). 
Westhead and Storey (1995) suggest that science parks provide a location with a 
critical mass of scientifically sophisticated individuals generating new technologies 
and innovative ideas, many produced in universities. These technologies and ideas 
are channelled and diffused by new commercial ventures located in purpose-built 
units in close proximity to the university. 
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Another conceptualisation of science parks is forwarded by Kaukonen and Nieminen 
(1999), who suggest that universities, on their own or in collaboration with 
government and/or industry have created science parks that attempt to create a 
supportive or 'entrepreneurial' infrastructure for the region. This infrastructure is 
comprised of the facilities and services present within a given geographical area that 
encourage the birth and development of new enterprises and promote knowledge 
transfer from academia to industrial and commercial use. 
The role of business incubators and science parks have arisen partly in response to 
the need of new enterprises to access resources locally and often at an affordable rate 
of exchange. According to Teece (1987) new enterprises may require varying levels 
of complementary assets depending on the type of innovation, market and sector and 
paymg market pnces for required resources labour, knowledge, 
materials/equipment, facilities, etc. - is often inhibitory. 
Literature also identifies a proliferation of vanous types of regional support 
programmes for stimulating the formation of new technology ventures in many 
countries. Amongst the best known are the Austin Texas incubator and the industrial 
cluster programmes of the Basque Country (Spain). 
One example of a regional innovation initiative is the Innovation Relay Centre 
(IRC)7, established by the European Commission in 1995. One justification for 
creating the IRC, among others, is data demonstrating that technology transfer and 
innovation exploitation is low in comparison to the United States. In total the 
network has 68 IRCs with links to local companies and research institutions, 250 
partner organisations and more than 1,000 specialist staff involved across Europe. 
The network also provides a channel to transfer technologies and know-how to new 
markets anywhere in Europe. 
The IRC network has become a leading European network for the promotion of 
technology partnerships and transfer mainly between small and medium size 
7 (http://www . i rcscotland. netJabou Urcl european_network .cfm). 
116 
companies (SMEs). However, it is evident that IRe provides more of a technology 
transfer role rather than creating local networking capabilities. IRC promotes the 
availability of innovative technologies to other organisations and companies through 
licensing, joint venture and manufacturing agreements, or commercial agreements 
with technical assistance. 
6.2.3 Regional Support Networks 
David Rosenberg, in his book "Cloning Silicon Valley" (2002), provides evidence 
that virtually every developed country in the world today is building or aspires to 
build its own innovation region using California's Silicon Valley as an example. 
Regional initiatives, such as the Regional Innovation Strategies of the European 
Union, are focused on creating conditions that facilitate new enterprises and the 
successful exploitation of commercially applicable innovations. Creating regional 
conditions is expected to make a sustained difference to regional economic 
development in the medium term (North and Smallbone 1996). 
The stimulation of 'support networks' is identified as a growing strategy designed to 
create and develop a supportive infrastructure for high technology companies, or an 
"entrepreneurial infrastructure" (Porter 1990). Networking as an intervention 
strategy is based on entrepreneurial network theory that suggests that strength, 
complexity and diversity of business relationships influence newly formed firm 
performance, reSUlting in improvement of the longer term chances of firm survival 
and growth (Shahidi 1998). 
Similarly, the literature on "industrial districts" forwards the argument that there are 
a certain number of invisible factors which are favourable to economic development, 
such as the constitution of networks and the development of confidence and close 
relationships between firms (Tremblay 1998). 
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Malechi and Todtling (1995) assert that network creation IS a growmg policy 
prescription for regions where networks have failed to emerge. They found that 
regional economic development agencies in many countries globally have invested 
public money into schemes to facilitate and strengthen particular kinds of local 
networks in the belief that these support local competitive advantages and give rise to 
additional capital investment, employment and higher new business birth-rates. 
Previous literature on regional entrepreneurship and network theory establishes that 
learning and innovation are often very localised. Efforts to strengthen the 
characteristics of effective and dynamic innovation systems are occurring at the 
regional level - for example the types of linkages that can be built between academic 
research, social partners, business support organisations and the individual firm, with 
particular emphasise on the needs of new enterprises. 
However, Saxenian (1990, 1994) stresses that regional collaboration must be 
considered in the context of the region's social, cultural and historical background, 
cautioning that attempts to emulate Silicon Valley must take these many 
characteristics into account. She argues that these factors influence the nature of 
technical expertise networks in the region that promote entrepreneurial flexibility and 
perhaps limit the transferability of the model to other regions. 
6.3 INTERVENTION IN SCOTLAND 
Much has been made of Silicon Glen, Scotland's high technology corridor between 
Edinburgh and Glasgow that claims to have the highest concentration of high 
technology companies in the world outside of Silicon Valley. Watson (1999) points 
out that Scottish public officials began efforts to attract foreign technology 
companies in the 1960s with regional government grants and successfully secured a 
host of American and Japanese multinationals. By the early 1990s, electronics had 
displaced whiskey as Scotland's top export and in 1998, Scotland attracted 87 foreign 
high technology projects involving investment of £1.7 billion. 
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Recently, criticism has grown in Scotland regarding the make-up of the country's 
industrial base and perceived over-reliance on manufacturing plants - established by 
multi-national inward investment - and the low number of high-growth small and 
medium sized (SME) indigenous companies. 
Part of the problem suggested by Downes and Eadie (1996) is that large multi-
national corporations do not undertake research or development activities in 
Scotland, while the propensity and ability of SMEs to engage in significant levels of 
R&D is limited. Indeed, Hamel and Prahalad (1994) argue for the regional presence 
of small start-ups and large corporations existing symbiotically in developing a 
sustainable technology sector, with each requiring and drawing on the unique 
capabilities of the other. 
Capell (2002) argues that the volatility in the global technology industry is exposing 
the weakness of Scotland's economic policy that he suggests is built on winning 
foreign investment at the expense of developing home-grown industries. Recently, 
large corporations such as Motorola and NEC Corporation have shut their Scottish 
plants and shifted production to Asia and Eastern Europe8. Job losses at Silicon Glen 
between 2000-2002 have been estimated at 15,000--more than 20% of the area's 
workforce. In 2002, the Scottish Executive announced that the Scottish economy, 
unlike the rest of Britain, was in recession. 
Capell suggests that the main problem is that Scotland, home to 5 million people, 
depends more heavily on exports than does the rest of Britain. He cites the example 
of electronics, which makes up 51 % of Scotland's overall exports. The plants in 
Silicon Glen shipped out $3 billion worth of goods in the first quarter of 2002-
down 16.3% from the same period last year. 
The low level of SMEs and new start-ups in Scotland and the strategic importance of 
supporting new enterprise creation in technology-based sectors have been a high 
priority topic of debate in Scotland for some time. Research for Scottish Enterprise 
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found that creation and growth of new companies in Scotland is under-performing in 
comparison to England and other regions of the European Union, despite an 
impressive track record of Scottish high technology innovation and research 
(Scottish Enterprise 1993). One key recommendation from this research was biasing 
assistance for start-ups in favour of the "wealth-creating" sectors such as 
manufacturing and computer software (Gallagher, Kidd and Miller 1995). 
The Scottish Business Birth Rate strategy was introduced by Scottish Enterprise in 
October 1993, aimed at improving the birth rate and early development of new firms: 
"To compete, companies will need to build strong partnerships through which 
information and ideas can flow quickly and to best mutual advantage. Spanning 
customers, suppliers, competitors and other supporting institutions such as the 
universities, colleges, research bodies and the utilities, these specialist networks or 
'clusters' create more of the sparks that fuel innovation and generate synergies that 
power them to greater competitiveness" (Scottish Enterprise, 1996:1). 
This strategy also acknowledged that there were problems with existing networking 
agencies within the Scottish economy, and argued the need to encourage the 
effecti veness of both formal and informal networking arrangements. Further 
research cited by Scottish Enterprise (1993, 1996) compared hi-tech new ventures in 
Massachusetts and Scotland and found that, in Scotland, there was little networking 
between industry and research staff in academia and government laboratories. This 
research concluded that networking, mutual support and encouragement were low. 
Other comparative research has demonstrated poor supportive agents for technology-
based entrepreneurship. A low technology culture in the UK is suggested by Murray 
and Lott (1995) who found that UK venture capitalists impose stricter criteria on 
technology-based enterprises than on non-technology investments. Ennew and Binks 
(1993) found differences between Scottish and English banks in the perceptions of 
small businesses and suggest that Scotland seems to have a more extreme set of rules 
and social mores in determining support and advice. 
8 Capell (2002) states that Silicon Glen's assembly-line workers earn an average of $1,300 a month, approximately ten times 
more than their counterparts in China. 
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Additional studies on the Scottish economy have found a lack of venture capital and 
inadequate mechanisms for investing in small finns, a shortage of small finn 
management expertise in strategic high-technology sectors, a lack of interaction and 
common purpose between academia and industry, and a weak 'entrepreneurial 
culture' (Collinson, 2000, Danson, 1996, Reid, 1997, Scottish Enterprise 1999). 
Influenced by various research findings, Scottish Enterprise - the government agency 
charged with promoting Scottish industry - began focusing a number of programs 
with outside agents playing more of a facilitating role. The model is reflected in 
Figure 6.1. 
, 
Figure 6.1: The Entrepreneurial Process 
(Scottish Enterprise, Top Teams in Growing Companies, 1999: 7) 
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Although support mechanisms such as Enterprise Allowance Scheme (EAS), 
Business Start-up Scheme (BSUS) have been abandoned in England, various focused 
support programs are facilitated or delivered through Scottish Enterprise. One 
example of a program reflecting Scottish Enterprise's new strategy is Targeting 
Technology Ltd (TTL), based in Glasgow, that delivers Innovation Relay Center 
(IRC) services in Scotland. TTL is a publicly funded company that also provides a 
comprehensive mentoring service covering all aspects of developing a business 
based on innovative technology for Scottish start-ups. It also has advisers with 
specialist expertise in managing intellectual property and intellectual assets within 
organisations. 
A key justification for supporting technology exploitation in Scotland is the high 
level of internationally recognised scientific and technology-based research emerging 
out of Scottish universities and research institutions (Downes and Eadie 1996). 
Institutions such as Edinburgh's Roslin Institute and Scotland's research-intensive 
universities - Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee, Strathclyde, Aberdeen and Heriot-Watt 
- are particularly strong in innovations in fields of biomedical and lifesciences, 
electronics, software and oil and gas, among others. 
The propensity to establish new technology-based enterprises to exploit university 
research includes the abilities and motivations of academics and the role of 
technology transfer offices that may not be compatible (Downes and Eadie 1996). 
Constraints to academic commercialisation can be traced to deeply rooted academic 
cultures, the research assessment exercise (RAE) that awards academics for research 
publications and departmental resource allocation regimes (Gascoigne and Metcalfe 
1999). 
Recent public schemes in the UK, such as the University Challenge Fund, suggest 
that there is more to do in commercialising university research and have contributed 
significant funding for university enterprise creation. Since 1999, over £45 million 
has been made available through 15 seedcorn funds to provide 37 research 
institutions (30 universities and 7 institutes) access to investment capital. According 
to recent data (European Venture Capital Journal, Sept. 2001) over 310 new 
enterprises have been spun out from the 37 institutions since July 1998, representing 
a three-fold increase compared to previous spin-out activity from these same 
institutions. 
It was described earlier that a university is one of the elements in the support 
structure to create and develop new enterprises (Walshok 1994; Maleki 1997; 
Botham and Eadie 1997; Downes and Eadie 1996). Another element is the wider 
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commercial environment that compnse investors and those funding technology-
based enterprises, small to medium-sized enterprises or corporations that may 
collaborate with universities, legal, management and marketing service providers and 
other public-private agencies that exist in the region to promote and support the 
development of start-up enterprises. Related to creating a regional support structure 
is the capability and inclination of the existing local industrial base to interact 
effectively with the academic research community. 
The identified need for a 'critical mass' of particular knowledge and expertise in 
Scotland that links academia with industry to support new technology-based 
enterprises provided initial justification for the program Connect Scotland - the 
regional enterprise support network that is the focus of this thesis. 
6.4 EVALUATING INTERVENTION PROGRAMS 
There is considerable debate over intervention and support programs and the need 
and effectiveness of such initiatives. While difficult to quantify, the quality and the 
value added by support initiatives reflect great variation from country to country, and 
even from location to location in a given country (Lalkaka and Abetti 1998). 
Much evaluation research has arisen from a rather narrowly based concern to ensure 
that public programme represent "good" value for money, Many evaluations are 
concerned fundamentally with assessing the success or failure of programmes (Rossi 
et al 1979). Few evaluations are able to provide definitive evidence regarding 
'success', mainly because of the complexity of methodological issues that confront 
researchers, according to Gregory and Martin (1998). Success may be determined in 
absolute or differential terms. The measurement of impacts present particular 
problems because of the way in which evaluators adopt various definitions of what 
constitutes success, i.e., job creation, firm growth or firm survival rates. 
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Deakins et al (1998) notes that research on business development support 
programmes is too often carried out retrospectively; giving little or no opportunity to 
compare the differences that such support has made to the objectives and managerial 
ability of clients involved in the programme of support. In the same vein, studies of 
support programmes have pointed to a consistent lack of internal monitoring and 
information-gathering mechanisms that make it very difficult to evaluate results and 
impacts. 
Rossi et al (1979) note that a critical first step prior to designing and implementing 
any intervention strategy is to verify that a problem exists in sufficient degree and 
extent to warrant an intervention. They argue that an evaluation methodology for 
any intervention programme requires a defined purpose as well as scaleable and 
appropriate assessment objectives. Different organisations may have different 
motives for undertaking and commissioning evaluations. Public accountability may 
emphasise a cost-benefit analysis and level of performance measurement for 
programme delivery. 
Alford (1998) stresses that evaluators require high quality primary data, and it is 
rarely assembled adequately by the programme administrators. Few programme 
evaluations have included both qualitative and quantitative measures of 'process-
oriented' outcomes and as a result some evaluators have found themselves unable to 
advise on improving programme design to enhance effectiveness (Gregory and 
Martin 1998). Individuals and groups may require evaluation systems that 
continually audit the delivery of services and their outcomes, and provide evidence 
of effectiveness to aid in their decision-making (Rossi, Freeman and Wright, 1979). 
Patton (1990) points out that process evaluations are aimed at understanding the 
internal dynamics of programme operations, and typically require a detailed 
description of programme operations. Process analysis asks how the programme 
works with emphasis on identifying ways of improving programme design and 
delivery, and is typically qualitative in approach (Cook and Reichardt 1979). A 
process evaluation requires sensitivity to both qualitative and quantitative change in 
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programmes throughout their development, and means becoming intimately 
acquainted with the details of the programme (Patton 1987). 
Patton (1990) suggests that process evaluations permit decision-makers and 
information users to understand the dynamics of programme operations, shedding 
light on the extent to which the programme is operating the way it is supposed to be 
operating. They are also useful for revealing areas in which programmes can be 
improved as well as highlighting those strengths that should be preserved. 
Patton cites two other uses of process evaluations. They permit people not intimately 
involved in the programme, external funders, public officials and external agencies, 
to understand how the programme operates. As well, they are particularly useful for 
dissemination and replication of programmes under conditions where a programme 
has served as a demonstration project or is considered to be a model worthy of 
replication at another site. 
Establishing effectiveness and credibility and improving a program's delivery and 
process are seen as important challenges for most evaluations. An analysis of the 
evaluation literature concerned with support programmes shows that there are at least 
four major criteria to be fulfilled in a process evaluation (Rossi et al 1979; Patton 
1990; Gregory and Martin 1996). These are: 
1. An evaluation methodology for any support programme reqUIres a defined 
purpose as well as scaleable and appropriate assessment objectives in terms of 
both process and outcomes; 
2. A process evaluation requires sensitivity to both qualitative and quantitative 
change in programmes throughout their development, and means becoming 
intimately acquainted with the details of the programme; 
3. If the results of an evaluation are to gain widespread acceptance and credibility in 
the public domain, it is essential that a full range of stakeholder perspectives be 
incorporated into the research design. This suggests incorporating a measure of 
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the 'value' that stakeholders perceIve from exposure to the programme, and 
preferably how that perceived value changes over the time of the programme. 
4. If a phenomenon under investigation is complex, infonnation-rich cases are 
useful in learning a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose 
of the evaluation. This is difficult to achieve and requires a level of analysis that 
focuses on each company (micro-finn level). 
Literature identifies particular issues in evaluating intervention at the regional level. 
Charles et al (2000) identify challenges of evaluating a regional innovation and 
technology transfer strategy and infrastructure scheme (RITTS) that include overlap 
among service suppliers. They suggest that an evolutionary view of evaluation 
emphasise 'relative' rather than 'absolute' impact changes, or how far improvements 
have been made from a starting position rather than how much impact has been 
achieved. 
An identified problem in evaluating university spin-out enterprises is understanding 
the regional effects of other commercialisation actors and how these enterprises are 
commercially enabled and supported by the community that is external to the 
university (Walshok 1994; Downes and Eadie 1996). 
Finally, identified in Chapter Six were evaluation issues related to networks and an 
identified underdevelopment of studies pertaining to the regional and intennediary 
dimensions of networking. These particular evaluation issues and use of networking 
as a regional intervention strategy for technology-based entrepreneurship will fonn 
the research issues taken up by this thesis, and will be described in Chapter Seven. 
6.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter identifies vanous intervention strategies undertaken to create the 
conditions characterising successful technology regions and to counter perceived 
commercial difficulties faced by new technology-based enterprises. Clusters, 
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incubators, and science parks are some of the mechanisms expected to improve the 
success for new enterprises and contribute to regional economic development. 
Critics of intervention argue that market forces must prevail, to ensure that only the 
competent and value-potential companies survive. 
Implications from this literature to the research intent of the thesis identify the 
relevance of regional intervention to Scotland, a country deficient in many of the 
infrastructure conditions characterising successful technology regions but possessing 
a world-class science and technology base. Justification for intervention is based on 
research showing high rates of enterprise failure, poor networking between industry 
and academia and studies comparing Scotland with characteristics of successful 
innovation regions. 
The appropriateness of a regional support network as an intervention strategy 
provided justification for the creation of Connect Scotland. However, literature 
identifies various methodological challenges in evaluating the effectiveness of 
intervention programs in general that include the consistent lack of internal 
monitoring and information-gathering mechanisms, the need for longer evaluation 
time-frames to allow effects on technology enterprises to emerge, post-mortem 
evaluation and the lack of scaleable and appropriate assessment objectives. 
Challenges for evaluating networks include the informal nature of networks, 
attribution of effect problems and difficulties in separated overlapping effects among 
different networks and support influences. Few studies have looked at regional 
support networks as an intervention strategy. 
Evaluation literature suggests the need to identify and describe the network support 
structure and potentially overlapping support influences that establish the regional 
support context. Identifying network attribution effects on technology enterprises 
requires a longer-term approach to evaluation. Taking the network, technology 
enterprises and support agents within the regional support structure as units of 
inquiry could provide a descriptive, functional and attributable assessment of active 
regional intervention support given the evaluation issues described in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RESEARCH DESIGN - BUILDING AN APPROACH TO 
EVALUATING A REGIONAL SUPPORT NETWORK 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter identifies key research issues from the literature, builds a research 
argument and describes the research design and methodological approach for this 
thesis. Research issues draw on socio-economic explanations of technology-based 
entrepreneurship and justifications for intervention mechanisms such as formal 
networks for stimulating the conditions that characterise successful innovation 
regIOns. 
The research argument centres on evaluating a regional support network for 
technology entrepreneurship in the UK - Connect Scotland - its creation, formation 
and growth, impact and value to participants and role among other regional support 
initiatives l . The chapter describes a pilot study of Connect that fine-tunes the action 
research design, identified as most appropriate when studying change, when the 
researcher is a participant in the change process and when an intervention technique 
is being evaluated. The constituency-building model is described that identifies for 
evaluation purposes the mUltiple elements of the network. 
A description of the empirical research includes: network and stakeholder analysis~ 
perceived value of the network as judged by stakeholders~ case studies that reveal 
how network value is realised and drawn into processes of enterprise formation and 
growth; and complementary support initiatives and regional external factors 
identified by network stakeholders that affect network activities and outcomes. The 
final section of the chapter describes the data collection processes and research 
limitations. 
I The methodological implication of using a single network as the research case will be discussed later in the chapter. 
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7.2. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Literature review identifies high priority given to technology-based entrepreneurship 
by public and private sectors - e.g. corporations, universities, regions and nations -
to improve competitiveness, counter decreasing public funding support and diversify 
the regional industrial base, among other factors. 
A social system perspective suggests that innovation and entrepreneurship are often 
collective achievements for countering the uncertainties, complexities and risks in 
commercialising technology innovations (Kline and Rosenburg 1986) that include 
lack of resources and capabilities, such as knowledge, investment and managerial 
expertise. Knight asserts that the 'gamble' in undertaking production under 
uncertainty can be socialised by collective ownership of the means of production. 
Similarly, Schumpeter emphasises that it does not matter that innovations or 'new 
combinations' and functions are carried out by the same people who control the 
productive and commercial processes (1934). 
A social systems framework describes the collective efforts of interdependent actors 
in common pursuit of outcomes (Mowery 1985; Nelson 1982) that includes the 
entrepreneur as an active 'change agent'. Outcomes of these effort evolve through 
the accretion of numerous institutional, resource and proprietary events that co-
produce each other over an extend period (Van de Ven 1993: 212). Van de Ven 
argues that the inter-organisational community or network is a relevant unit of 
analysis if one aspires to understand the factors that contribute to entrepreneurial 
outcomes. 
Molina's socio-technical constituency approach considers the sources of knowledge, 
expertise and other factors that facilitate technology development and exploitation 
within a particular constituency. This approach suggests that various elements -
human, material and financial - are in a constant state of flux, and are influenced by 
activity external to the constituency as well. Molina emphasises the continual 
evolution of constituencies and the importance of interactions and knowledge 
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exchange across socio-economic networks and the influence of key institutions and 
their inherent interest groups. 
Social theorists further argue that the spread of innovations and commercial success 
is a function of the support that can be drawn into new ventures from the larger 
community as well as industry conditions. Research on corporate entrepreneurship 
describe the importance of social capital and social networks in gaining support and 
legitimacy as well as in securing necessary resources to exploit new opportunities 
within existing companies (Kanter 1985; Burt 1987). Literature on academic 
entrepreneurship suggests that most universities rely on external support from public 
and private sources to secure investment, provide market diligence of technology, 
secure professional management and supply channels among others. 
Literature on national systems of innovation, regIOns, clusters and networks 
describes the conditions under which enterprises are created and flourish. The 
concept of the 'entrepreneurial infrastructure' (Vaughn 1983; Porter 1990) 
emphasises the convergence of roles and activities that contribute to the creation, 
development and growth of enterprises. The achievements of technology regions 
such as Silicon Valley, Route 128, and the Boston area have resulted in regional 
policies and programs from less successful regions attempting to imitate these 
successful ones (Rosenberg 2002). 
In the case of Scotland, support initiatives have emerged to counter research 
evidence and generally held perceptions that Scotland has a low entrepreneurial 
culture, low levels of infrastructure support and a low birth rate of new companies 
(Storey 1994, Collinson 2000). Drawing on many of the concepts and perspectives 
described above, the identified need for a 'critical mass' of particular knowledge and 
expertise to stimulate regional technology entrepreneurship is behind justification for 
the network-based program Connect Scotland. 
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7.2.1 Issues from the Literature: Networks as a Regional 
Intervention Strategy 
Literature identifies limited research on networks as a regional intervention strategy. 
Although there is comprehensive literature on network theory, much of it is based on 
exchange and dependency relations within or between existing organisations or on 
structural characteristics such as network size, density, strength of ties (Monge and 
Contractor 1999). 
The application of network theory to regional support networks is made difficult by 
the various definitions, dimensions and variables used in network analysis. 
Literature suggests that there are many 'types' of networks serving different 
functions: formal and informal networks (Birley 1985), information, exchange and 
influence networks (Johannisson 2000), service, assistance and product development 
networks (Monsted 1993) and innovation and business networks, among others 
(Bundall and Smith 2001). 
Network researchers identify the need to further explore how networks are formed, 
how they develop and evolve and their focus and effectiveness (e.g. Burt 1992; 
Hakansson and Johanson 1993; Saxenian 1994; Walker et al 1997). Grandori and 
Soda (1995:184), for example, argue that the understanding of the initial stages of 
network development is particularly lacking. 
Few studies have examined networks as an intervention program and their effects on 
improving the conditions to emulate 'successful' technology regions. This includes 
identification of various private-public roles and the activities and levels of 
interaction between them - in effect a level of regional entrepreneurship - and the 
determination of how these roles and activities manifest themselves as benefits for 
new and emerging enterprises. For example, although universities are prominent in 
regional efforts to exploit innovations, an identified problem in research on 
university-based enterprises is the lack of a theoretical basis in understanding how 
enterprises are created and supported by the outside community (Autio 2000). 
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The management dimension to networks identifies the role of co-ordinating network 
activities and intennediating in the resource exchange between network actors (Burt 
1987; Casson 1997). Questions arise over the type of networks that are formally 
managed and evaluation of network intennediation activities and assessment of 
impact that has 'value for money' implications, common features of many public 
program evaluation. This issue calls into question the use of various measurements 
to determine network 'success', i.e., job creation, company growth or survival rates. 
These measurements may not be identified as networking objectives, or the network 
objectives being measured may be too broad to capture actual program effects2. 
Overall, there appears to be a need to establish more clearly what a regional support 
network is and how it makes a difference in supporting the exploitation and 
commercialisation of technology-based opportunities (e.g. Rangan 2000). 
Establishing network benefits is challenged by evaluation difficulties in attributing 
network benefits on the enterprise (e.g. Birley 1985; Aldrich and Zimmer 1986; 
Aldrich et al 1987; Venkataraman 1989; Dubini and Aldrich 1991; Larson 1991; 
Larson and Starr 1993). Evaluation issues include accommodating the evolving 
nature of networks over time and justifying and establishing the unites) of analysis -
e.g. network, region, enterprise, entrepreneur and knowledge creator. 
7.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND INTENT 
Three sets of research questions are proposed from the above background. The first 
set of questions is focused on network theory and practice as it relates to regional 
support networks. What is a regional support network, how is it created, and what 
are its management and operational characteristics? What benefits do a regional 
enterprise support network provide to network participants and to what extent? How 
does this network change over time as suggested by evolutionary network theories? 
The second set of research questions relates to network effects on new technology 
2 Connect San Diego, operating since 1985, has only recently began to formally evaluate its impact and effects. 
132 
companies - the primary targeted beneficiary of most intervention initiatives and for 
Connect Scotland. What specific commercialisation difficulties are faced by new 
technology companies that justifies the need for support and what benefits are 
attributed to involvement within the network? Are benefits of a network-based 
support initiative similar to network benefits identified in other studies, e.g. social 
capital effects, knowledge transfer, business credibility, access to resources not held 
internally, etc. 
The third set of research questions is focused on the role of the Connect network 
among other regional support initiatives. What is the role of Connect with 
universities, seed funding schemes and other initiatives and how are these 
complementary elements perceived by network stakeholders and used by technology 
companies? How does the Connect network function as an element of a regional or 
national system of innovation? 
In addition to the three levels of research identified above, practical insights 
regarding support networks are expected to emerge as research results unfold. 
Connect Scotland is identified as a relevant case for exploring the mUltiple 
interrelated questions arising from the literature. Since Connect Scotland 
commenced operations in 1997, there has been a perception by Connect stakeholders, 
staff and others that Connect is fulfilling its aims and objectives. However, these 
impacts and outcomes have not been monitored or recorded on a structured basis. 
This is primarily because the Connect program itself has lacked the resources to 
pursue such activity. Its main focus has been on building the national network. 
Ellaram (1996: 100) claims that a single case study can be used to "test a well-
informed theory, an extreme or unique case, or a case which represents a previously 
inaccessible phenomenon". Although other support networks, such as Connect San 
Diego, were considerations for comparative study, 'national' network support 
programs similar to Connect Scotland were not identified. 
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7.3.1 'Pilot Study' of Connect Scotland 
A pilot study was undertaken in 1999 using as a guideline six quantifiable targets 
(Table 7.1) that were established for Connect's first 4 years of operation, 1997-2000. 
These targets focus on three themes: number of events and audience rrtix 
(stakeholder attendance to events); number of technology companies securing 
development/growth funding; and number of spin-out companies, collaborations and 
associated jobs created. 
From Table 7.1, it can be seen that the nature of the committed targets increases in 
difficulty as one moves down the table. Delivering a specific number of events, for 
example, is much easier than demonstrating that a rrtinimum of 180 new high income 
jobs were enabled by Connect. Yet any evaluation of these targets would be 
expected to account for both. 
Table 7.1: Quantifiable Targets for Connect's Outputs and Impacts 
(up to end of year 2000) 
KeI Indlcators , " ~t .' "~~"" ,,:j;'i;"""'" ,'li:,';' ,," " QuantUi'able Tar2ets 't~," "', Jlj'Jj 
I, 
I x. ' ·-i".. ! "' , j ~ • ' -",, ' " 
, 
No. of events held -At least 162 events; minimum of 25 ' participants per event; target mix is 50% 
technology ventures; 30% academics and 20% business professionals 
No. of technology -At least 180 new and emerging technology companies will attend the mix of 
ventures workshops and briefings; 
participating in -Learning achieved wiLL significantly enhance the ability of participating companies 
events to increase their rate of sustainable growth 
-Quality target is 75% of participants to rate the event as "good" or better on a scale 
measuring the perceived value of the event to the businesslindividual 
No. of -At least 216 academics/research staff will attend the mix of events 
collaborative -At least 45 collaborati ve projects between technology ventures and 
projects university/research centres to be established in the project period 
No. of technology -At least 40 technology companies will secure developmentaVgrowth funding 
ventures securing -Pilot has already established that technology ventures participating in Connect 
funding significantly improve their ability to secure development finance through their 
increased understanding of the needs of providers of finance 
No. of spin-out -Connect will facilitate and enable the creation of 15 spin-out companies from the 
companies formed Scottish science base and established technology companies 
-Participation in Connect is likely to improve the survival and growth rate of any 
spin-out company 
No. of new jobs -Minimum of 180 new high income jobs enabled by Connect 
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The pilot study experienced limitations3 on available data and infonnation that could 
detennine only two of six 6 key indicators in Table 7.1. The study also identified 
that more challenging targets (i.e. funding, spin-outs and employment) were related 
to building a support network and that evaluation of these targets was perhaps 
premature. Research suggests that evaluation early in the lifetime of a program may 
be misleading, as the full scale of program impacts may not yet be evident (Segal et 
alI985). 
Indeed, Connect CEO Ian MacDonald acknowledged that direct benefits to private 
sponsors (i.e. gaining new clients from network involvement) may not be evident in 
the short-tenn in 1997 by stating, " ... From the outset it was emphasised to sponsors 
that they would be unlikely to see any significant return on their investment for at 
least three to five years. " 
The pilot study generated the question of whether or not economic impact targets 
were appropriate since Connect Scotland does not pursue fonnal and systematic 
mentoring of new technology-based companies. Measuring these targets would 
require isolating 'contributions' from network actors, attributing them to formation 
and investment outcomes as well as defining what the tenns 'facilitate' and 'enable' 
are meant to imply. These quantitative measurements would assume a static, 
equilibrium-based analysis where the enterprise and contributors are rational entities 
engaged within relative network structures4. 
Literature suggests that network effects are often cumulative and consequently 
difficult to measure. Output targets in Table 7.1 do not provide insights into network 
processes, cause and effect relationships of social interaction and business exchange 
among network actors or any credible measure of network effects on technology 
3 Quantitative analysis of event, attendance and audience mix targets was made difficult by a lack of readily available data. 
Although Connect had maintained a record of attendance to each event, this information existed on individual Microsoft (MS) 
Excel forms and thus needed to be transcribed to MS Access in order to formulate totals and determine patterns of activity by 
stakeholder category. Similarly. membership data needed to be formulated to determine active versus non-active stakeholders. 
company sectors, key company contacts, etc. 
4 This approach would incorporate quantitative research methods and reduce the evaluation to quantitative indicators that are 
more easily integrated into economic models. Although policy-makers will often demand quantitative data for the purposes of 
prediction and the 'political need for numbers' will win through the researchers best intentions (Easterby-Smith et al 1991: 
105), this approach would still require assumptions and predictions of network effects that would limit validity and reliability 
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companies during the formation phases when they are expected to be most active in 
the network. Of key interest is the social structure element of Connect that is 
missing in any quantitative evaluation. 
This thesis will argue that the Connect network can be conceived as a sociotechnical 
constituency encompassing the interrelation and interactions between key players 
supporting the transformation of technological innovations into new enterprises. 
Network actors are constituents seeking interaction to provide and acquire a variety 
of resources and capabilities with the network itself shaping and being shaped by the 
actors and their interactions. Molina suggests that the interests, expertise and power 
held by different actors in the constituency shape the development of a given 
technology (Molina 1990, 1995, 1998). This could apply as well to the social 
shaping of a network. 
Evaluating an evolving phenomenon comprised of multiple structural elements and 
social processes suggests a holistic perspective to discover key categories, 
dimensions and interrelationships rather than testing theoretically derived (deductive) 
hypotheses (Patton 1990). The strategy of inductive designs allows important 
analysis dimensions to emerge from patterns found in the cases under study without 
presupposing in advance what the important dimensions will be. 
7.3.2 Post-Pilot Methodological Considerations 
Based on pilot study findings, further methodological considerations are forwarded. 
Evaluation of Connect as a case subject will draw upon a well-developed 
sociotechnical constituency theory (Molina 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998) that strengthens 
the argument for a single study. As Stake suggests (1994: 242) "generalisations 
from differences between any two cases are much less to be trusted than 
generalisations from one". 
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The research will adopt an action research design, identified as most appropriate 
when studying change, the researcher is a participant in the change process and/or 
one is evaluating an intervention technique (Foote Whyte 1991; McKernan 1991). 
Action research is also appropriate for limitations in theory and practice that require 
flexibility to accommodate issues of topicality, uniqueness and usefulness while 
following sound research methods that generate acceptable theoretical insights 
(Mone and McKinley 1993). Action research can also establish different 
perspectives on program processes for the purpose of improving such programs 
(Silverman 1993). A key concept in action research, according to Robson (1993), is 
that the research does not end with interpretation or theoretical understanding. 
The strong social structure component of networks suggests a design that can 
explore the often 'tacit' component of knowledge, that' resides in people' (Vincenti 
1990) since network theory and practice emphasise that networks are social 
structures comprised of multiple actors. The level of social engagement inherent 
within a network and the desire to assess perceptions and gain information and 
insights from others is particularly well suited to placing the researcher within the 
research environment. 
Therefore, a participant observer approach will be undertaken that allows the author 
to position himself for research purposes within Connect to gain access to 
knowledge, perceptions and other insights as both the network and its actors evolve 
over time. 
In keeping with the spirit of action research, this thesis will adopt a 'real-time' 
approach to evaluation by regularly informing the program for the purposes of 
improvement. Evaluation, according to Posovac and Carey (1997) can facilitate 
program improvements when discrepancies are noted between what is observed and 
what was planned, projected or needed, when adopting a logical sequence between 
needs, processes, outcomes and efficiency. 
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In this regard, evaluation of Connect will not be an anns-Iength "post-mortem" 
evaluation but rather one where the evaluator becomes part of the 'learning factor' as 
the evaluation progresses. The role of the researcher provides a 'real-time' factor 
contributing to the development of the program by making explicit achievements, 
difficulties, challenges and weaknesses, with the results fed back into the evolving 
Connect constituency to inform and improve the program. This methodological 
approach provides a practical application to this research and for other network-
based programs that face similar evaluation challenges. 
Finally, in considering the longitudinal character of this proposed research, process 
evaluation guidelines are appropriate for ongoing assessment of perceptions of 
people, the context or 'milieu' where they are found and the less understood social 
processes in operation (e.g. Bulmar 1986; Silverman 1993). Guidelines include: 1) 
defining the original intent of a program for all stakeholders and a description of 
program activities; 2) identifying growth or change throughout the program; and 3) 
including a full range of stakeholder perspectives if evaluation results are to gain 
widespread acceptance and credibility in the public domain (Rossi et al 1979; Patton 
1987; Gregory and Martin 1996). 
7.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
7.4.1 Levels of Analysis 
The research incorporates complementary units of analysis to address the three sets 
of research questions, as Figure 7.1 shows: 1) the network; 2) its stakeholders; 3) the 
primary intended beneficiary of network efforts, technology companies; 4a) 
complementary support initiatives; and 4b) external factors affecting the network and 
support for technology entrepreneurship. 
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Figure 7.1: Integrated Levels of Analysis: An Action Research 
Approach to Evaluating Connect Scotland 
1) Network Creation, 
Evolution and ....... 




Evolution and Value 
Attribution 
3) Cases: .... ---.--...I4a) Complementary 
Network Value at Support Initiatives 
Firm Level 
4b) Regional Factors 
affecting Network 
Network analysis begins with the origins and development of the Connect program 
and describes its events, activities and mechanisms. Program evolution and key 
success factors examine how a change in June 2001 to Connect's funding structure 
has affected network activities and benefit delivery. As mentioned earlier, network 
growth by itself does not explain the level of interactions and connections among and 
between stakeholders, types of value exchange occurring or the value and 
effectiveness of the network in general. Insights in network membership retention 
levels identify factors affecting attraction to the network and network disengagement. 
Stakeholder analysis looks at the value-added delivered by the Connect program with 
reference to its original objectives and judged by its stakeholders. Measuring 
effectiveness and attributing value to the network is made difficult by the nature of 
the Connect's indirect role. As mentioned, Connect has no direct control of 
processes leading to new or increased numbers of collaborative projects, spin out 
companies, or new jobs. 
The pilot study identified the difficulty of measuring direct attribution to Connect. 
This prompted the question on whether or not network benefits or value gained by 
stakeholders in attending recurrent events could be deconstructed for purpo es of 
measurement. 
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Three value flows were identified from Connect's own objectives -social, knowledge 
and financial value flows. Table 7.2 shows that knowledge value is an overriding 
expectation of all Connect events, with financial value also pursued explicitly. At 
the same time, social value is central to Connect's mandate with the expectation that 
interactions, social contacts and the building of relationships between people are the 
starting point for business-focused activity and outcomes. 
Table 7.2: Value Focus of Connect's Core Events 
Type of Event Objective Value Focus 
Technology briefings To enhance understanding and facilitate Knowledge/social 
technology transfer 
Enterprise Workshops To develop the general management skills of Knowledge/social 
both technological entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurial technologists 
Meet the Entrepreneur Learning from the experience of others and Knowledge/social 
("An Audience with") discussing development of their own businesses 
Springboard Workshops To provide the entrepreneur or academic with Knowledge/social 
practical, realistic and expert advice and 
recommendations 
Investment Conference To provide the opportunity for technology Financelknowledge/ 
companies seeking finance to present to an social 
international audience of investors. 
Partnership Conference To assist in the exploitation of the research KnowledgelFinance/ 
through partnerships, joint ventures, new social 
company creation 
The specification of three dimensions to measure network value is based on explicit 
objectives of each of the recurrent events with social, knowledge and financial value 
provision as common themes. Each of the three value flows is decomposed into 
topics aimed at capturing a gradation of impact or value added by Connect as 
perceived by the program's stakeholders. 
The resulting topics are listed m Figure 7.2. From these topics, a total of 20 
indicators were chosen for the three value dimensions, with each indicator rated 
using a modified Lickert scale5. The value survey can be found in Appendix A. The 
objective of the survey is to evaluate where Connect has been beneficial to all 
5 To avoid sample bia . sample selection involved two different samples of similar stakeholder groups using the same survey 
and 20 indicators. Guidelines were followed from Child (1990), who argues that samples need to be taken from a homogeneous 
population, a factors may be specific to each population. He cautions that crossing popUlations requires an interpretation that 
defines attributes appropriately. Sampling is discu sed in Appendix B. 
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stakeholders, not simply technology compames, regarding social and business 
contacts, gaining or giving relevant knowledge, and attracting or providing financing 
for member companies. A further intention of the value survey is to assess whether 
or not this value is changing over time. The sampling process for the two value 
surveys, 1999 and 2001, is outlined in Appendix B. 
Figure 7.2: Social, Knowledge and Financial Value of Events 
SOCIAL VALUE 
Meeting interesting people with shared interests; Feeling part of a network for contact, advice 
KNOWLEDGE VALUE 
Relevant business information 
IPR, licensing, transfer of technology 
New technologies/developments 
How to partner/collaborate 
Valuation 
Management skills 
Training and support opportunities 
Writing/presenting business plans 
Learning from others in network 
Advise from supportive agents 
FINANCIAL VALUE 
Contacts 
Between companies and financiers 
Between service providers and potential 
clients 
Activities 
Provision of financial information 
Receipt of financial information 
Transactions 
Investments and developments 
Collaborations and spin-outs 
Case study analysis identifies a cross-section of technology companies active in the 
Connect network to capture evidence of actual effects of the Connect program on 
early-stage formation processes and provide some cross-industry validation of 
network effects. In acknowledging that there is no generally accepted set of 
performance measures to evaluate new enterprises (McGee and Dowling 1994), 
interviews with company founders identify formation challenges, commercialisation 
difficulties. Four of the six case studies involve interviews with two or more 
founders to temper respondent bias. 
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Analysis of complementary support initiatives and regional factors identified by 
stakeholders qualify Connect's role, activities and effects during the course of the 
research and informs the practice of regional intervention initiatives from the point of 
view of intended beneficiaries and those managing the initiatives. 
7.4.2 Constituency-building Model 
Integrating these levels of analysis is a 'constituency building model' or 'conceptual 
lens', developed to accommodate the development, value, weaknesses and potential 
for improvement in the Connect constituency-building process (Figure 7.3). The 
development of Connect is seen as a process of constituency-building targeted on 
specific audiences and intent on achieving defined targets through the 
implementation of an integrated set of mechanisms and activities. 
The content of this constituency-building process shows a multi-layered diagram 
containing Connect's events and mechanisms, Connect's existing and target 
stakeholders, and Connect's existing and target outcomes. In particular, the lens of 
constituency-building helps to partition and organise the treatment of the multiple 
elements involved in the development of the Connect constituency. These layers 
should not be seen as separate from each other. In practice, each of the outer layers 
subsumes and requires of the inner layers to happen. 
In Figure 7.3, the circle at its centre represents the focus of the evaluation, namely, 
the entire process of Connect constituency-building for the purpose of supporting the 
creation, development and growth of technology-based enterprises throughout 
Scotland. The first layer around the core shows the main activities, events and 
mechanisms through which the Connect constituency-process is realised. 
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Figure 7.3: Network Constituency-Building Model 
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The second layer around the core shows the key constituents or stakeholders, either 
present or targeted by the activities, events and mechanisms of the Connect 
programmes. The third and final layer around the core shows the target results 
expected to lead to the ultimate mission of growth of Scottish technology ventures 
and industry. These outer layer targets reflect the 'interface' between Connect 
Scotland, complementary support initiatives and public and private activities as these 
targets can be considered as common contributors to the economic goals for the 
region. Beyond these layers can be conceived external factors and conditions that 
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'permeate' these layers and affect, in particular, markets and technology companies 
and ultimately the initiatives supporting them. 
7.4.3 Empirical Research 
The empirical research involves various structured and semi-structured methods that 
include participation data analysis, value and investment surveys and case studies, 
and ongoing interviews with stakeholders. Research objectives and data collection 
activities are shown below: 
1. Network: 
a) Analysis Objectives: 
o Network justification and creation 
o Network management mechanisms, activities and events 
o Growth and evolution of network (1997-2002) 
b) Data Collection: 
o Connect membership, event attendance data (1997-2001) 
o Interviews with Connect management, board and key 
stakeholders: (1999-2002) 
o Company retention/flow-through by sector, level of failures, 
spin-outs versus non-spin-outs 
2. Stakeholders: 
a) Analysis Objectives: 
o Original stakeholder expectations 
o Level of network activity (event attendance) 
o Stakeholder perceptions of network value (social, knowledge, 
financial) at two points in time, quality of events and overall 
perceptions of Connect Scotland 
o Retention/flow through of stakeholders 
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b) Data Collection: 
o Assessment of explicit stakeholder benefits 
o Stakeholder membership data (1997-2001) 
o Value surveys (1999 and 2001; n=116) 
o Random interviews from among sample of survey respondents 
in 1999 and 2001 (n=52) 
o Investment survey (1997-2001; n=35) 
3. Technology Companies: 
a) Analysis Objectives: 
o Value 'transfer' from network to companies 
o Regional 'enablers and constraints' to commercialisation 
b) Data Collection: 
o 6 cases studies of technology companies active in network 
o Survey feedback from technology companies 
4. 'Complementary Initiatives' and Regional Factors: 
a) Analysis Objectives: 
o Identification and assessment of related regional mechanisms 
and factors identified from previous levels of analysis 
b) Data Collection: 
o Scottish Enterprise (SE) and Proof-of-Concept Fund 
o Edinburgh Technology Fund 
o Scottish Research Institutes (Roslin Institute) 
o Scottish Institute for Enterprise 
Descriptions of research processes can be found in the following appendices: 
o Appendix A: 
o Appendix B: 
o Appendix C: 
o Appendix D: 
o Appendix E: 
o Appendix F: 
o Appendix G: 
o Appendix H: 
o Appendix I: 
network value survey 
value survey sampling 
key stakeholders interview schedule 
interview format 
list of survey respondents interviewed 
investment survey results 
letter to case study companies 
interview format: post-spin-out 
description of seed funding schemes 
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7.5 METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS 
Attribution of network effects remains a research limitation in identifying, assessing 
and measuring Connect's direct impact on targets of new company creation (spin-
outs), collaborations and job enablement. One reason is that causal relations for 
these types of outcomes are influenced by factors beyond the direct impact of the 
activities and mechanisms of the Connect constituency-building process. 
The effects of complementary support initiatives will be identified in the research as 
they relate to the experiences of Connect stakeholders. Regional economic factors 
that influence the network and the creation and growth of technology companies will 
also be identified as they relate to network stakeholders. However, the effects of 
technology market conditions and the impact of public policy has not been directly 
examined and is assumed to be a significant variable affecting Connect's technology 
company members, although issues related to Scotland's industrial structure is 
considered in Chapter Eleven. 
For the value survey, further statistical measures beyond cross-tabulation are not 
incorporated because the research focus .is on an exploratory comparison of 
perceived value to distinguish results between stakeholders and between two points 
in time. Cross-tabulation of survey results contain dependent variables (social, 
knowledge and financial dimensions and 20 indicators) and independent variables 
(public, private sponsor, university, technology company, individual/other category). 
This research approach identifies with a reflection by Bechhofer (1974:73) who 
states: "the research process, then is not a clear cut sequence of procedures 
following a neat pattern, but a messy interaction between the conceptual and 
empirical world, deduction and induction occurring at the same time". This 
research approach also supports the claim by Karl Mannheim, who cautions that one 
cannot understand the diversity of beliefs and standpoints in society unless one 
explores and analyses the range and diversity of its group life (Levine 1959). 
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7.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter described the research focus and methodological approach to be taken 
in this thesis. The research is based on identified conceptual, theoretical and 
practical gaps in understanding the creation, evolution and effectiveness of formal 
support networks, made difficult by the evolving nature of networks over time and 
lack of definition of units of analysis - e.g. network, region, enterprise, entrepreneur 
and knowledge creator. 
A study of a regional enterprise support network, Connect Scotland, provides the 
research case. The research establishes four central levels of inquiry. First is an 
examination of the creation and evolution of the network itself - its justification, 
mandate and objectives and Connect Scotland's mechanisms, activities and events 
used to enhance regional connectivity. 
The deli very model of Connect Scotland is examined - taking into account that 
Connect has evolved from a university-based enterprise support network program to 
a private company and is one amongst other support programs in Scotland focused 
on technology commercialisation. Exploring Connect's network management model 
is undertaken to determine its affects on network processes and value delivery to 
stakeholders and to inform the evolutionary network model debate. 
The second level of inquiry examines Connect stakeholders within the network. 
Active stakeholders are surveyed between 1999 and 2001 to capture social, 
knowledge and financial value perceptions implicit in Connect's program mandate 
and activities and to examine how this value is evolving over time. Stakeholders are 
interviewed to further examine their perceptions of Connect, recommendations for 
improvement and issues facing technology entrepreneurship in Scotland. 
The third level of inquiry examines the value of the network to new technology-
based enterprises - the stakeholder group of central importance to the network. In 
addition to the value flows identified above, a survey of companies that presented at 
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Connect's investment conference over four years establishes more measurable 
financial value attributable from the network. Case studies provide a more in-depth 
and descriptive assessment of Connect's value to enterprise fonnation processes and 
infonn the debate on how regional factors enable or constrain early stage technology 
companies in the Scottish context. 
The fourth level of inquiry examines complementary support initiatives and regional 
factors identified during the research as factors affecting the evolution and impact of 
the Connect Scotland network. 
In short, empirical research includes assessment of network event and participation 
data over 5 years (1997-2001); two value surveys, in 1999 and 2001 of 116 
stakeholders and an investment survey of 35 presenting companies; 6 cases studies of 
early-stage technology companies, interviews with 52 stakeholders and examination 




NETWORK AND STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides results that examine Connect's first 6 years (1997-2002) following 
the constituency-building framework. The first section describes the Connect network: its 
creation and formation, objectives, network management mechanisms and activities and 
events. The second section examines Connect's growth and development up until it 
became a private company, in June 2001 1, that includes its transition from pilot project to 
national network program achievements of its original four-year program targets (1997-
2000). 
The third section examines Connect stakeholders, beginning with membership growth and 
retention patterns and insights into why stakeholders enter and leave the network. Results 
of the 1999 and 2001 surveys describe sponsor, university and technology company 
perceptions of event quality, social, knowledge and financial benefits they attribute to 
Connect and provide general comments and recommendation on Connect's effectiveness. 
Results of the 2001 investment survey identify tangible and intangible value directly 
attributed to Connect's investment events. 
I Chapter Eleven examines Connect one-year after it evolved into a private company and the discussion at the end of this chapter 





8.2.1 Creation and Early Development 
OF CONNECT 
The creation of Connect Scotland is a story of transfer of entrepreneurship. In 1995 Ian 
MacDonald, on staff at the University of Edinburgh Management School and involved in 
research on support programs, perceived that a similar style of organisation to a US-based 
model - Connect San Diego - could play a significant role within the Scottish business 
arena. Connect San Diego was created in 1985 at the University of California, San Diego 
and had developed one of the most comprehensive business support networks in the US. 
At the time, a number of important differences existed in adopting the San Diego model for 
a similar program in Scotland. A stronger entrepreneurial culture, greater supply of 
investment, larger critical mass of new companies, SMEs and larger corporations 
characterised the region of San Diego. Different objectives and expectations would need 
to be considered in addition to the fact that Connect San Diego has been operating for a 
decade. 
From this context, Ian suggests that in 1995 there were fundamental issues not being 
addressed in Scotland regarding supporting new technology companies, creating a gap 
between the actual needs of technology companies and existing support programs. These 
issues included the development and growth of a support network of people common to 
high technology regions and the development and growth of a Scottish-based supply of 
investment. In particular, management skills and good networks were seen as necessary to 
get the resources and know-how that entrepreneurs require to create and develop 
companies. 
The concept of a Connect-like program conformed to one of the key themes in SHEFC's 
1995 Corporate Plan, namely, "to develop the responsiveness and vitality of the research 
base in Scottish higher education, and to work with higher education institutions and other 
agencies in contributing to economic competitiveness and the quality of life." More 
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specifically it conformed to a critical objective within this theme, "to develop further links 
between Scottish higher education institutions and industry and commerce.,,2 
Most importantly, the development of a Connect program In Scotland was a central 
recommendation given in the Technology Ventures strategy document published on 28 
August 1996. Technology Ventures' broad aim is to establish new businesses and jobs 
within Scotland and is based at Scottish Enterprise. Technology Ventures itself was 
created as a result of a Commercialisation Enquiry conducted jointly by the Scottish Office 
and the Royal Society of Edinburgh. 
This document built on the earlier Commercialisation Enquiry conducted by Scottish 
Enterprise (SE) and the Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE) and identified a wide range of 
factors requiring attention to help nurture a technology ventures culture and economy in 
Scotland. It also proposed avenues to tackle the problem, amongst them, the establishment 
of a networking and business support infrastructure to generate effective academic-industry 
links facilitating the multi-directional flow of information between academia, companies 
and service providers. 
The document identified Connect at the University of California, San Diego as " an 
appropriate model,,3, stating that the development of Connect in Scotland constitutes a 
clear answer to this recommendation and the "vision is to create and develop a programme 
that will have an impact in Scotland similar to that of the Connect programme in San 
Diego.,,4 
2 Request for Funding from SHEFC to Support the National Development of the Connect Programme (1997)] 
3 The document described UCSD Connect as follows: "Run from the University of California San Diego and funded by the private 
sector, it promotes the development of the region's high tech industries and the commercialisation of the University's research. It 
creates networking opportunities, stimulating the flow of ideas and knowledge between the academic, business and financial 
communities, and offers business development services assisting, for example, companies to obtain finance and academics to 
commercialise their research. Within the high tech community it acts as a hub, linking local and global networks." (RSPJSE, 
Technology Ventures: COl1lmercialising Scotland's Science and Technology, Scottish Enterprise, Glasgow, 1996, p.22) The perception 
exists that similar conditions to San Diego would apply in Scotland, thus making possible the potentially successful implementation of a 
Connect programme in Scotland. 
4 MacDonald and Ritchie, 31 ,1 October 1997, p.4. 
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In 1996, a proposal was submitted to the Scottish Higher Education Funding Council 
(SHEFC)5 for the start of a pilot program of activity and events initially focused on the 
Lothian and Fife region. In this 1996 proposal, it was made clear that the intention was for 
the activities of Connect to be eventually extended to other regions within Scotland. This 
intention was realised through a further proposal in 1997, with the result that the 
programme expanded nationally to become Connect Scotland.6 
Connect was originally conceived in 1995 to be an Edinburgh-focused program that would 
be informal and low key. CEO Ian MacDonald concedes that there was not an initial 
expectation to plan a Scottish national programme to support technology companies 
although there was evidence that a national programme was needed. Although Scotland is 
well-recognised for its technical creativity, there was evidence (discussed in Chapter Six) 
of a low entrepreneurial culture in Scotland and low levels of technology-based start-ups in 
comparison to other regions of the UK, Europe and America. 
The initial challenge for Connect, according to Ian, was to get people in Edinburgh to sign 
up to a program based on the premise that "we are going to do something which is useful, 
will you pay for it"? Awareness of Connect as a program and brand was non-existent and 
the first primary challenge was to establish a critical mass of private sector sponsors. One 
of the first people Ian sought for consul and discussion on the concept was Martin Ritchie, 
one of Scotland's most successful Scottish entrepreneurs whose support, Ian believed, 
would provide initial credibility in developing a supportive infrastructure in this critical 
early stage. 
Martin Ritchie's decision to take on the role of Connect's Chairman provided Connect 
with critical management and leadership capabilities and access to a far-reaching business 
network. Ian affirms that Martin was key in establishing a core of 20 founding private 
sponsors and dealing with numerous public and private organisations to promote the 
concept of Connect. 
~ MacDonald, I, Connect - The University of Edinburgh Programme in Technology and Entrepreneurship, 29 May 1996. Proposal to 
SHEFC detailing the background, mission Statement, key stakeholders, programme administration and activities, resource requirements 
and funding. 
(, MacDonald, I. and Ritchie. M., Connect - National Development Proposal. 31" October 1997. 
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Public sector support from the University of Edinburgh was identified as another key 
factor further enhancing Connect's early credibility. In their 1999 interviews, both Ian and 
Martin allude to the critical support from Sir Stewart Sutherland, the Principal of the 
University of Edinburgh, who saw the value of Connect not only for the university but also 
for Scotland. 
A critical mass of both private and public sponsors was quickly secured in 1996. 
Scotland's larger research-led universities (Glasgow, Strathclyde and Heriott-Watt) 
followed Edinburgh's lead and signed up as Connect sponsors, thus 'pulling' the other 
Scottish universities into the network quite quickly. Connect West Director Dr. Andrew 
McNair suggests that other universities did not want to miss out on new commercialisation 
opporturiities related to their technologies, and the establishment of a Connect network 
with a base of Scotland's top universities as public sponsors compelled remaining 
universities to join the network. 
The successful creation and early development of Connect in Scotland cannot be attributed 
to one particular factor. Certainly a broad public support base for the Connect concept was 
important - particularly from Technology Ventures, the Royal Society of Edinburgh, the 
Scottish Education and Industry Department and the Scottish Higher Education Funding 
Council. Direct support from the University of Edinburgh was a significant factor while 
early private sector support and business contacts initiated by Martin Ritchie secured a 
critical mass of private-sector sponsors. 
Another significant creation factor was the entrepreneurial VISIOn and drive of Ian 
MacDonald, first in generating interest for a Scottish Connect based on the San Diego 
model and second, in convincing key private and public actors to join and assist with their 
spheres of influence. Professor James Fleck, School of Management Director at the time 
of Connect's creation, argues that Ian MacDonald's determination in the face of 
'considerable early uncertainty' and his willingness to forego an academic career to start 
Connect cannot be underestimated as a factor in Connect's successful formation. 
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8.2.2 Connect's Mission and Objectives 
Since its inception in 1996, Connect has maintained the following mission: 
"To support the creation, development and growth of technology-based enterprise 
throughout Scotland". 
This mission required that Connect bring together multiple actors in different regions of 
Scotland that include universities, sponsors, entrepreneurs and companies. Connect's 
mission followed the rationale that interaction between these communities is critical for the 
development of high growth and high technology enterprises 7 . It also followed the 
findings and recommendations of enquiries and policies of key Scottish industrial and 
academic institutions, including Scottish Enterprise, SHEFC and the Royal Society. 
Connect remains the only national network programme focused on high technology 
compames. 
To a large extent Connect Scotland set for itself a fundamental challenge for this Scottish 
knowledge economy namely to stimulate a resource and expertise environment for 
interaction, learning and opportunities for different communities interested in the 
development of technology-based ventures and, ultimately, economic growth. Bridging of 
the knowledge gap existing between these different communities is central to this purpose 
and relates to Connect's key objectives, as explained below. 
1. Develop and educate an expert infrastructure that understands and supports the 
needs of technology-based ventures, giving companies access to networks of 
expertise and resources essential to their success in a global market-place; 
2. Facilitate and support the transfer of technology from the Scottish science base 
to new and existing firms, either by spin-out or through collaborative projects; 
3. Complement specific initiatives in individual agencies and organisations, 
providing a resource which can be used by all participants to promote and 
develop related activities and projects;8 
4. Enhance the ability of new and existing firms to secure finance; 
7 See COllnects Request/or Funding/rom SHEFC to Support the National Developmem o/the Connect Programme (1997). 
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8.2.3 
5. Educate entrepreneurs about business development and issues germane to their 
industries; 
6. Help entrepreneurs to define new enterprises and whether to start them. 
Network Events and Activities 
Connect's mission and objectives are to be achieved through a program of formal events 
facilitating and encouraging interactions between communities sharing a common interest 
in supporting technology entrepreneurship. These communities include the university 
sector, large corporations, emerging technology ventures and existing companies, service 
providers, regional government, economic development agencies and support groups. 
Figure 8.1 identifies six formal events designed by Connect to facilitate exchange between 
the people from these communities: entrepreneurs, technologists and scientists, technology 
transfer personnel, banks, equity capital providers, business consultants, accountants, 
lawyers and policy-makers, among others. 
It is through attendance and participation at these events that the majority of Connect 
stakeholders are expected to interact. Connect's events are therefore used to stimulate a 
resource and expertise environment for interaction, learning and opportunities for these 
different communities interested in the development of technology-based ventures. 
R From the beginning Connect has made it clear that the aim is not to compete with established activity but to provid~ a channel for all 
participants. in particular research institutions and technology companies, to access skills. expertise. resources which already eXists 
throughout Scotland. 
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Figure 8.1: Connect Events and Activities 
Governance 
Table 8.1 describes each of these six events and their objectives. Each event is expected to 
play a specific purpose for specific stakeholder audiences and they together combine to 
fulfil Connect's objectives that include bridging the knowledge gap existing between these 
communities. 
8.2.3.1 Recurring Events 
The first three events in Table 8.1 are recurrmg types of events that are central to 
Connect's national constituency mandate: technology briefings, enterprise workshops and 
meet the entrepreneur events. These events are delivered primarily at four locations: 
Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh and Glasgow and, of major methodological importance, the 
thesis argues that the majority of the Connect constituency (sponsors, companies, others) 
come together at these three events. Therefore, it can be argued that development of the 
Connect constituency and the identification of stakeholders' participation can be derived 
from patterns of attendance to these 3 events. 
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Table 8.1: Event Descriptions and Objectives 
Event Type Description Objective 
Technology briefings Forum for institutional researchers to To enhance understanding and 
present their work and research activities facilitate technology transfer 
to Connect sponsors and technology 
companies. 
Enterprise Workshops Workshops bringing together technology To develop the general 
companies and researchers with advisors management skills of both 
and business professionals technological entrepreneurs 
and entrepreneurial 
technologists 
Meet Technology entrepreneurs discuss the Learning from the experience 
the Entrepreneur development of their businesses, their of others and discussing 
successes and failures and their views of development of their own 
what it takes to succeed. businesses 
Investment Conference Annual venture capital investment To provide the opportunity for 
conference technology companies seeking 
finance to present to audience 
of international investors 
Springboard (pre- Forum for individuallbusinesses to present, To provide the entrepreneur or 
investment workshop) in confidence, their technological academic with practical, 
concepts, proposed business strategy or realistic and expert advice and 
business plans to an expert ganel recommendations 
Boot-camp Two-day course focused on twenty to To provide a series of experts 
thirty companies, providing preparation for to discuss core subjects; i.e. 
the investment conference routes to market, refining the 
technology proposition 
Other Events National program kick-off in Glasgow, Events created to respond to 
Annual Corporate Partnership Conference, specific needs of Connect as 
Breakfast meetings they emerge 
8.2.3.2 Investment Events 
Connect delivers three integrated investment events that support technology companies in 
becoming investor-ready and attracting investment and section 8.4.4 of this chapter 
examines benefits realised by companies from the investment conference. 
The "Investment Conference", first delivered in 1997, is considered Connect's 'flagship' 
event with 25 new and emerging technology companies presenting their business 
propositions each year. This conference is unique in Scotland as the only investment 
forum exclusive to new technologies and had developed into an attraction for investors 
from the UK, other countries of Europe and the US and Canada. 
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Since 2000, after Connect had run 3 Investment Conferences, the "Springboard" Workshop 
was created to specifically focus on companies seeking early-stage financing. Connect 
found that early stage companies presenting at the Investment Conference had developed 
to the point that these same companies came back looking for second round funding or pre-
IPO funding. Connect saw the need for creating a 'sister event' to the Investment 
Conference to focus on stimulating the development of 'investor-ready' companies leading 
up to the Investment Conference. Key objectives of Springboard include: creating a 
unique market-place for pre-start and start-up companies to present to an expert audience 
of technology angels, experienced entrepreneurs and business professionals; providing 
networking opportunities; and showcasing the best emerging technology companies in 
Scotland. 
Springboard consists of formal 10-minute presentation seSSIOns, after which presenting 
companies adjourn to breakout rooms to meet on a one-to-one basis with the expert 
audience. The criteria for applicants are pre-start and early-stage technology businesses 
who have not yet raised a first round of investment finance and are seeking the opportunity 
to present their business proposal to a qualified audience. There is no cost to presenting 
companies. Connect intends on offering more than one springboard a year as the business 
environment develops in Scotland. This includes the expectation of successful student 
entrepreneurs from the Scottish Institute for Enterprise (SIE) with technology backgrounds 
that want to spin business out. 
A third and most recent investment event, "Boot-camp", is similar to springboard as a 
preparation for the investment conference. Boot camp is a two-day course focused on 
twenty to thirty companies, providing a series of experts to discuss particular core subjects 
such as routes to market and refining the technology proposition. For example, the focus 
of 2001 boot-camp was product marketing and how to sell the business to potential 
customers or partners or investors. Boot camp sits at the post-seed stage - up to raising 
serious venture capital funding and showcases specific business issues. 
These three investment events reflect a more 'hands-on' approach by Connect in 
supporting technology companies. A common theme of these investment events involves a 
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selection process using a sponsor-based selection committee. Connect then assists selected 
candidates in fine-tuning their business proposition at boot-camp and springboard in order 
to ensure that credible and compelling opportunities are presented to serious investors at 
the annual Investment Conference. 
8.2.3.3 Other Activities 
Connect provides 'other' events on an ad-hoc basis that includes breakfast meetings to 
discuss particular topics of interest and one partnership conference to recruit technology 
workers for new companies. Large flagship 'type' events have also been an important 
strategy for Connect in attracting people into the network. For example, when Connect 
expanded to the west of Scotland to develop a national network, a large event was held in 
Glasgow, attracting one hundred people, many of them key business leaders. Connect 
brought up speakers from Microsoft Cambridge and invited media and policy makers as 
well as existing members of Connect. Dr. Andrew McNair, Connect West Director 
suggests that other private sponsors, particularly legal and accounting institutions from the 
west, signed up as sponsors at this event. 
8.2.4 Governance and Communication Mechanisms (to June 2001) 
Connect's national mandate to support technology entrepreneurship has resulted in a 
formal structure of governance and communication for its events and activities. Connect's 
governance is based on a formal 'membership-based' model that generates fees to cover 
the costs of delivering events and activities. All sponsors - private and public - pay a 
£3000 annual fee to join Connect. Sponsors are entitled to sit on the Advisory Board of 
Connect and are involved in developing event topics for members. 
Mcmbers are companies and individuals paying a small fee of £100 per year in exchange 
for access to Connects' events, receipt of the Jargon newsletter and the opportunity to 
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present their ideas at the Springboard event and Investment Conference. Individual 
members generally are those people with no organisational affiliation. 
Since 1997, Connect has been operated by 5 full-time staff: CEO Ian MacDonald, three 
regional directors (north: Aberdeen - Susan Morrison; west: Glasgow - Dr. Andrew 
McNair; and east: Edinburgh - Ian MacDonald), Events and Sponsorship Director -
Gillian Mayman and an office administrator. Regional directors are responsible for 
recruiting new company members and 'plugging' them into the network and event 
organisation. The directors also identify potential new sponsors for CEO MacDonald, who 
is the primary contact between Connect and its sponsors. 
In addition to membership and event management, the Connect office administrator and 
Event Director also recruit new company members by scanning a variety of information 
sources relevant to new and emerging technology-based companies. These sources include 
the regional business magazines and newspapers, professional publications and 
newsletters. These efforts complement the recruiting activities of Connect's regional 
directors who are more involved in one-to-one interactions and recruiting through third 
party introductions. 
Figure 8.2 provides an approximation of the structure of the Connect network. Starting 
from the bottom right are all the stakeholders of the Connect constituency: sponsors, 
enterprises, individuals, etc. who are scattered across North, East and West of Scotland. 
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Regional working groups, shown to the left of Figure 8.2, provide stakeholders with direct 
contact and feedback to the Connect Executive or National Board. Connect activities 
overall are guided by the Advisory Board, made up of sponsors and regional working 
group representatives who are instrumental in assisting Connect in developing event 
content and providing general advice. 
Connect's administrative office in Edinburgh is responsible for interfacing with sponsors, 
members and others linked to Connect (Figure 8.3). Communication between Connect and 
its network stakeholders up until 2001 was primary through its newsletter Jargon that kept 
sponsors and members abreast of ongoing developments in technology and information on 
upcoming events, workshops etc. 
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After June 2001, this communication between Connect and its network will become more 
web-based (www.connectonthenet.com). The web-site, according to Ian MacDonald, will 
be designed to offer a complementary mechanism for Connect's approximately 16009 
acti ve stakeholders - sponsors, members and others - to communicate outside Connect 
events and meetings. Approximately £100,000 is being set aside for the Connect web-site 
from Connect's ERDF programme to hire a database specialist for the office to formalise 
contact information and the profile of sponsors and members. The web-site will focus 
more on showcasing regional and external skills and expertise among the Connect network 
and provide customised and timely information and tools for its membership. 
Leveraging the human capital that Connect has brought together and directing specific 
activities onto the website is expected to provide additional opportunities for the generation 
and dissemination of quality information to complement Connect events. CEO 
MacDonald expects Connect to develop performance targets for the website that will allow 
Connect to approach sponsors at the end of each year and assess their perception of its 
value and level of usage. 
Q Thi. c timate by the Connect central office (June 2002) accounts for those active sponsors and members, interested partie and others 
that ha e c nta ted Connect to r quest ongoing correspondence. 
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8.3 NETWORK GROWTH AND EVOLUTION 
8.3.1 Connect's Transition from Pilot Project to National Program 
A significant challenge for Connect early on, in addition to raising its profile and drawing 
new people into the network, was the decision in 1998 to move forward as a national 
programme from an Edinburg-focused pilot project. This involved expanding the delivery 
of Connect's three core events to each region of Scotland (east, west and north), from 3 to 
9 events per month. Connect Program Director Gillian Mayman concedes that this high 
level of activity was necessary to raise Connect's profile nationally to draw new people in 
from other regions of Scotland. 
This national expanSIOn had operational consequences for Connect, beginning with 
logistical issues: such as securing more venues for events, regional event promotion and 
ensuring that Connect staff would be in attendance at each event held in Dundee, Glasgow, 
Edinburgh and Aberdeen. High demands were placed on sustaining such activity with a 
small staff base while working to ensure that Connect's programme of events was fresh 
and there was a constant flow of high quality speakers. 
A key operational issue for Connect at this time was the uncertainty in determining what 
skill-set to hire for the growing organisation. As Gillian Mayman states, all of Connect's 
directors had joined Connect with a 'clean slate', arriving with a mix of backgrounds and 
learning on the job as Connect developed. It became evident that Connect required a 
database to accommodate an expanding network membership base as this duty could not 
be undertaken by existing staff. A second Connect office secretary was eventually hired 
that could also set up and administer the database. Mayman concedes that a continual 
challenge for Connect is to balance network operational requirements with direct support 
for technology companies as there is no slack in staff time and internal resources. 
CEO MacDonald suggests that his ability to manage excessive demands on staff has been 
challenged by his own workload and reliance on the autonomy of his staff in getting things 
done. Ian describes the managerial learning curve he continues to experience and the 
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balance required in managing his own activities and considering those of his staff. The 
combination of increased events and memberships, managing stakeholder expectations and 
raising the profile of Connect contributed to a significant increase in staff workloads. 
Indeed, the ability of Connect to manage this growth phase can be attributed in large part 
to the competency and dedication of Ian and his staff that have together provided a high 
level of program consistency in promoting itself to the public and to prospective and 
current stakeholders. CEO Ian MacDonald has been with Connect since its inception, Gill 
Mayman has been involved since 1996 and Dr. Andrew McNair since 1998. 
Another operational issue faced by Connect in expansion has been regional inclusion - i.e. 
ensuring that each region of Scotland is perceived as belonging to the network. As the 
greatest concentration of Scottish companies is in the central belt between Edinburgh and 
Glasgow, there is concern that northern regions (Dundee and Aberdeen) would not feel 
part of the national network. Practically, more travel has been required by northern 
stakeholder to attend Connect events, but in reality travel to events out of region has not 
been as prevalent as expected. Interviews with stakeholders and Connect staff identify that 
travel time is an attendance constraint for small company owners typically stretched for 
time. As well, lack of a familiar social network of people at distant events and less 
relevance to regional business issues are factors that may favour local network activities 
and support programs over attendance to Connect events. 
Connect North Director Susan Morrison, based in Aberdeen, alludes to other issues facing 
Connect in supporting new companies in the north region. First, she contends that the 
angel investor community and professional advisor infrastructure is not as diversified as in 
the east and west, tending to be focused on oil and gas rather than other technologies. 
Mon-ison asserts that Connect's profile is higher in the central-belt of Scotland, partly due 
to the fact that there is simply more technology company success stories. Further, 
Morrison asserts that there is a large geographical area for her to cover, resulting in less 
time spent working with new technology opportunities and more time spent on 
administration and travel. 
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8.3.2 Network - Building Targets (1997-2000) 
In building a national network for technology support, Connect set for itself a number of 
quantitative and qualitative targets to achieve in its first four years of operation, 1997-2000 
(Table 8.2). 
Table 8.2: 'Network-building' Targets (1997-2000) 
Key Indicators 
c . 
Ql1an~able Tar2ets ;j;,' 
No. of events held and -At least 162 events; minimum of 25 participants per event; target mix is 50% 
stakeholder mix technology ventures; 30% academics and 20% business professionals 
No. of technology -At least 180 new and emerging technology companies will attend the mix of 
ventures participating 
workshops and briefings; 
in events 
-Learning achieved will significantly enhance the ability of participating companies 
to increase their rate of sustainable growth 
-Quality target is 75% of participants to rate the event as "good" or better on a scale 
measuring the perceived value of the event to the business/individual 
No. of collaborative -At least 216 academicslresearch staff will attend the mix of events 
projects -At least 45 collaborati ve projects between technology ventures and 
university/research centres to be established in the project period 
No. of technology -At least 40 technology companies will secure developmental/growth funding 
ventures securing -Pilot has already established that technology ventures participating in Connect 
funding significantly improve their ability to secure development finance through their 
increased understandin~ of the needs of providers offinance 
No. of spin-out -Connect will facilitate and enable the creation of 15 spin-out companies from the 
companies formed Scottish science base and established technology companies 
-Participation in Connect is LikeLy to improve the survival and growth rate of any 
spin-out company 
No. of new jobs -Minimum of 180 new high income jobs enabled by Connect 
From Table 8.2, it can be seen that the nature of the committed targets increases in 
difficulty as one moves down the table. Delivering a specific number of events, for 
example, is much easier than demonstrating that a minimum of 180 new high income jobs 
were enabled by Connect. Results evaluating these targets are described below, beginning 
with indicators from the top of the table. 
8.3.2.1 Event Attendance 
Stakeholder attendance to recurrent events shows significant growth from all stakeholder 
categOlies (Graph 8.1) but growth was especially high between 1998 and 1999. Thi 
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reflects the fact that, during this time, Connect began developing the national constituency 
in Scotland. It should be emphasised again that the purpose of the recurrent events is to 
deliver specific knowledge from keynote speakers on relevant technology and business 
topics while providing a regional forum where the vast majority of Connect' s stakeholders 
will interact. 
Graph 8.1: Stakeholder Attendance to Recurrent Events, 1997-2000 





After the leap of 1999, attendance growth between 1999 and 2000 continued at a slower 
rate in all stakeholder categories, with the exception of sponsors who show a significant 
drop of 33%. These absolute figures however can be put in perspective, because during 
2000 Connect Scotland ran 46 events as compared with 59 during the year 1999. Clearly, 
13 less events go a long way to explain the relative slow down in growth, as shall be 
discussed below after seeing other figures. 
Graph 8.2 gives another angle into the evolution of attendance patterns to the 3 recurrent 
events over the 4 years. It can be seen that 'enterprise workshop' attendance more than 
tripled (333%) between 1997 and 1999 and has dropped off by 11 % from 1999 to 2000. 
'Meet the entrepreneur' event attendance shows continuous growth of 130% between 1997 
and 2000 and a slight drop off by 2% from 1999 to 2000. In contrast, 'technology 
bliefing' attendance shows a drop of attendance early between 1997 and 1998 of 39%, but 
has almost tripled in growth (290%) between 1998 and 2000. 
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Graph 8.2: Total Attendance to Recurrent Events, 1997-2001 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 






Graph 8.3 provides a more accurate picture of attendance patterns to Connect's core events 
for the 4-year period and help to put in perspective the apparent 'slow down in 2000' 
mentioned earlier. It shows that Connect ran a total of 46 core events in 2000 compared to 
59 in 1999. Most revealing however is the average attendance to all events, which shows a 
consistent pattern of total average attendance to core events of about 26 for period 1997-
1999 with a significant increase in 2000 to 33. This means that absolute attendance for 
year 2000 actually leaped forward by more than 25%. 
It is interesting to note the role played by the event "enterprise workshop" since it is 
largely responsible for the 180% increase exhibited by the total number of core events 
between 1997 and 1999. Indeed, the number of 'enterprise workshops' increased steeply 
from 6 in 1997 to 29 in 1999. At the same time, average attendance to these workshops 
more than doubled from 21 in 1997 to 59 in 1999. In 2000, this attendance dropped to 46, 
still double the attendance average in 1997 and well inside the average attendance of 25 set 
by Connect's quantifiable targets. It can be concluded that Connect has achieved its 
quantifiable target of 'average attendance of 25 to core events' over the 4 years 1977-2000. 
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Graph 8.3: Number of Annual Events by Type, Total Events by Year, and 
Average Attendance to Total Events, 1997-2001 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
8.3.2.2 Stakeholder Mix and Number of Events 
[] Meet the entrepreneur 
• Enterprise workshops 
o Technology briefings 
o Total events for year 
• Average attendance: all 
events 
The 'percentage of stakeholder' targets were originally created by Connect Director Ian 
MacDonald to ensure that there was an effective mix of stakesholders at recurrent events. 
There is a difference between the target categories (business professionals, universities and 
technology companies) with the categories used for attendance at the real events (sponsors, 
universities, technology companies, individuals and others). For comparative purposes, the 
discussion that follows equates ."business professionals" with "sponsors" and "technology 
companies" is also assumed to include "individuals" and "others". 
Table 8.3 below provides an overVIew of achieved number of events, and percentage 
participation by stakeholder against the quantitative targets originally set by Connect for 
their first 4 years. 
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Table 8.3: 'Mix' of Network Stakeholders: Connect's 4-Year 
Quantitative Event Targets and Achievements (1997-2000) 
(Total Annual Events and % of Attendees to Recurrent Events by Each Stakeholder Category) 
Category 4· Year 4·Year 2000 1999 1998 1997 
Target Achievement 
1997·2000 1997·2000 
Total Events 162 177 49 68 33 27 
(Cumulative) (177 cum) (128 cum) (60 cum) 
% Business 20% 23.5% 15% 23% 27% 29% 
professionals 
% Universities 30% 16.25% 20% 18% 15% 12% 
% Technology 50% 29.25% 30% 29% 27% 31% 
Companies 
% Individuals 5.25 9% 5% 4% 3% 
% Others 25.75 26% 25% 27% 25% 
60.25% 59% 
The first point to note from the first row of Table 8.3 is that Connect has exceded the 
targeted 'number of total events.' It has run 177 events against the target of 162 and the 
177 events only account for core and investment events, without including meetings. The 
second row reveals that the percentage of sponsors (business professionals) shows a 
reverse trend, decreasing from a high of 29% in 1997 to 15% in 2000. The overall target 
of 20% however has been met. 
The situation with universities (third row) is revealing of one of the major challenges still 
faced by Connect Scotland. Here, the original target for university attendence was 30% of 
the total attendance. The average result for the entire period 1997-2000 is just over half at 
16.25%. The encouraging fact however is that it started with 12% in 1997 and has 
increased consistently to reach 20% in 2000. 
An important observation from Table 8.3 (fourth row) is the stable percentage of 
technology companies (around 30%) over the 4 years of attendance to core events. The 
target was for a 50% attendance of technology companies. One explanation for thi 
169 
variation is that companies are 'signed up' in two other categories, individual members and 
others. Together, these 3 categories comprise just over 60% of attendees to core events in 
2000, well beyond the target of 50%. 
What do these event and attendance patterns reveal regarding Connect's network-building 
objectives? All targets have been achieved except for the percentage of university 
participation at events (16% instead of 30%). Another observation is the progressive drop 
in sponsor attendance from 1997 to 2000. These findings will be further discussed in 
section 8.5. 
Returning to Connect's original objectives for these events, as described in Table 8.1, 
results suggest that: 
• The attendance objective of 'enterprise workshops' (to bring together technology 
companies and researchers with advisors and business professionals for the purpose of 
developing general management skills) is proving highly attractive to all stakeholders. 
Sponsors, companies and universities display the highest level of attendance. 
• The attendance objective of 'meet the entrepreneur' is proving attractive to sponsors 
and companies, the primary intended target of the event. Universities and individuals 
attend the least, so this event has not developed into a platform for stimulating strong 
university-industry relations. 
• The attendance objectives of 'technology briefings' are not being fulfilled at present 
given that attendance by sponsors and companies is quite low. The objective of 
technology briefings is to provide a forum for institutional researchers to present their 
work and research activities to Connect sponsors and technology companies. The 
attendance patterns suggests that there is much to be done to stimulate closer relations 
and interactions between university and business. The challenge for this event is to find 
ways to increase the mix of attending stakeholders. On the positive side, this event has 
almost tripled in growth between 1998 and 2000. 
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8.3.2.3 Collaborative Projects, Spin-outs and Funding 
Evaluation of Connects 4-year targets does not find direct evidence of collaborative 
projects, spin-outs, funding and employment being directly attributed or facilitated by 
Connect. This difficulty in verifying these targets using available information has 
provided justification for the methodological approaches used in this thesis, including 
survey evaluation of stakeholders described in section 8.4 and case evaluation results 
described in Chapter Nine. 
8.3.3 Operational Challenges to Growth 
Connect's growth from pilot project to national program in 1998 has resulted in significant 
network growth but created new operational challenges. One challenge is to create an 
awareness of a national network rather than simply Edinburgh-focused. Connect CEO Ian 
MacDonald concedes that the Edinburgh University brand was essential in gaining 
credibility for Connect. As identified earlier, the support of the Edinburgh University 
Principal was instrumental in the programme having a home and access to an 
administrative support system. 
All of Connect's directors, (Andrew McNair, Susan Morrison and Gillian Mayman) have 
commented that a considerable amount of their time and energy has been taken up in 
dispelling this perception of Connect as a program favouring specific regional or 
institutional interests. 
Another operational challenge is increasing constraints to autonomy In remaInIng a 
university-based program. CEO MacDonald points out that although Connect's strategic 
and operation activities have been lead by an external advisory board since 1996, processes 
and procedures related to staff, finance, personnel and administration are aligned with 
those of the university. This has limited decisions on staff salaries by Connect as they are 
set on a university pay scale. 
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Advantages of Connect as an independent company from Edinburgh University, according 
to Ian MacDonald, include single line reporting that is not encumbered by rules and 
regulations of a large university and spending less time dealing with bureaucracy issues 
and more time see companies and sponsors. 
Connect identifies the need for a professional board of directors that is not possible as a 
university program. Although founding sponsors provided the initial governance of 
Connect, a national board was established once Connect became a Scottish-wide program 
and sponsors became members of the advisory board instead. According to Gillian 
Mayman, the national board has been highly useful as a strategic catalyst and providing 
advice to Connect and its ongoing development. However, the problem with the advisory 
board, Gillian says, is that all 63 sponsors are members, creating in essence a shareholder 
group. At the same time, there is an ongoing flux in sponsor attendance to Connect events, 
with the challenge being one of keeping all sponsors informed of Connect activities, not 
only those actively involved on the advisory board. 
A professional board would allow all sponsors to resume participation on an equal basis so 
that Connect is perceived as an inclusive rather than exclusive network, and to avoid those 
sponsors with deeper pockets to dominate the Connect agenda. Indeed, the initial aim for 
Connect was to be majority private sector funded. 
8.3.4 Preparations for Spin-out: Connect's Evolution to an 
Independent Company (to June 2001 1°) 
Connect and its advisory board made the decision to pursue a new direction as a private 
company and leave the university, beginning negotiations with Edinburgh University in 
2000. Although negotiations were not as smooth as Connect had hoped, the University 
agreed to an official date of June 1, 2001 whereby Connect would cease to be a university-
based program. One concession granted Connect was that it could remain in the 
Management School until a suitable new premise was secured. 
10 Interviews were completed in April-May 2001 as Connect was poised to begin operations in June as a private company. 
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Described below, Connect directors and stakeholders identify potential challenges facing 
Connect just prior to its transfonnation into a private company in June 2001. 
8.3.4.1 Financial Self-sufficiency 
Financial self-sufficiency is seen as the most pressing concern facing Connect as a private 
entity, as it will no longer be eligible for ERDF funding and will have to cover finance and 
administration activities previously provided by the university. 
From 1997 to 2000, Connect had raised close to £1 million in private and public sources, 
amounting to an approximate average cost of £330K per year to finance its operations. 
Graph 8.4 shows that Scottish public sources, including universities, have contributed 
approximately £270K to Connect (about £90K per year). Without counting the funds from 
university sponsorship (£118K), this amounts to close to £150K total or £50K per year. 
Graph 8.4: Public and Private Sources of Funding for Connect 
(1997-2000) 
o European Union 
• Scottish Public 
o Scottis h Private 
This money has in tum leveraged over £220K from private sector sponsors and close to 
£500K from European Union funding for Scotland. To June 2001, funding has not been a 
resource constraint for Connect operations. CEO Ian MacDonald states that there has 
always been enough funding to allow Connect to deliver what it desired up-front. 
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Gillian Mayman identifies that public funds have provided Connect with a significant 
advantage in growing its network. She states that Connect has been able to exercise 
flexibility and latitude in using the funds to develop its events and activities without 
restrictions from preconceived guidelines tied to funding. Thus the public funds have not 
hindered the progress of Connect or its ability to develop innovative programs. 
From this point of view of value for Scottish public money, it could be argued that Connect 
represents a rather inexpensive program, given Connect's development of a multi-
stakeholder national network and in comparison to the costs involved in operating local 
enterprise companies (LECs) or other support programs provided by Scottish Enterprise, 
such as the Scottish Birth Rate Strategy. 
At the same time, evaluation of Connect's initial quantifiable targets (1997-2000) created 
by CEO Ian MacDonald suggest that the challenge remains for Connect to raise network 
value to the more demanding targets it sets for itself. As described, measuring attribution 
to Connect of some targets is not easy to ascertain with available information and has 
prompted further investigation underpinning much of the research efforts undertaken for 
this thesis. 
According to Ian, these original performance targets for Connect will need to evolve into 
more realistic and applicable targets based on the specific needs of its membership with 
Connect becoming a private company. 
8.3.4.2 Re-valuing Services 
Program Director Gillian Mayman argues that Connect will no longer be able to give 
services away as it has done in the past. To date, Connect's philosophy for attracting new 
members and sponsors has been to invite people along to events without them having to 
commit. Gillian states that often these people will continue to attend Connect events 
without committing, and that this may have to change as Connect seeks a financial return 
in exchange for the value they provide as a private company. 
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Reliance on membership revenue is expected to change the approach taken by Connect in 
managing its network. Gillian asserts that the greater need for revenue and cost assessment 
will require a more formal approach to membership and enrolment. Events are expensive 
to run, and one approach may be a staggered membership depending on the number of 
employees in the company that will use the Connect network. Another suggestion by 
Gillian is to charge those people who sign up but don't show up to events, particularly 
because drop-out rates to some Connect events have been high. 
8.3.4.3 Evolving Sponsor Expectations 
Connect as an independent company will need to provide greater accountability to 
sponsors according to Connect Director Andrew McNair. Up to 2001, Andrew suggest 
that sponsors have not measured their return from their sponsor fees with the amount of 
new business generated through Connect. As Ian MacDonald made clear back in 1997: 
" ... From the outset it was emphasised to sponsors that they would be unlikely to see any 
significant return on their investment for at least three to five years." With Connect now 
in its fifth year of operations, Andrew suggests that sponsors will be more discerning 
regarding the expectations. 
Gordon McAndrew, Chairman of WL Ventures and former Board Member of Connect, 
states that Connect sponsors require a better flow of start up companies in the technology 
sector with a higher likelihood of success to produce a better economic environment 
within the region (in this case West Lothian). Personally, Grodon expects that through 
Connect's efforts, WL Ventures may find people in whom it can invest. Gordon 
acknowledges that Connect's provision of advice and training to a new company 
presenting at the 2001 Springboard in Glasgow made it easier for WL Ventures to deal 
with the new company on issues of finance, strategy and future prospects. 
For the future, Gordon asserts that Connect needs to continue the present programme of 
events that include local events and the national conferences such as springboard and the 
investment conference. One thing Gordon would like to see is more attention directed at 
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technology spin-outs that arise from existing industrial companies. Just as the university 
person has limitations, so has the R&D manager of an existing company, and Gordon feels 
that expanding support to industrial spin-outs would be complementary to Connect's 
mandate for supporting technology companies in Scotland. 
8.3.4.4 Greater Value to Technology Company Members 
Connect also needs to meet the evolving requirements of technology-based companies 
according to Ian and Gillian, who agree that Connect must provide a sharper focus on 
specific needs of companies at their various stages of commercialisation and development. 
At the same time, Connect must ensure that their activities are not overlapping with those 
services already offered in the marketplace, often by Connect sponsors. 
Connect has been highly focused in its early years on start-up technology companies, and 
one of the three core events, enterprise workshops, continues to emphasise topics related to 
entrepreneurs and the development of new companies. According to Gillian, Connect 
provides the greatest value to the start-up technology company, therefore the majority of 
Connect events focus on topics and issues most relevant to the early stage technology 
company. 
As new companies develop and grow, it is more difficult to determine where value can be 
added as a support mechanism, Gillian states. In Connect advisory and staff meetings, the 
spread of events over the course of the year is assessed with the objective of providing 
value to both early stage and developing companies. The dynamics of Connect's member 
companies are assessed, and feedback from these companies regarding their needs is 
considered in establishing new event topics. 
Connect North Director Susan Morrison concurs with her Connect colleagues and asserts 
that Connect requires greater emphasis on a customer-focused approach. This includes 
delivering on time and meeting deadlines, greater involvement from the Connect Board 
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and Chainnan, delivering more tangible benefits to sponsors and ensuring that events are 
valuable to companies. 
Connect aspires to position itself in Scotland as the benchmark and first stop for any 
technology company at any stage, according to Andrew McNair. Connect also intends to 
be the contact network not just for zero stage or first round stage investment but later stage. 
The vision is to capture the knowledge and experiences of creation, development and 
commercialisation activities within the Connect network and to keep that cycle ongoing. 
This allows retention and development of the entrepreneurial drive that creates and fonns a 
small company to spin out and back round to the Connect network, similar to the model 
used successfully by Connect San Diego. 
Connect's continual evolution may see it become an investment management company, 
using its extensive network of private sponsors to raise funds and leverage a recognisable 
brand. However, Gordon McAndrew argues that Connect should not evolve into the 
provision of capital to technology companies. Gordon suggests that issues such as 
conflict of interest with sponsors, the need to acquire an entire set of professional skills 
and the time and energy by Connect to seek out and establish an investment fund are 
reasons for Connect not to get involved. Connect should continue to act as a catalyst by 
knowing where the sources of money are and providing people with infonnation. 
8.3.4.5 Improving Relations with Complementary Initiatives 
A further challenge for Connect is working with other people in the support environment 
in Scotland. Connect is not self contained and 'needs to be giving and taking in all 
directions, and encouraging give and take with the various agencies who are trying to do 
the same or similar sorts of things', according to Gordon McAndrew. 
At the same time, Connect's credibility as a successful regional support program model has 
been substantiated in 2001 when the program, its brand and logo were copied with 
pelmission from Connect Scotland by the Midlands region (University of Warwick) and by 
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Yorkshire in 2001. Both these English-based programs are usmg Connect Scotland 
expertise to assist in start-up. 
8.3.5 Section Summary 
Key findings in the early formation and development of Connect's national network 
include: strong evidence of need for intervention and support, establishing early private-
sector program credibility by involving a high profile business leader and early public 
sector program credibility with support from Scottish Enterprise and Scotland's leading 
research universities. The identification of clear benefits to be derived by stakeholders of 
the network and a formal, integrated set of events and activities bringing together 
stakeholders is based on a proven and successful US model. 
The constituency-building model used to exarmne Connect Scotland in this section 
emphasises the interrelations between: Connect as a formal network 'manager'; the events, 
activities and mechanisms it uses to realise its objectives; and the specific stakeholders and 
their expected benefits. The next section will examine results of the stakeholder analysis 
to establish the level of benefits being realised by stakeholders. 
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8.4 NETWORK STAKEHOLDERS 
Connect's events, activities and mechanisms focus on key stakeholders involved in 
technology-based entrepreneurship (Figure 8.4). They include technology companies, 
universities and research institutions, private service providers, public complementary 
initiatives (support agencies) and the more general community. 




Connect has identified specific benefits for each of the key stakeholder categories seen in 
Figure 8.4 that are described below: 
Technology Enterprises11 
Technology companies will benefit from an enhancement in their ability to: 
• access new markets, clients, partners, products, technology and finance, and improve 
marketing skills; access to technical and managerial assistance; 
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• secure developmental! growth funding; 
• stimulate collaborative projects between technology businesses and 
universities/research centres, including access to national and international sources of 
R&D funding and capitalisation; 
• facilitate and enable the creation of spin-out companies from the Scottish science base 
and established technology companies; 
• learn about business development and issues germane to their industries; and receive 
help to define new businesses and whether they should start them. 
In general, technology-based ventures and companies will benefit from the development of 
an expert infrastructure that understands and supports, and benefits from, their needs for 
success in the global market. The overall result is envisaged to lead to the creation of new, 
additional 'high income' jobs. 
Universitiesf2 and Research Institutions 
• Scottish science base will benefit from facilitation and support for technology transfer 
to new and existing firms, either by spin-out or through collaborative projects; this 
includes increased interaction between campus-based researchers and industry 
scientists. 
• Individual academics and researchers will benefit from an effective infrastructure 
which institutions can use to better understand the needs of technology-based 
companies and financial sectors and to commercialise their research; 
Service Providers (e.g., regional attorneys, bankers, accountants and 
marketing professionals) 
• Service providers will benefit from enhanced competence regarding high technology 
products, companies and industries. This happens through the provision of technical 
II These arc defined by Connect as companies competing on the basis of proprietary technology or know how. 
12 The Connect San Diego model deals with one university. the University of California. San Diego (USCD) and remains a university-
based program. On the other hand. Connect Scotland deals with 14 universities and will no longer be a university-based program as of 
June 2001. 
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briefings and education about umque characteristics of high-technology products, 
financing, manufacturing and marketing. 
'Complementary Initiatives' and General Community 
• Complementary initiatives (support agencIes and programs) will benefit from the 
provision of a resource that can be used by all participants. 
• The general community is expected to benefit from increased community awareness of 
the issues affecting the development of high technology enterprises, as well as from the 
provision of a community resource for data and information on the status of research 
activities and business development in the high-technology sectors; 
All the above parties are envisaged to profit from the access to a common network of 
expertise, resources, and the opportunity to interact on a regular and informal basis through 
the Connect program described in the next section. 
8.4.1 Participation Growth and Retention Analysis - 1997-2002 
This section examines stakeholder membership growth and retention data to qualify earlier 
assumptions regarding Connect's growth and identify factors affecting why stakeholders 
enter and exit the network. 
Overall, the size of the Connect 'subscriber' constituency has grown significantly over 6 
years (1997-2002) to 148 organisations (65 sponsors and 83 member companies) and 55 
individual members. Connect 'subscriber' constituencyl3 follows the Connect Office's data 
categorisation of sponsors, universities, companies and individuals. Graph 8.5 shows the 
number of paying stakeholders associated to Connect by category at June 2002. 
13 Subscribers are those organisations or individuals paying a membership fee to join Connect. 
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Graph 8.5: Stakeholder Categories of Connect (to June 2002) 
(*public sector includes all 14 Scottish universities, Scottish Enterprise 
and SHEFC-Scottish Higher Education Funding Council) 
o *Public Sector Sponsor 
• Private Sector Sponsor 
OTech Companies 
• Individuals 
Graph 8.6 shows this growth for sponsors, companies and individuals, with universities 
included in the sponsor category. All categories, in particular companies, show substantial 
growth. It should be emphasised that all 14 Scottish universities are sponsors of Connect. 








Although overall growth in 'subscriber' stakeholders seen in Graph 8.6 suggests that 
Connect is delivering value to each stakeholder category, this cannot be assumed without 
further information. Determining how stakeholders perceive the value of Connect will be 
substantiated by results from the surveys and cases in chapter nine. 
The next section will qualify stakeholder growth shown in Graph 8.6 by exammmg 
membership retention rates and factors affecting the level of network entry and exit by 
sponsors and technology companies. 
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8.4.1.1 Sponsors 
Graph 8.7 shows a further breakdown of types of organisations acting as sponsors of 
Connect. Since 1997, there has been a three-fold increase in sponsors, from a core of 21 
founding sponsors to 65 in June 2002. Graph 8.7 shows that although universities 
represent the largest single 'homogenous' category of sponsors, professional services 
(legal, consulting and investment agencies) comprise approximately 75% of the sponsor 
membership base. As expected, private sponsors are primarily Edinburgh and Glasgow-
based or along the central Scottish belt between the two cities where the majority of 








o Consulting Firms 
• Corp Finance 
I!JBanks 
• Specialist consultants 
o Other Private 
• Public agencies· 
The regional element of Connect is more evident with the presence of the public sponsors. 
All 14 of Scotland's universities are public sector sponsors with these universities 
representing a broader spread geographically. Scottish Enterprise (SE) is Connect's major 
single public agency sponsor, and as Scotland's leading economic support agency, 
provides local enterprise companies (LECs) throughout Scotland that deliver general 
business support. SE's early and continual support of Connect is based on Connect' s 
national mandate and its focus on Scottish technology sectors. 
Overall, annual membership renewal by private and public sponsors continues to remain 
high with over 90% of private sponsors and 100% of public sponsors renewing 
membershi p in 2001 . 
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8.4.1.2 Members 
Examining company retention patterns shows a very different picture to that of sponsors. 
Although Graph 8.6 shows a five-fold increase in members of Connect since 1997, the 
total number of company members fell between 2001 and 2002 from 106 to 83. Graph 8.8 
shows member retention using data on annual new members, non-renewals and continuing 
members since 1997. Similar ratios are evident for 1997, 1999 and 2000 between new 
signs-ups and non-renewals that result in a retention rate of approximately 40% for each of 
these three years. 
Graph 8.8: Network Retention of Companies: Number of Annual Technology 
Company Sign-ups, Non-renewals 
1997 
and those remaining as Members in 2002 
1998 1999 
fl New members 
~~..;;....;~~~~~~. Non-renewals 
o Members in 2002 
2000 2001 
Market conditions, as expected, playa significant role in explaining retention patterns of 
company members. Graph 8.9 shows retention of technology companies by sector 
reflecting the high tum-over pattern for all technology sectors after year one. Companies 
retaining membership for over 3 years reflect a balance between electronics and software 
companies, and an almost equal number from other sectors, including 2 biotech and 2 
telecom companies. The higher retention rate of the 'other' category reflects a mix of 
sectors such as incubators and industrial application. 
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Graph 8.9: Network Retention by Sector: Number of Companies and Length 
of Time as Members of Connect Network (1997-2001) 
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Graph 8.9 shows the pattern of retention according to technology sector, showing that 
although software companies are the dominant sector retaining long-term network 
membership, electronics companies show the highest rate of retention in 1997. 
Biotechnology companies were highest in 1999. This view suggests that network 
membership patterns will vary year by year because Connect's company members are 
drawn from across a breadth of sectors. At the same time, this multi-sectoral company 
constituency provides some level of network stability, because market conditions vary 
widely between sectors. 
A significant factor explaining almost half of the total non-renewing memberships since 
Connect commenced operations is companies ceasing to trade (Graph 8.10). 
Graph 8.10: Non-renewing Company Members of Connect versus 
Companies Ceasing to Trade (1997-June 2002) 
Total member non-renewals No longer trading 
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Graph 10 shows that 36 companies (out of 75 non-renewing memberships) have ceased 
trading as of June 2002, with the majority of these companies (67%) from the software and 
life sciences sectors. 
But market and sectoral conditions do not fully explain the significant level of company 
tum-over in the Connect network. Connect CEO Ian MacDonald concedes that Connect in 
its first years of operation did not actively focus on securing company memberships and 
focused rather on building the national network and establishing a pattern of events. The 
year 1998, as shown in Graph 8.8, demonstrates both a low level of new members and a 
high exit rate, with only 1 company from 1998 still remaining as a member of Connect in 
2002. Ian and two of Connect's directors attribute the low level of retention in 1998 to the 
fact that all efforts were focused on developing Connect from an Edinburgh-based project 
into a national network. Ian also concedes that part of the retention problem has been a 
lack of marketing Connect to companies. Much of Ian's time in the past has been devoted 
to attracting sponsors into the network and securing sponsorship investment. 
Another explanation given by Connect is that engagement in the network by entrepreneurs 
and technology companies continues to be non-mandatory and flexible. However, this 
argument is valid for sponsors, and retention remains high in that membership category. 
Indeed, based on the retention rates identified above, the Connect CEO was asked about 
the high tum-over of technology companies as it affects expectations by private sector 
sponsors to secure new companies as clients. Ian suggests that the high level of attendance 
to Connect events (Graph 8.2) provides a satisfactory 'high chum' for sponsors to identify 
high potential clients while acknowledging that most new companies will not have 
resources to hire them. Ian argues that those companies remaining in Connect for more 
than one year are more likely to hire professional services as they develop while those that 
leave Connect after one year mayor may not, depending on the initial contacts made 
during their time within the network. 
One question regarding network membership related to the level of early-stage technology 
companies (less than 5 years old) that are members of Connect among the total 'pool' of 
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technology companies in Scotland. This figure was not available from Scottish Enterprise 
or any other public agency, indicating a problem regarding measures of emergmg 
enterprise formation among total new venture creation figures using VAT data. 
An estimate by Connect suggests that the actual population of technology companies in 
Scotland is approximately 500. Approximately 75 of those in anyone year seeking to raise 
investment finance and approximately 50 (10%) will cease to trade that include companies 
being acquired and companies failing. This population of 500 will tum over again over a 
10-year period according to Ian. Ian thus forwards the argument that the actual population 
of companies that are appropriate for Connect is quite small, drawing from an estimated 
population of 150 companies from the estimated 500 in Scotland that will be less than 
three years 01d14. 
Membership retention results described here have been acknowledged by Connect as a key 
challenge to its future plans to become a private company. Chapter Eleven will further 
examine how Connect has met this challenge through its new business model by evaluating 
Connect one-year after it became a private company. 
14 "Technology companies" are defined by Connect as those competing on the basis of proprietary technology or know how. 
187 
8.4.2 Stakeholder Perceptions of Network Value (1999) 
This section examines network benefits and value, based on perceptions from a total of 116 
Connect stakeholders (67 in 1999 and 49 in 2001) who provide feedback on 3 areas of 
inquiry: 1) quality of Connect events and mechanisms; 2) perception of social, knowledge 
and financial value flows; and 3) recommendations for improvements and general 
comments on Connect value as a support network. Results are described according to 
stakeholder group - sponsors, universities, technology companies and individuals/others -
beginning with the 1999 survey. 
8.4.2.1 Event Quality 
Graph 8.11 shows that Connect events were rated 'good to very good' by 58 of the 67 
respondents (86%), exceeding Connect's 4-year quantifiable target objective: "75% of 
participants rate event as 'good' or better, according to perceived value". 






Comments on quality of recurrent events revealed three common themes: 
o Events are well organised and well timed (majority of comments); 
o Events are relevant across a range of interest areas, providing both immediate 
relevance and background interest (majority of comments on content); 
o Connect has, to date, been able to attract and sustain a high quality group of 
speakers. Quality of speakers is an important feature of attracting people to events, 
particularly with the increase in the number of network programs and sector-
specific associations (majority of comments); 
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o More international speakers as Connect has utilised many of Scotland's existing 
business 'names' in previous events and Connect competes with other events that 
also have high quality speakers (6 comments); 
o Connect moderator needs to take a more active role, and "provide more impact if 
the speaker is not dynamic" (3 comments); 
o Logistical difficulties to attend events from those distant from Glasgow, Edinburgh 
or Aberdeen (for instance, of a total of 20 Enterprise Workshops during 1999 - 8 
took place in Edinburgh, 5 in Glasgow, 6 in Aberdeen and 1 in Dundee) (3 
comments). 
8.4.2.2 Network Value Flows 
Graph 8.12 shows compansons of social, knowledge and financial value between 
stakeholder categories 15 • Social value is rated highest followed by knowledge and financial 
value respectively with one noticeable exception being 'sponsors' who rate financial value 
higher than knowledge value. A lower knowledge value by sponsors is suggested with the 
premise that many sponsors are knowledge specialists themselves and familiar with the 
commercial topics represented by the survey indicators. 
Graph 8.12: Perceived Value (%) of Connect (n=67) 





15 , ffi d ... I th h Univcr itics' as a stakeholder category include only technology transfer 0 Ice and related a rrurustratJve personne • ra er t an 
univcr ity cienli IS and those involved in 'spin-out' activity. This latter group is included in the 'company' category . 
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The high rating of social value seen in Graph 8.12 would be consistent with the evolution 
of networks where social interactions and acquaintances tend to precede the exchanges and 
collaborations involving knowledge and financial value (Falemo 1989; Butler and Hanson 
1991; Larson and Starr 1993). 
Graph 8.13 identifies the difference between affirmative responses to perceptions of social, 
knowledge and financial value overall. Following the assumptions of evolutionary 
network theory noted above, it is postulated that affirmative responses to knowledge and 
financial value will increase in relation to social value in the future. Indeed, an identified 
challenge for Connect in the future will be to "increase the knowledge and financial value 
delivered by the network as perceived by its stakeholders". This statement is made 
because Connect itself explicitly states that knowledge and financial benefits, in addition to 
social value, are to be derived by stakeholders from involvement with the network. 




~~""""---1 0 Financial 
Most Definite & To 
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Section 8.4.3.2 examines changes to these levels of perceived value, comparing this 1999 
sample with a similar proportional sample of stakeholders with similar levels of network 
participation in 2001. Network evolution is further examined through the experiences of 
case companies (see section 9.4.1 of Chapter Nine) that suggests a 'network value curve' 
whereby new companies involved in the network experience a progression of social and 
business-related benefits from their network participation activities that eventually 
diminish over time. 
Ih PSS ero -tabulation: percentage of 'most definite' and 'rea lised to some extent' responses to total responses for each set of value 
dlmcn ion ( oeial, knowledge, financial) questions . 
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8.4.2.2.1 Social Value 
A better picture of social value emerges when responses to each social value indicator are 
compared as shown in Graph 8.14. 
Graph 8.14: Affirmative Responses to Social Value Indicators (n=67) 
met potential service 
providers 
met potential clients 
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As expected, the more demanding indicators at the top of the graph (e.g. 'met potential 
backers of my ideas') are rated lower than more general 'social affiliation' indicators of 
'meeting interesting people that share similar interests and concerns', and 'feeling part of a 
network of advice and contact'. Clearly, a high level of social interaction within the 
network is suggested with a 91 % affirmative response rate. 
Looking more specifically at stakeholder responses by category, Graph 8.15 shows where 
stakeholders differ in perceptions, with these differences most evident in questions related 
to social exchange. Clearly, sponsors rate "client contacts" highest, while companies and 
universities rate "partner contacts" highest, reflecting different objectives for relationship 
building within the network. 
Graph 8.15 shows a high rating given by university respondents to "gave valuable advice" 
while sponsor ratings to this indicator are significantly lower. A number of possible 
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explanations are forwarded here, one being that universities are public sponsors and are 
attributing advice provision in general terms and to those with university technologies 
active at Connect events I7. The low level by sponsors, most of them private service 
providers, could reflect a greater selectivity on advice provision to only those considered to 
be potential clients of their services as private sponsors are used to charging for advice. As 
these suggestions are speculative, further findings will qualify these assumptions and be 
discussed later in the chapter. 
Graph 8.15: Affirmative Responses to Social Value Indicators by Stakeholder 
Group (n=67) 
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Feedback from stakeholders provides qualification of survey results for each value 
dimensions. 
Sponsor Comments • 
Sponsors generally describe Connect as an inexpensive network that creates good dialogue 
for support because "the key and important people are at these events" and "participants 
have the opportunity to draw on others' experiences". Two sponsors indicated that the 
quality of discussion at events is open and optimistic. A respondent representing a Scottish 
Enterprise LECs (local enterprise company) finds that Connect provides value as a forum 
17 Twenty-one companies out of a total of 51 responding to the 1999 and 2001 surveys were identified as university spin-outs or start-
ups 
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for marketing its Science Park in Aberdeen to technology companies In attendance at 
events. 
University Comments 
University respondents generally identify Connect as an informal network for meeting key 
supporters of high technology in Scotland. One respondent states that "networking is the 
start of everything, that includes the build-up of friendship and trust", echoing the 
importance that university stakeholders place on forming new social relations within the 
network. 
Another frequent response was "access to an informed network". Three universities 
alluded to their need to keep in touch with what is happening in Scotland; as one 
respondent states: "[our] university needs to be there". Another respondent added that 
Connect is a valuable resource, in that "[one] knows Connect is there if you need it, as it is 
a group of people within a supportive environment". 
University respondents are unanimous in stating their expectation that social contacts will 
lead to collaboration. As noted earlier, survey results identify the high value attributed to 
partner contacts and meeting potential backers of their technologies as well as providing 
valuable advice to others. 
Company Comments 
Company respondents are more diverse than sponsors and universities in perceptions of 
social value. One common theme is the importance of Connect as a venue for initiating 
and developing social relations. As one respondent states: "Networking is most important 
for first-time attendees to build relationships and for keeping in touch and keeping those 
contacts ". 
Others identify the diversity of the network as important. One company respondent states: 
"Connect facilitates making and keeping contact in a range of sectors, i.e. academic and 
public sectors, various industry sectors". Similarly, another respondent notes: "The 
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networking platform is very important in that it provides a solid mechanism for the 
biotechnology community to network with other stakeholders". 
Companies identify Connect as a social environment that is conducive for business. An 
informal atmosphere at events is identified as facilitating interaction between service 
providers and companies. One respondent states: "Connect is well-suited for doing 
business and facilitates it well; there is no problem flashing business cards at the events; 
Connects is good at managing these different interests". Another indicates that: "Connect 
is the most relevant network for potential business because of the overlap of potential 
clients of [our company] and the Connect attendees". Indeed, results identify partner 
contacts as the most important social value for companies. 
A third theme expressed by company respondents is the importance of Connect as a venue 
for like-minded entrepreneurs experiencing similar issues and difficulties. One comment 
suggests: "Connect reflects a shared vision of everyone of future success of start-ups". 
Another respondent identifies a recurring comment among a few of the newer network 
members by stating "It is a place to meet different people that share similar 
experiences ... it's lonely as an entrepreneur". 
8.4.2.2.2 Know/edge Value 
Graph 8.16 shows a more varied pattern of responses to knowledge value indicators in 
comparison to social value. Although it would be expected that learning of 'relevant 
information' and 'relevant technologies' for their business would be highly rated 
knowledge indicators, the lowest rated questions reflect issues most relevant to 
commercialising technologies, such as 'learning about business-related skills', 'IPR and 
licensing issues'. To reiterate, an objective of Connect's recurrent events to facilitate 
transfer of commercialisation knowledge. 
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Graph 8.16: Affirmative Responses to Knowledge Value Indicators (n=67) 
o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
Another key observation Graph 8.16 is the low rating given to the question 'introduced my 
technology to a highly relevant audience'. Another objective of recurrent events is to 
provide a networking forum for exposing new technologies to potential supporters. These 
findings require further qualification by stakeholder category in Graph 8.17. 
Graph 8.17: Affirmative Responses to Knowledge Value Indicators by 
Stakeholder Group (n=67) 
business intro of ideas to learnt of relevant protecting IPR, training and business related 
relevant info relevant new tech licensing,etc. support info skills 
audience 
Graph 8.17 confirms the low rating given to the question "introduced my technology to a 
highly relevant audience" by companies and universities, two stakeholder groups expected 
to benefit from the recurrent event forum. This finding may suggest that an appropriate 
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technology audience is not available at recurrent events or that the forum provided by 
recurrent events is not generating business discussion and activity but is rather delivering 
topic knowledge, as noted by the high ratings of business relevant and new technology 
information. 
Graph 8.17 also qualifies commercial support perceptions of stakeholders, and indeed, 
companies rate 'learnt about business-related skills and 'learnt about IPR and licensing 
issues' the highest among stakeholders as expected. An interesting finding, however, is the 
high rating by universities to 'learnt about training and support programs', suggesting that 
Connect events provide a valuable forum to university technology transfer personnel in 
updating them on external support programs. 
Sponsor Comments 
Two themes emerge from sponsor comments on the perceived knowledge value of 
Connect. The first is the use of Connect as a training venue for staff, as noted below: 
"Connect allows us to expose staff to industry sectors to increase their knowledge; with the 
intention of eventually giving sector advice to clients". The second theme is the role of 
Connect as a knowledge provider, with Connect facilitating, as one sponsor said, the 
"lateral transfer of information". Other comments include: "[Connect] breaks down the 
lack of knowledge; a key problem in Scotland" and "[Connect allows for] market 
awareness, who are the players, angels, etc. and what is innovative in Scotland". 
University Comments 
Although survey results identify a low value attributed to commercialisation topics (IPR, 
technology transfer), university respondents commented on the importance of information 
on commercialisation issues, as one respondent states: "to gain insight into how others are 
tackling issues of commercialisation; such as where are the gaps"? Another states: "from 
the Technology Briefings, one can get a snap-shot of a technology or industry sector in a 
single session". One university respondent identifies a more general benefit, stating 
"Connect facilitates a greater awareness of various institutions and agencies and how they 
operate". Related to the previous comment is a further statement: "Connect provides 
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practical knowledge on how to do something; this differs from experience with the civil 
servant mentality". 
Company Comments 
Sharing business experiences with other entrepreneurs was the most frequent comment 
from companies. Three company respondents note the value of hearing about other 
people's experiences in setting up businesses and the problems they have encountered. 
Companies were also interested in sector-specific information, as noted by one respondent: 
"Connect provides a cross-sectoral venue as well as relevant topics according to industry 
sector". 
Other comments identified learning being facilitated through Connect through an 
evolutionary staging of topics at events with different issues raised and discussed. A 
number of company respondents cited information that related to specific commercial 
issues they were experiencing at the time (e.g. "last year's seminar on insuring businesses 
was highly relevant and informative"). Company respondents, despite the high percentage 
of spin-outs, did not identify knowledge from universities as important despite the high 
rating given by universities to 'gave valuable advice'. 
8.4.2.2.3 Financial Value 
Graph 8.18 identifies the Connect network as most valued for social contact with investors 
and entrepreneurs, although these two primary financial indicators are not as strong as the 
respective social and knowledge indicators. Respondents also confirm a lower level of 
financial knowledge exchange, as seen in responses to 'gave valuable financial 
information' and 'obtained valuable financial information'. More tangible financial value 
is not apparent based on the response level to 'obtained financial backing' and 'invested in 
new business', with both these indicators rated the lowest. As expected, the number of 
respondents perceiving value decreases as the indicators imply a more demanding value. 
Contacts between investors and entrepreneurs are being facilitated at events but attribution 
of deals being made is not confirmed according to these indicators. 
197 
Graph 8.18: Affirmative Responses to Financial Value Indicators (n=67) 
o 10 20 30 40 50 
Graph 8.19 shows high level of investor and entrepreneur contact among sponsors and 
universities as expected and to a lesser extent by companies. Sponsors also identify a high 
provision of giving valuable financial information at events. 
Graph 8.19: Percentage (%) of Affirmative Responses to Financial Value by 
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An interesting observation from Graph 8.19 is that company respondents rate 'invested in a 
new technology' higher, suggesting that company members are also active in investment. 
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It would be expected that companies and universities would rate 'obtained investment' 
higher than sponsors, as they are more explicitly seeking investment. 
Graph 8.19 suggests that overall, company members of the network are actively engaged in 
social activities related to investment that includes seeking and providing investment, 
suggesting that not all company respondents are emerging start-ups. It also appears that 
there is greater selectivity on the part of sponsors and universities to what they are seeking 
in terms of financial value that is limiting their level of financially-biased social exchange. 
Sponsor Comments 
Connect sponsors, most of who are professional servIce providers, identify their 
expectation of securing clients through early contact with technology entrepreneurs. One 
sponsor comments: "[We] want to see potential clients early to develop long-term 
relationships; our prime motivation is to increase the number of clients". Similarly, 
another explains: "Although most new ventures can't initially afford [us], Connect is a link 
to get to know potential clients of the future". 
Sponsors also comment that, in return for 'complementary' business knowledge they 
provide to new companies at events, entrepreneurs will feel a level of obligation to contact 
them when seeking professional services. As one sponsor explains: "By providing 
business advice, it is hoped that clients will develop a moral obligation for a long-term 
relationship with us". Another sponsor suggests a level of compatibility between the 
objectives of Connect and sponsors, stating: "Connect is supportive of new ventures, in 
line with the focus of [our company], who want to support and provide services for these 
companies" 
However, few sponsors could attribute any new business directly to attendance to Connect 
recurrent events. Connect CEO Ian MacDonald acknowledged that direct benefits to 
private sponsors may not be evident in the short-term. In 1997 he stated, " ... From the 
outset it was emphasised to sponsors that they would be unlikely to see any significant 
retunl 011 their investment for at least three to five years." It is argued here that an 
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identified challenge for Connect will be to "increase the financial value delivered by the 
program as perceived by its private sponsors". 
Sponsors also identify the importance of the investment events in stimulating interactions 
between young technology companies and potential investors, with a number of 
suggestions that the Springboard event was a needed program for filling the gap for very 
early stage companies. 
University Comments 
Universities are unanimous in stating their expectation of attracting investment for the 
technologies they represent at Connect events. Commercialisation officers representing 
three universities explicitly stated these intentions. One states: "[Our] university already 
has technologies waiting to go", while another explains: "Through Connect we hope to 
expose enough of our technologies to secure financial backing for university 
technologies". A third offered a simple explanation for his attendance: "I want to meet 
potential funders for our technologies". 
Survey results identify a low value associated with 'obtained investment' by universities, 
although a few respondents stated their expectation that investors will be found. As one 
commercialisation officer states: "we have yet to obtain financial backing for 
ideas/products but expect to in the future". Others stated their concern that investment 
was not forthcoming, suggesting an impatience and level of expectation that Connect 
events would facilitate more tangible financial value. 
University expectations of financial returns through network participation are more direct 
and explicit than sponsors and companies. As will be discussed later, these expectations 
and the role of universities with other stakeholders are factors influencing their realisation 
of financial returns. It will be further suggested that these factors contribute to the 
difficulty in identifying Connect's original targets (e.g. spin-outs, collaborations) as these 
targets will reflect the strength of university relationships with other stakeholders. 
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Company Comments 
Entrepreneurs and company representatives identify their expectations of finding investors 
and partners for their technologies and getting general financial advice, supporting survey 
results that identify companies absorbing financial value across all financial indicators. 
Introductions by third parties was noted as an important aspect of establishing contacts 
with investors at events and being introduced to new business prospects. 
A number of comments allude to the quality of the investment conference, with 
recommendations that it should be held every 6 months instead of annually because of the 
frequency of start-ups. Others suggest that the profile of the investment conference in 
attracting foreign investors to Scotland is particularly important for their technologies, 
fearing that appropriate investors are not available locally. 
8.4.2.3 Stakeholder Recommendations from 1999 Survey 
Stakeholders in the 1999 survey were asked: "if you could make any changes to the 
activities and organisation of Connect, what would they be and why?" General themes 
and specific recommendations by stakeholder category are described below. 
8.4.2.3.1 Sponsors: 
• More Entrepreneurs at Events 
Many sponsors noted that often the number of entrepreneurs at events is not large; 
therefore it is disappointing for service providers looking for opportunities to 
develop relationships with new businesses and other stakeholders. It was noted that 
there is a shortage of both entrepreneurs and venture capital in Scotland, perhaps 
due to the size of market and geographical situation. 
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• Managing Sponsor ExpectationsJ8 
A number of sponsors cautioned that Connect should not promote the network to 
prospective sponsors simply as a 'deal-flow' venue, as many new companies in 
attendance are not able to afford such services. Two sponsors suggested that there 
should be greater selectivity in sponsorship; there is a question of whether or not 
the sponsors really matter. One sponsor noted that Connect must deliver value for 
its sponsors, while another stated: "[our company] sees their role as a sponsor to 
be more active with Connect; with the goal of trying to get a more strategic role for 
Connect, i.e. business leader forum that focuses on skills for new venture start-
" ups. 
• Connect Needs a Focused Differentiation Strategy 
Many sponsors suggested that, with the proliferation of support programs for start-
ups, Connect must differentiate itself from other organisations such as Business 
Forum (which acts more as a sounding board for entrepreneurs). This includes 
more actively promoting the features and benefits of the network to the Scottish 
business community and the sources of start-ups such as universities and research 
institutes. 
Sponsors also provided specific recommendations for Connect. One sponsor suggests that 
some entrepreneurs are not natural-born 'networkers', so an introductory session on 
networking would be valuable. Another suggests that many new companies have gaps in 
their management teams, so one session could discuss how to attract non-executives, and 
how to create a board; while another session recommendation is to bring in an experienced 
chairman to discuss strategic direction and how to access investment. 
Another sponsor emphasises the importance of dialogue across different support programs 
and a "cross-fertilisation for learning and knowledge sharing for Connect's long-term 
sUll1ival" that would include program such as Connect San Diego and local programs such 
as First Tuesday. 
18 . I f1 .. f 
Already identified is the expectation that sponsors will be seeking more tangible benefits such as an attnbuted dea ow ansmg rom 
their participation within the network, suggesting that their role within the network will evolve from supportive and passive to proactive 
and needs orientated. 
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8.4.2.3.2 Universities: 
• Connect should playa more hands-on role in championing the university technology 
environment 
Universities identified the need to improve collaboration between universities and 
those supporting technology exploitation. One respondent explains that "Connect 
should develop a "showcase" for new start-ups at the universities ... a baby version 
of investment conference to act as a springboard, (but don't mention investment)". 
More focused commercialisation events for technologies were suggested, such as 
product marketing by sector, e.g. software, biotechnology, and providing sessions 
on branding, company law and human resource issues. 
• Governance of Connect should be more transparent 
Governance issues were raised that included the need for more communication with 
Connect's Advisory Board and increasing the accountability of the Board (i.e. the 
need for a recognised business plan). One respondent questioned whether or not 
Connect's mandate is changing, by asking where public sponsors fit and the role of 
the European Union and SHEFC (Scottish Higher Education Funding Council) as 
the primary funders of Connect. 
• Leverage the political neutrality and integrity of Connect 
University respondents identified the importance of Connect as a unique support 
forum in the Scottish context. One respondents explains that: "Connect is a 
platform that provides integrity and confidentiality; therefore allowing it to offer a 
diverse range of services". Another suggests that: "Connect is out of the political 




• Clarify Connect's Distinctionfrom other Support Initiatives 
Companies identify the proliferation of support programs and the need for Connect 
to identify to prospective companies its distinction, similar to sponsor 
recommendations. One respondent suggests: "there is a need for Connect to be 
specific to new ventures, as it is "a minefield out there for entrepreneurs". 
Respondents also suggest that Scotland needs to focus on small firms, not growing 
global giants and that Connect, as one respondent suggests "needs to champion the 
realisation of value in small firms, and help grow new firms". 
• Promote More to University Researchers 
A common recommendation is getting more people from the university out to 
events, especially post-doctoral students, "as they have the highest potential to 
leave the university to form a spin-out venture". Two respondents noted that 
Connect is a good tool for training scientists about commercial possibilities but one 
of them argues that there are university 'gatekeepers' of Connect information that 
do not adequately forward information on Connect. This respondent suggests that 
Connect develop a database of individual researchers that can receive information 
directly from Connect. 
• Facilitate Flow-through of Companies in and out of Connect 
Company respondents suggested the need to track what happened to companies that 
left the network to identify what have they gained and where they are going to get 
more information, advise and support. One respondent explains that: "the dynamic 
nature of business support requires a continuous assessment and refreshment of 
ideas for program's content and mechanisms". 
Related to tracking 'graduate' companies were suggestions that Connect be more 
explicit in their partnerships with other support agencies and private sector partners. 
Companies identify a 'value curve' with Connect providing high value early on in 
the start-up phase of the company and less value later on, as explained by one 
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respondent: "I have plateaued in what I can get out of Connect; things are new at 
the outset, as in the Law of diminishing returns in Scotland; get to know everyone 
and run out of things new and different". 
One respondent of an established company suggests that Connect is at a stage 
where they need to diversify. Another comment asked whether Connect has 
overextended itself (event fatigue), and the respondent suggests Connect may need 
to have fewer events with more impact. 
Conversely, another argues that Connect should more actively recruit new members 
rather than cater to established companies, stating: "I am seeking out different 
things now and use the Business Forum among others; Connect thus needs to 
encourage new people to come along to events, as Connect shouldn't be for 
establishedfirms ... the purpose for Connect is to "get you going". 
Company recommendations stress the need for Connect to continually refresh their event 
content and clarify how Connect fits among other support initiatives that members are 
involved with. Another challenge for Connect is whether to remain focused on new 
companies or to expand and diversify events to meet evolving needs of companies as the 
emerge from successful start-up and seek growth-related information and knowledge. 
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8.4.3 Stakeholder Perceptions of Network Value (2001) 
8.4.3.1 Event Quality 
Graph 8.20 identifies a slight decrease in the overall quality rating of network events, 80%, 
in comparison to 86% in the 1999 survey. This rating remains above the original target set 
by Connect to ensure all events are rated very good or at the level of 75%. 
8.4.3.2 






Changes to Network Value Flows: Comparing 2001 and 1999 
Survey Results 
This section compares 1999 and 2001 survey results using SPSS cross-tabulation and 
Pearson's chi-square to qualify the significance of changes to social, knowledge and 
financial value dimensions and to each of the 20 contributing value indicators. Survey data 
has been 'cleaned' by removing 'not-applicable' responses and collapsing the non-
affirmative responses (,not so far', 'not so far but I expect to in the future', and 'not at all') 
into a single category, that creates three categories that include 'most definitely realised' 
and 'realised to some extent' affirmative categories. 19 
Table 8.4 compares affirmative responses to each of the three value dimensions between 
the 1999 and 2001 from which a number of observations related to each value dimension 
can be made. Affirmative responses to social value have remained proportionally the same 
between both surveys, decreasing in 'most definite' and increasing in 'to some extent' 
response categories by almost identical levels (7.1 and 7.0) in 2001. In contrast, 
affirmative responses to knowledge value have increased proportionally in 2001, the result 
of a greater increase in the 'most definite' response category than decrease in the 'to some 
extent' category. Affirmative responses to financial value demonstrate the most 
proportional change between surveys and produce the most statistically significant chi-
square value. 
Table 8.4: Comparison of 2001 and 1999 Surveys: Network Value 
Dimensions 
Value Dimension Social Knowledge Financial 
Proportion of 'Most Definite' Affirmative 38.8 12.9 11.2 
Responses to Total Responses 
1999 Survey 41.8 7.5 6.0 
2001 Survey 34.7 20.4 18.4 
Change -7.1 +12.9 +12.4 
Proportion of To Some Extent' 55.2 44.8 37.1 
Affirmative Responses to Total Responses 
1999 Survey 52.2 46.3 25.4 
2001 Survey 59.2 42.9 53.1 
Change +7.0 -3.4 +27. 
Pearson Chi-Square Value 9.952 4.350 18.526 
Degree of Freedom 2 2 2 
Assumption Significance .051 .114 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.747 3.044 16.615 
Graph 8.21 uses data from Table 8.4 to show that knowledge and financial value have 
increased in greater proportion to social value. Although social value retains the greatest 
proportion of affirmative responses overall, this level has decreased slightly in 2001 while 
the proportional difference between social value and knowledge and financial value has 
reduced. A further observation in graph 8.27 is that financial value has overtaken 
knowledge value in terms of total affirmative responses. 
Identified earlier in section 8.4.2.2 was the challenge in 1999 for Connect to increase 
knowledge and financial value as explicit benefits to be gained by stakeholders actively 
engaged in the network. Clearly, Table 8.4 and Graph 8.21 suggest that this increase in 
knowledge and financial value has occurred while maintaining a consistent level of 
affirmative social value. 
19 This reconfiguration of response categories provides a robust assessment of the survey data set while focusing on affirmative changes 
to network value dimensions rather than evaluating the survey tool itself. 
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Graph 8.21: Changes to Network Value Dimensions: Total Affirmative 
Responses and Comparisons with 1999 and 2001 Responses 
('most definitely realised' and realised to some extend' responses combined) 
1 
Proportion of Affirmative to 
Total Responses 
1999 2001 
These proportional changes to Connect's three value dimensions support earlier 
assumptions that business-related exchange is occurring at a greater level within the 
network overall in 2001 as compared to 1999. Returning to network evolutionary 
literature, this change could be the result of various factors. One explanation, based on the 
higher level of social value in 1999, is that social investment activities of individual 
stakeholders are now realising specific business benefits (Birley 1985; Burt 1992; 
10hannisson 2000;). However, two different samples of stakeholders have been used in the 
2001 and 1999 surveys, making it difficult to confirm that social relations are a precursor 
to knowledge and financial value specifically at the individual level. 
Another explanation is that Connect as a network manager is evolving into a more efficient 
facilitator of business exchange (Hakensson and Snehota 1995). Connect' s high retention 
rate of sponsors may be developing into a supportive network community more elaborately 
connected and willing to facilitate knowledge and financial value exchange more readily 
amongst themselves. Greater familiarity among institutions and their staff at events may in 
tum facilitate a greater level of knowledge and financial value exchange between sponsors 
and members. 
The following sections examine each value dimension and related value indicators to 





8.4.3.2.1 Social Value 
Table 8.5 identifies proportional increases in more demanding social indicators of 'met 
potential backers of my idea' and 'gave valuable advice' compared to 1999 where 
affirmative responses accumulated towards less demanding indicators. Less substantive 
increases are seen in affirmative responses to 'met potential partners' and 'met potential 
clients' . 
Table 8.5: Social Value Indicators: Comparison of 1999 and 2001 Affirmative 
R esponses 
Indicator Met Feel Met Met Met Gave Met 
Interesting Part ora Potential Potential Potential Valuable Potential 
People Network Clients Service Partners Advice Backers 
Providers 




1999 Survey 47.7 46.8 25.8 32.8 25.4 40.4 25.6 
2001 Survey 33.3 50.0 35.3 35.6 34.0 53.5 35.3 
Change -14.4 +3.2 +9.5 +2.8 +8.6 +13.1 +9.7 
Proportion of 51.3 39.1 25.0 16.5 21.7 17.8 7.8 
'Most Definite' to 
Total Responses 
1999 Survey 44.6 37.1 21.0 19.0 25.4 14.9 4.7 
2001 Survey 60.4 41.7 32.4 13.3 17.0 20.9 11.8 
Change +15.8 +4.6 +11.4 -5.7 -8.4 +6.0 +7.1 
Pearson Chi- 2.793 1.495 3.903 .586 1.516 3.585 2.695 
Sq uare Val ue 
Degree of 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Freedom 
Assumption .247 .474 .142 .746 .469 .167 .260 
Significance 
Findings in Table 8.5 suggest that increases in more demanding social value indicators are 
the result of improved levels of social exchange within the network. Indeed, Graph 8.22 
shows increases in social exchange indicators in the 2001 survey for sponsors, where client 
contact responses have increased, while for universities, client, service provider and 
partner contacts have all increased. Similar to the 1999 survey, sponsors rate client 
contacts highest while universities rate partner contacts highest. Indeed, the level of 
increase in social exchange indicators in 2001 could suggest that universities are taking a 
more active approach to social relationship building. Overall, it appears that universities 
and the individual/other category are the primary benefactors of the increase in affirmative 
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social exchange value identified in 2001, with both categories showing an increase in 
affirmative responses to 'met potential backers of my ideas. 
Graph 8.22: Survey 2001: Affirmative Responses to Social Value Indicators 





















Sponsors in 2001 continue to view Connect as a valuable forum for social exchange, as one 
sponsor calls it, "an inexpensive network that creates good dialogue for support". 
Another sponsor identifies the social and business networking benefit of Connect, stating: 
"[ expect to meet with entrepreneurs and have exposure to new technology business 
ventures, while also networking with peers. My perception is that Connect operates most 
effectively as a support network/or new business". 
However, sponsors in 2001 identify their expectations of benefits ansmg out of their 
partIcIpation. One sponsor states: "We expect to raise our company profile in the 
technology sector by being active contributors in helping Connect reach its goals locally". 
For some sponsors, there were identified concerns raised over Connect's role in facilitating 
the needs of certain technology sectors such as oil and gas. One sponsor identified the 
concern over linkages with SMEs and new technologies. He states: "Our expectation was 
that we would, through Connect, be able to access and develop networks with SMEs who 
are developing technologies, not traditionally associated with, but with the potential for 
application to the upstream oil and gas sector. It may need more energy on both our own 
210 
and the part of Connect to bring the appropriate parties together. But to now I'm afraid 
the information sent to me by Connect has not sparked off any possibilities. Maybe 
Connect needs to act more proactive and begin to facilitate this interaction - our company 
after all spends around [large sum] per year in Scottish-based businesses". 
This suggestion that Connect facilitate linkages between new technologies, SMEs and 
larger companies identifies a key challenge for Connect and Scottish support initiatives in 
general and will be further discussed in Chapter Ten. 
University Comments 
Connect continues to provide access to an informed network of key supporters of high 
technology in Scotland, according to university respondents. With all Scottish universities 
now sponsors of Connect in 2001, a shared expectation is that social contacts will lead to 
collaboration and investment. As one respondent put it: "Good networking is pivotal." Or 
as another respondent puts it: "We want to see a vigorous market in technology-based 
industries in Scotland. We expected Connect to playa significant part in support this 
market by bringing together relevant communities. These expectations have been met to 
some extent. " 
Connect is also identified as delivering social value to universities beyond the central belt 
of Scotland where most are located, as explained: "In general, Connect provides a good 
service in Aberdeen. It provides a good meeting forum and helps to link those interested in 
technological innovation and providing services. " 
Company Comments 
Company comments on social value were more diverse in 2001 than 1999. One theme 
continues to highlight the progression of initiating and developing social relationships that 
may lead to business relationships. Related comments include: "I expect the Connect 
network to provide contacts for partners, investors and customers". Another states: "The 
Connect forum is great. I have found its meetings very well organised and useful from a 
networking point of view". Similarly, "Connect is a valuable organisation that has a key 
role to play in generating and delivering new opportunities-business, employment, wealth 
creation and re-investment". 
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A long-standing company member offers an overview of the value of Connect: "I have 
been involved with Connect in a variety of ways since the development of the concept and 
have always enjoyed my interaction, either from an audience perspective or as an assisting 
party for Springboard and the Investment Conference. Connect does a good job bringing 
technology people in contact with business angels and to increase awareness of the sector 
and our expectations are to continue to have links with other new technology companies". 
Other compames expressed difficulties in benefiting from Connect either because of 
geography, or because their business activity was not closely related to Connect's focus. 
Thus, one respondent comments that: "being based in the Highlands, it is difficult to make 
the most of being a member of Connect. My perception of Connect in supporting high 
technology start-ups is that the company has to be based in a main centre to reap full 
benefits. " 
In tum, a respondent whose business did not seem to relate to Connect's focus stated: "I 
have met some very interesting people through Connect although as yet my business 
(business development in marketing and sales) has not directly benefited. This is probably 
down to me and my lack of involvement in high-technology business. However, it may 
happen yet". 
Unlike the 1999 survey, some company respondents in 2001 expressed outright 
dissatisfaction with the social value delivered by Connect Scotland. One respondent 
simply states that "Connect tends to be dicky". Another experienced entrepreneur voiced 
his dissatisfaction, stating: "Speaking as a high-technology entrepreneur with 20 years of 
experience of building high-technology companies from scratch, I have found the Connect 
experience disappointing. While the technical meetings are enjoyable and informative, as 
a networking forum, I find it pretty useless. It is also very measured, typically Scottish and 
ultimately, boring. I was hoping to meet people with good technical ideas who could 
benefit from my experience, particularly in sales and marketing. Perhaps I am wrong, but 
I thought the idea of Connect was to bring people together, spark off new ideas and help 
build a lively, vibrant, Scottish high-technology scene. At this rate, we will catch up to 
Silicon Valley some time in the next millennium". 
Another disgruntled participant states: "Whilst I accept that the real problems are 
elsewhere in 'the system', after such early promise to 'break the mould', I am very 
disappointed in how things have panned out, re: being in Connect". 
8.4.3.2.2 Knowledge Value 
Table 8.6 identifies a proportional increase to the more demanding knowledge indicator of 
'introduced my technology to a relevant audience'. The low affirmative response to this 
indicator in 1999 prompted concerns that company members were not identifying the 
Connect network as an effective forum for showcasing their technologies. This increase in 
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recurrent events, either by chance or through a more active role by Connect in matching 
companies and sponsors. 
Table 8.6: Knowledge Value Indicators: Comparison of 1999 and 2001 
Affirmative Responses 
Indicator Learnt of Introduced Learnt of Learnt of Learnt of Learnt 
Business- Business! Technologies Protecting Training Business 
related Technology Relevant to IP, and Skills 
Information to Relevant my Business Licensing, Support 
Audience etc. Pro2rams 




1999 Survey 54.0 15.9 60.0 32.7 50.0 36.0 
2001 Survey 39.6 31.3 41.3 39.5 51.1 45.7 
Change -14.4 +15.4 -18.7 +6.8 +1.1 +9.7 
Proportion of 45.9 23.7 24.5 13.8 7.2 14.1 
'Most Definite' to 
Total Responses 
1999 Survey 41.3 20.5 21.7 14.3 5.8 12.0 
2001 Survey 52.1 28.1 28.3 13.2 8.9 17.1 
Change +10.8 +7.6 +6.6 -1.1 +3.1 +5.1 
Pearson Chi- 2.425 4.228 3.832 .436 .433 1.862 
Square Value 
Degree of 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Freedom 
Assumption .297 .121 .147 .804 .805 .394 
Significance 
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Table 8.6 shows that business-related knowledge and information on relevant technologies 
remain the two most highly rated knowledge indicators. However, a noticeable decrease in 
proportional affirmative responses to these two indicators is an unexpected finding. This 
finding could confirm some concerns voiced by stakeholders in the 200 1 survey that 
Connect is not meeting the needs of certain sectors or over-emphasising others, suggesting 
the challenge for Connect in maintaining relevance to a broad constituency of technology 
sector interests. This drop in affirmative response rate could also suggest that event topics 
are losing their 'newness'. 
Graph 8.23 identifies an increase in affirmative responses to knowledge value by 
universities, particularly to 'learned about information on IPR and licensing', suggesting a 
more active role played by universities in the network in 200l. A more active role by the 
individual/others category is also suggested in 2001 by a noticeable increase in affirmative 
responses across all knowledge value indicators. 
Graph 8.23: Survey 2001: Affirmative Responses to Knowledge Value 
Indicators by Stakeholder Group (n=49) 
business intro of ideas to learnt of 
relevant info relevant relevant new 
audience tech 
Sponsor Comments 
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Sponsors in 200 1 are more explicit on the knowledge value of the network. A respondent 
urns up a number of comments on the use of Connect as a knowledge forum, stating: 
"Connect provides a useful network - it enables us to leanl about new technology and new 
technology businesses and to meet others who are also interested in assisting them." 
Another respondent identifies the multiple role of the network, stating: "We attend to leanz 
more about the investment community in Scotland and to meet potential clients, as well as 
to impart specialist advice (this has not happened often!). " 
Sponsors continue to identify the value of Connect as a network for doing business. One 
sponsor identifies the proactive role played by companies seeking services, stating: 
"Connect enables new companies to advertise for and attract help in commercialisation". 
University Comments 
Although comments from universities in 2001 were less frequent compared to 1999, one 
concern emerged regarding Connect's provision of benefits to universities. One university 
commercialisation officer states that: "Connect seems to be aimed more at business start-
up needs than university needs. More advice on spin-outs, etc. would be useful." 
Company Comments 
Three common themes emerge in 2001 from companies, two of which are similar to 1999. 
The first emphasises Connect as a place to obtain advice and ideas on technologies and 
business. One respondent states: "My expectation is that Connect carries on giving advice 
on all issues surrounding technology. I think that Connect has done a good job and I look 
forward to more of the same in the future". Similarly, another states; "We judge Connect 
by the knowledge of technology and the contacts that we acquire. I think that Connect 
does an excellent job for technology companies". The value of events like the 'meet the 
entrepreneur event' is identified by another respondent, who says: "Through Connect, I 
expect to learn about alternative business models and strategies for company development, 
and to leanz about running a business from people who have done it already. " 
A second theme identifies a wider economic role played by Connect, summed up in 
comments from a long-standing company member. He states: "Connect fills a key role in 
Scottish industry/commerce. The need to grow indigenous businesses and establish a go to 
market model is paramount. My expectation is to be able to playa role in helping new or 
start-up businesses ill a consultative or non-executive director role". 
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A third theme voices concern over potential bias in knowledge provision towards some 
industrial sectors. One respondent comments of bias towards electronics and less 
relevance to biotechnology, echoing a previous concern regarding Connect's lack of 
relevance to Aberdeen's oil and gas sector. Another states: "Connect occasionally comes 
up with ideas or technologies that I am interested in. Its heavy bias towards electronics 
means that it is less relevant to bio-technology than one would hope for. " 
Bias towards university technologies is also identified as a concern of another company 
member, who states: "Connect is more directed to academic/university start-ups ... 
although I understand Connect is intended as a valuable resource for all start-ups needing 
contacts and advice." Indeed, similar to 1999, little evidence is identified from companies 
to suggest any significant level of value exchange between companies and universities. 
8.4.3.2.3 Financial Value 
Table 8.7 shows the financial value indicators contributing to the significant chi-square 
value attributed to the financial value dimension as identified in Table 8.4. 
Table 8.7: Financial Value Indicators: Comparison of 1999 and 2001 
Af· R flrmatlve esponses 
Indicator Obtained Learnt Good Obtained Good Gave Have 
Valuable Value of Contact Investment Contact Valuable Invested 
Financial Productl with with Financial 
Info. Service Investors Entrepren Info. 




1999 Survey 32.0 28.9 36.2 15.9 31.0 32.6 5.4 
2001 Survey 45.7 44.4 36.7 24.2 52.1 26.8 3.8 
Change +13.7 +15.5 +0.5 +8.3 +21.1 -5.8 -1.6 
Proportion of 8.3 3.7 33.6 11.7 26.4 23.0 11.1 
'Most Definite' to 
Total Responses 
1999 Survey 0 0 29.3 2.3 22.4 6.5 8.1 
2001 Survey 17.4 8.3 38.8 24.2 31.3 41.5 15.4 
Change +17.4 +8.3 +9.5 +21.9 +8.9 +35.0 +7.3 
Pearson Chi- 14.200 6.988 1.596 10.975 10.749 15.668 .865 
Square Value 
Deg. of Freedom 2 2 2 2 2 2 ') 
Assump. Signif. .001 .030 .450 .004 .005 .000 .649 
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These results suggest that the network is more oriented to doing business in 200 1 when 
observing proportional affirmative increases to more demanding financial indicators such 
as 'obtained investment' and exchange indictors of 'gave' and 'received valuable financial 
information'. The proportional increase in social contact indicators i.e. with investors and 
entrepreneurs, suggests that high levels of social exchange indicators are related to 
investment. This assumption will be further discussed in the chapter summary. 
Graph 8.24 qualifies above observations with response patterns by stakeholder category. 
Universities shows increases in 'learnt financial value of technologies' and 'obtained 
investment' and demonstrate the highest affirmative response increases on 'making contact 
with investors' and 'learnt financial risks of my product'. At the same time, universities 
are identified with the lowest level of 'gave valuable financial information', supporting an 
earlier observation that universities are less active in reciprocal exchange activities. 
Graph 8.24: Survey 2001: Affirmative Responses to Financial Value by 
Stakeholder Category (n=49) 
o Sponsor 
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Companies are identified with an increase in 'obtained investment' and 'made good 
contact with entrepreneurs'. Further evidence of financial value is examined in section 
8.4.4 where investment survey results confirm Connect's more active intermediary role in 




Graph 8.24 also shows a noticeable increase by private sponsors to 'obtained valuable 
financial information' yet a decrease in 'made good contact with investors'. One 
explanation is the increased activity of individual members of the Connect network that 
also demonstrate a high level of affirmative responses to the indicator 'have invested'. It is 
suggested that 'business angels' are playing a strong role in the investment arrangements 
stimulated by Connect Scotland. Indeed, it is estimated by Connect that between 8-12 
individual members are private investors. 
Sponsor Comments 
Sponsors in 2001 continue to identify their expectation of deal flow from events. One 
sponsor states her expectations: "As a sponsor, we would ideally like to get early sight of 
opportunities, and perceive of Connect as a 'shop window' for early stage opportunities". 
Any sponsor explains: "Our firm expects to make contacts in the technology sector which 
will be a catalyst for new business. " 
Sponsors also identify that deal flow is not the primary criteria for participation at events. 
As one sponsor suggests: "Opportunities to establish potential client relationships are very 
limited and virtually all of 'new work' comes from other sources. I'm not aware of any 
'new work' won under the Connect umbrella. That said, it is a useful medium to keep up to 
date with this sector, know what young companies are up to and to tell people what [our 
company J is doing. " 
Sponsors in 2001 also identify Connect's contribution to investment deals while at the 
same time identifying attribution of effect difficulties. A sponsor states: "I am interested 
overall in business development and good investment opportunities. While others are 
doing some of the things which Connect does and Connect cannot claim credit for all 
investment following its investment conferences, I do think it has a role to play". 
University Comments 
University comments identify concerns over the level of exchange between universities 
and investors at events. As one respondent states: "I feel that the level of engagement of 
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academics talking about spin-outs and real venture capitalists have been a bit lower than I 
expected. " 
Another university commercialisation officer offers his concerns: "What I have not seen 
much of in Aberdeen, is the presence of potential investors at the meetings. Investors in 
technology and new start-ups are few in Aberdeen and even fewer seem to come to 
Connect meetings". 
These comments add to the identified concerns by Connect stakeholders regarding the 
level of university-business interactions and managing the expectations of university 
sponsors through Connect. 
Company Comments 
Companies in 2001 continue to identify their expectations of finding investor at recurrent 
events. One company respondent commented "My expectations are that I will meet 
potential investors. I feel that this has been achieved." Another respondent describes the 
value realised through investment events: "The Connect Investment Conference definitely 
helped [my company] in its VCfund-raising experience". 
Companies also identify the network itself as a reason for participation at events as this 
respondent explains: "through membership in Connect, I expect to become part of a 
network of like-minded business professionals and expose my company to opportunities for 
partnership and development". 
8.4.3.3 Stakeholder Recommendations from 2001 Survey 
Analysis of stakeholder feedback from the 2001 survey identifies the following 
recommendations and challenges for Connect. 
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8.4.3.3.1 Sponsors: 
• Enhance the speed and content of information flows and improve reporting to sponsors, 
especially regarding financial information. 
• A forum for member companies that have 'outgrown Connect' is suggested, while at 
the same time ensuring that Connect makes its niche in the technology start-up market 
sustainable. 
• Public sector sponsors stress the importance of Connect doing more in 'other' areas of 
Scotland (Aberdeen, Tayside) and making an impact. 
• Monitor sponsor expectations, in particular private sponsors that may at some point 
require evidence that there are direct benefits returning to the company. Attendance 
patterns suggest that sponsors have begun to target their attendance to Connect events. 
Although the analysis clearly found indirect benefits were realised by sponsors (social 
and knowledge), some private sponsors in particular may need to demonstrate financial 
value. The investment conference and springboard events are attracting more sponsors. 
However, the value for new technology companies at recurrent events may be 
compromised if sponsors are not there providing the social contacts and advice. 
8.4.3.3.2 Universities: 
• Provide an informal forum to allow all university sponsors to voice their expectations 
and commercialisation requirements to facilitate a better understanding of needs. 
Evidence, from attendance patterns and value survey, suggests that there is much to be 
done to stimulate closer relations and interactions between university and business. 
The percentage of university attendees can be raised by greater interaction with 
organisations such as the Scottish Institute for Enterprise (SIE), to promote Connect 
events to university entrepreneurs and researchers. 
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8.4.3.3.3 Companies: 
• Connect must maintain its open and friendly attitude and maintain neutrality in the 
newly independent organisation. 
• Connect must continually improve its events, with a potential extra fee if needed to 
attract high quality speakers. 
• Provide greater transparency in their reporting of activities to stakeholders. This issue 
is even more importance as an independent organisation moving out of Edinburgh 
University. A more systematic communication and consultation effort will enhance the 
constituency-building process by helping to make Connect the 'property' of all 
members of the constituency. 
• Involve other support constituencies to help advance the public policy aim of program 
integration and simplification for more effective delivery of support to users. 
• Connect should take on a leadership role in creating a global Connect Alliance. 
Establishment of Connect programs in Yorkshire and Warwick recently points to the 
importance of Connect Scotland as a leader in the field. Enhancing and strengthening 
these relation for purposes of knowledge sharing and cross-fertilisation of learning 
experiences is recommended. Despite the limited resources at the present time, 
Connect must leverage this position and be creative in exploiting their competitive 
advantage as a support program that others are emulating. 
8.4.4 Investment Event Survey 
This section examines benefits that presenting technology companies have attributed to 
Connect's Investment Conference. Companies that presented between 1998 and 2001 
were contacted to respond to two questions pertaining to investment: (1) did you directly or 
indirectly gain investment through your participation in the Connect Investment 
Conference; and (2) is there a level of investment (% of amount sought or £ amount) that 
you can attribute to participation in the Conference? (survey results are in Appendix F). 
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8.4.4.1 Investment Expectations of Presenting Companies 
Graph 8.25 shows the breakdown of sectors represented at each of the 4 conferences, 
reflecting the heterogeneous nature of new technology companies seeking funding in 
Scotland. With a limited investor base for technology in Scotland, it can be argued that 
bringing together these companies and investors to a single event provides efficiencies in 
scale and centralises a critical mass of investors to focus on a critical mass of companies to 
make it worthwhile for both groups. 
Graph 8.25: Presenting Companies by Sector, 1997-2001 
('other' category (far right) is comprised of primarily e-commerce ventures) 
Bio-tech Medical Electronic Industrial Software Other 
Graph 8.25 shows that 'software' companies have been consistently the most prominent 
sector in the four Connect investment conferences, although e-commerce (other category) 
reveals dramatic growth between the 1999 and 2000 conferences. This reflects the high 
level of dot-com start-up activity in 2000. Biotechnology has also had a consistent 
presence in the 1999 and 2000 conferences. 
Graph 8.26 shows the type of investment funding sought after by the companies presenting 
at the investment conference. These are SEED funding, early commercialisation, growth 
funding and public funding. Over the years the relative demand for each of these types of 
funding exhibit a highly variable pattern. In 1997, for instance early-commercialisation 
funding was by far the most sought after type of funding. 
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In 1998, the funding preference moved to SEED funding with commercialisation closely 
behind in second place. In 1999, SEED funding was clearly at the top with early-
commercialisation being displaced by growth funding in the second place. Finally, in year 
2000, growth and SEED funding shared the place with the top demand. It is also 
interesting to note that public funding was sought after only in the first conference, with 
public funding not evident since. 
Graph 8.26: Investment Expectations for Attending 
Investment Conference Companies, 1997-2001 
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Table 8.8 distinguishes between the types of investment funds sought. 
Table 8.8: Types of Investment Funds Sought by Presenting 
Companies at Investment Conference2o 
SEED First (initial) phase of funding: to verify technology/product with prototype, 
protect the technology with patents, cover professional fees, complete 
market analysis and build credible initial management team. Typically 
£25,000 to £250,000 sought. 
Commercialisation Second or third round of funding to cover costs associated with physical 
& Development location, taking product to market and market entry. Broad range depending 
on the technology and sector; £100,000 to £1-3m 
Growth Subsequent stage of funding to cover costs associated with growing demand: 
more human resources, sales and marketing, increased product capacity. 
Funds required depend on current success, technology and sector. 
Public Initial public offering (IPO) : funds to be raised from an offering of common 
stock (equity) of the company to the public. Usually more that £3 million . 
20 Detinitions from Bank of England report "Finance for Small Firm. Apri l 2002 and "University Spin-outs, August 200 I. 
.2001 
Literature suggests there is no one commonly accepted definition for stages of funding; 
instead they are nonnally secured in sequential fashion following the success of achieving 
certain milestones. Milestones include proof-of-concept, letters of intent to purchase the 
technology, establishing the management team, actual sales, level of growth, etc. 
8.4.4.2 Investment Survey Results 
The survey found that 8 of the 35 companies surveyed directly gained investment through 
participation in the Connect Investment Conference. Table 8.9 identifies company by 
sector, conference year and investment amount attributed to the conference by the 
company respondent. 
Table 8.9: Investment Directly Attributed to Investment Conference 
Investment Conference 1"CQmPllny,:Sector" ld!iSS'j" £ .:% of Investment 
1998 Electronics 365,000 
1998 Electronics 10% 
1999 Telecom (mobile) 25% 
1999 Software 50% 
2000 Medicallhealth 100,000 
2000 Opto-electronics 100% 
2001 Software 2.5 million 
2001 Medical 80% 
A further two companies confinned indirect attribution of investment gains to Connect's 
Investment Conference: 
o 1998: Software: 
o 1999: Biotechnology: 
£850,000 
£1.5 million 
The bio-technology respondent comments that the significance of the Investment 
Conference for their company "was to start the ball rolling and to build on momentum 
from there." He adds: "the VC community does tend to act locally and it was critical for 
liS to keep [VC firm] and Scottish Enterprise on side. The other two VC funds at the 
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investment conference who invested in us really came on the back of the original two 
investments and their follow-through". 
The survey also found that a further 17 of 35 respondents attributed non-investment 
benefits from their participation at the Investment Conference. The conference is 
identified as a valuable forum for fine-tuning business propositions for subsequent funding. 
A respondent from the 1999 Conference states, "the process was an invaluable pre-cursor 
to the first-round funding we finally secured", while a respondent from 2000 comments: 
"our company indirectly gained benefits by helping close and gaining more control over a 
deal that we already had in place". 
One respondent from 2000 identifies the conference as a training forum for their company 
in stating: "No direct investment came out of the presentation. It was a little too early to 
be asking for £1 million as the company was still quite embryonic. We did learn the sort of 
things needed to move the company forward though and today we are much more 
substantial." Another respondent from 2000 asserts that "we benefited from the exposure 
to potential investors and it didfocus our attention more on the planning of the business". 
Profile raising and public relations is another identified benefit derived from presenting at 
the conference. A respondent in 2000 states: "Presentation at the Conference was a key 
element in raising finance (and profile) of the company. Though the deal is yet to be 
closed, the conference was instrumental in making connections with 2 syndicate members. 
Similarly, a respondent from 2001 states: "We did get benefits in tenns of exposure to the 
VC community and assistance in refining our sales pitch. But we didn't get investment 
from the conference." 
Findings identify the difficulty in attributing a direct role of Connect in gaining investment. 
One respondent from 1999, states: "We have received in excess of £1 million of funding 
since the Connect conference, but none of it was as a direct result. The indirect amount is 
more difficult as the public relations (PR) cannot be quantified." Similarly, another 
respondent comments: "The value of the networking opportunities and the lifting of our 
125 
profile are incalculable, as we enjoyed and learned from the experience of presenting at 
the conference". 
The 7 respondents who attributed no benefits to their participation in the Investment 
Conference forwarded no negative comments of the Investment Conference. One 
respondent did suggest that the conference was not the most appropriate for their needs. 
He states: "our beliefwas that it was not the right type offorumfor a company such as us, 
which has been established for 10 years, but has remained small and is now looking for a 
small amount of mezzanine funding. The attraction of Connect was the limited time we had 
to put into the fund raising to gain access to a group of investors. " 
According to Dr. Andrew McNair who is responsible for the investment events, a 
noticeable shift in attitudes from those involved with the Investment Conference occurred 
between 1998 and 1999. Andrew states that presenting companies were suddenly a lot 
more bullish, and the 1999 Investment Conference attracted more interest from venture 
capitalists (VCs) not only from around Scotland but also from London, Europe and a few 
from the United States. Andrew calls the 1999 event "a real milestone" as 43 qualified 
applications were received for a total of 24 presenting companies, 4 more than in 1998. -
8.4.4.3 'Springboard' Results 
Connect has run two Springboard events in 2000 and 2001 for 13 companies and seen an 
increase in audience attendance from 100 to 140. Audience attendees include large 
corporations and venture capital finns that include Cisco Systems, BP, 3Com, Scientific 
Generics and 3i, among others. 
It has been more difficult to measure attribution of benefits and detennine the success of 
Springboard in comparison to the Investment Conference for the following reasons: 
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o Springboard provides a forum of support by Connect to companies to get them 
'investor-ready', and to expose them to a more 'friendly' audience that is 
supportive. Investment is thus not the primary goal. 
o Springboard is a complement to the Investment Conference and thus the impact of 
investment will be more apparent and expected at the Investment Conference 
o It can only be inferred that companies are more successful at the Investment 
Conference (or elsewhere) in securing the funding they seek because of their 
experience at Springboard. With only 2 years of Springboard, this is yet to be 
determined. 
8.5 DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY21 
Findings show Connect to be an increasingly stable social network based on a consistent 
affirmative response level of stakeholders identifying the network as a forum for meeting 
interesting people and feeling part of a social group. The network is facilitating more 
social capital overall with a notable increase in more demanding social value indicators. 
A key finding in this chapter is the evolution of perceived network value. Value flows 
within the Connect network have evolved towards more business-focused benefits 
represented by knowledge and financial indicators in the survey. This evolution of social 
to business exchange is consistent with research suggesting a logical evolution of networks 
where social interactions and acquaintances tend to precede exchanges and collaborations 
involving resources (Larson and Starr 1993). 
Findings show the Connect network is facilitating institutional linkages and stimulating 
collaboration that remains a central element of Connect's mission statement. Graph 8.27 
shows that for sponsors and universities, potential collaborators are not only in attendance 
at network events but that social interactions are occurring between and among clients, 
service providers and partners. As would be expected, 'client contacts' are rated highest 
21 Chapter Eleven continues the network evaluation as Connect evolves to a private company. Therefore. conclusions identified here are 
only based on network evaluation undertaken in this chapter. with Connect operating as a public-private organisation. 
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by public and private sponsors, while 'partner contacts' and 'service provider contacts' are 
rated highest by universities and technology companies. 
Graph 8.27: Social Exchange among Institutions: Meeting Potential Clients, 
Partners and Service Providers at Recurrent Events (n=116) 
Private sponsors Public sponsors 
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Differences in stakeholder perceptions of network social value can be traced to search 
expectations that motivate network attendance and benefit accumulation that shows an 
eventual diminishing return. The latter explanation is particularly relevant for technology 
compames where social capital is used to establish business relations and access 
knowledge and financial value. Indeed, as Table 8.10 shows, there is significant 
correlation between social and financial indicators from the value survey22. 
Table 8.10: Correlation Between Social and Financial Value Indicators from 
Recurrent Events (n=116) 
Variable 1 " 
--;-
Variable. 2 Correlation Significance 
(pearson's PM) Level 
(Social) Made good contacts (Financial) Obtained investment for .546 .01 
with investors my business 
(Social) Met potential backers (Financial) Obtained investment for .497 .01 
of my idea/product my business 
(Social) Introduced my (Financial) Obtained investment for .450 .01 
technology to a highly relevant my business 
audience 
(Social) Made good contacts (Financial) Invested in a new .366 .01 
with entrepreneurs technology or business 
22 SPSS correlation analysis provides evidence of relationships between variables in the value survey. Pearson's Product Moment 
Correlation Coefficient (r) is used to measure interval variables (Bryman and Cramer 1994) showing sigllificallt correlatioll in the 
eXChange of social, knowledoe and financial value using both surveys as a single sample. However, causal relationships cannot be 
inferred from correlation alo;e (Childs 1990) as some test scores are the end products of processes - such as thinking or perceiving , 
Thus, these scores are considered in the context of other evidence deriving from stakeholder feedback. 
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Table 8.10 suggests that development of positive social relations is important for both 
investors and those being invested in. Another social factor identified in stakeholder 
feedback is the importance of introductions by third parties that initiate contacts with 
investors at recurrent events and also introduce investors to new business prospects. 
Search motivations for universities, on the other hand, have been identified with securing 
investors for the technologies they represent. One explanation for the increase in 
university perceptions of social value in 2001 is that low levels of financial value, seen in 
the 1999 survey, are stimulating technology transfer personnel to more actively engage in 
social interactions leading to investment. As for individuals and others, this stakeholder 
category in 2001 is comprised of a significant number of private investors who are 
potentially active in developing new social contacts as well. 
Connect's value as a knowledge network for all stakeholders is most importantly in its 
provision of relevant business commercialisation knowledge and knowledge on 
technologies. All commercial-related knowledge indicators have increased in 2001, and 
this increase is primarily from sponsor and university respondents. A significant increase 
in perceived knowledge value is much more extensive among sponsors and universities 
than expected. Indeed, the expectation was that technology transfer personnel at 
universities and private sector service providers would already possess a high level of 
commercial knowledge compared to entrepreneurs and new companies. 
Private sponsors identify their 'use' of recurrent events as an informal educational forum 
particularly for new staff or those seeking a greater awareness of local technologies and 
service provision to particular technology sectors. This knowledge includes many issues 
not traditionally offered within the legal and accounting communities, such as business 
planning, structuring a financial deal, protecting or licensing a technology. Keeping 
abreast of the latest in technology due diligence interacting with all Scottish universities 
and associated research institutions also provides management consulting companies with 
a forum for their technology-specialists. The identified lack of new client deal flow 
attributed to recurrent events by sponsors reinforces the importance of knowledge 
provision to sponsors. 
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Another key finding is the significant increase in perceptions of the Connect network as a 
facilitator of financial value. Identified was an evolving level of exchange between 
entrepreneurs, investors and others and the provision and receiving of valuable financial 
information that are explicit components of financial value indicators. Also identified was 
a notable increase to the question "have obtained investment". Returning to earlier 
findings, correlation between social and financial indicators suggests that high levels of 
social value identified in 1999 have evolved into business relationships and investment. 
Sponsors and the individual/others stakeholder category outperform both university and 
companies regarding perceived financial value. As noted earlier, sponsors are particularly 
interested in learning about the financial risks of technology. A number of individual 
members are identified as private investors and it is suggested that business angels are 
playing a stronger role in the network in 2001 than in 1999. Certainly the individual/other 
stakeholder category are much more actively involved in the network overall with 
significant increases in social, knowledge and financial value perceptions. 
The drop in university perceptions of financial value from 1999 to 2001 is traced to a 
combination of factors. One is the identified concern that universities, despite indicating 
higher perceptions of social value in 2001, are not as involved in reciprocal value exchange 
and are primarily seeking investors for their technologies. Another factor, identified in 
stakeholder comments, is that many universities are difficult to deal with, e.g. over-valuing 
their technologies or seeking unrealistic partnership terms. Findings identify a higher 
number of private investors attending Connect events, and these investors may be more 
attracted to technology opportunities outside university control. 
These findings suggest that greater effort is required to improve the university-industry 
interactions within the network and ensure a proper mix of stakeholders. University 
participants comprise 16% of attendees compared to the target of 30%. The attendance 
patterns of technology briefings suggest that there is much to be done to stimulate closer 
relations and interactions between university and business. The objective of technology 
briefings is to provide a forum for institutional researchers to present their work and 
research activities to Connect sponsors and technology companies. 
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Another observation is the progressive drop in sponsor attendance from 1997 to 2000. 
Connect cannot assume that sponsors' numbers will simply rise again when economic 
conditions in the services improve. Other support initiatives such as First Tuesday or the 
high profile 'Entrepreneurial Exchange' provide sponsors with various choices and 
stakeholders identify that they cannot afford to be members of multiple support programs. 
Connect's three investment events, Investment Conference, Springboard and Bootcamp 
demonstrate a mentoring role by Connect in linking a cross-section of Scottish technology 
sectors (e.g. bio-technology, medical, industrial, electronics, software, others) with 
investors. The Investment survey reveals significant tangible benefits gained by presenting 
compames: directly attributed investment by 23% of respondents and a further two 
compames identified £2.35 million indirectly attributing it to the Conference. 
Approximately 80% of respondents attributed various non-investment benefits, including 
fine-tuning the business proposition for subsequent funding, meeting potential investors, 
profile raising and public relations, among others. 
Survey results confirm the growing challenge of Connect to remain relevant to a cross-
section of regional technology sectors. Overall, the 2001 survey identified an increase in 
stakeholder complaints and concerns regarding Connect's relevance to a multi-sectoral 
technology audience that was not identified in the1999 survey. This increased level of 
critical feedback requires an ongoing vigilance and level of monitoring on Connect's part 
and verifies the importance of a real-time evaluation approach. Identifying changes in 
attendance, membership and stakeholder mix patterns and addressing ongoing concerns 
among stakeholders as they arise allows for a proactive rather than reactive philosophy for 




CASE COMPANY ANALYSIS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The constituency-building approach for evaluating Connect now focuses on the real 
experiences of six technology company members of the network, their origins, 
principal reasons for their success and challenges they have faced in their 
development l . Following a brief description of each company and their experience 
with Connect, case studies are synthesised and analysed from an entrepreneurial 
process point of view. Common themes and challenges to early stage company 
development in the Scottish context are discussed along with recommendations from 
companies to improve the support environment in Scotland. 
9.2 DESCRIPTION OF CASES 
Each company's founder(s) were interviewed as well as other senior managers to 
present as accurate a picture of the early development of these case companies as 
possible. Each of the six companies was established during the 1990s, Spektra Ltd. 
being the oldest with its roots established in 1990, and Intrallect Ltd. being the 
youngest firm, having spun out of Edinburgh University as recently as 1999. Cases 
and their commercial sectors were as follows: 
D Spektra Systems Ltd. 
D Yaba Ltd. 
D AXEONLtd. 
D Intrallect Ltd. 
D DILAB Ltd 
Computer Software 
Biotechnology; Testing Kits 
Microprocessor-based Electronics 
Data Storage 
Diamond Coating - Materials 
D ExpressOn Biosystems Ltd. Specialised molecular technologies 
I Complete cases have not been included in the appendices due to their combined length but are available on request. 
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9.2.1 Spektra Systems Ltd2 
9.2.1.1 Company Description 
Spektra Systems, based in Livingston, is one of Scotland's most successful and high 
profile software companies. The company was founded by Managing Director 
Gordon Stuart in 1990 as Schindler R+D, a software research and development 
facility for the world's largest manufacturer of elevators, Schindler AG of 
Switzerland. The present form of Spektra was the result of a Management Buy Out 
(MBa) in 1996. Russell Brodie, Development Director and Euan Robertson, 
Technical Sales Director are the other owner/managers of Spektra. 
Although a five-year contract signed with Schindler initially provided Spektra the 
opportunity to focus on target markets and refine best practice, Spektra now provides 
internet-based business applications for large corporate clients such as Scottish 
Widows, Scottish Equitable, and The Royal Bank of Scotland. Spektra specialises in 
the core plumbing that sits behind many dot.com and business-to business e-
commerce systems of today and has developed a high level of technical knowledge 
for complex and demanding software development and consultancy work. As well, 
Spektra advises blue-chip clients in the development of strategies for one-to-one 
Internet trading and web marketing. Spektra is the only Sun Microsystems 
Authorised Java Centre in Scotland, and are a business partner for ffiM Lotus. 
9.2.1.2 Experience with Connect and Other Support Initiatives 
As an original company member of Connect since 1996, Spektra has realised an 
array of primarily intangible benefits through its participation at Connect events. 
The three Spektra directors interviewed all noted different reasons for attending 
Connect, although they were all seeking primarily intangible benefits. 
2 Case information is derived from interviews with Spektra's three directors; Gordon Stuart. Managing Director. Russell 
Brodie, Development Director and Euan Robertson, Technical Sales Director. 
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Technical Director Euan Robertson points out that Connect was very much from 
Spektra's viewpoint the most appropriate support program back in 1996. He states: 
"Connect had the right players in it; had the like-mindedness and was buoyant and 
positive with a we can do it attitude. Connect speakers were entrepreneurs who had 
been there and done it, and events were focused". 
Euan sees the networking through events as the key attraction of Connect. Euan says 
this relates to the fact that the first thing a company does is go to the lawyer to write 
up legal contracts to protect assets IPR, then asks the lawyers, "who should I be 
talking to". From this point begins the process for the company of building a 
reputation through contacts with others. He states that there is a focus there with 
Connect that provides for the opportunity to do deals. He notes that Connect has 
identified the people that have been there and done it, and Connect has got them 
involved. 
One important feature of Connect, Euan points out, is the critical mass of people that 
begin to talk about you. He states: " .. . so that when someone says have you heard of 
Spektra, there is this mass of the right people who know you. This facilitates lots of 
cross-fertilisation that goes on through Connect". Euan' s comments on the 
importance of getting known relate to stakeholder findings on the importance of 
getting to know the right people at Connect events. 
Spektra's Development Director Russell Brodie VIews the value that Connect 
provides from two levels; one level is what he calls the "Gordon and Euan level, 
where you want to network at an event when Spektra happens to be looking for 
venture capital investment. He states that Connect can act as a channel to find the 
right investment people and obtain the right kinds of advice and recommendations. 
Through Connect, Spektra has met people that have provided financial and 
technology information and advice. At the Investment Conference in 1998, they met 
an executive from Motorola in Germany, and visited him in Germany. As Managing 
Director Gordon Stuart comments, this visit encouraged Spektra to "think ouf of the 
box" and take a more international focus to its business. A number of the dot.com 
opportunities for Spektra have come through the relationships that were either made 
directly through Connect or indirectly. 
The second level of value is in providing a network to access good people. In his 
role as Development Director, Russell suggests that Connect is a valuable forum for 
overcoming what he argues is a significant barrier to growing a software company in 
Scotland - finding and recruiting people. 
Russell notes that overall Connect has been appropriate for Spektra's senior people, 
but not for the technology-focused staff, as these staff want to find out about what is 
new in technology nitty-gritty details. He suggests that many Connect events would 
be more of a passing interest to these people. 
9.2.1.3 Summary of Most Positive Effects of Connect 
• "Spektra has only been seeking intangibles from the Connect events and that 
is what we have received" 
• "Connect is a very good organisation; particularly valuable in the learning 
phase" 
• Connect is focused where it should be 
• Connect needs to recognise that its member constituents will change, 
although sponsors and investors will stay basically the same 
• Connect's Investment Conference is good and should be held every 6 months 
instead of annually. This is because of the frequency of start-ups and it gives 
a reason for foreign investors to come to Scotland 
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9.2.2 Yaba Ltd3 
9.2.2.1 Company Description 
Yaba was created in 1997 as a 'spin-out' from the Moredun Research Institute 
located at Pentlands Science Park in Penicuik. Dr. Gareth Jones, considered to be 
one of the world's leading veterinary chlamydiologists founded Yaba to develop and 
produce state-of-the-art diagnostic kits for both human and veterinary medical 
markets. Yaba's mission involves two objectives: to develop novel, highly specific 
diagnostic tests for the infectious disease market (humans and animals); and to 
increase shareholder value through innovative technology development. 
9.2.2.2 Experience with Connect and Other Support Initiatives 
Yabajoined Connect in 1997. Scott states that they were very fortunate coming at it 
when they did, as Connect was in its infancy and people were beginning to buy into 
the Connect concept. In particular, he points out the speakers as top of the range. 
Scott identifies the diversity of infonnation and knowledge at Connect events. He 
states: "the information and advice is invaluable because there is no angle to it; 
there is often frank and candid advice given based on others' experiences. i.e. not all 
venture capitalists are the same". 
Scott notes that "Connect is a place where you can get the buzz on the streets and 
find out for example who's got money and doesn't have money", you can also get a 
better understanding of business angels and where they are coming from. You don't 
have to go through a whole learning curve on certain issues, you can do that through 
Connect. 
3 Case information is derived from interviews with Yaba's two directors; Dr. Gareth Jones, Technical Director and Scott 
Johnstone. Marketing Director. 
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As Scott states, "without Connect it would have been difficult for Yaba to know the 
strengths and weaknesses of all the commercial bodies; what's the difference 
between the professional service providers?" 
compansons. 
This information allows for 
Although the small size of Scotland is sometimes cited as a limitation, Yaba has 
pointed out lack of knowledge on the part of the investor community on 
biotechnology. Both Gareth and Scott see a more active role for Connect in this 
regard. Scott states that "Connect is about getting people together to make it more 
difficult for the ones that normally say no, such as venture capitalists, angels, and 
high flying CEOs". 
Both Gareth and Scott identify the importance of the 1998 Connect Investment 
Conference in generating investor interest in Yaba and allowing the company to 
focus more on their opportunity. However, they concede that investor interest fell 
away, reflecting the nature of biotechnology at the time that was entering a sectoral 
downturn. Gareth states that if he had to do it all again, he would chose to go to one 
investment conference in Scotland and one in London; or somewhere more 
international. One of the companies Yaba is talking to for second round financing is 
London-based and Gareth suggests that it is unlikely that they would be attending 
future investment events in Scotland, stating "we have exposed ourselves to any 
serious biotechnology investor in Scotland by now". 
Scott feels that much of the positive effect of Connect results from its informal 
network focus. Through Connect, company profiles can be raised in the hope that 
other companies coming through will have an easier time than Yaba. Scott doesn't 
think there will ever be an "easier time", but companies will also benefit from 
knowing what companies before them have gone through. 
Scott suggests that Connect events may be getting somewhat diluted, as people are 
being spread around more thinly in terms of the number of presentations. 
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9.2.2.3 Summary of Most Positive Effects of Connect 
• "Connect has been our single most helpful support organisation" 
• Y aba's lawyer was met through Connect 
• Yaba's company mentor (non-executive director) was found through Connect 
• Yaba is engaging in second-stage investment through a Connect contact 
• Connect reflects a shared vision of everyone of future success of start-ups 
• Relevant event topics are available according to industry sector 
• Meeting different people that share similar experiences (lonely as an 
entrepreneur) 
• Connect provides an alternative to technology-focused programs such as 
Scottish Enterprise Clusters Team, Edinburgh Biotechnology; these forums 
allow one to sit around with competitors in sector-specific discussions 
9.2.3 AXEON Ltd4 
9.2.3.1 Company Description 
AXEON was formed in 1998 by Hamish Grant and his wife, Susan in Aberdeen to 
leverage their knowledge and experience gained in building and selling SYSTEMS 
FX, a UK based software testing tools and services business. AXEON's creation is 
based on an Umbrella Agreement with the University of Aberdeen to develop the 
Learning Processor™, a unique patent protected architecture targeted specifically at 
providing cost and power efficient solutions for non-linear system problems. 
The Learning Processor™ has been taken from the conceptual design stage to a 
fabricated prototype and it is now part of a process to launch several new product 
ranges. AXEON now works with alliance partners in developing application specific 
solutions, hardware development kits and training/developer support programmes. 
4 Case information is derived from two interviews with AXEON owner Hamish Grant. 
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AXEON also provides a range of other additional processor products such as 
accelerator cards, chip sets, simulation tools and network management systems. 
9.2.3.2 Experience with Connect and Other Support Initiatives 
AXEON has been a member of Connect since 1998 and Hamish suggests that 
Connect is a highly appropriate support group for finns at the initial stages of 
developing technologies and looking for funders: "We used Connect and Ian for all 
our various funding rounds. They introduced us to the Sutherland guys who were 
half of our first funding round. They also took us to the Hamilton guys for later 
rounds". 
Hamish identifies Connect CEO Ian McDonald, in particular, as a strong supporter of 
AXEON's efforts. He states: "We presented at both the '98 and '99 Connect 
Investment Conferences. Those conferences gave us a platform on which to advise 
ourselves. The meetings proved to be a very good networking environment and 
indeed Ian McDonald himself was a very good person who had a good source of 
contacts. I rung him up several times and said 'Ian I'm in a hole. Do you know 
someone who can do x, y, or z' ?" 
As well as providing a crucial link to potential investors, Connect is seen by AXEON 
providing a local meeting place and networking opportunities. Hamish comments: 
"Even if you think that you have a very strong market expertise and technical 
expertise, there are always bits of the picture that you don't know, be it a corporate 
finance guy or sales person. Being able to call someone up or meet someone and say 
'point me in the right direction', the social things, is one of the things I really 
appreciate most about Connect". 
Hamish suggests that unlike some other support groups, Connect does not attempt to 
say 'we are going to come in and somehow make you a better business'. The ethos 
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of Connect is viewed more in terms of "we will give you a platform and a bit of 
guidance along the way that will help you show off your wares". 
9.2.3.3 Summary of Most Positive Effects of Connect 
• Investment events and forum to meet potential investors 
• Increasing network opportunities with potential partners and collaborators 
9.2.4 Intrallect Ltd5 
9.2.4.1 Company Description 
Intrallect is a Livingston-based company formed in June 2000 by Dr Charles 
Duncan, Dr Peter Douglas and Dr Martin Morrey as a spin-out from the University 
of Edinburgh. The company offers software (tlmiddlewaretl ) tools for the current and 
next generation of e-Learning systems. Intrallect's mission states: "/ntrallect will 
dominate the provision of content management systems for e-Learning systems to the 
larger corporate organisations of the world by offering high-quality, platform-
independent tools ... "Superior products at competitive prices delivering unique e-
Learning tools". 
Intrallect also offers turnkey tools and content for specialised areas, air-traffic 
control, meteorology, etc. that provide entry into the high-value, academic and quasi-
government contracts offered by various European countries. Intrallect also hosts 
and organises international conferences and seminars, the most recent being in Sao 
Paulo, Brazil, harnessing the reputation of Dr. Charles Duncan, CEO. 
5 Case information is derived from interviews with two of Intrallect's founding directors; Dr. Martin Morrey and Dr. Peter 
Douglas. 
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9.2.4.2 Experience with Connect and Other Support Initiatives 
Intrallect has been a member of Connect since 1998. Martin has found Connect to be 
highly valuable in the early stages of company formation. For example, Connect 
helped Intrallect's application for a SMART award and provided hands-on assistance 
by introducing Intrallect to various people in the Connect network. Both Martin and 
Peter identify the value of speaking with entrepreneurs that are experiencing similar 
'trials and tribulations' of growing a company that provides a key reason for 
attending Connect events. 
Peter and Martin also credit other support agencIes that provided assistance to 
Intrallect. In winning the 'who wants to be an entrepreneur' award, Intrallect has 
received strong support from Scottish Enterprise's local enterprise company (LEC) 
in Lanarkshire, and in particular one consultant - Campbell Murray, who assisted 
Intrallect in entering the network because of his enthusiasm for their technology and 
business. Martin asserts that the combination of Research Fellowship, SMART, 
QUEST award, 'who wants to be an entrepreneur' have been essential to their 
success to date. The early support from Edinburgh Technology Fund and its 
Director, Keith Winton, is also identified as a key factor. 
Martin suggests that advisors providing commercialisation support must have 
practical knowledge if they are to be credible and helpful to new companies. Martin 
states that Connect's credibility is in providing a certain level of advice then 
introducing you to another level of advice through others in the network. Peter 
suggests that the evolving and accumulating knowledge of entrepreneurs also require 
varying types of advice and support that will also change over time. 
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9.2.4.3 Summary of Most Positive Effects of Connect 
• Business skills and knowledge 
• Advice on company formation and spinning out of the university 
• Guidance on applications for seed funding 
• Friendly and supportive environment of like-minded people 
9.2.5 DILAB Ltd6 
9.2.5.1 Company Description 
DILAB began in 1994 at Heriot-Watt University as collaboration between Professors 
Philip John in the Chemistry department and John Wilson in Physics that was based 
on a shared interest in materials problems. DILAB provides diamond films and 
coatings for mechanical, optical, electrical and other engineering industries using a 
decomposition process that produces chemical vapours in an electrical discharge. 
Although DILAB is an incorporated company, a umque characteristic is that it 
remains within the university through a 'symbiotic' agreement with the university. 
The strategy of DILAB is to remain at the university providing contract solutions for 
specific commercial clients until such a time that major commercial opportunities 
allow it to spin-out. Philip and John, and a third unnamed original founder all retain 
their academic positions with Heriot-Watt University. A fourth owner, the only non-
academic, provides the role as Financial Controller for DILAB. 
9.2.5.2 Experience with Connect and Other Support Initiatives 
DILAB has been a member of Connect since 1997, one of the oldest standing 
members in the network. John states that they met their lawyer at Connect meetings. 
6 Case information is derived from an interview with DILAB founder Professor John Wilson. 
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But John suggests a primary reason for his ongoing involvement is to network with 
others going through similar commercialisation difficulties and growth. They 
continue to nurture connections that may lead to potential partnerships with DILAB. 
Time constraints have limited his involvement in Connect more recently. 
John suggests that Scottish Enterprise events have been beneficial in providing good 
advice on strategy, and he cites a previous program put on by Edinburgh Council 
focused on assisting defence companies to diversify, focusing on marketing, sales 
and pUblicity. Being encouraged that a company was possible, John and Philip were 
chosen to attend a European course sponsored by Scottish Enterprise along with four 
other Scottish companies that provided three separate weeks of course work. 
John states that Scotland has been a supportive environment overall with a level of 
encouragement and a level of competition between universities comparing their 
commercial output. However, he finds that investment is still tight. 
In terms of academic entrepreneurship in Scotland, John suggests that with changes 
to academic life, e.g. less freedom to pursue research interests, more academics may 
pursue commercial opportunities. John suggests that initiatives to promote 
entrepreneurship at UK universities will be beneficial to those students that have an 
interest, but he asserts "that it is difficult to 'make' entrepreneurs". John further 
suggests that it is important to demonstrate to students what is possible and provide 
the message that 'entrepreneurship is not so much of a black art' but John concedes 
it is difficult to know how much impact these efforts will make on economic life in 
Scotland. 
9.2.5.3 Summary of Most Positive Effects of Connect 
• DILAB met lawyer through Connect 





• Continue to meet potential partners or collaborators although nothing has 
transpired to date 
• Good contacts with other academic entrepreneurs sharing similar 
experiences 
ExpressOn Biosystems Ltd7 
Company Description 
ExpressOn BioSystems Ltd was founded in 1999 by Dr. Peter Estibeiro and Dr. 
Eleanor Barnard to provide access to specialised molecular technologies and to 
develop a range of effective antisense reagents. Prior to starting the company, 
Eleanor worked as Peter's postdoctoral student on neuro-degenerative diseases in the 
Department of Biomedical Science at Edinburgh University. The location of the 
company, at the Roslin Institute near Edinburgh, is identified by Eleanor as an 
advantage particularly due to the support they receive in areas such as health and 
safety and waste disposal and the international reputation of Roslin that bodes well as 
an address for the company. 
ExpressOn Biosystems provides an integrated package of consultancy, experimental 
services and proprietary technology that supports bioscience research for 
pharmaceutical, medical and health outcomes and clients. It is currently the only 
antisense design company in Scotland, specialising in the rapid design of effective 
antisense reagents, and is focused on developing antisense as therapeutics for the 
treatment of neurological disorders. Antisense reagents are a relatively new class of 
drugs, but they have the potential to provide greater therapeutic benefit than 
traditional drugs. ExpressOn aims to unlock that potential through the rapid design 
of effective antisense reagents guided by its mission: "To further scientific research 
and drug development through the provision of high quality, technologically 
advanced products and services to those at the cutting edge of bia-science". 
7 Case information is derived from interviews with Dr. Peter Estibeiro and Dr. Eleanor Barnard 
9.2.6.2 Experience with Connect and Other Support Initiatives 
ExpressOn joined Connect in 2000 and Peter suggests that Connect has been 
'immensely valuable and instrumental' in providing credibility for ExpressOn. The 
Connect Investment Conference provided positive exposure to the VC community 
and press coverage that attracted Adam Christie, their commercialisation director to 
the company. Peter also found their current venture capitalists through the 
investment conference, and as a direct result of going to Connect, ExpressOn is 
closing its second round of funding. Peter has also presented for Connect at one of 
its events. ExpressOn is planning on applying to present at the next investment 
conference to secure its third round of funding. 
Eleanor states that Connect provided a great deal of benefit early on but the company 
has moved on. Business advice changes as the needs of the company change and 
ExpressOn now receives more specific business advice from their board members 
and venture capital investors. 
In terms of other support mechanisms, Eleanor states that Scottish Enterprise, in 
particular Rhona Ellison, has been particularly helpful for the company in providing 
portions of funding support - 50% cost -funding support for market research for the 
business plan, 20% for the JANET computer network, and 50% for additional market 
information. 
More than anything, Scottish Enterprise has enabled ExpressOn to close the latest 
round of investment by providing £150,000 in equity following a financial and 
market due diligence assessment by Grant Thornton that found that ExpressOn was 
suffering from market failure. In other works, the funding gap experienced by 
ExpressOn was seen as a lack of investment funds available rather than a deficiency 
in the investment opportunity. This shortfall of £150,000, had it not been filled by 





Summary of Most Positive Effects of Connect 
• ExpressOn attracted their commercialisation director through Connect 
• Exposure and credibility through Investment Conference and met second 
round investors through Connect 
• Valuable business knowledge and information 
Section Summary 
In this section, companies have described their experiences with Connect and other 
support programs without examining the basis for support or understanding the 
factors contributing to the success of these companies. In other words, absent is an 
understanding of creation and formation processes and challenges as perceived by 
those people involved. 
The next section takes an analytical approach to exammmg the entrepreneurial 
processes, commercialisation challenges and strategies of these case companies to 
qualify the effects of Connect and other support programs. 
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9.3 SYNTHESIS OF CASE STUDIES FROM AN 
ENTREPRENEURIAL PROCESS PERSPECTIVE 
This section synthesises case results that establish how original technological 
innovations have been exploited and companies formed, the ongoing challenges to 
growth and regional enablers and constraints from the viewpoint of company 
founders and directors. These factors will be examined under four common themes 
identified in the case analysis - pre-formation, formation, growth and opinions on 
external support. 
9.3.1 Pre-Formation 
9.3.1.1 Core Technologies and First-Mover Advantage 
For each of the six case compames, a core technology has provided a major 
technological platform upon which the company was based and from which further 
product ranges are supported. For all cases but Spektra, company-forming 
technologies can be directly traced back to research programs conducted within 
Scottish universities or research institutes. Spektra's origins however are based on 
spinning out of a corporate parent and modifying previous technologies gained as an 
R&D unit. Core technologies are as follows: 
• Spektra Systems Ltd Customised e-commerce software 
• YabaLtd Panclabort, chlamydia testing 
• AXEONLtd Learning Processor™ 
• Intrallect Ltd E-Learning Middleware 
• DILAB Ltd Diamond-coati ng 
• ExpressOn Biosystems Ltd Antisense Agents 
The majority of these companies sought to exploit 'first mover advantage', whilst also 
expressing a clear awareness that such strategic positions were often only temporary. 
Differences can be seen in how each adapted their core technology largely dependent 
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upon the nature of their core-technology and the market sectors each company chose 
to compete in. 
For example, Yaba's technology, Panclabort, established a first-mover advantage in 
testing for chlamydia by providing a complete test system unlike existing tests at the 
time that required an initial reference procedure before administering the test. 
Panclabort requires no special training and thus is easier to use than current tests on 
the market. Yaba has adapted Panclabort from a veterinary application to encompass 
diagnostic kits for both human and veterinary medical markets. This adaptation of 
the core technology to many other market segments relatively quickly came after a 
certain level of knowledge, skills and experience had been gained during the process 
of developing the technology for the initial target market. 
In the case of ExpressOn, the first-mover advantage occurred through research in a 
relatively recent technology that allowed the company to become the only antisense 
company in Scotland and one of only a few in Europe with the ability to develop 
antisense. The company mission explicitly states how its core technology is to be 
developed in providing the first of a new generation of antinsense-based applications 
and in becoming a major player in pharmaceutical and molecular technoloy 
customisation through the adoption of their platform technology. The company's 
emerging market strategy is based on its prediction that antisense therapeutics will 
become the most significant medical advance since antibiotics. 
Indeed, the potential of adapting ExpressOn' s technology is based on the breadth of 
applications and global market reach for their science as well as for the related 
services they provide to potential customers. The service offering - an important 
component of ExpressOn's strategy - is explicit in its focus to provide value for 
money and service flexibility for clients looking for various antisense applications. 
The importance of the company's service business to complement its science can be 
seen in the variety of qualifications that ExpressOn continues to secure. They 
include Quality Assurance (QA) procedures based on six principles defined by the 
DTI-sponsored National Measurement System Valid Analytical Measurement 
248 
(VAM) Programme, Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) standards and ISO 9001 
accredi tati on. 
Intrallect's strategy of being 'first to market' is based on its range of e-Iearning tools 
developed from its award-winning EuroMET technology. Co-founder Peter Douglas 
states that Intrallect's strategy began with an assertion that the company did not have 
any competitors and had a unique product. He adds that there were no obvious direct 
competitors at the time, but similar companies were evident in hindsight that were 
seeking funds to enter the same market with related products. 
The distinctive advantage of Intrallect's tools for the e-Ieaming market, according to 
Peter, is that they are designed to be rigorously compliant with existing 
standards/specifications, now and in the future. This compatibility feature combines 
with constantly improving innovations to the original EuroMET technology in 
providing transformation channels to delivery content from a single source into 
multiple delivery channels. These channels can be proprietary "web-based learning 
environments" or substantially different technologies such as interactive digital 
television or wireless, handheld devices, and devices yet to be devised. Intrallect's 
tools provide functions such as capturing and storing e-Iearning content and 
separating the content from any specific technology - that is expected to increase the 
longevity and flexibility of the knowledge and skills encapsulated in the e-Iearning 
content. 
For DILAB, a first-mover advantage was identified when research on laser optics 
was combined with chemistry research among two science departments to create a 
protective, resistant-wear coating with a variety of industrial applications. Although 
there are other coating methods in the market, this process was confirmed to produce 
the best quality and provides the greatest flexibility for a variety of applications and 
prompted the scientists to create the company. 
DILAB's initial application was as a high transparency and hard optic material for 
the defence industry - missiles, ray-domes and lasers. However, the Ministry of 
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Defence saw the potential of developing this type of technology for their own use 
and ended the collaboration with DILAB. This loss of a major customer required the 
DILAB founders to consider specialist applications that include sensory applications 
for hazardous and extreme environments - deep-sea, oil-well, explosive. Although 
DILAB is involved in contract negotiations to gain accreditation and specifications to 
enter into these markets, lack of a major customer and market has limited the ability 
of DILAB to emerge as an independent spin-out company. This limitation will be 
discussed further in section 9.3.2.2. 
In the case of Spektra, an identification of 'new commercial possibilities and 
opportunities' occurred during a re-organisation of Schindler R&D, when founder 
Gordon Stuart, in particular, 'saw' the opportunity for the R&D centre to grow as a 
separate company. Realising that original technologies and knowledge developed as 
an R&D unit provided a strong base for exploitation, Gordon initiated the managed 
buy-out (MBO). 
Unlike the other case companies, Spektra began with an existing market position in 
the highly competitive software sector having kept blue-chip customers from its 
previous business. An established market presence make it easier for Spektra in 
deciding to challenge the 'existing ways of doing things' in many other areas of the e-
communication sector as a new company. 
Unlike Yaba, ExpressOn and DILAB whose core technologies provided first-mover 
advantages, Spektra 'evolved' to a first-mover advantage in Scotland by replacing 
existing technological solutions with their own customised technologies. This 
advantage was accomplished by demonstrating to existing and potential customers 
that its solutions were more effective, efficient and therefore, superior to its 
competitors. The new company provided a level of flexibility, unavailable as an 
R&D unit of a major corporation, to identify and pursue other opportunities in the 
near future. However, re-focusing Spektra as a new company required significant 
changes to operations that will be discussed in section 9.3.3.1. 
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Despite the diversity of technologies, a common characteristic of case company 
founders and directors interviewed is an expressed longer-term belief in the 
commercial viability of their technology. In identifying a first-mover advantage 
from their technologies, most of those interviewed stated their expectation to further 
adapt their existing core technology, as opposed to designing a product for one niche 
market. Not only were these companies following a longer-term strategy of 
technological development, but each company, irrespective of their technology 
sector, was In essence following, In Freeman's terms (1982), "an 
opportunist/offensive style of strategic innovation, as opposed to, and imitative, 
defensive or dependent style". 
It has already been described that Spektra's strategy is to constantly search for, find 
and explore potential new niches and marketplaces. For ExpressOn, the strategy in 
the medium term is to develop in-house anti sensory agents against diseases of the 
brain and to sell them on to pharmaceutical companies at a much higher price. The 
strategy is to feed intellectual property into the bigger companies. ExpressOn' s 
market strength is its development of the antisense platform technology that also 
provides licensing or selling opportunities as "ExpressOn can't possibly do 
everything with the technology" according to co-owner Eleanor Barnard. 
ExpressOn also predicts that outsourcing of molecular technologies will expand 
rapidly in the next few years, and it aims to be at the forefront with the development 
of a set of tools which enables the genetic manipulation and analysis of a biological 
system. Molecular biology services are directed towards providing technological 
support to academic and industrial research laboratories. These services are focused 
on scientists who wish to apply these tools to their chosen system but who have no 
formal training in molecular biology, or who cannot afford the expense of re-
equipping laboratories or re-training personnel. 
The longer-term focus of ExpressOn is to finalise the technology and sell to 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies as a target validation tool. Antisense 
is emerging as a new class of drugs, although ExpressOn intends to sell to them 
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initially as a research tool. Peter likes to think that the key strategic advantage for 
the company is the potentially disruptive antisense design technology and the rise of 
antisense as a generic class of therapeutics. 
In the case of Intrallect, the company identifies that it maintains 'considerable' first 
mover advantage since it spun out two years ago and that they expect to maintain 
competitive presence in the marketplace. Although they suggest that there is little 
direct competition in their market at present, due mostly to the results of impending 
take-over bids within the marketplace, Martin and Peter suggest that this position 
may change in the medium tenn as they become more successful and competitors 
react and re-focus. 
In the longer tenn, Peter and Martin both suggest that one of the larger e-Ieaming 
companies may take Intrallect over, although an obvious candidate is not identifiable. 
In the meantime, Intrallect's strategy will continue to focus on the ongoing 
application of e-Ieaming modules for customers while securing a sustainable market 
presence based on ongoing innovation. 
9.3.1.2 Entrepreneurial Vision to Start a New Company 
Another common feature of the case companies was an identified individual vision 
and drive that supplemented to varying degrees the 'exploitation potential' of the 
core technology itself in prompting fonnation of a new company. Literature 
describes the special abilities, or personal characteristics, of the entrepreneur as a 
common characteristic in creating new compames. The importance of key 
visionaries, who are largely responsible for providing the driving force of a 
company, and are also largely responsible for the setting of the long-term strategic 
and technological directions of the finn, has been suggested for some time (e.g. 
Bennis and Nanus, 1985; Sashkin, 1987). 
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The particular 'entrepreneurial vision' of typically, either one person, or a very small 
group of individuals is as diverse as the technologies themselves. Within all of these 
companies there were typically one or two clearly identifiable individuaVs who are 
characterised as mainly responsible for 'seeing' the potential commercial 
opportunities; in essence they were the visionaries. It is suggested that visionaries 
for the case companies were: 
• Spektra Systems Ltd Gordon Stuart 
• Yaba Ltd Dr. Gareth Jones 
• AXEONLtd Hamish Grant 
• Intrallect Ltd Dr. Peter Douglas 
• DILAB Ltd Professor John Wilson 
• ExpressOn Biosytems Dr. Peter Esterbeiro, Dr. Eleanor Barnard 
In conceptualising an entrepreneurial 'spectrum', it can be argued that one end finds 
the neo-classical entrepreneur, a market opportunist seeking profit opportunities. It 
is argued here that Hamish Grant of AXE ON characterises the 'lone entrepreneur' 
whose drive and behaviour typifies the stereotypical market intermediary. Indeed, 
formation of AXE ON can be characterised as following the neo-classical model of 
the firm that commences with the search for a profit opportunity in the marketplace. 
AXEON was created around an explicit vision to gain a profit in the market, as stated 
by Hamish: "We decided to aim high, with the goal to develop a high growth, world 
class, multi-million pound business in a five-year period, a dream that became 
AXEON". The vision created by Hamish and his wife Susan was based on their 
decision to return to Scotland and leverage their previous career experiences after a 
six month reflection of future opportunities whilst abroad. Both had decided that 
they did not wish to spend the rest of their working life overseas and wished to be 
more in control of their own business future. Hamish had initially gained a great 
deal of his business acumen working in the oil industry for British Borneo, with 
Susan developing an in-depth knowledge of the information technology sector. 
Upon arriving in the UK, they became UK distributors of SYSTEMS FX, a software 
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testing tools and services franchise. This provided Hamish and Susan with technical 
knowledge, business experience and capital upon selling this business that would be 
used in created their new company. 
Hamish then began a search for a new developmental technology with identified 
potential market prospects that would allow them to realise their vision. He decided 
to contact a number of Scottish universities and entered into discussions with many 
of the industrial liaison and technology transfer officers in Scotland. Hamish found 
most of them to be at best 'unhelpful' and comments: "It appears that for an 
entrepreneur to literally 'tum up at the door', asking for contacts with technologists 
and inquiring about the possibility of co-developing marketable products was not 
something that the universities were administratively able to cope with". 
Indeed, it was only two universities, Edinburgh and Aberdeen, that were considered 
in anyway amenable to being approached externally by Hamish as a lone 
entrepreneur, albeit one with experience, enthusiasm and motivation. Hamish states 
that these meetings with technology transfer office were 'less than fervent', stating: 
"We thought maybe it was because we did not really have enough pulling power to 
get the academics in Edinburgh and the others to talk to us. The reality probably was 
that for Edinburgh we were just too small '. 
This left Aberdeen University as the only university in which anything promising, in 
terms of potentially successful market technology, had been found; that being the 
processor research and technology that was to lead to the early prototypes of the 
Learning Processor™. This was considered as 'lucky' rather than 'planned', as they 
already lived in Aberdeen. Thus, the core product ofAXEON was produced from 
technology that was being developed within Aberdeen University. 
The creation of Spektra is also characterised by a strong entrepreneurial vision to 
pursue new market opportunities. Although it can be argued that Spektra followed 
perhaps a less risky strategy than AXEON, the decision of Gordon Stuart and his 
partners to initiate an MBO and spin-out was a high-risk decision given the 
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competitive nature of the software sector and the previous security of operating as a 
unit of a successful large parent corporation. 
Moving towards the other end of the 'entrepreneurial spectrum', it can be argued that 
an entrepreneurial 'vision' is not a common, explicit and premeditated event within 
the academic research community. Indeed, literature suggests that remarkably few 
researchers have the ability to see or act upon such commercial possibilities (Howell 
et aI1998). 
For some of the case companies, a particular milestone in conducting their research 
provided the 'eureka moment' in the company's foundation. For Dr. Gareth Jones of 
Yaba, the possibility of creating a new company came when he realised a need for 
better diagnostic tests for chlamydia and the fact that an initial consortium looking to 
develop these tests was going to take too long. Gareth made the decision that 
converting to a platform technology would enable Yaba to produce new tests for 
chlamydia quite rapidly. 
Faced with a potentially large market opportunity for human testing, Gareth on the 
one hand realised that a new company could exploit this opportunity, but on the other 
hand more research was required to develop the synthetic proteins that formed the 
test. Gareth identified a patented method of sticking peptides into plates by a Danish 
company and, perceiving this to be a good opportunity, contacted Scottish Enterprise 
to assist in negotiations with the Danish company and to validate the technology. 
Scottish Enterprise, Gareth explains, was very helpful, providing advice and 
assessing the technology. The Danish company had an inflated idea of the value of 
the technology and in the end, Yaba decided that the asking price was too much. 
However, during this process of negotiations, Yaba looked at alternative 
technologies that they could use. 
During the extended period when Yaba were operating as 'a one man operation' this 
appeared to be exactly the type of entrepreneurial characteristic that 'saw them 
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through to better times '. Yaba was existing as a one-person company, as Scott 
maintained his position as incubation manager for Pentlands Science Park. Gareth 
was taking no salary and Scott was not actually 'on the books'. As Gareth states, 
"Yaba was essentially 'working onfree air'." 
In the case of Intrallect, co-founders Peter Douglas and Martin Morrey identified 
'external affirmation' of their EuroMET technology in winning the European 
Academic Software Award (EASA) as the defining moment for committing to start 
the company. Peter elaborates: "We always felt that these tools were very powerful, 
that we had done something quite clever, valuable and useful. The EUSA Award 
made us think that we should do something about it." Similarly, Martin states: 
"Starting a new company had always been in the background as a possibility, but 
there was never any need to push it forward before. At the award, someone talked 
about commercialising an academic innovation that was timely and appropriate and 
znsplrmg. " 
Nevertheless, the driving force to commercialise Intrallect's tools was taken on by 
Peter Douglas although the entrepreneurial role has continued to evolve as a shared 
activity among the three founders. A key factor identified by Martin and Peter in 
forming Intrallect's was a 'pre-formation' partnership agreement made between the 
three co-founders regarding their individual commitment to the company 
immediately following the EUSA Award. All three founders had worked together 
for a few years on projects. Martin states they trust each other's judgement and also 
attributes Charles Duncan's attitude on the company as a catalyst for 'kicking the 
whole thing off'. Because Charles was the leader of the research group, Martin 
suggests that he could have been justified in assuming a greater equity stake in the 
new company. Instead, Charles asserted that the company would be based on equal 
partnership, setting the tone for the partnership. 
A further reflection of the positive relationship among the three founding partners 
can be seen through Martin's philosophy of his year working full-time to build the 
company. Despite being the only partner working on the company that year, Martin 
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views his commitment year as an Enterprise Fellow 'doing what the other guys most 
wanted to do', while Peter and Charles worked less on the company and fitted it in 
during their spare time. 'It all evens out', states Martin. 
John Wilson of DILAB admits that he was the driving force to create the company, 
and admits in hindsight that he would choose his partners more closely, as the level 
of dedication and commitment to the company is not evenly distributed. One partner 
in particular has not provided the level of commitment, although at the time it was 
seen as important to include the individual on the team. 
For ExpressOn, the leading edge SCIence being developed in the new antisense 
technologies initially convinced founders Peter and Eleanor that their research efforts 
could lead to the creation of a commercially viable company. 
9.3.1.3 'Sustaining Strategies' in Company Formation 
Similar to AXEON and Spektra, each of the founders among the university spin-outs, 
although evolving to this realisation, became imbued with a strongly held belief in 
the commercial viability of their particular technology. In committing to a 
commercial route, a common theme among the university spin-outs was enacting 
some form of 'sustaining strategy' for the company while developing their 
technologies, acquiring further resources and securing customers. 
ExpressOn, DILAB, and Intrallect, for example, all offered consultancy services to 
sustain themselves while assessing the potential of company formation and spin-out 
from their respective universities (Bullock 1984). Another characteristic of these 
companies was reaching a certain 'threshold of technology development' where 
sufficient market demand prompts the scientist to commit full-time to the company. 
How each company enacted sustaining strategies is described below. 
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For Intrallect, running a university-based consultancy prior to spinning out from the 
university allowed them to refine techniques and concepts developed in the 
EuroMET project that won them the EASA award. These techniques were used in 
several other projects, including the "National Learning Network for Remote 
Sensing" now being used by students all over the world. The consultancy leveraged 
the University of Edinburgh brand and also allowed the co-founders to run seminars 
in e-Ieaming and produced bespoke software, including a system to enable a 
distributed team of editors to maintain a multilingual newsletter over the web. 
For Intrallect, another key factor sustaining the company as it formed was Martin 
winning a Royal Society of Edinburgh Enterprise Fellowship Award that provided a 
salary for one year to develop the company. Once the three Intrallect partners agreed 
to set up a 'product' company rather than a conSUltancy, the first objective for Martin 
in the Fellowship was to write a business plan to take to investors. During that time, 
Peter secured another contract at Edinburgh University in another department while 
Charles continued as a full-time academic. 
A Scottish Enterprise SMART award provided funding for Martin for another year, 
although the intention in applying for an award was to validate the technology to 
attract investors. Because a key selection criteria for a SMART Award is to verify 
an innovative product that is commercially viable, the partners expected SMART to 
lead to investment. Outside investment came in the form of a matching amount to 
the SMART award through a contact Martin met at a First Tuesday8 meeting in 
Edinburgh. Graham Bucknell, a business angel, joined Intrallect and immediately 
forced us to look on the commercial end', as Martin states, and organised the 
finances of the company. Graham has since evolved to become a non-executive 
director with Intellect in 2002. Following a SMART Award, there were enough 
funds in the company for Peter to join the company full-time. 
8 First Tuesday is a national network for e-commerce businesses that provides monthly events the first Tuesday of each month 
( http://www.firsttuesdayscotland.com). 
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Edinburgh Technology Fund - Edinburgh University's investment fund - provided 
approximately £10,000 that was used by Intrallect to 'trial' Gordon to undertake 
market anal ysis. Dr. Gordon Rankine, Director Sales & Marketing, has more than 25 
years experience as directors of sales, marketing, commercial, and business, and has 
been CEO of a number of companies, the majority of which were start-up 
manufacturing organisations. 
In hindsight, both Martin and Peter concede that this phased approach of joining the 
company only after each salary can be sustained saved the company from possible 
insolvency early on. As Martin states: "If none of us had been able to take that risk, 
and just jumped straight into the business I don't think it really would have 
happened. We were running consultancy work in our spare time but it would have 
been a real struggle to do long term". 
Similar to Intrallect, ExpressOn began by providing contract research in molecular 
biology on a much more bespoke basis than the average research contract and thus 
were more like an academic collaboration but on a more commercial basis. This 
contract research provided Peter and Eleanor with an immediate source of revenue 
that was close at hand. Initial projects typically involved completing the last few 
months of a grant in which a researcher had left early or involved troubleshooting of 
projects where difficulties had arisen. These initial contracts evolved into entire 
projects from the university on behalf of other research groups needing input from an 
area such as molecular biology for multi-disciplinary projects - i.e. pharmacology -
where they are not specialists. 
ExpressOn's experience in various contract research areas has provided the company 
with a broad base of expertise. Eleanor concedes that without the use of university 
facilities, it would have been very difficult to develop the company with their lack of 
funds. Eleneor and Peter purchased the same equipment for the company that they 
had used as academics, at a depreciated rate from the university. Eleanor asserts that 
this support contributes to their 'love-hate relationship' with the university that will 
be further explained in section 9.3.2.2. 
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Yaba's fonnation story involves simultaneous technology development and 
emerging market opportunities. Gareth acquired a SMART award of £45,000 in 
1997 that allowed Yaba to hire two people to further develop the technology: first of 
all, the tests of chlamydial disease for fann livestock, called chlamydial abortion, and 
then later, developing a test for chlamydial infection in humans. It was during the 
human test that Gareth and the technologists identified what they perceived as a 
major market opportunity. At this time, there was an epidemic of chlamydial 
infection world-wide, placing the issue on the agenda of concerned governments and 
policy makers. The existing means to diagnose infection were very expensive and 
not applicable on a wide scale. Yaba felt that they could produce a test that was 
inexpensive, effective, automated and applicable on a wide scale. By using synthetic 
peptides in the test Yaba would be able to ensure complete specificity of the 
technology to apply to diagnosis. 
DILAB, similar to Intrallect, Yaba and ExpressOn, received a SMART award that 
John suggests ' ... was exactly the kind of money that we wanted to get started'. The 
SMART awards allowed DILAB to develop its processing equipment, and they also 
developed a prototype that they were not expected to complete. The company also 
received a SMART II award, although John states that their advisor from Scottish 
Enterprise was incompetent, causing big delays in the application process. John also 
began giving presentations to potential investors but without receiving any strong 
interest. 
DILAB at this time, John suggests, was somewhere between a real product and a 
service and was thus not a particularly strong investment opportunity. John states 
that he and his partners knew they had a technology capable of producing diamond 
coatings but at the time there was not a great demand for the application of the 
technology. 
John's original idea was that DILAB would sell the equipment used for making the 
diamond coating because there were a growing number of research groups wanting 
to start in the field and there was only one supplier of reasonable equipment from the 
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us. This idea was rejected for a variety of reasons, but they decided to protect their 
idea while making sure they could develop the research side. 
John says that the previous head of department was instrumental in assisting DILAB 
to use facilities, as this individual was involved in a commercial venture of his own 
and knew the issues and problems. At the present time, however, John suggests that 
Heriot-Watt University is only interested in a financial arrangement rather than other 
benefits accrued by the university from the relationship with DILAB. 
The sustaining strategy for DILAB has been to remain within its university as it has 
yet to achieve a revenue threshold to sustain itself as a separate company. For 
DILAB, the challenge for the technology that exists today is cost, as many customers 
want an inexpensive application or customers want the application onto plastics, 
which requires a slightly different material application and process. 
The key breakthrough required for DILAB and others in the industry remains to push 
costs down, rather than improve the technology. The company has costed out the 
possibility of spin-out and understands the threshold revenue requirements before 
there is any possibility of a spin-out option. Currently there is interest from an 
outside investor that may change the current position of the company. 
Unlike the university spin-outs, AXEON's sustainable strategy in preparing to form 
the company involved a higher risk approach. Initially, not possessing the capital to 
generate and obtain the intellectual and financial property of their own company, 
they spent their time building up SYSTEMS FX as a simple software tools sales and 
distribution business. After growing the business in this manner for several years, 
they then chose to achieve additional growth within SYSTEMS FX by developing an 
additional on-line specialist business services aspect to SYSTEMS FX, aiming at 
achieving a tum-over of up to a million and a half pounds per year. 
By 1997 AXEON had reached this level and employed a total of twenty two people, 
when they decided to sell the business to raise capital for their next and more 
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ambitious business venture (AXEON), deciding to move their family and base their 
new company in Scotland. 
9.3.1.4 Leaving Academia: Personal Factors Influencing Spin-out 
Decisions 
In describing his decision to leave the university to start-up Intrallect, Peter talked 
about the 'convergence of circumstances' leading to an exit that include winning the 
EUSA award, his interest in further development of the tools and his absence of a 
rigid commitment to an academic career. Although Peter identified the freedom of 
an academic career as a benefit, the low salary, temporary contract (as a research 
fellow) and somewhat relaxed lifestyle were key personal factors contributing to a 
decision to leave academia. 
Martin also states that his temporary research fellowship position did not provide 
much security and added that he and Peter did not have dependants at the time, 
making the decision to leave academia easier. However, both Martin and Peter 
conceded that, had they both been on permanent university contracts, the decision to 
leave and commit full-time to the company would have been more difficult. Charles, 
on the other hand, has only recently left Edinburgh University now that Intrallect is 
reasonably established. His decision has required greater deliberation and risk 
management, according to Martin, because of considerations for dependants (married 
with two children) and his tenured position with the university. 
For ExpressOn, Peter and Eleanor decided that starting a new company was worth 
pursuing and that they would leave their university jobs. Eleanor was on a temporary 
contract and Peter did not hold a tenured position. Peter states that he never 
perceived himself as a career academic even though he spent 15 years in that 
capacity. He therefore didn't see leaving to start a new company as a high-risk 
option as it was giving up a job he actually didn't like. Eleanor states that she has no 
regrets in leaving the university and feels much happier working with ExpressOn. 
262 
She states she did not feel particularly well cut out for an academic and "loves the 
commercial aspect of the business" and balancing the lab and the commercial world. 
As discussed earlier, John points out that DILAB as a company has not been built up 
to full success and the potential is there but has yet to be full y realised. There has not 
been enough business to date to make the company self-sustaining, thus no income 
has been taken from DILAB by its academic owners other than incurred expenses 
and related costs. 
In hindsight, John says he and the other partners expected to get to the stage of full-
time employment with the company much earlier. This creates what John calls 'the 
'Catch 22' of academic entrepreneurship', where academics want to commit to 
exploiting their innovation and create a company, yet there isn't a market that 
currently demonstrates high demand or justifies them leaving their university 
position. Related companies globally in the area of diamond coating have either 
folded or been taken over by larger companies that themselves have reduced 
considerably their respective product range. 
John describes his position as an academic entrepreneur, that he defines as someone 
that has not yet left the university and continues to hold an academic position. In the 
most successful cases, an academic entrepreneur would ensure that 
commercialisation opportunities from the research are going to be used and not just 
given away, ideally through their own company and connections. He views the 
difference between an academic and 'regular' entrepreneur as one where the 
academic entrepreneur may not expect to make a living with the commercial 
opportunity. Once one leaves the academic side entirely, he or she is no longer an 
academic entrepreneur, John suggests. 
A key problem for academic entrepreneurs according to John is that they often do not 
have to take on the risk of leaving their university. In his case, there is no special 
encouragement or great incentive to leave the university; rather it comes down to the 
individual's perception of challenge, interest or ability to do something different. 
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John states that when DILAB was first established, the partners came to a reasonable 
agreement earlier on regarding the status of their existing positions, with three of the 
four maintaining full-time academic positions. John identified that he and his 
partners have been nervous about any of them leaving academia, particularly with the 
financial situation of the company. 
Another reason making a departure from the university difficult is the existing ability 
to lease laboratory equipment and continue to generate new ideas and move product 
development forward with a direct academic link, even if this meant paying a 
licensing agreement with the university. 
For John and his partners, the dilemma exists even if market opportunities arise 
regarding the company's relationship and position within the university. John 
concedes that there are others that may be more qualified to run the company but do 
not have the technical qualifications and linkages to research that currently exists at 
Heriot Watt University. 
In terms of balancing the academic and commercial demands on his time and energy, 
John admits that this has been a challenge. With restructuring ongoing at Heriot 
Watt in 2002, John is becoming head of department that he anticipates will place 
greater pressures on time. John performs much of his DILAB work in the evenings 
where he comes across various ideas and concepts accidentally. Indeed, he admits 
that some of the best product 'pieces and bits' that the company has made have been 
totally unpredictable and have emerged from completely unforeseen directions. 
9.3.2 Formation 
9.3.2.1 Initial Investment 
Case companies identified early stage investment, or 'seed' capital, from a variety of 
sources with no clearly defined pattern on how funds were secured or how funds 
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were used. A common theme, however, was that the level of initial seed funding was 
often far below what was needed to achieve initial business milestones set by the 
company. 
Public schemes such as the SMART9 awards have been secured by each of the four 
university spin-outs to develop technologies and support salaries. The Edinburgh 
Technology FundlO (ETF) is another public scheme successfully tapped by Yaba and 
ExpressOn to file their patents and by Intrallect to undertake market analysis. 
Some companies obtained a 'mix' of early stage public and private investment. Debt 
financing was used by ExpressOn in the form of a £10,000 bank overdraft secured 
with assistance from the Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce who helped with their 
business plan and provided an introduction to the bank's commercial lender who 
ultimately provided the overdraft. This was followed by ETF investment to secure 
patents and fund a one-year pilot project. 
Yaba also identifies a 'mix' of early stage investment that began with investment 
from ETF followed by venture capital from 3i that together provided an initial fund 
of £120,000. Although Yaba identified its early-stage milestones to be specific 
patents relating to the human chlamydia test and animal chlamydia tests, this level of 
funding was below what was needed to achieve Yab's identified milestones. 
However, by 2001, Yaba had raised approximately £450,000 for the development of 
its intellectual property rights (IPR) and the company's first product Panclabort. 
This subsequent funding involves seed venture capital from Scottish Enterprise and 
3i, UK Government grant funding through SMART stage 1 and stage 2 awards, loans 
and directors' funds. 
Other companies, like AXEON, sought a broad range of early stage investment 
beginning with personal savings, debt and private equity from multiple sources. 
9 Eligibility for SMART requires applicants to be an individual resident in Scotland planning to set up a business in ~cotland, a 
sole-trader, partnership, independent company or part of a group operating in Scotland with less than 50 employees (I.e. a small 
enterprise) and have a highly innovative R&D project that may lead to the introduction of new products or processes 
(Source:http://www.scotland.gov.uklwho/elldlrnd_SMART_l.asp). 
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Hamish and Susan invested approximately £300,000 of their own money in AXEON. 
money generated from the sale of SYSTEMS FX. Then AXEON obtained 
approximately £335,000 equity and £200,000 debt finance early in 1999. The equity 
finance was provided by a combination of institutional investors, such as 3i PIc and 
Scottish Enterprise and Business Angels, such as The Sutherland Consortium. The 
Bank of Scotland and Grampian Technology investments (Grampian Enterprise) 
provided the debt finance. AXEON used this mix of early stage investment to 
develop the Learning Processor™ from the conceptual design phase to the fabrication 
of early prototypes. 
Hamish suggests that obtaining seed funding was not particularly difficult, and he 
expressed a belief that they had developed a good initial business plan, based around 
a viable technology. Indeed, Hamish comments: " ... that [seed funding] was 
relatively straight forward to obtain". 
A key concern identified by each case company in securing initial investment was 
the amount of time taken up with the search for funding from a variety of sources. 
Hamish suggests that the 'tying-up' of senior personnel seeking investment is a 
particular problem. He states: "When you have five people in your firm, two of those 
five people may have to get involved solely in doing the deals and that may paralyse 
them and your business for three months while they could be getting on with other 
crucial business tasks and that is the most difficult aspect of it [raising funds]". 
Hamish continues: "Waiting months for finance is no good when you have to pay 
people salaries, pay building rent and so on, every day". Hamish identifies the 
challenge of dealing with private investors also in terms of the time constraint and 
states: "The biggest difficulty was generating the aspiration from the capital funders 
to do a money deal quickly. The reality is that they are often monoliths and they still 
have to go through their monolith processes so it all can take a long time if you are 
not careful". 
10 ETF targets the world-class research community in and around Edinburgh, seeking to invest money. in emerging 
technologies, and research entrepreneurs, that demonstrate the potential to establish new commercial opportumtJes capable of 
generating significant income to be returned to the community (see Appendix O. 
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In terms of the public schemes, some case companies stated concerns over the 
'masses of forms and regulations required' contributing to longer lead-times to 
obtain investment. As described earlier, John of DILAB states "the application 
process for the SMART II award was a bureaucratic nightmare ", with an advisor 
who contributed to big delays in the application process. At the same time, John 
stresses that the SMART award was " ... was exactly the kind of money that we 
wanted to get started". The SMART awards allowed DILAB to develop its 
processing equipment and a prototype. 
Eleanor from ExpressOn found that secunng a SMART award diminished their 
ability to secure the maximum of £250,000 from the Small Firms Scheme because of 
the ceiling of the European limit of support in any three-year period. Although 
SMART II is exempt, a company can't go to SMART II without SMART I, and 
Eleanor feels that SMART I should be exempt. 
However, similar to DILAB, ExpressOn credits their SMART award to attracting 
renewed interest in the company by venture capitalists. Eleanor adds that seed 
funding was made difficult because, at the time, there were few seed funds available 
for biotechnology and they were fortunate to secure an ETF grant. Eleanor feels that 
a SMART Award is necessary for a biotechnology company to endorse its 
technology. The SMART was used to refine the technology to be a predictive tool to 
identify anti sensory agents that 'knock down to different levels' to allow for a range 
of drugs effective for each particular gene. 
Particularly for Yaba and ExpressOn, an additional problem identified is the longer 
time horizon over sectors such as information technology and software for investors 
of biotechnology due to the often very long technological development lead-times. 
Peter of ExpressOn argues that part of the issue is for private capital to understand 
biotechnology and decrease the pressure to exit quickly. Short-term risks are very 
high, and he suggests that 8-10 years is required in many cases to generate the 
returns expected by venture capitalists. 
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Yaba and ExpressOn founders' experiences suggest that many venture capitalists 
simply do not have the longer-term view of investment and explicitly avoid 
biotechnology companies. Both companies identified examples of high-potential 
Scottish biotechnology companies [names withheld] that have been undervalued and 
sold off because venture capitalists took their money out early rather than wait until 
reflects higher value. Gareth suggests that a focal group in Scotland should be 
created to provide a check and balance for this type of VC behaviour as well as to 
educate investors on investment issues particular to the biotechnology sector. 
Yaba identifies a number of investment challenges faced in securing investment for 
their diagnostics tests; an area that Gareth suggests is not the "sexy" part of 
biotechnology. The reason that Yaba chose diagnostics was because it is sustainable 
and they could get a number of products into the market. Yaba now has one product 
and a potential second product in the pipeline, which, if they secure adequate 
funding, will provide a solid business in both veterinary and human diagnostic 
testing. 
Although diagnostics provides a platform technology that enables other technologies . 
to develop very rapidly, the challenge for Yaba has been to secure enough money to 
employ the people to focus on specific tests, with the same platform technology used 
for all these different tests. Thus, the rate of progress is rapid and not constrained by 
the technology. The investment gap for Yaba is identified as the funds needed to 
hire the people to develop these tests. 
One angel investor group turned Yaba down for investment because they felt the 
company should market themselves. Yaba's marketing strategy was to sell directly 
into laboratories, identified by Yaba as a large market. Gareth and Scott, from quite 
an early stage, felt that in developing products for human diagnostic tests, they would 
not take on board their own marketing of the technology. Marketing into the human 
arena, Gareth points out, is a massive undertaking. Yaba was instead looking to 
license or sell the entire package for any human tests that they developed. 
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Another challenge for Yaba related to investment has been in valuation and due 
diligence. Gareth suggests that ves wait until they get verification on a particular 
technology from someone they respect. Any generalisation of business investment 
may not apply to biotechnology, so investors may need a strong biotechnology 
background to spot and understand the value of the opportunity. 
According to Gareth, for many investors the expectation for due diligence is "let's 
look and see if the valuation is correct". Yaba is undergoing due diligence by a 
neutral body at the moment, which has been commissioned by Scottish Enterprise. 
The due diligence document is getting paid for by one of Yaba's investors. If Yaba 
does get funding, they will have to pay for that due diligence. Scottish Enterprise has 
defined the scope of the due diligence and this is the first time that Yaba has gone 
through a structured due diligence process. Gareth and Scott were somewhat 
surprised that there was no initial significant discussion with the people that would 
perform the due diligence, in order to "get to the bones o/what Yaba was about". 
The problem with using business plans for due diligence, Gareth argues, is that they 
have to be toned down so that they are readable. It became quickly evident by those 
performing the due diligence that the business plan was a totally unsuitable 
document for them. They realised that Yaba had far more than what was within the 
scope of the due diligence originally outlined by Scottish Enterprise. 
From Yaba's perspective, it is the role of others, such as financial intermediaries, 
accountancy firms etc., to take on the role as an independent body that acts as a 
conduit between the company and the venture capitalist. But it hasn't worked that 
way for Yaba. On the other hand, if Yaba paid for its own due diligence, there 
would be a question of bias. As Gareth notes, there can be a considerable conflict of 
interest when it comes to valuation of a company. 
One criticism noted by Peter at ExpressOn about biotechnology in Scotland and the 
UK is that many spin-out companies actually emerge, but there is not enough 
emphasis placed on growing these companies and generating a critical mass of them. 
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Peter argues that Scotland has the potential for building of critical mass of 
biotechnology companies and creating a virtual pipeline to take forward technologies 
competitively without mergers and acquisitions. Instead, Peter suggests there is a 
high merger and acquisition dynamic in biotechnology. 
Peter identifies that ExpressOn has benefited from people who understand the issues 
of biotechnology. He cites attending Connect meetings where they met Keith 
Winton of Edinburgh Technology Fund and secured £100,000 that funded a one-year 
pilot project. Eleanor feels that setting up the company, having a business plan and 
demonstrating commercial intelligence in terms of winning contracts - as it is 
unusual for a biotechnology to have any revenue stream in its early years -
convinced Keith of the potential of the company. Eleanor feels that commercial 
credibility of ExpressOn is made difficult by the fact that two academics are 
attempting to set up a company on their own. 
A common theme in securing early stage investment by these case companies is the 
trade-off between the cost in time needed to establish relationships with various 
investment sources or complete applications and the uncertainty of investment 
success. Initial time and effort is required to initiate hands-on and realistic 
relationships with investors, and the importance of intermediaries is identified by 
ExpressOn in securing its bank overdraft and the Connect network in meeting 
investors such as Keith Winton of ETF. 
Public schemes such as ETF and SMART are identified as critical to early stage 
technology development, patent filing and market analysis but qualified by the 
problems of bureaucratic constraints as experienced by ExpressOn and DILAB. 
However, as time passes, companies attempt to seek further rounds of investment, 
investment relationship develop and evolve. In the case of companies like Yaba and 
AXEON, for example, having a strong, well constructed and realistic business plan is 
one thing, yet high-technology start-ups will most likely face unforeseen 
technological problems and the need for further development. For many start-ups, 
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this will prove to be an insurmountable problem. In the case of Yaba and AXEON, a 
prolonged 'product development to market' phase has resulted in investors 
questioning their projected financial returns, thus delaying investment until other 
investors are found to share the risk or technologies are further developed and 
markets and customers confirmed. 
9.3.2.2 Intellectual Property, Licensing and Issues with 
Universities 
The notion of protecting, licensing and owning intellectual property (IP) and dealing 
with universities was expressed as a 'complex issue' for the case companies, but was 
nevertheless considered highly critical to protect the companies' prime-mover and 
industry standardisation advantages. Indeed, IP was one of the specific issues 
mentioned time and again that the firms wished to find out more about by joining 
communities such as Connect, as the cost of employing specialist lawyers is 
identified as prohibitively expensive in many cases. 
Protecting technologies with patents is particularly critical to maintain first mover 
advantage while companies continue to develop the technologies. ExpressOn, for 
example, has ongoing patents pending on a number of techniques that they use to 
develop their antisense technology, requiring constant attention to IPR issues. This 
does not mean that patenting follows a predicable pathway directly linked to 
completion of technological milestones. Although ExpressOn filed an initial patent 
to protect its early antisense technology, the technology moved on quickly during 
ongoing development, differing from the original patent request. 
Eleanor concedes that there was benefit to holding off on patenting their 
developments and the company is now at a stage where they have been put in as a 
Patent Co-operation Treatyll (PCTs) file and initial search results from the patent 
office are coming in. PCTs effectively delay the decision for a year and adjustments 
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can be made in the meantime. Once patent results are in, the company will make 
decisions on the scope and breadth (geographically) of protection. 
Similarly, AXEON has a patent on the Learning Processor™ and also has a patent 
pending on a number of other core-products. They have been highly careful to 
maintain a great deal of control over their IPR involved with their technological 
developments. This seems a prudent lesson as it is often suggested to be near 
impossible (or at least extremely difficult) to develop into a world-wide and 
successful producer of microchips without huge amounts of funding, presumably 
diluting further the founders control of their company. 
However, AXEON is different from ExpressOn in that it licensed its core technology 
derived from Aberdeen University. Hamish explicitly expressed the notion that 
licensing their technology was a 'way forward', together with the increased pursuit 
and expansion of their developmental partner programmes. As mentioned earlier, 
AXEON sought a likely candidate technology and hoped to cut a 'very sensible 
umbrella deal' concerning intellectual property rights and royalties, as Hamish 
states. This deal provided access to key, world class researchers at the university as 
well as to the potential technology. In June of 1998, the person whose PhD 
originated the idea of the Learning Processor™ - Dr. Neil Lightowler- was hired. As 
Hamish puts it: 'We got him on board as we needed to move from a PhD thesis to a 
business model that we could get funded, the situation was that the individual owned 
the idea not the actual university and this is where we wanted to get to '. 
As well as beginning to launch its own range of products, AXEON is actively 
engaged in seeking product development partners who wish to apply the Learning 
Processor™ to their own respective products. Such a targeted business model 
suggests that AXEON is highly committed to developing relationships with potential 
alliance partners to develop the licensed application specific solutions for a variety of 
market sectors. 
II PCT is a world-wide system for simplified multiple filing of patent protection from a single application that is applied to a 
large number of countries simultaneously. 
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In the medium tenn, AXEON plans to pursue the business model of IP Core supplier, 
in the long-tenn they believe that to gain a high level of technology adoption, the 
company must focus on specific markets and utilise its technology within chip-based 
products that provide specific solutions to specific problems identified within the 
industry in general, and more precisely, by the customer. 
For the university spin-outs, all identified particular problems in dealing with their 
respective universities and securing ownership of the intellectual property. 
The initial step towards setting up ExpressOn occurred through a meeting with 
Edinburgh Research and Innovation (ERI), Edinburgh University's technology 
transfer office, in the summer of 1999. Peter notes that the proposition that was 
taken to ERI was a means for a very rapid design of antisensory agents, to reduce the 
time and expense of design. The proposition was to provide relatively small 
biotechnology and phannaceutical companies to undertake genome-scale projects 
that might otherwise be accessible only to large multi-national phannaceutical 
companIes. It was on the scalability of antisense design that ExpressOn as a 
commercial opportunity has been based. 
Peter concurs with Eleanor in suggesting that he would have clarified his personal IP 
position at the time that he signed his first contract with the university. He argues 
that the key issue was the fact that ERI owned the IP yet chose not to exploit and 
protect it themselves or support the company seeking to exploit it. Peter suggests 
there are one or two people at ERI that can be difficult and that the university is very 
risk averse, telling Peter and Eleanor "not to 'pester' Keith at ETF". Yet they did 
meet Keith at a Connect event and found that they were exactly the type of company 
ETF was set up to support. Peter argues that ERI should have encouraged and 
supported their application to ETF. 
University support for ExpressOn did come from a fonner head of department, who 
arranged for Eleanor and Peter to lease lab and office space in the department. A 
new head of department has not been as supportive as the previous head. One 
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consideration, noted by Eleanor, is that the rent actually is not realised by the 
department but is rather secured centrally by the university. At the same time, 
pressures on the department to consolidate space resulted in a situation where the 
department was being paid to make office and lab space empty for new initiatives. 
Peter adds that the former department head buffeted them against the negative 
attitude of the university and particularly the Faculty of Medicine that was very much 
against ExpressOn at that time. Peter notes that there were individuals within ERI 
that were supportive of the company, but ERI formally did not support the company. 
Peter and Eleanor took legal advice in their attempt to get assignment of the IP from 
ERI and succeeded eventually to set up the company in September 1999. ERI 
decided that the intellectual property (IP) was too complex and difficult to patent and 
protect and would be too expensive and consequently turned down the option of 
being involved. ERI were difficult during this time over intellectual property, 
according to Peter, and at one stage offered the company a two-year non-exclusive 
license. 
The end result was a letter from ERI that signed off intellectual property to the 
company. As Peter asserts, this assignment was a necessary condition to securing 
ETF funding and gaining subsequent interest from venture capitalists. Eleanor states 
that they were advised to take a 'soft approach' in dealing with the university and 
achieved it through personal negotiations. 
Eleanor feels that they set up the company 'in spite of ERI' as their experiences with 
ERI were not particularly helpful. At the same time, the company does have an 
ongoing relationship with ERI as the company subcontracts with the university to 
carry out entire projects on behalf of customers, some of whom are located within 
Edinburgh University. One recent example is completing a pilot project for an 
academic needing to demonstrate the commercial viability of a project, much of 
which has been outsourced to Eleanor and Peter. 
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In hindsight, Eleanor feels that it was wise that they didn't set up as a university spin-
out because ExpressOn is independent of the university - ERI holds no equity -
although ETF is a shareholder. At the time, however, ERI's lack of support was a 
source of frustration and disappointment. ExpressOn rather than ERI have generated 
subcontracts with departments at Edinburgh University. ExpressOn also plans to 
contact other university technology transfer offices to promote their services, and this 
effort will not be actively pursued on the company's behalf by ERI. 
Peter is adamant that much of the commercialisation support provided by ERI could 
be out-sourced, as many of the advisors may have science or management degrees 
but are lacking in relevant commercialisation experience. This argument will be 
picked up again in the section on complementary support programs. 
Intrallect's expenence is similar to ExpressOn's. As Peter Douglas states, "the 
process of actually assigning the intellectual property (IP) signed over to Intrallect 
has been long and arduous, unnecessarily so". At the same time, both Peter and 
Martin noted the their contact person at ERI provided key support in the early stages. 
This individual suggested that they first set up the consultancy rather than going 
directly into a spin-out, and also helped with the SMART Award application. 
Initial contact with ERI at Edinburgh University had occurred while Martin, Charles 
and Peter were providing consulting outside the university with its contracts directed 
through ERI. The consultancy provided Martin, Peter and Charles with a business 
identity, logo and website, and this consultancy, Martin claims, was a factor in 
eventually securing the Research Fellowship. Peter is quick to point out that both the 
consultancy and ERI benefited from this arrangement as ERI takes a large percentage 
of the contract. 
Peter suggests that there was little encouragement from ERI to spin-out of the 
university up to this point. The initial consultancy support from ERI suggested in 
1999 that the opportunity was for a start-up with no IP issues. But as Intrallect 
attempted to spin-out by 2000, ERI took the position that the university would 
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licence the IP to Intrallect. As Martin states, this is no use when attempting to raise 
investment. But a sudden shift in ERI's position - with ERI moving to 'the other 
side of the table' occurred as Intrallect moved into a potential spin-out position. 
according to Martin. 
Following Intrallect's presentation at the 2000 Connect Investment Conference, the 
profile raised through the conference gave notice to ERI of the value of Intrallect's 
IP, according to Martin. Just prior to the conference, in order to provide a vehicle for 
depositing the SMART award and initial investment from Graham Bucknell, 
Intrallect was established as a company with ERI not a shareholder. Immediately 
following the investment conference, negotiations for IPR began with ERI concerned 
that they were not a current shareholder. 
Interestingly, both Martin and Peter argue that the IPR was of little value to anyone 
else. In fact, Intrallect didn't use any of the technology that was on the CDs that 
were part of the IPR assignation. As with many software products, Intrallect 
expected that their software was going to change and evolve, and the technology was 
not as valuable as they initially thought, rather it was the business processes and 
applications that were more valuable. Software value, according to Martin, requires 
continuous maintenance, upgrading and improvements and the original product's 
software was outdated by the time IPR negotiations with ERI began in 2000. 
Previous advice, identified as complementary and free, was then identified in the IPR 
negotiations as something to include in the negotiations. Edinburgh University 
initially wanted undiluting shares and ended up with 5% share. In hindsight, Martin 
suggests that back in 1998, the partners would have been willing to give the 
university 15%. 
Intrallect's advice to other spin-outs is "to get a clear agreement from the university 
from the start - in temu of assistance and provide standard principles for exchange 
of IP or get clear advice from a third party that is familiar with these issues, such as 
Ian Macdonald of Connect". Another piece of advice from Peter is that things in the 
276 
university in general take a long time, and this time is highly critical during company 
formation. Peter feels that, in this regard, dealing with ERI was a significant barrier 
over the IPR issue that added perhaps 6 months to the process. Part of this problem 
was also the unclear situation of ERI providing initial support through one source 
and then having other players enter the negotiations with different outcome 
expectations. 
The expenence of DILAB provides another example of the 'enabling and 
constraining' role of universities similar to those experienced by ExpressOn and 
Intrallect. Back in 1994, John and Philip contacted Heriot-Watt University's 
commercialisation office to discuss commercialisation issues and found the initial 
reaction to be ambi valent. John states that their advice was to ''follow the rules for 
IPR, register things, ... we can't invest, we don't have any special interest and carry 
" on . 
There was no commercialisation route at all, John concedes, for start-up companies, 
although there was a consultancy route for academics through the commercialisation 
office. "They really didn't know what to do with us", John states, but after a few 
months when they realised DILAB was still going and was attracting some business, 
the commercialisation office called a second meeting to discuss shares without a 
corresponding input of money or services. At this point, John says it was too late as 
DILAB had external shareholders. 
John concedes the university commercialisation processes have evolved since that 
initial meeting. No preferential treatment was provided and DILAB was treated like 
any other company coming to the university and were offered lease terms for the use 
of facilities and equipment. DILAB was not able to use the university name because 
HW was not a partner. The university suggested that DILAB take a place in their 
Research Park but the company turned it down as it was too expensive. 
Currently, both the university and DILAB benefit from the existing 'loose 
arrangement' that John admits is a 'strange partnership'. Should the current 
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scenario change, DILAB would most likely remove its equipment that is located in 
university labs and effectively stop some of the research that benefits both parties. 
John points out one advantage of the current position within the university. He states 
that the commercial 'problems' faced by John and the other partners that are pure 
research ones are usually run through the university research links especially if there 
is uncertainty regarding a problem's potential commercial outcomes. This allows for 
a variety of people to query the processes for finding solutions to research questions 
when they arise. John states that a visiting German academic to the department was 
instrumental in assisting them with a microwave application now incorporated into 
DILAB's technology. 
A trade-off to this set-up is that John and the others must create the time to complete 
this work in addition to performing their academic responsibilities. In the previous 
university contract for outside research, John says this set-up allowed for one day a 
week to be dedicated to outside work. However, the more recent contract does not 
provide that option. 
Another advantage for DILAB within the university is that students and research 
associates provide a variable workforce for DILAB, as they do for much of the 
applied research at Heriot Watt. John says that DILAB tends to get problems that 
others cannot solve, providing DILAB with two options. The first is to attempt to 
convince the customer to enter a longer-term contract where DILAB will look at the 
problem closely and build it up. The second option is to look at the problem quickly 
and say whether a solution will work or not. John states that it is very difficult to get 
British industry to do long-term contracts that involve investigative research. 
A related spillover effect of using postgraduate students is the commercial 
experience they gain in working with DILAB. Two of John's postdoctoral students 
working with DILAB went into industrial jobs, while three PhD employees worked 
with the company. Since DILAB began, other commercial ventures have 
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commenced in the physics department that John suggests may have been stimulated 
by the efforts of DILAB. 
9.3.2.3 Scotland as a Home Base 
Case compames suggested that Scotland is a good regIon for setting up their 
companies for a variety of reasons described below: 
• The concentration of several world-class universities and other educational 
institutes in a relatively small area. 
• The proximity to 'silicon-glen' (for IT -based firms in particular) centred 
around Livingston, home to a large concentration of firms. 
• The relative cheapness of premises. 
• The number of support programmes available to new companies. 
• The high standard of living for the founders. 
Spektra Systems, originally an R&D unit of the world's largest manufacturer of 
elevators, Swiss corporation SchindlerAG, was established in Livingston because of 
the concentration of world-class universities within 30 minutes drive with strong 
computer science and artificial intelligence departments. The presence of a mass of 
other software companies in Livingston, known as the centre of the Scottish 'silicon-
glen', was another reason for locating in central Scotland. 
That did not mean to say, however, that Scotland was considered the only place to 
base the company. All of the firms reviewed expressed the clear understanding that 
there are several other places in Britain, and the world, of great importance to them, 
and that many market, finance, human resource and developmental partnership 
opportunities existed elsewhere. Indeed, it was a source of query from case founders 
that the members of Connect Scotland did not have direct access to other 
international Connect programs around the world. 
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For AXEON, Aberdeen was chosen as its base for both personal lifestyle and family 
reasons of the founders. Indeed, Hamish states that he knew many established 
entrepreneurs in Scotland who had also chosen to establish themselves there for 
similar reasons. That is to say, the favourable perception of the standard of life, 
cheapness of housing and business premises and availability of a well trained and 
motivated workforce allied to many new firm start-up support programs and 
university technology transfer offices all have a large bearing on where entrepreneurs 
chose to establish their firms, as well as where to live themselves. 
Both Peter and Martin of Intrallect stated that Scotland is a good place for setting up 
a new company. The Company's site in Livingstone is convenient for commuting 
from Edinburgh, where all three partners live. 
9.3.3 Growth 
9.3.3.1 Responding to Set-backs 
Another set of challenges. facing each of the case companies has been attempting to 
balance science and business responsibilities following successful company 
formation and responding to various set-backs. Clearly, growth of these technology-
based companies demands a great deal of protracted research and development that 
must go hand in hand with the growth and establishment of other aspects of the 
company; that is to say, the hiring of staff, the search for new investment and 
revenues and adoption of more formal management practices. Many of these 
challenges are identified in evolutionary stages of firm growth (e.g. Mount et al 
1993; Bhida 2000). 
The problems that Hamish of AXE ON faced in the development of his core 
technological platform were manifold, beginning with investment difficulties holding 
up further technology development. These funding difficulties also led to the sort of 
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'business paralysis' Hamish suggests is a problem faced by many start-ups. He adds 
that at least four months worth of progress was lost. 
AXEON's competitive strategy, after all, was based on the belief that to gain a high 
level of technology adoption, the company must focus on specific markets and utilise 
its technology within chip-based products that provide specific solutions to specific 
problems identified within the industry in general, and more precisely, by the 
customer. Without developments in their technologies, AXEON would be unable to 
commence discussions on licensing agreements, develop partnerships, set up 
technological standards and so on. The long-term business aim of providing a 
combined product and service offering from IPR and Licensing agreements would be 
seriously jeopardised since AXEON did not actually manufacture the technologies 
themselves. 
Hamish suggests that this period, although stressful and uncertain, was actually 
crucial for the future development of AXE ON. It was said that it would have been 
all too easy to sign away huge portions of the equity of AXE ON 'in panic'. Once 
again the founders of AXE ON displayed an ability to 'step-back' from their business 
and think about not just the 'here and now of doing business' but also their 'long-
term wishes for the firm'; a lesson that it is suggested too many entrepreneurs may 
fail to heed. He states: "By using this time to take stock and have a long look at 
ourselves and see what we wanted to do, how we wanted to do it and what we were 
prepared to put in and take out of the firm, we did not feel lost or panicked. By 
focusing on the long-term vision it kept us on track" 
Hamish suggests that AXEON were able to 're-group' with a stronger sense of 
purpose, growing the firm to eight people. Hamish sums this up by stating: "By now 
we had begun to prove our technology and we had a much clearer idea of our 
potential markets and where we intended to go and what we had intended to achieve 
with AXEON" 
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This 'stock taking' meant that they also now had a better idea of how to manage their 
current and future relationships with their investors. He states: "The new Business 
Angel investors and the existing investors were fundamentally different from each 
other. First and foremost they [the Angels] were business people and not, for 
example, Government civil service people. As such, they recognised our business 
needs much better. They recognised that they were not simply going to invest but also 
help us actually to raise, say, three million in the future that I will need. They 
recognised that I need a large sum of money, to have some financial security and to 
go out and hire people, already in the bank and not after the fact". 
As well as beginning to launch their own range of products, at the middle of 2001, 
AXEON continue to actively seek product development partners who wished to 
apply the Learning Processor™ to their own products. Initially, the company had 
planned to focus on providing solutions to the network management market. These 
first products aimed to focus on providing Internet bandwidth acceleration and 
optimisation for Internet Protocol-based fixed and mobile networks. 
This targeted business strategy suggests that AXEON is highly committed to 
developing relationships with potential alliance partners to develop the application 
specific solutions for a variety market sectors, as well as providing a comprehensive 
programme of tools and support for these partners. It is in this future challenge that 
one may see the benefit of developing clear and mutually supportive relationships 
with financiers, potential partners and supporting agencies. These aims have been 
instrumental in AXEON becoming involved in Connect as a 'social' support and 
networking program. 
Growth challenges for Intrallect are evident now that the company is becoming 
successful. Intrallect's growth to 2002 can be described as 'organic' and the risk of 
overtrading is an identified risk according to Martin. Current tenders, should they 
materialise, will stretch the existing resources of Intrallect. Martin and Peter suggest 
that the skilled workforce needed to grow is available in the region. 
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In the early stages, Intrallect outsourced their software development to an outside 
company that subsequently ceased trading. As timing would have it, Intrallect was 
recentl y able to secure two of their software engineers and have others on temporary 
contracts. Martin and Peter concur that this recycling of skilled labor is occurring 
particularly in the software sector in 'Silicon Glen'. 
Since its software has application to a variety of sectors, Intrallect has recently 
entered into agreements with other companies that represent them in different 
industries (Aberdeen in oil and gas) and in different regions - Australia and the USA. 
In Yaba's case, initial difficulties in negotiating for a patented technology, due 
diligence and investment challenges slowing testing development have forced the 
company to explore other new technological avenues; avenues that were to prove 
much more successful. Re-focusing on veterinary and human testing and 
development of the current technological products have arisen from changes to the 
initial strategic objective that Yaba had intended. 
Spektra's growth challenges can be traced not to investment constraints and 
technological difficulties as much as to re-directing a successful going concern. As 
Euan states, the MBO agreement was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it 
allowed Spektra to invest in technology that has put Spektra where it is today. 
Financial security ensured that debt financing or outside investors were not placing 
restrictions or forcing strategic decisions on Spektra. 
On the other hand, there was no real consistency to what Spektra was doing. Spektra 
was delivering solutions to what customers wanted and delivering to large companies 
that Spektra had previously developed relations with as a unit of Schindler: large 
customers such as Hitachi and Hewlett-Packard. These companies continued to see 
Spektra as a very good development unit. 
Following the MBO, Spektra went from being part of a cost centre to an independent 
company, focused on sales of business-to-business, e-commerce, and java-
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enterprise-based services. Spektra had very quickly decided after buying out from 
Schindler that there were potential benefits with Java, but didn't know precisely 
what. At the time, they could see its value in terms of the internet space, 
The first thing that Spektra did was to reengineer much of the software that they had 
previously developed for Schindler; C C++, unix shell script, and service-side Java. 
The critical point is that Spektra did a lot of development on the service side at this 
time. If the company had chosen to go off and re-implement user interface in Java, 
Russell cautions, they might have had a significant number of problems, such as the 
early problems experienced with Java. 
Euan stresses that the whole thing about setting up new technology is developing 
support for it; people who are in the marketplace who have those skills to use that 
product and deliver it. To this point, Microsoft had put a program together where 
they had identified centres of excellence, so that when they went to a big client, such 
as a bank, they could provide local support for any system they introduced. 
Spektra identified that if the company continued to want to work with blue-chip 
clients in Scotland, it needed to have the backing of a big player. Spektra negotiated 
a deal with Sun Systems and decided on Java. There was a strategic intent behind 
this initiative, Euan points out. In the market, the tide was turning against Microsoft 
as the way to deliver serious support. Spektra had recognised that a strong presence 
to back professional sales was critical. Spektra had decided in anticipation of where 
the market was heading, and chose the main delivery platform in Sun Systems. 
Thus, Euan relates the importance of the technological development aspects of the 
core product to the continued growth of the company. In essence, he suggests that 
they must go 'hand in hand'. 
The challenge now for Spektra is to grow in a linear function: as size does matter 
with economies of scale in sectors such as software. Spektra is now confronted with 
a whole seties of new challenges to business growth as it "stretches at the seams". 
Business at the moment is very much service based. As the company grows; so does 
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overhead, therefore there is a critical focus of the sales function toward business 
relation development over a wide client base. 
However, in the case of DILAB, lack of a sustaining market to allow the company to 
develop has placed the company in 'current suspension '. John concedes that they 
have not attempted to secure large investments because they cannot justify it and do 
not need it at the moment. Should a large customer emerge, the financial partner has 
suggested that the company will tum to the banks to secure funding rather than 
engage venture investment. In hindsight, John suggests that a rapid 
commercialisation move early may have launched the company, but also points out 
the demise of similar companies in the sector. 
9.3.3.2 Growth Financing 
Despite time delays and application challenges, securing early stage 'seed' funding 
was identified by most case companies as a successful process. However, 
subsequent rounds of investment have been described as significantly challenging. 
AXEON's 'consortium' of early stage funders that included venture capitalists 3i and 
Scottish Enterprise, were on the whole 'minded to re-invest', Hamish suggests: 
"They were not without their strong reservations about the likelihood of turning this 
venture into a commercial success". Concerning this reticence of existing funders to 
re-invest, Hamish claims: "Their fundamental issues were, I think, probably that we 
were being too ambitious. They had some concerns, on the market projections for 
our business growth and particularly on the technology. Fundamentally we have 
learnt a lot from that and have adapted our strategies accordingly". 
Similarly, with the search for second round funding came a re-evaluation of the 
personal criteria for developing AXEON (and SYSTEMS FX) in the first place: a 
criteria that seems highly influential throughout Hamish' and Susan's business lives, 
that of having a large sense of control in their own business future. 
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Clearly the initial aIm of attracting seed funding was related to the simple and 
pragmatic goal of getting AXEON off the ground. Yet with the previously stated 
long-term personal goals in mind, it was felt that with the search for second round 
funding the founders might have risked losing a good deal of the strategic and 
financial control of AXE ON to their investors. 
Accordingly, Hamish and Susan expressed a wish to find alternative investors as they 
wanted to be sure that they were not giving all the company's equity away. This 
meant that the process of obtaining second round funding eventually dragged on 
longer than was hoped for. As Hamish comments: "We let the process run on far too 
long and eventually we had quite a large potential syndicate of investors. The 
problem was we took the eye off the ball about getting our existing investors 
absolutely convinced that they were going to fund us on mutually suitable terms. In 
trying to get new investors, we forgot, or at least didn't pay enough attention to, our 
old ones". 
Eventually, after a good deal of complex negotiation with their existing funders, 
allaying fears concerning the development of the technology and potential 
commercial success and the possible loss of control for the founders, several 
'mutually beneficial' deals were struck to provide approximately £660,000 of second 
round funding, from a mixture of existing and new investors. 
Eleanor of ExpressOn states that they experienced a funding gap in seeking a second 
round of investment of £500,000 to £1 million because this amount is too big for 
seed funding and too small for most venture capitalists. Anther problem they 
experienced was "getting quite far down the road with one venture capital firm but 
then finding out that their offer required that we merge with another company in 
their portfolio". In starting the process over again, ExpressOn was about to close 
again when one of the VCs dropped out of the syndicate, requiring another 6 months 
to build the syndicate up. 
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Currently, ExpressOn is closing a second round of funding from venture capital to 
finish off the prototype, although the original concept turned out not to be workable. 
But Eleanor concedes that it has taken over two years to secure this second round of 
funding, echoing a common concern from other case companies that obtaining 
further rounds of funding has proven to be a much more difficult task. Peter adds 
that the message from VCs to ExpressOn was to complete the development from 
which a larger amount of funding could be secured. ExpressOn was at a stage where 
it was still considered high risk because they had still not finalised the development 
of the technology. 
Gareth and Scott of Yaba point out the importance of public schemes and debt 
financing to "keep itself afloat" while seeking its second round of investment. Yaba 
used a SMART 1 followed by a SMART 2 award, then acquired a small loans 
guarantee from a helpful bank manager followed by a business growth fund. Yaba 
began seeking second phase funding in November 1999 and secured a substantial 
six-figure deal in 2001. Yaba now has two patents now lodged and is focused on 
various milestones set by its investors. 
In March 2002, Intrallect completed a second round of funding that secured 
£420,000. A broad base of investors includes a public scheme, ETF, venture 
capitalists WL Ventures, a private business angel and private equity from the 
founders. The consequence of this investment is adding two new investors to the 
non-executive board. 
The current status of DILAB in maintaining its position within the university and 
seeking a large customer, has resulted in the company not seeking further investment 
because as John states, they cannot justify it and do not need it at the moment. 
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9.3.3.3 Management Team 
A common characteristic of each case company has been growing their management 
team because of limitations in the founder(s) skill-set. This ability of young 
companies and their founders to identify, seek and secure new human resources is 
identified in the literature as a key factor in successful growth and its absence a 
common characteristic of start-up failures (Johannisson 2000; Bhide 2000). 
The majority of those interviewed identified that this 'team-building' skill was a 
highly critical part of the entrepreneur's craft. In essence, this could be seen as a 
necessary part of them making their business 'vision' a commercial reality. As 
identified in previous sections, it was mostly left to the founders to conduct the initial 
identification of market opportunities, negotiate ownership of their technology and 
secure investment. 
Peter of ExpressOn states that he realised early on that his academic background 
would require a new set of business skills. He suggests that this has been attained by 
a combination of hands-on mentoring from Adam Christie, ExpressOn' s acquired 
Commercial Director, and his active participation in programs like Connect. Peter 
states that these learning environments have been critical for Eleanor and himself, 
but adds that they both are keen to balance their science and business skills. In fact, 
Peter states that selling the product is difficult for him, partly due to his shyness but 
running a business has not proved to be difficult. 
Similar to ExpressOn, other university spin-outs have brought in experienced senior 
commercial managers to assist in running a growing commercial venture. 
Particularly when private investment was involved, a caveat for investment is the 
addition of business personnel. 
One of the criticisms levelled at Intrallect when seeking investment was the lack of a 
seasoned management team that had taken a new company through formation and 
growth to exit. Without funds to hire a full-time CEO, Intrallect was seeking 
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someone to take an equity position, eventually being introduced by their lawyers to 
Fergus Duncan who took on the role as Intrallect's Chairman. Fergus founded Libra 
Syscom Ltd in 1994 and as managing director developed it into a successful software 
company employing 40 people. He exited by trade sale in 1999 and began a role as a 
business angel and hands-on mentor. 
Intrallect also attracted a Non-Executive Director and Financial controller, Graham 
Bucknall, who provided international marketing experience to Intrallect. He is 
former CEO of TrustNet, the financial services website and previously set up an 
Australasian division of a global information and software company, leading it from 
start-up to exit. He spent his early career in corporate finance with Dresdener 
Kleinwort Benson, raising over $1 billion of finance for UK pIc's. 
Yaba has brought on two experienced managers and grown from a one-person 
operation in 1997 to 6 staff, 4 of which are scientists. Yaba has put in place a Board 
and found through Connect a Non Executive Chairman who is well known in UK 
business circles. Another Non Executive Director has a background in diagnostics 
but also has a strong financial background. 
Since obtaining further investment, AXEON has grown considerably and at present 
employs 42 people. Hamish Grant has hired a Chief Operating Officer and Chief 
Technology Officer recruited directly from the University of Aberdeen. Also added 
to the management team was a Vice President of Corporate Communications, 
responsible for marketing and market research and a Product Development Manager. 
The diversification of founder's roles and activities is also identified in the growth of 
the company. Indeed, it was typically suggested that even if they were taking on new 
staff to fill some of the duties, the initial researcher or entrepreneur's time was often 
solely taken up with one task or another, and as such, other aspects of the business 
suffered. 
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Company evolution may also reqUIre a re-stimulation of entrepreneurship of an 
existing company, as seen in the case of Spektra evolving from their management 
buy-out of a corporate unit to a new technology company. Russell Brodie, 
Development Director of Spektra, points to the significant difference in attitude 
between being part of an R&D unit and a new company that required not only new 
personnel but changes to founders' roles. Spektra's background as an R&D unit had 
created a company of technologists, but as there was no requirement for commercial 
expertise, there was no entrepreneurial drive, commercial focus or expectation for 
such activity. As Schindler money tapered off, Spektra became more accountable for 
its own actions with a new focus on cash generation, making it essential to expand 
sales activities. Some people's skills, abilities and attitudes were therefore not 
compatible with the need by Spektra to change how it did business in order to create 
a new and dynamic market presence. 
In hindsight, if there was a chance to do it all again, Euan suggest that the company 
would have identified where the weaknesses were earlier and brought on people 
straight away. This was because Spektra was a very attractive proposition at that 
point; therefore a professional sales team would have made a difference. Euan was 
also originally a technologist; he had done an MBA that provided new skills for his 
new responsibilities. Euan, as Technical Sales Director, has moved from being a 
technologist to heading the sales and marketing team. 
Spektra's other directors have evolved in their roles. Russell, as Development 
Director, is responsible for ensuring that fulfilment happens, and spends considerable 
time on recruitment. His position has became more removed from core technology 
activities, i.e. developing code, cutting code, carrying out designs etc. He is more 
focused, as he states, on "what people do we need, what gaps do we have in our skill 
sets, what skills should we be looking to train, what kinds of people should we be 
bringing in, i.e. young graduates, 2+ years of experience". 
Gordon's role as Managing Director of Spektra has been to continue to provide a 
high level of financial control and give Spektra "visibility over the horizon" as to the 
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company's financial situation. Since the MBO, he has become more responsible for 
key financial decisions requiring revenue generation as Schindler payments ceased. 
This required Gordon to pass on "knowledge" to the other directors, i.e. cash flow, 
amount in the bank, amount in our pipeline, bum rate, graph to show when we go 
bust, etc. Gordon's role was to ensure that Spektra had the financing, was taking 
people on at the right rate etc. 
This level of financial knowledge was critically important, because Spektra has no 
external equity being released. The founding directors and employees own Spektra. 
Despite the success of securing new management by the case compames, most 
identified that considerable time and effort was taken to find and attract qualified 
new people. One problem is the limited number of experienced managers In 
Scotland that have seen technology companies through to a successful exit. 
Another problem, identified by Spektra, is the lack of qualified technical personnel in 
Scotland and the expense of hiring outside consultants to conduct personnel searches. 
This issue will be further examined in the next section. 
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9.3.4 Recommendations to Improve Support for New 
Technology Companies in Scotland 
Case companies forwarded their opinions regarding improvements to the supportive 
environment in Scotland for technology entrepreneurship. More specific 
recommendations for Connect based on their experiences will be described in section 
9.4.2. 
9.3.4.1 Registry for Technology Excellence 
Russell stresses that Scotland requires a register for technology excellence, arguing 
that recruitment costs are one of the most difficult challenges for new technology 
firms. He suggests the Recruitment industry is worth £15 billion per annum, so there 
would be resistance to setting up a national software skills registry in Scotland. 
A current yet temporary advantage for Spektra, according to Russell, is that barriers 
to other local companies competing against Spektra are high. Bringing good people 
together at Spektra acts as a magnet for attracting and recruiting more good people, 
and this, he says, builds up something that is a compelling proposition. Spektra is 
actively involved with Scottish universities; offering project prizes and making 
presentations to fourth-year computer science students. Spektra is the only Sun 
Systems Authorised Java Centre in Scotland and is attractive to potential employees 
by providing opportunities to gain certified skills and to work on leading edge 
technologies, 
development. 
dot.com development and business-to-business e-commerce 
Spektra feels that potential candidates for positions will not find 
opportunities like that anywhere else in the UK other than London. 
However, a key challenge for Spektra as a rapidly growing company is securing a 
wide range of qualified human resources, driven by its commitment to recruit and 
train the best team of Java architects in the UK. Russell again argues that growing a 
workforce is very expensive and gaining access to a recruitment agency's database 
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costs almost £5000 per person, so a major growth of 50 people costs £250,000 just to 
find them. In hindsight, back in OctINovember 1999, Spektra would have recruited 
as many object technology people with the right attitude and right commercial 
awareness it could have if it had the funds. Coming into 2000, there are a number of 
other big start-ups that are attracting these people with big budgets, thus elevating the 
rates in the market. 
Similarly, Yaba sees the cost of professional services as a major restriction for a new 
company, as it takes up a huge percentage of limited available money. Gareth 
suggests that one scheme that was attempted in Scotland should be attempted again. 
One group tried to get on board a number of well-respected professional service 
companies, in areas of accountancy, law, patents and copyright, etc. This group 
aspired to provide these services at knock-down rates for start-up companies on the 
premise that if the companies became a going concern, they would remain as their 
professional service provider. Gareth suggests that this would be a very effective 
approach, but the group failed to get funding to follow up on the concept. 
Russell suggests that the technology is there to develop this free database; it's finding 
the necessary compelling reason to get people to register. Technology skills could be 
registered on a central database so that people wherever they may be, can go and 
browse candidates' details and information freely without having to pay a significant 
sum to do that. By clicking on a candidate and through a controlled disclosure 
mechanism they can chose to investigate further. Information would be through a 
standardised CV format. 
Russell sees this being set up with a credible body like Connect or the Scottish 
Software Federation. The difficulty, Russell says, is in compelling people to put 
their details into this registry; one must find the correct psychological lure to fill in 
the details. He suggests that it could start by going to technology courses at 
universities and getting students to fill in their details and receive an Amazon 
voucher. By offering an e-mail address that goes with them wherever they go, one 
could forever contact those people. It is then up to the individual companies to 
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create the environment and the attractions to stay with that company, as people can 
register details anonymously and compete within the software market. 
Through marketing and cultivation efforts, one could build-up a census of 
technology skills in Scotland. Russell concedes that the problem is that skills are 
quite dynamic but believes that the benefit to business in Scotland in 5 years time 
would be colossal. He emphasises that this should be a free resource to all the 
technology companies in Scotland. 
9.3.4.2 Registry for Mentors and Directors 
Case companies identify that finding good directors is highly subjective, prone to 
errors in judgement and costly for new entrepreneurs and companies. They suggest 
that Connect could assemble a list of potential directors and board members for 
different sectors so that a company could go to them. This would allow new 
entrepreneurs to tap into solid business experiences for useful advice and direction. 
Connect could also facilitate those wanting to act as mentors. 
9.3.4.3 Database of Potential Investors 
Gareth of Yaba points out that there is a requirement for a neutral company that can 
develop a database of different financial investors in Scotland. This database would 
include what these providers invest in and the level of funding they provide. This 
would allow emerging new technologies to come along and chose those more 
relevant investors. Seeking of financing has been much more of an ad hoc process 
than Yaba had anticipated. Scott has gone to the US, Germany and throughout the 
UK to seek financing. This kind of approach takes time, and for a small company 
like Yaba that is financed by loans, it is risky, because of their payment 
requirements. 
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Gareth suggests that perhaps Connect, perceived by many in Scotland as a neutral 
body, could develop a list of potential investors and ask each potential investor to 
describe what they are interested in, and possibly give a list of the companies that 
they have invested Ill. This would enable companies to make the appropriate 
approaches. 
This more proactive role for Connect would be to provide companies with the names 
of people that would be interested in their specific technology, with Connect playing 
a role in brokering informal meetings at a Connect event. As Scott notes, it is not 
feasible to go through the front door of VCs, as you are just another business plan. 
He also suggests leveraging the Connect network beyond Scotland, i.e. investors in 
San Diego and other parts of Europe. 
9.3.4.4 Export Support 
One support gap identified by Yaba regards exporting opportunities. Scott suggests 
that missing in advice to date is someone actually listening long enough to 
understand the product and provide information on appropriate markets and explain 
the means available and processes to do it. Critical to this knowledge is who the 
right people are, and strategic options if one strategy is not viable. Scott and Gareth 
point out that, for their business, this type of service is not readily available in 
Scotland. 
Although generic information is available, it is the higher level of information that is 
missing. The key question Yaba asked is 'how does a company get round the 
obstacles in the export business '? Although Yaba has had contact with a number of 
supportive agencies, their request for specific information was beyond the area of 
expertise. 
Gareth and Scott suggest that this information is critical, as it saves valuable time and 
money if the company immediately knows that it has to consider alternative ways to 
295 
enter the market; i.e. getting a domestic company to manufacture the kits and sell 
them under a license. As an example Yaba found out from laboratories in the US 
that they couldn't export into the US, but had initially been led to believe from a 
source in the UK that they didn't need an export license to do so. As Gareth states: 
"IfYaba had know that 6 months ago, they would not have wasted time and money." 
9.3.4.5 Ongoing Training Programs 
The challenge for Spektra, according to Russell, is to be leading edge in a highly 
competitive and dynamic sector, with the company committed to continually 
benchmarking its skills against the highest industry standards. This involves keeping 
an eye on what is coming from the USA. A key challenge is ensuring that their staff 
get the right training and personal development that they require. As there are very 
lucrative contracts out there to be delivered on, Spektra has to be clever on how they 
make sure that people are still developing their skills and not being thrown into 
situations that are beyond them. 
Russell states: "My challenge at the moment is to find enough training companies 
who are prepared to provide training that is convenient to the company and client 
rather than to the training company". A one-week course is not convenient or 
viable. Russell points out that training programmes per se don't really exist. The 
company has had to be creative; i.e. have developed breakfast training sessions using 
local training companies, starting at 8: 15am, providing breakfast, and finishing at 10 
am, once a week for 8 weeks. This enables people to retain control of their 
commercial projects but provides this slightly fun element of training for their 
development. 
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9.4 DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
9.4.1 Value of Connect for Case Companies 
Graph 9.1 shows that all six case companies rated social value as most important and 
significantly higher than 1999 and 2001 survey averages. Although knowledge value 
for all companies was rated higher than survey averages, two of six companies rated 
financial value significantly higher than knowledge value. 
Graph 9.1: Social, Knowledge and Financial Value of Case Companies 
CSocial 
• Knowledge 
1999 2001 Case 1 
Case 2 
Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
Company Company Spektra 
Yaba 1999 
Axeon Intrall DILAB Express 
Average Average 1999 2001 2002 2001 2002 
CSocial 67 62 78 89 80 100 78 78 
41 55 67 100 60 58 58 33 
35 47 50 70 50 80 50 60 
Graph 9.1 shows significant variation in levels of social, knowledge and financial 
value perceptions among case companies, demonstrating how network relevance 
depends on evolving needs of companies and their founders when measured at 
different points in time. For a new network member company like Yaba, its two 
directors identify Connect as the company's most important support program. 
Affirmative responses to all social and knowledge indicators and three of six 
financial indicators suggest a 'significant' value curve for both Gareth and Scott a 
these two 'new' entrepreneurs form their company. 
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Connect's value to Intrallect has been in providing its academic entrepreneurs with 
commercial contact to form their business and meet investors and develop 
commercial business skills, particularly for Dr. Peter Douglas, who was primarily 
responsible for forming the company. Intrallect directors rated technology 
knowledge value lower, primarily because the company is highly focused on moving 
its fully developed middleware and e-Iearning tools to new applications for export 
markets. 
Similar to Intrallect's responses, DILAB's Professor John Wilson rates the 
knowledge from business-focused event topics more important than learning of new 
technologies, as his diamond-coating technology is unique in Scotland, limiting his 
interest in technology topics available through Connect. ExpressOn similarly has a 
unique antisense technology and rates social and financial value significantly higher 
than knowledge value. 
Each of Spectra's three directors rate knowledge value perceptions differently that 
reflect individual needs and benefits. However, they were consistent in their rating 
of social value that reflected their shared perceptions of the importance of 
networking for the compa!lY' Euan Robertson explains that the process of gaining 
credibility for the new company was all important: "This relates to the fact that the 
first thing a company does is go to the lawyer to write up legal contracts to protect 
assets IPR, then asks the lawyers, "who should I be talking to". From this point 
begins the process for the company of building a reputation through contacts with 
others" . 
A common theme among all case companies is the value of Connect particularly in 
the early stage development of their companies. Euan Robertson of Spektra 
commented that Connect was the most appropriate support group for the compan y 
earlier on: "Connect had the right players in it; had the like mindedness and was 
buoyant and positive with a "we can do it" attitude. Connect's speakers were 
entrepreneurs who had been there and done it, and events were focused". 
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Companies identify the role of Connect in helping to allay some of the difficulties 
faced in the search for investment. By immersing themselves within the network, 
those interviewed suggested that this environment provided them with a solid 
business-like basis for understanding, in realistic terms, what they could achieve, 
whom they should approach and what they could expect in terms of possible 
investment options. 
Hamish Grant of AXE ON explains that Connect has been most useful support group, 
with particular relevance to the problems faced with raising finance, with Ian 
McDonald in particular proving to be of great value. Hamish states: "We presented 
at both the '98 and '99 Connect Investment Conferences. Those conferences gave us 
a platform on which to advise ourselves [about where they thought they might be 
going wrong]. The meetings proved to be a very good networking environment and 
indeed [Connect CEO J Ian McDonald himself was a very good person who had a 
good source of contacts" 
Spektra's Managing Director Gordon Stuart praises Connect's role in developing 
angel investors with a 'technology bias' and in providing knowledge dissemination 
to institutional investors. These efforts, Gordon argues can be seen in the growth in 
software investment in Scotland by angels active in Connect (e.g. Ian Ritchie, Martin 
Ritchie, Andy Davis). The challenge for Connect and others should remain focused 
on "championing the realisation of value in existing small firms and helping grow 
new firms" Gordon states. 
Another way Connect is making a difference regarding investment, according to 
Gordon, is in changing attitudes to equity. He states that entrepreneurs are realising 
that a small percentage of a big pie, with the right people moving it forward, is more 
valuable than a large percentage of a small pie where value has yet to be added by 
others. 
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9.4.2 Specific Recommendations for Connect 
9.4.2.1 'Staying the Course' 
Hamish suggests that Connect "have served their purpose admirably" and are 
'outgrowing Connect now that AXEON is no longer a 'new' company. With this 
assertion, Hamish cautions that Connect should be wary of "overstepping their 
current boundaries of expertise". He adds that by concentrating on, and possible 
increasing, what its does best - more networking programs and getting better at 
attracting people to networking programs - Connect's value can be enhanced. In 
summary, it was felt that Connect's main value was in the delivery of quality social 
networking opportunities, the facilitation of knowledge flows and the increased 
exposure to potential financiers. 
9.4.2.2 Flow Through and Recruitment of Members 
Gordon of Spektra asserts that a key challenge for Connect is to define more clearly 
whom they cater to. Gordon states that he has personally 'plateaued' in terms of 
benefits derived from Connect, noting that things are all new at the outset so new 
entrepreneurs benefit most from Connect but the rate of learning eventually slows 
down. Connect thus needs to encourage new people to come along to events, as 
Connect shouldn't be for established firms; the purpose for Connect is to "get you 
going". Gordon hopes that in time he will be able to contribute to helping others 
through Connect. 
9.4.2.3 Event Relevance for Stakeholders 
An identified concern expressed by some case company respondents - also identified 
in survey findings - is the expectation that Connect must be relevant to a broad cross-
section of technology sectors and stakeholders. For example, Russell of Spektra 
notes that Connect was most appropriate for their senior people, but not necessarily 
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for the technology-focused staff, as they simply wanted to find out about what was 
new in technology nitty-gritty details. 
However, other companies, such as ExpressOn and Intrallect, argue that scientists in 
spin-out companies require commercial knowledge and skills in addition to 
maintaining their technological expertise and keeping in touch with recent 
developments. As such, the social aspect of Connect events are considered, not just a 
'hub for people to exchange ideas' but also a forum where people can access 
business experience and knowledge outside their immediate business setting that is 
friendly and informal. 
For some sponsors and other stakeholders, too much of a technical orientation at 
events is not welcomed, as one respondent in the 2001 value survey states: "some 
events tend to be a little bit too much academically focused". As well, some 
respondents suggest that there was a slight imbalance in member backgrounds with a 
general bias in the culture towards investment and business interests focused on 
opto-electronics and other IT interests. Indeed, it was expressed that the 
"biotechnologists who are looking to start companies are feeling like second-class 
citizens" . 
9.4.3 Summary of Connect's Benefits to Case Companies 
• Connect is perceived as a valuable forum most relevant during early formative 
years of the companies: 
• Connect is highly relevant for individuals requiring business-related skills and 
advice, thus facilitating the "learning curve" particularly for academic 
entrepreneurs with limited commercialisation experience; 
• The informality of events sets the correct tone for its members. The social aspect 
of Connect's events are considered, not just a 'hub for people to exchange ideas' 
but also a place where people can gain crucial business experience and 
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knowledge outside the immediate confines of their own business in a relaxed and 
informal environment; 
• The informal atmosphere of Connect's meetings also fosters new ideas or 
applications to be derived from potential clients; and 
• Connect opens a channel to speak to other sectors and helps to expose business to 
new market in a 'non-threatening' manner. 
Connect's value for case companies are seen at two levels; at the 'personal level' 
where entrepreneurs wished to create increased opportunities to network at particular 
events. Here, Connect acts as a 'guide' in finding the right people and the right kinds 
of recommendations. 
At the second level, a 'development level', companies gained opportunities to gain 
legitimacy and reputation, search for investors, partners and service providers as well 
as searching for new management personnel, directors and other suitable human 
resources. 
Case study findings confirm the importance of a particular range of 'intangible 
benefits' derived from the Connect network. Even though different technological 
capabilities are centrally important to each company, social capital as a common 
intangible benefit allowed companies to identify and secure necessary 
complementary resources. Connect also accelerates the 'learning process' for new 
business skills and knowledge particularly for academic entrepreneurs. The 'meet 
the entrepreneur' event, for example, was credited for its provision of valuable 
insights into 'trial-and -error' issues that founders were experiencing at the time. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
COMPLEMENTARY SUPPORT INITIATIVES AND CONNECT 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes complementary support initiatives and the role of Connect 
amongst these initiatives that first examines Scotland's support environment for 
technology entrepreneurship and relevant initiatives identified by Connect's 
company members. They include Scottish Enterprise programs, university 
technology transfer offices, Edinburgh Technology Fund (ETF), Scottish Institute for 
Enterprise (SIE), the Entrepreneurial Exchange and Global Connect1. 
The role of universities In supporting technology entrepreneurship is further 
examined along with perspectives from one of Scotland's most high-profile research 
institutes - the Roslin Institute - on how they exploit their science and their views on 
the support environment in Scotland. Connect's role amongst these complementary 
initiatives is then examined followed by a chapter discussion and summary. 
10.2 MULTIPLE SUPPORT INITIATIVES IN SCOTLAND 
Complementary support initiatives, along with sponsors, universities and research 
centres, individuals and the wider community, make up the multi-stakeholder 
constituency of Connect whose objective is to support new technology enterprises in 
Scotland (Figure 10.1). 
As a result, multiple points of access for entrepreneurs and technology companies are 
available among this support constituency. Points of access include university 
technology transfer offices, local enterprise companies (LECs) of Scottish Enterprise, 
I The ETF and Scottish Enterprise Proof-of-Concept Fund have been examined in detail as described in Appendix I. 
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Technologies Ventures Scotland, Scottish Institute for Enterprise (SIE), and various 
technology-specific agencies. 
Figure 10.1: Key Constituents (Stakeholders) of Connect Scotland 
Community 
Individuals 
The extent of this supportive 'landscape' creates confusion for entrepreneurs and 
new technology companies, according to some Connect stakeholders. Dr. Keith 
Winton, the Director of the Edinburgh Technology Fund (ETF) argues that there are 
too many steps for assistance and many points of entry for new start-ups in Scotland. 
Keith states that he is unclear how Connect fits with other support initiatives, such as 
Technology Ventures Scotland and Scottish Enterprise. He indicates that multiple 
support programs that seem to be doing similar things ' muddies the water' and 
creates confusion for not only potential entrepreneurs and academics but also for the 
agencies themselves. 
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For example, Scottish Enterprise's LINC2 (local investment networking company) is 
itself a nation-wide, not-for-profit, business introduction network or "marriage 
bureau" for companies and investors. LINC is also supported by a wide range of 
public and private sector sponsors with a mandate to offer an independent and 
impartial service as facilitators rather than investment advisors. 
Ideally, Keith suggests that a new technology company should be able to contact one 
agency to co-ordinate things and act as account manager, project manager, etc. to 
identify and draw in the necessary resources and requirements for the new company. 
For spin-out companies, this role would allow the academic to focus on what he/she 
does best, i.e. focus on the technology development, and Keith suggests this should 
be the role of the university technology transfer office. 
For non-academics attempting to start a new company, Keith argues that the process 
is even more difficult. Within the Scottish Enterprise network itself, Keith suggests 
there is significant variability in the quality of services and no consistency in the 
brand across Scotland. He adds that a consequence of this variability is that other 
support initiatives, perhaps Connect among others, take up the slack and provide 
services that are not being fulfilled by other initiatives with a similar mandate. 
Hamish Grant of AXE ON sees a problem with the credibility and background of 
public support advisors, stating that too many support programmes are filled with 
"low-grade consultants and low-grade civil servants" that are not entrepreneurial 
themselves and consequently do not really understand the actual needs of 
entrepreneurs. Hamish suggests that Connect takes a different approach to 'support' 
and avoids many of these problems. This point will be further discussed in section 
10.6. 
Hamish further argues that the Scottish government and in particular, Scottish 
Enterprise3, typically introduce a lot of well-meaning programs that at first sight may 
2 LINe acts as an intermediary between investor members interested in investing in technology based businesses and 
~rospective new companies seeking investment in an attempt t~ achieve a ,'good fit' (http://www,lincs~ot.co,uk) , 
. Scottish Enterprise (SE) is the Scottish government's offiCial econonuc support agency and prOVides a mynad of support 
schemes. programs and projects for all forms of business activity, 
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seem useful but in reality are often very poorly considered and implemented. He 
points out the recent demise of the 'Scottish Birth Rate Strategy' as an example. 
Hamish goes on to suggest that a problem with some of these programs is the 
administrative burden of applying to the grants that they administer. Hamish 
suggests that the average entrepreneur simply cannot be bothered to apply and states: 
"It seems that you must not start working on a project before you have been awarded 
a grant, but then it can take six to eight months to get the grant in the first place, that 
is simply not what is helpful to us". 
At the same time, the existence of the Scottish Enterprise program, Keith Winter 
suggests, is looked upon jealously by those in other parts of the UK. The English 
scene is highly fragmented without the same level of assistance but Keith also 
concedes that this may only be because Scotland is such a small region in 
comparison to England and easier to co-ordinate. 
One major problem with public support initiatives is the combination of broad 
objectives and how 'success' is gauged and measured, according to Connect CEO 
Ian MacDonald. Literature identifies measurement and evaluation as a common 
evaluation pitfall for public support programs (Patton 1990) and in particular 
choosing appropriate performance measurements and implementing them. 
Ian suggests that many public support programs use simple quantitative measures, 
one being the 'number of companies that are offered assistance'. A problem with 
this measure, according to Ian, is that numerous programs may take credit for the 
performance of a particular company receiving support. Thus the quality or value of 
support provided is not assessed. 
A related problem regarding public initiatives is launching new public sector support 
that may replace or duplicate initiatives already in existence. Connect Director 
Andrew McNair states his concern regarding resource take-up of public programs as 
they attempt to add new programs and services. Similarly Connect CEO Ian 
MacDonald expresses frustration that some public organisations are taking credit for 
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what Connect is doing, and that public funds are being directed to provide duplicate. 
rather than complementary programs. 
Ian points out that the Connect network - built on public and pri vate investment -
has been developed over a 6 year period to a point now where considerable value is 
available within the network for new technology companies. The fact that some 
Scottish support initiatives have not worked and been discarded, such as the Scottish 
Birth Rate Strategy, is another factor in Connect's favour and highlights Connect's 
value, Ian argues. 
The real issue for all support programs, according to Ian, is to demonstrate value. 
The issue of value by stakeholders is critical, according to Ian, in distinguishing 
Connect from other support programs, but he concedes that the key challenge 
remains in actually showing people the value of Connect, why it is different to other 
initiatives around and why companies and sponsors should get involved. 
10.3 RELEVANT COMPLEMENTARY INITIATIVES 
10.3.1 Scottish Enterprise 
All four university spin-out cases described in Chapter Nine received SMART4 
awards administered by Scottish Executive's Enterprise and Life-long Learning 
Department. The stage-one award is a competitive award and provided Intrallect to 
carry out a market feasibility study lasting 6-18 months. Successful completion of 
stage-one - completing stated milestones - allowed DILAB and Intrallect to secure a 
non-competitive stage-two award designed to assist with the development of a pre-
production prototype. 
4 Key criteria for SMART is an R&D project leading to introduction of new productslpr~esses. Projec~s mu~t be highly 
innovative in a technical sense (i.e. a 'first' for the UK or sector concerned). and be commercIally and finanCIally VIable. There 
is no limit to the number of companies funded; 37 companies received awards in 2001. 
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Another important seed scheme identified by the case companies was the Proof-of-
Concept Fund (POC)5 administered through Scottish Enterprise. POC was created to 
address a perceived pre-seed funding gap restricting the flow of technology from 
university laboratories to the marketplace. Being a relatively recent initiative, it was 
not identified in case studies. However, Connect Director Andrew McNair suggests 
that the Proof-of-Concept fund is providing the momentum for change regarding 
university commercialisation. A limitation of POC is that it provides funds directly 
to the university to support basic research in developing a prototype of basis for a 
marketable product. Although it is hoped that new company formation will result, it 
is not a prerequisite for successful receipt of the fund. 
In addition to the Scottish Enterprise investment schemes, case companies identified 
specific people from the agency whose assistance was attributed to achieving 
milestones particularly during company formation. These advisors assisted Yaba 
with due diligence and licensing negotiations with a Danish technology company, 
helped Intrallect in winning the SE "who wants to be an entrepreneur award", and 
assisted ExpressOn in securing investment. These advisors are normally based 
within one of Scottish Enterprise's 12 local enterprise companies (LECs) that 
provide general start-up support and advice throughout Scotland. 
10.3.2 Edinburgh Technology Fund 
In addition to SMART awards, Edinburgh-based case companies Intrallect, Yaba and 
ExpressOn secured support from the Edinburgh Technology Fund6 (ETF). Unlike 
the POC fund, ETF Director Dr. Keith Winton explains that the ETF can put funds 
immediately into a new company and is much more commercially focused. The ETF 
fund of approximately £2 million is intended as grant funding rather than realising 
5 The POC fund was launched in 1999 as a three-year. £ II m fund that has grown to £33 in 2002 to cover the next six years. A, 
of 2002, the POC fund has supported 83 projects that SE suggests reflects a combined market value of £ 13m and 207 new Jobs. 
6 The ETF is part of Chancellor Gordon Brown's University Challenge Fund announced in 1997 to provi.de seed-~om funds for 
university-generated science and technology ideas for commerciali.sation .. The ETF mvolves the UmveTSlty of Edmburgh and.a 
number of its associated research institutes that include the Roshn Institute, Mordun Institute and a number of other pubhc 
research institutes. Glasgow-based spin-outs have access to their own similar fund. 
308 
returns on investment but can also be used as equity funding to eventually keep the 
fund sustainable. 
Unfortunately, ETF and Proof-of-Concept initiatives emerged at approximately the 
same time from different sources with no co-ordinated strategy, according to Keith. 
One of the problems that both POC and ETF faces, he explains, is the assumption 
that seed funding can proceed without identifying subsequent investment possibilities 
at the same time. 
Keith explains that the "real objective of the seed funding is getting people onto the 
'latter' and generating investor credibility or awareness to facilitate a next stage of 
private investment". But the economic situation has changed that progression. In 
fact, he suggests that he would not create the same model of the ETF today because 
getting the next round of funding is a key challenge for new companies. Keith 
suggests that this gap is recognised by Scottish Enterprise and other initiatives such 
as the Co-investment Scheme between public and private investors but more needs to 
be done. Findings from the case studies support Keith's assertion, as all but one of 
the six companies identified a significant gap between seed funding and subsequent 
investment. 
The true objective of ETF, Keith explains, is to provide an assessment level fund to 
determine if there is a market opportunity. Keith describes it this way: "a few 
thousand pounds to do a ceiling, wax and string demonstrator in the lab ... if that 
seems to work, ETF may put in development money and then the next stage would be 
commercialisation - possibly a larger amount of money as the opportunity 
progresses successfully". The sum total cannot be more than £250,000. 
Keith explains that the pnmary benefit of ETF is to promote the commercial 
seriousness of a new company. This is accomplished by keeping the financial 
records and providing initial corporate governance, allowing Keith to actually close 
the company down rather than allow the company to go insolvent. Keith in essence 
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assists the company by setting up, as he calls it, "a vehicle with a commercial shell 
that divorces the company from the research environment". 
Keith has reviewed over 300 business proposals in the last 3 years and ETF has 
supported 50. None of these companies to date have realised returns to ETF as of 
June 2002. Almost one-third are biotechnology and life science, a third are 
electronics and software and the remainder include companies from chemistry, 
engineering and social sciences and consulting. 
Both Ian and Andrew of Connect identify the POC fund and ETF as key 
complementary initiatives for Connect in that they provide 'deal-flow' into Connect. 
In other words, companies with these awards have already undergone initial scrutiny 
of their technologies that have been identified to have high commercial potential. 
Connect's value focuses more on the commercial value needed to form and grow a 
company, seen in the social capital, knowledge flows and investment opportunities 
attributed to Connect by company members. 
10.3.3 The Scottish Institute for Enterprise (SIE) 
Other initiatives are identified as having direct relevance with Connect in addition to 
'deal-flow' initiatives promoting new company formation. The Scottish Institute for 
Enterprise (SIE) is focused on nurturing the next generation of entrepreneurs in 
Scotland. As identified in the case studies, entrepreneurial vision, initiative and 
persistence, among other traits, were key drivers in not only forming new companies, 
but in overcoming a myriad of technological and commercial obstacles. SIE Director 
Carl Togneri explains that Connect and SIE are continuing to formulate a working 
relationship to provide entrepreneurial content and support initiatives for science 
students at universities in Scotland. 
Professor John Wilson of DILAB provides another view of the SIE initiative. He 
suggests that initiatives to promote entrepreneurship at UK universities will be 
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beneficial to those students that have an interest, but he states that "it is difficult to 
'make' entrepreneurs". It is important to demonstrate to students what is possible 
and provide the message that 'entrepreneurship is not so much of a 'black art' but 
John concedes it is difficult to know how much impact promoting entrepreneurship 
will make on economic life in Scotland. 
1 0.3.4 The Entrepreneurial Exchange 
Connect directors identify the Entrepreneurial Exchange as a possible 'next step' 
forum for technology companies as they successfully develop as a going concern. 
The Entrepreneurial Exchange's mission is to "make Scotland a more entrepreneurial 
and confident society" and calls itself "Scotland's leading members' organisation for 
ambitious, growth-orientated entrepreneurs". Formed in 1995, it claims 400 
members, representing over £6 billion of turnover and 88,000 employees. 
Connect CEO Ian MacDonald suggests that the Entrepreneurial Exchange would be a 
threat to Connect's role if they decide to develop a similar network model. As 
Andrew McNair states, "they have more clout with Scottish Executive and Scottish 
Enterprise than Connect" and companies and indeed sponsors, cannot afford to be 
members of various organisations and support programs. 
However, the Exchange is more focused on successful entrepreneurs and companies 
and does not appear to share the same mandate as Connect at this time. Indeed, 
survey findings confirm that Connect is most appropriate for young technology 
companies, providing a relevant forum and contact point from which social, 
knowledge and financial benefits are realised to varying degrees. 
The diminishing relevance of Connect for companies as they successfully form and 
grow would suggest that the Entrepreneurial Exchange may be one of those different 
communities and more focused networks (Birley 1985) available for Connect 
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'graduates' as they seek appropriate new social contacts and business-related 
resources. 
10.3.5 Global Connect 
A broader complementary initiative is the Connect Global Alliance7, a consortium of 
all Connects around the globe that have originated from the Connect San Diego 
model started in 1985. Currently there are 14 Connect programs, and discussions are 
underway to develop a global alliance of these Connects by leveraging their common 
philosophy of networked support to promote and showcase technologies among 
stakeholders of the alliance. 
A further opportunity for Connect Scotland is providing an educational forum to 
promote the benefits and features of the Connect model to other regions around the 
globe8, This opportunity has arisen in response to a request from Connect San Diego, 
who has experienced significant interest in recent years from other regions interested 
in adopting the Connect model. Connect San Diego was finding that a high level of 
staff resources was being devoted to answering requests for information, meeting 
with interested parties and organising visits and workshops. 
10.4 ROLE OF UNIVERSITIES 
The commercial role played by universities in enabling (and constraining) spin-out 
companies and the weaknesses of university-industry linkages is prominent in the 
case study and survey findings. 
7 Global Connect includes 5 US-based programs, 4 in Sweden. 2 in England and one in each of Norway. Denmark and 
Scotland. 
8 Connect Scotland has agreed to assist in providing formal educational forums to discuss the. Connec~ philosop~y and 
operations. Connect will provide four two-day workshops to overview Connect. On an annual baSIS. two Will be held III San 
Diego and two will be held in Europe. 
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The directors of Scotland's two largest technology transfer offices, Dr. Bob Smailes 
of Edinburgh University and Dr. Cathy Gamer of Glasgow University, identify the 
high expectations by their universities is realising commercial returns on generated 
innovations and technologies. Their high volumes of research are expected to 
produce increasing levels of value that provides immediate or near-term returns 
rather than medium to long-term returns. Indeed the notion of risk is a strong 
consideration for technology transfer decision-making. 
Therefore, increasing benchmarks with similar universities, competitive pressures 
and the more recent inclusion of AUTM (Association of University Technology 
Managers) figures for comparison purposes creates institutional inertia to continually 
increase research returns. The role of the spin-out company, although clearly 
identified as an annual target, is much higher risk and much more difficult for 
technology transfer personnel to deal with because of the intangible variables and 
commercialisation considerations. 
Gordon McAndrew, Chailman of Venture capital firm West Lothian Ventures and a 
former chairman of Connect's working group in Dundee, identifies a number of 
issues and challenges in exploiting university technologies. Gordon is one of 
Scotland's most respected business advisors and has been involved in doing 
technology spin outs and technology start ups for nearly 20 years. 
Gordon has watched with interest the emergence of large technology transfer 
offices, particularly at Edinburgh and Glasgow universities. He suggests that some 
technologies created within universities may have markets that are world-wide and 
often the only way to reach them is through existing channels that require a degree 
of power and critical mass found in a large technology transfer office. He cites the 
example of strong relationships required for medical diagnostics with leading 
distributors such as Hammonds and Roche. These companies have the routes to 
market and the credibility with not just the NHS in the UK but with American 
private health. 
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In addition to providing routes to market and assisting inventors with 
commercialisation strategies, such as licensing or selling to a company with already 
established channels or spinning out, Gordon sees technology transfer offices 
providing the necessary processes, such as IPR protection, licensing agreements, 
etc. that prepare the innovation for exposure to these channels and networks. 
However, Gordon cautions that technology transfer will suit some commercial 
situations but not all. For a young company to try to break into world markets no 
matter how innovative and advanced and good its technology is, it will find it an 
uphill struggle, Gordon explains. 
A key hurdle initially in the commercialisation process, according to Gordon, is that 
someone has got an idea but doesn't know what to do with it. He cites the example 
of Axis Shield, a Dundee University biotechnology spin out that began in the 
basement of Ninewells Hospital in 1982 and now employs over 400 people and is 
listed on the London Stock Exchange. Gordon ,got involved with Axis Shield from 
the beginning, after the inventors had gone into the Tayside Regions Industrial 
Office who recommended that they talk to Gordon because of his business 
expenence. 
Gordon's experience with Axis Shield and other university spin-outs highlights to 
him the naivety and the inexperience of the commercial world and commercial 
realities that lie within the university sector and the difficulties of spin out for very 
intelligent, technically-focused people. 
Gordon stresses that there is a very significant need, there in 1982 and still today, to 
provide a catalyst to this subset of university technologists and certain others who 
wish to spin out. Although those expected to manage a spin-out business often have 
excellent technological ideas, Gordon points out that they have been brought up in a 
university society which in general is not just ignorant but sometimes hostile to the 
commercial world. 
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ETF Director Dr. Keith Winton shares some of Gordon's concerns regarding the role 
of university technology transfer offices. Keith suggests, first of all, that universities 
are the first port-of-call for any academic scientist or technologist attempting to start 
up company, since technology transfer offices are official bodies dealing with 
members of staff. The technology transfer office will eventually become involved at 
some point, and Keith argues that contacting them early on saves much grief later on 
when attempting to spin-out and sign over IPR. Case company Intrallect identified 
this lesson in dealing with Edinburgh University. 
Keith argues that a problem for very large research universities such as Edinburgh 
and Glasgow is the wide range of innovations generated from a number of 
specialised departments. This makes it difficult for a central single technology 
transfer office to have all the skills and knowledge to support each area of research. 
Keith also feels that spending efforts attempting to turn academics into business 
people may be futile, as those with entrepreneurial aspirations will follow an 
opportunity without being pushed. He suggests finding those people with the skills 
to commercialise the innovations that are partly developed, similar to Gordon's 
assertion of 'providing a catalyst' to those in the university with excellent ideas. 
A further concern for Keith regarding university support for company creation is 
what he calls "an enormous scope for conflict of interest in the present structure 
because technology transfer offices are charged with commercialisation of their 
university's research - whatever that may be". But the technology transfer office 
also has a role in the management of the technology transfer centre that is effectively 
there to incubate new companies and provide support. 
Keith continues "if you are in the game of incubating companies then you are very 
quickly going to be at a point where those companies will need advice on spinning 
out a company from an independent source ... technology transfer offices cannot 
represent both of these". Keith states that academics wanting to spin a company out 
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are members of the university entitled to a certain level of support that any other 
member of the university would receive. 
Keith therefore argues that there should be a separate entity, possibly even within the 
university, to act as a father figure to the company'. 
The other issue for technology transfer, according to Keith, is the over-emphasis on 
licensing and the value of IP without understanding that IP is not of much value 
without the people behind the innovation. Intellectual property within a new 
company, by contrast, is fundamental to the company's mission and its core activity. 
Universities are a 'collection of fiefdoms, each with their own research group 
interests with little interest in picking up other research if another research group 
disappears. The university itself cannot actually exploit anything directly in the 
marketplace, it can only do it through the staff, and if the university staff are not 
interested in licensing or they leave, the university does not have much of any value '. 
Keith suggests that it is a common fault of many universities to inflate the value of 
IP, although it must be considered in the context of increasing pressures on 
universities to generate more income through their commercialisation results. In 
many cases, Keith argues, this is unfair pressure because it results in "loosing site of 
why universities exist - universities exist to do basic research and teaching - and the 
product is a graduate with skills that can be used elsewhere". The commercialisation 
of research, Keith continues, is important but is a by-product - a third leg - to what 
universities do, but universities should not be seen as promoters of economic growth, 
although the are perceived that way because of the research they perform and 
because of their SIze. But universities should not be seen as economic growth 
agencies. 
A worrymg trend catching on in Scotland, according to Keith is university 
involvement in science parks and incubators, seen by the most recent Technopole 
project by Edinburgh University. Models for comparison include the Cambridge 
Science Park and the success of the "Cambridge Phenomenon". Keith points out that 
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although Cambridge and its colleges initiated the Science Park, companies now go 
there because of the address and the presence of competitors and not the university. 
He adds that its operation is quite separate from the university now. 
These initiatives, Keith argues, are not the core business of a university, and 
universities need to concentrate on what they do best. Although there could be a 
graduating process to the incubator then the Science Park, etc. without actually 
establishing a preferred route, he suggests that these initiatives should be separate 
from the university and be left for people that can operate them effectively. 
10.5 RESEARCH CENTRES: THE ROSLIN INSTITUTE 
Public research centres are also stakeholders of Connect but take a somewhat 
different role in commercialising their research than universities. Dr. John Wither, 
Roslin's Assistant Director, provides his views on how Roslin exploits its 
technologies and science base, the role of Roslin with Scottish universities and the 
challenges facing technology start-ups in Scotland. The Roslin Institute, home to the 
first cloned mammal 'Dolly the Sheep' is one of eight research institutes funded by 
the British BBRC (Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council) and 
among a number of world-class research centres based in Scotland. 
Roslin has strong relationships with a number of Scottish universities but is an 
associated institute of Edinburgh University9 - an official title with no legal standing. 
Roslin has linkages with 17 UK universities that include many of the Scottish 
universities and Nottingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool and others in England. These 
links with other universities are based on links between institutions' scientists rather 
than any formal linkages with the institutions. 
9 Historically, Roslin was part of Edinburgh University, from 1917 when it was the Institute of Animal Geneti.cs and was 
located at the university's Kings Buildings until 1980. A number of senior staff at R~slin hold ~onorary .ch.alfS ~Ith the 
university. One reason, John suggests, for the strong linkage between. the two institution.s ~s geographIcal proxuruty, With o~ly 
7 miles between Roslin and Kings Buildings of Edinburgh UniverSity. Most of Roshn s PhD students are registered With 
Edinburgh University. 
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Unlike universities, Roslin does not have a separate technology transfer office. 
John's role is responsible for all non-scientific and business, legal and personnel 
aspects of the institute and Roslin's annual turnover is £12 million provides 
justification for a business manager. One of Roslin's drivers to pursuing commercial 
exploitation, if government policy is set aside, is to survive, John claims. 
Government funding for agriculture is reducing significantly, as 70% of Roslin's 
funding traditionally came from the UK's Ministry of Agriculture. Ten years ago, 
John says that core funding was 90% and in 2002 is down to 24%. Thus exploitation 
of Roslin's science is a prerequisite for ongoing sustainability in the least. 
Although Roslin for many people is synonymous with Dolly, John points out that this 
has overshadowed the other 30 science projects currently ongoing. He suggests that 
one emerging project has the commercial and financial potential to be far more 
important than Dolly - a blood test for neuro-biological ailments such as 
Alzheimer's disease. Roslin has 250 scientists and 32 principle investigators 
working traditionally on farm animal genetics, genomics and moving more towards 
biomedical and biotechnology research. Roslin recruits scientists globally and will 
seek the very best. 
Science projects commence at the Roslin Institute by defining a new area of science 
first, then going out and recruiting a new principle investigator. Roslin will fund the 
principle investigator, the technicians and a 'wellfound laboratory'. It is the 
discretion of the principle investigator whether or not to expand hislher project by 
submitting various grant applications. John cites an example of projects where the 
core funds only support the principle investigator and one technician, while another 
14-15 technicians are supported by outside grants. The evolution and growth of 
science projects often begin to generate results and intellectual property and deals 
starting to be discussed. 
Roslin's structure for commercial exploitation of their SCIence begins with the 
'leaders of exploitation - the principle investigators'. John states that their function 
is to identify any intellectual property that may have commercial value and can be 
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protected. To assist them, John provides training programs to increase their 
knowledge and understanding of processes of exploitation that include legal issues, 
patenting and licensing. 
John states that one of the initial problems when Roslin began a more focused 
approach to exploitation was the cultural barrier among principal investigators 
regarding their perceptions of commercialisation, i.e. what they could say about the 
science, the time and effort needed for exploitation, etc. 
Roslin has made great strides to facilitate a commercial awareness and involvement 
among their principal investigators through training, John states. He adds that these 
efforts have resulted in a greater acceptance of research commercialisation when 
scientists understand the benefits and opportunities, such as speeding up the 
patenting process, being able to discuss the science and publish once a patent is filed, 
etc, that can provide scientists with a greater level of academic freedom. 
Scientists are thus a key factor in identifying the commercial potential of their 
science and John states that principal investigators are expected to know what the 
potential market is for the particular innovation and to make most of the contacts 
based on their networks. These networks could include biotechnology companies, 
the European Union, government organisations, etc. The principle investigator is 
always involved from the start in any negotiations with a potential commercial client. 
Once a commercial opportunity is identified, John states that there is a split between 
his function and the function of the principle investigators. As the process gets 
underway, the principle investigator begins discussion with the other party's 
scientists to see whether some form of collaboration between the two organisations at 
the scientific level is feasible. Because as John states, "the only work Roslin want to 
do is work that adds onto our scientific program, as we are not a contract research 
organisation". If it is clear from the scientists discussions that collaborative work is 
possible and the personal interactions are positive, John then enters the process to 
provide all the 'backup mechanisms' that include project costing and financial, legal 
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and contract negotiations. The role of the scientists is therefore focused only on 
developing the scientific program. 
John states that approximately 95% of Roslin's SCience IS exploited usmg the 
licensing process just described. What Roslin is looking for in a scientific 
collaboration is that the third party will fund normally a three-year research program 
at Roslin that will develop Roslin's intellectual property, with the average 
collaboration being £1 million. 
In addition to the research funding, Roslin expects a royalty fee for any product that 
emerges. John concedes that this royalty fee may be small, particularly with 
'stacking provisions' that will impact the return. Further, Roslin will attempt to 
secure some equity in the collaborating company, particularly if it is a small start-up 
biotechnology company, although John concedes this is not an option with the large 
biotechnology corporations such as "Big Pharma'. In return for this deal structure, 
Roslin in return normally provides a license to Roslin's protected IP in a defined 
field plus any improvements that arise over the 3-year period. The licence, like any 
licence, is negotiable, states John, and the third party normally seeks to secure a 
worldwide license and Roslin will not be adverse to that request provided that the 
income generated is sufficient. 
The second method of exploitation is the joint venture. This involves Roslin and 
another organisation setting up a joint company, with Roslin providing the 
intellectual property and the other organisation providing the funds. This is not a 
favoured option, John suggests, because it is usually complicated and will be 
undertaken only if there is no other way of exploiting the science. 
The third and final method of exploitation for the Roslin Institute is the spin-out 
company. Two reasons are given by John to pursue the spin-out option. The first is 
where Roslin perceives a market failure - i.e. where there is intellectual property that 
has value but there is no one to license the IP. Roslin will then go to the market to 
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raise the money and set up the company themselves. One example of this route is 
PPL Therapeutics. 
The second reason for the spin-out option is where Roslin has a technology that it 
believes is highly valuable and believes that a few more years of developing the 
technology will make it even more valuable. Therefore, rather than give it away to 
others to commercialise or licence it, Roslin will do a spin-out. 
Roslin has set up five spin-outs to date of which four are still in existence. PPL 
Therapeutics is Roslin's first spin-out company that is now over 15 years old. 
Rosgen was a cattle geno-type company and John suggests it failed in its attempt to 
switch from an animal to a human market. Although the decision to pursue the 
human market was a good decision according to John, the company dumped the 
cattle market before they established the human market. The funders therefore 
walked away. Roslin Nutrition is a service company, and as services are no longer in 
Roslin's mandate, it spun the company out. John suggests that this company had 
good management, a strong drive to succeed and a niche market that they could 
develop. 
Roslin Biomedical was Roslin's most recent spin-out, created in May 1997 to 
develop the technology that created the cloning technology and Dolly the sheep. 
Originally, Roslin had created two patents - Magic and Quiescence - that were filed 
in 1996, followed by the creation of Dolly, the world's first cloned mammal, in 1997. 
As John recalls, there was tremendous interest in the technology, from large 
corporations such as Big Pharma to "some real charlatans" on the other end. Roslin 
administration realised that whatever was being offered at the time, the technology 
was more valuable than those offers. 
Roslin raised £6 million from venture capital group 3i. Both were equal 
shareholders, with Roslin providing the intellectual property and 3i providing the 
money. A high-profile CEO was recruited from the US, Simon Best, who was 
running Zenica Plant Sciences. In November 1997 it became apparent to John and 
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others that the patents - that were only filed and not granted - were not going to be 
the vehicle to get products to market. There was no guarantee that the patents would 
be granted, as much controversy surrounded the cloning technology. Rather 
commercial success for the company was going to require "an amalgam of quite a 
number of patents - technologies that were going to have to be put together". One 
of the groups that emerged was Genron Corporation from California who had 
complementary intellectual property related to tealameres. 
Discussions began with Roslin and Genron purely on the scientific front. It became 
clear to Roslin that there was a deal to be done in putting the intellectual property 
together. At the time Geron was cash-rich and their view was to buyout Roslin 
Biomedical rather than pursue a joint venture or collaboration. The return included 
£12.5 million, a significant share holding in a quoted company and royalties. From 
Roslin's point of view, John feels it was a very good deal. The programs to develop 
the cloning science were written by Roslin and agreed by Genron, with Genron 
receiving a licence - with an exception for PPL Therapeutic - to exploit the 
technology world-wide. 
One of John's business functions, as noted earlier, is taking equity In new 
biotechnology start-ups. Depending on the progress of these companies and should 
they go public, Roslin will tend to sell their equity and reinvest in something else, 
such as blue-chip companies and bonds. This provides an investment portfolio for 
reinvestment. At the same time, John points out that when Roslin wants to start 
something new and reinvest, it 'pump-primes' by using the normal institute reserves. 
Money that is received by the Roslin Institute for its science goes to specific research 
projects. All projects are costed out, and the £12.5 million from Genron essentially 
reflects that amount in research over a 5-6 year period. Almost 50% of that amount 
is an overhead element - part of full economic costing of the projects - that goes to 
the operations of the Roslin Institute. 
322 
In pursuing any of these exploitation options, John states, Roslin focuses on selling 
its key asset - its science - rather than tangible products. As John states: "If Roslin 
goes down that road of going beyond the basic strategic research attempting to 
produce products, we will not survive. There are too many people out there that 
have been at it for too long whom would be much better than us". 
Roslin's most recent commercial venture demonstrates this philosophy. Roslin 
Biocentre Ltd is a commercial site created in 1998 with the primary objective of 
gathering a critical mass of scientists and related organisations working in the life 
sciences sector. The focus is to generate interactions among companies and 
scientists that lead to informal and possibly formal collaborations. 
10.5.1 Roslin's View on Scotland's Support Environment 
John's perspective on technology transfer in Scotland is one of uncertainty on what is 
attempting to be achieved. John suggests that many universities are too target-
driven, e.g. number of spin-outs and amount of licensing income. John states that 
this sets an institutional logic for focusing on targets above all else since technology 
personnel are committed to delivering on what is agreed regarding pre-set objectives. 
Regarding spin-out companies, John argues that the real question is not how many 
spin-outs are being set up but rather how they survive and prosper. The idea of the 
'scientist to CEO progression' for a start-up is not going to work, John suggests, 
because of the lack of experience in business. The key factor for any spin-out to be 
successful, John asserts, is the management team. The quality of the intellectual 
property and the science is important, but John argues that a new company needs "a 
damn good CEO and you need to pay the market rate". You also need to tie them in 
to incentivise them. He cites Roslin Biomedical as an example, claiming that strong 
leadership of the CEO leveraged the strong intellectual property that made the 
company attractive to Genron. 
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John poses a similar caution regarding use of licensing and income generation 
targets. It is the scientist that has to deliver, and if the scientist is not interested then 
output problems will occur. Roslin's approach to involving the principle investigator 
from the start reinforces its philosophy that the scientist always leads and agrees a 
scientific program. This is one reason why Roslin does not have a business manager. 
As John has seen in previous organisations, a business manager goes out and does a 
deal, secures a contract and investment and delivers the contract and deliverables to 
the scientist that may not want to be involved. The organisation is faced with a 
contract that they can't deliver. 
A related problem around commercialising innovations and setting up companies, 
John argues, is that some Scottish universities demonstrate a lack of expertise in 
technology transfer - particularly in the ability to negotiate deals. One Scottish 
University has been difficult enough that John suggests Roslin is growing sceptical 
about future collaborations with them. 
Besides institutional issues facing university commercialisation, John believes that 
Scotland must promote itself better within global markets, with the North American 
market being particularly attractive. Scotland has tremendous potential, according to 
John, because its science base is particularly strong. He suggests that in terms of the 
commercial-potential science regions in the UK, Edinburgh ranks third only behind 
Cambridge and London. 
10.6 CONNECT'S DISTINCTIVENESS AMONG OTHER 
SUPPORT INITIATIVES 
Connect distinguishes itself from other support initiatives "by co-ordinating a broad 
mix of the right kinds of people sharing a common interest in supporting new 
Scottish-based technology companies", according to Connect Director Gillian 
Mayman. Provision of valuable information through a managed approach to event 
topics delivered by dynamic speakers and relevance for multiple technology sectors 
also makes Connect distinct, she adds. 
To avoid duplication of services with other initiatives, Gillian says that Connect 
works at establishing and maintaining a good working relationship with other 
agencies and gaining familiarity with their program, particularly those that fulfil 
different but complementary objectives. Connect's regional directors based in 
Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Glasgow regularly monitor these other support initiatives. 
Connect from its early days has made a conscious effort to avoid political overtones, 
Andrew McNair suggests, and more recently Connect's sponsors and board have 
been explicit in advising that Connect should not be wasting time on public policy, 
public bureaucracy, or public politics. He suggests that this approach has contributed 
to Connect achieving a level of external credibility that separates it from private 
sector service providers. 
Indeed, Connect's independence and neutrality is one factor distinguishing Connect 
from other support initiatives according to survey and case findings. This has 
allowed Connect to work with all the Scottish universities at the same commercial 
level, that includes linkages with the technology transfer offices and SIB students as 
much as it is consistent with Connect objectives. Connect's 'not-for-profit' mandate 
is also seen as facilitating an equal representation of stakeholder interests allowing 
Connect to focus on building a national network and creating its program. 
There are limitations on what Connect can provide in its current role and CEO Ian 
MacDonald stresses that Connect will not become a consultancy because of the 
perception of conflict of interest. Ian adds that the general 'economic development 
role' of Connect is to make the network function, and that role would be 
compromised if it became too service oriented and consultative. Taking a more 
consultative role would compromise public sponsors of Connect such as SE's LECs 
that are mandated to provide hands-on support services for new businesses in 
Scotland as well as Connect's private sponsors, many of whom are professional 
service providers seeking technology company members as clients. 
At the same time, Connect directors provide initial hands-on advice when plugging 
new technology company members into the network. As an example, Dr. Andrew 
McNair, in his role as Connect Director responsible for the west of Scotland and 
investment events, has commercial experience as well as technical expertise in life 
sciences and biotechnology. This advice, Gillian explains, is focused on assessing 
company needs and then directing them to the right people within the network or 
beyond. 
Ian MacDonald suggests that Connect as a private company will take a more 
proactive role to help member companies specify their commercialisation issues for 
the future and what choices are available to them. He stresses that Connect will 
continue to take an active leadership role in preparing and linking new technology 
companies with investors, a function that Connect has championed through its high-
profile Investment Conference. 
ETF Director Keith Winton's suggests that the combination of multiple support 
initiatives with similar mandates and significant variability in quality of services will 
lead to Connect continuing to 'fill the gap'. He suggests that Connect is well placed 
to provide advice because other agencies often don't have technology-specific 
experience or access to Connect's extensive network of contacts. 
10.6.1 Connect's Role with Universities and Research Centres 
Critical to Connect's success is to be strongly linked to the university sector, states 
Connect CEO Ian MacDonald. All fourteen Scottish universities are public sponsors 
of Connect and use the network as an outreach mechanism to the technology and 
business communities. Ian asserts that this provides a strong motivation for private-
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sector sponsors to join Connect as approximately 50% of new technology start-ups 
are university spin-outs. 
Connect is a mechanism for breaking down some of these barriers between the 
university and commercial worlds identified earlier, according to Gordon 
McAndrew. When Connect began in 1996, Gordon explains that need was great to 
assist university-generated IP in becoming a commercial reality for the benefit of the 
wider economy as well as individuals. Gordon states that also needed at that time 
was an infusion of a variety of skills that were not normally within the skill-set of the 
entrepreneurial innovator technologist. 
Since 1996, Gordon suggests that Connect has developed a 'risk free' environment 
to enhance the university potential for spin out. This is done by bringing together 
the university people with commercial people 'on the other side of the fence' to 
demonstrate to those in universities that there is a difference and giving them an 
idea of how difficult it may be to commercialise their technology. He suggests that 
Connect is risk free because it is a friendly environment, people talk and come to 
talk. 
One difficulty is trying to persuade academic institutions of the value of the 
technology-focused network of Connect. Connect Director Andrew McNair points 
out that some of the universities are very good at working with Connect but the 
larger universities are very poor because they've got a high degree of ownership. 
Glasgow and Edinburgh, for example, have a large staff in their technology transfer 
departments, as does Scottish Enterprise's LEC network. Andrew suggests that these 
departments and organisations have various company development teams, 
technology teams that "are responsible for trying to justify their existence and 
complete performance project boxes". 
Connect, on the other hand, is focused on trying to get academics in touch with 
independent expert advice and resources so that they may access a whole array of 
information that they can use and gain knowledge from. 
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Andrew suggests that Connect's "complement of events" have made new technology 
companies more aware that their founders don't have all the abilities needed for the 
full management team. As Andrew states, "one issue is that it is very difficult to get 
technology companies to put their head above the parapet, as they are all very 
focussed in developing technology". For example, Connect's 'technology briefing' 
event, focused on university projects, attempts to provide a spread of speakers and 
technologies and to discuss the various stages of commercial development. 
10.7 DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
Complementary initiatives operating alongside Connect are seen as operating at a 
number of levels. At one level are commercialisation enablers created to counter 
perceived gaps to forming technology companies. These include the SMART 
awards scheme and Proof-of-Concept fund from Scottish Enterprise, ETF seedcom 
funds and the Royal Society of Edinburgh Fellowship Scheme. Case companies 
identify their usefulness for further developing their technologies and assisting 
company formation by providing market analysis and funds for salaries. Additional 
benefits include advice and guidance on company formation and directing companies 
to further support contacts. 
Infrastructure enablers are identified to correct perceived regional socio-economic 
disadvantages. Connect and SIE have evolved a complementary relationship to 
educate students on entrepreneurship, stimulate entrepreneurial projects, and 
encourage students to start their own companies, leading to presentation at Connect's 
Investment Conference. At the business level, the Entrepreneurial Exchange also 
identifies a mission to make Scotland more entrepreneurial while providing a 
membership-based network for Scotland's successful entrepreneurs. 
Intermediator initiatives that provide a business introduction service or "marriage 
bureau" for companies and investors is seen in the LINC program of Scottish 
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Enterprise with more general business information provided by the Scottish 
Enterprise LECs that operate more at the district level. 
A number of issues are identified regarding the role of universities in supporting 
technology entrepreneurship. One is the potential conflict of interest of achieving 
university performance targets, e.g. income, patents, licensing deals, spin-outs etc. 
while ensuring the best interest of staff in their commercialisation decisions. One 
criticism of these targets is that how many spin-outs 'set up' is much less important 
than how many spin-outs 'survive and prosper'. 
A counter-argument is whether scientists can be 'transformed' into entrepreneurs and 
CEOs and the assertion that entrepreneurial scientists will leave attempting to secure 
the best deal for their new company. The question arises whether universities should 
be maximising their returns or generating regional economic benefits by assisting 
spin-out companies with the assistance of external complementary initiatives. 
Connect suggests that universities utilise the Connect network as an outreach 
mechanism to the technology and business communities, but that its relationship with 
universities is not as active collaborators. 
Multiple support initiatives and multiple points of entry to various support agencies 
are identified as a problem constraining support delivery in Scotland. Lack of co-
ordination and failure to acknowledge features and benefits of existing programs 
contribute to the problem, according to some support initiative directors. 
Stakeholders identify various delivery problems that include lengthy application 
processes, lack of commercial experience and competence of advisors or advisors 
simply not understanding the technology and its implications in forming a company. 
Connect identifies its active role in ensuring its uniqueness among complementary 
initiatives. Connect remains neutral and apolitical, monitors other initiatives and 
their services and provides technology-specific experience while providing its 
sponsors and members access to Connect's extensive network of contacts built up 
over 6 years. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CONNECT'S EVOLUTION AS AN INDEPENDENT 
COMPANY AND REGIONAL FACTORS 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines Connect's evolution from a public-private network-based 
program to an independent company. The objective is to identify changes to network 
events and activities, governance and communication mechanisms, value delivery to 
stakeholders and Connect's role among complementary support initiatives. This 
evaluation is based on interviews with Connect staff and stakeholders one-year after 
Connect's 'spin-out' (June 2002) and draws on insights from case and survey 
findings. 
The chapter also examines changes to Scotland's business environment during the 
timeframe of the Connect evaluation (1997-2002) that are identified as relevant to 
understanding the evolution of the network, its effects on stakeholders and Connect's 
role within a regional system of support programs and initiatives. 
11.2 CONNECT AS AN INDEPENDENT COMPANY 
11.2.1 Self-sustaining Business Model 
Financial self-sufficiency has been the first and most important operational milestone 
achieved one-year after spin-out. CEO Ian MaDonald states that the key question at 
the time of spin-out was simply "can we sustain Connect without the public ERDFI 
grant (approximately £300,000)?" One year on, it is evident that the answer is 
affirmative. Connect has been successful in attracting revenues to hire new staff -
web manager, database administrator, part-time accountant - and securing private 
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office space in central Edinburgh, thus growing the company during its transition 
year. 
The pnmary source of this financial self-sufficiency is membership fees from 
sponsors and a membership renewal rate of almost 100%. This achievement is 
impressive given the volatile economic conditions for technology sectors in 2001 and 
2002 and the operational challenges of disengaging from the university. 
The self-sustaining model is based on a revised membership structure to the sponsor 
community. The previous flat rate sponsor fee of £3000, applying to all sponsors, 
has been replaced with a matrix cost structure that is banded according to the size of 
the sponsor organisation and sector. Table 11.1 below sets out the membership fees: 
Table 11.1: Connect Membership Fees (since June 2001) 
'. . ·Me.n6ers,(dp 
" :... 
11-50 .. 'Ell1,p~9yee .9-umb4!rs: 1-10 51 plus Investment 
., Category 
, ~.,. ;;;, '. _ .... , " . 
Conference .. 
. : . , 
PRIVATE SPONSORS £3000 £4000 £5000 
PUBLIC SPONSORS 
U ni versi tieslResearch £3000 
Not-for-profit £1000 £4000 £5000 
COMPANY £500 (annual fee) £1000 
More explicit benefit provIsIOn to sponsors are to: 1) gam potential business 
development opportunities; 2) promote their company and servIces on 
ConnectontheNet.com and highlight company developments through the site bulletin 
board; 3) receive discounted places at the Investment Conference; and 4) contribute 
their knowledge and experience to early stage technology companies. 
The new self-sustaining model has also produced a revised company membership 
structure. Both Ian and Andrew note that Connect's board voiced a collective 
concern that Connect was 'giving away' their services and Ian's assertion was that 'if 
a company wants to get involved in the Connect network, "they will have to pay for 
it". Various revenue models were discussed, with the primary challenge one of 
I European Regional Development Funds (ERDF) are investments for infrastructure and local development initiatives that 
should lead to the creation or maintenance of jobs. (http://europa.eu.intlcommlregional_policy/funds/prordlprord_en.htrn). 
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attributing a financial figure to the value provided by Connect to new companies. A 
key consideration, identified by Andrew, was 'getting the Scottish mindset attuned to 
the value that the Americans already attribute to similar services J. 
Increasing company membership fees was based on the assertion that the original 
£100 fee for companies was heavily subsidised by public funds in the pre-spin-out 
model. Andrew states that initial discussion over a new membership fee to more 
accurately value the membership proposed a tiered membership package of £1500 
for a new company that would provide up-front services for a new company entering 
the network, followed by an annual £500 renewal fee. This fee structure was based 
on estimation by Connect staff that the actual value based on the time and service 
provision for previous companies amounted to £10,000, based on consultant fees 
using a daily rate. 
However, initial feedback from compames and Connect's board found that the 
majority of new companies could not afford £1500 and the model was rejected. An 
identified concern from most companies, Andrew found, was not the argument over 
the value attributed to the network but rather that companies simply did not have the 
funds available for the fees. 
In its place, Connect identified a more realistic 'price-point' of £500 per year for 
membership, with investment events charged separately. Connect believes that in the 
first year, most companies will be eligible for the Springboard investment event, and 
an additional fee of £1000 is set for the investment events (Table 13). The choice of 
paying £1000 or deferring payment until the company attracts initial financing 
essentially creates a 'success-based' payment model2. 
The £500 fee covers access for all company employees to Connect core events, a 
listing on the website www.connectonthenet.com and discounts to Connect's 
investment events. In addition, members can promote their company and services on 
the website and access all areas of Connect's online network: post ads, question 
2 In 2002, actual Investment Conference fees were £500 for Connect members and £1000 for non-members. 
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Connect's online expert community, view archive presentations and post the latest 
company news and releases. Members continue to receive copies of Connect's 
newsletter, Jargon. 
The most significant difference in value provision for technology companies with the 
new model is a more intense 'mentoring process for gaining access the know-how, 
resources and skills in the first 18-24 months of membership. This 'plugging into the 
network' process will be discussed in section 11.2.4.1. 
Overall, Connect's mission has not changed since becoming a private company and 
remains: " ... to support the creation, development and growth of early stage 
technology-based ventures throughout Scotland". However, performance metrics 
for Connect are more membership-based in contrast to many of the original 4-year 
quantitative impact targets identified in Chapter Eight (section 8.3.1) that were 
focused on multi-stakeholder constituency-building at the regional level. 
Connect's has created new quantitative targets explicitly aimed at 'membership' 
growth and retention that is directly related to revenue generation: 1) increase the 
number of member companies from 100 to 200 within two years (between 2001 and 
2003); and 2) increase the number of private, corporate and public sector sponsors 
from 60 to 90 within two years (between 2001 and 2003). These performance targets 
are expected to establish a robust revenue stream to enable the effective and 
sustainable development of Connect as an independent, not-for-profit company. 
Although these targets demonstrate Connect's ambition to 'grow' the network 
membership after a period of relative network membership stability since 1998, one 
observation is the absence of explicit targets for other stakeholder groups. Another 
noticeable omission is any economic impact targets similar to those originally 
established for Connect's first four years (1997-2000). However, this research has 
identified key limitations in attributing economic output targets to Connect that 
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include the indirect role of Connect3 and regional factors challenging achievement of 
targets such as number of spin-outs and university-industry collaboration. 
11.2.2 Network Events 
Connect's current mix of recurrent events - 'meet the entrepreneur', 'enterprise 
workshops' and 'technology briefings' remain the cornerstone of network activities. 
Connect continues to provide formal knowledge-based topics that encourage 
stakeholder attendance and stimulate interaction, collaborations and value flows 
described in Chapter Eight. Investment events continue to operate as before. 
However, one identified weakness in facilitation of recurrent events previously was 
their abstraction in terms of outputs, explained by Ian MacDonald as 'the problem of 
planning these events to be of interest to all the communities in the network'. A 
revised 'lifecycle of events' strategy has emerged with the new model that reflects a 
more integrated structure and flow of topics. 
The three recurrent events are now integrated within a two-year 'lifecycle' that 
attempts to run in parallel with a new company's business lifecycle. This recurring 
program mix will start every 9 months to allow recent company members to enter 
into the program and realise a complete lifecycle of event topics that cover key 
company formation issues. Ian suggests that this event cycle is driven by stages of 
funding that many technology companies in the network will have in common 
despite their technology peculiarities and differences. 
A further justification for this lifecycle-based provision of events is to benefit private 
sponsors who are able to determine where companies are located according to their 
needs and level of development by the events they are attending. However, one 
concern with this approach is the potential loss of sponsor attendance at early events, 
when companies would benefit most from sponsor's social capital, experience-based 
3 
In May 2001. CEO MacDonald identified the need to create more 'realistic and relevant' targets for the future 
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advice and knowledge but are too early to be perceived by sponsors as gomg 
concerns. 
11.2.3 Network Management Mechanisms: Governance and 
Communications 
The governance of Connect has changed with the appointment of a professional 
Board of Directors that have legal obligations as of September 2001 to, among other 
things, "ensure that Connect is doing 'appropriate things". Prior to this time, 
Connect's board was an advisory board, as Edinburgh University performed all of 
the administrative, line management and financial decisions for Connect. This trade-
off with the university, Ian concedes, provided Connect with a number of benefits. 
Overheads were waived by the university on the condition that Connect would not 
receive or expect subsidisation from the university. Premises at the Management 
School and administrative support were provided to Connect. An interesting 
comment by Ian in hindsight suggests that Connect was able to perform relatively 
autonomously from the university in terms of its mandate. 
Connect's new board structure is perceived to be more inclusive of stakeholder needs 
and expectations. Andrew McNair points out that the new Connect's board is 
nominated from sponsors and member compames, allowing sponsorship 
representation, company representation and entrepreneurial representation. He 
asserts that the long term capability and vision of Connect, to grow the technology 
company community and make it prosperous, also provides a level of stakeholder 
integration that will ensure that the network of sponsors will continue to maintain its 
involvement and interest socially, knowledge-wise and financially. 
Connect staff are more focused on higher standards of service provision to ensure 
that sponsor membership retention remains high, not unlike other service-based 
companies. A more resource-based operational philosophy has emerged with 
specific performance-based job descriptions outlining where and how Connect staff 
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will add value to the company. For Connect's directors, this includes the number of 
'man-hours' employed to attract new company members into Connect. 
The importance of this servIce orientation to sponsors has resulted in Connect 
Director Gillian Mayman, previously Program Director, taking on a new role as 
Sponsorship Director. Andrew estimates that since the revised model was 
introduced, an additional 20 percent of 'new effort' from Connect's directors has 
been dedicated to talking with new companies and sponsors. A continuing challenge 
for Connect staff, identified in Chapter Eight, is to market and promote Connect to a 
broad cross-section of technology sectors and to know what events and issues are 
applicable to what sectors. This requires maintaining an 'ear to the ground' to keep 
abreast of ongoing issues and how these are relevant to Scottish companies as well. 
Managing and directing Connect as a spin-out company has provided CEO 
MacDonald with numerous challenges. Ian concedes that he had to 'learn how to set 
up a new company', a somewhat ironic confession given that Ian has been involved 
since 1996 in providing start-up and commercialisation advice to numerous 
technology companies. In hindsight, Ian provides some lessons: 
o Set up the board earl y. 
o Organise and confirm legal issues of company set-up early, contracts for 
employment, intellectual property (IP) and trademark issues. 
o Cash-flow forecasts and projections take a considerable amount of time, 
particularly when the economy is in a down-tum. Accounts receivable has 
become a particular issue for Connect in this economy. Although Connect's 
payment period is net 30 days, average accounts are taking over 90 days, 
creating significant cash flow issues. Ian concedes that cash flow is the most 
serious challenge to Connect's solvency as a company. 
Network communication continues to rely primarily on referral and 
recommendations between Connect staff and the wider community and among 
network stakeholders. However, communication mechanisms since June 2001 have 
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become more dependent on networking technology In the form of 
www.connectonthenet.com. 
The web presence is expected to counter an identified weakness of regional inclusion 
particularly in the north (Aberdeen, Dundee and the north west) by directing 
knowledge flow to stakeholders and providing an open two-way communication 
channel. The site can also provide up-to-date information on Connect's events and 
activities and act as a medium for customised information and advice flow among 
companies, Connect, sponsors and others using confidential password access. 
Findings suggest that networking technology will not supplement face-to-face 
interactions facilitated through Connect's various events. Findings in Chapter Eight 
suggest that the diverse, unpredictable, informal and unmanaged flow of information 
and knowledge generated at recurrent events cannot be duplicated using technology 
mediums nor can the building of social capital, reputation, trust or credibility be 
developed through them. Both 'what you know' and 'who you know' have been 
identified as particularly critical in a Scottish context. 
11.2.4 Value Delivery to Stakeholders 
Strengthening the ties between sponsors and members within the network lies at the 
heart of enhancing value provision in the revised model. Connect stakeholders are 
becoming 'more aware of why they are doing what they are doing', according to Ian 
MacDonald. More and more, stakeholders are looking to spend their time as 
efficiently and productively as possible. Utilising contacts that are developed within 
the network becomes increasingly important for new companies, and selectivity of 
discussions arise as entrepreneurs become more confident regarding their business 
proposition. 
A 'sales pipeline' can be used to conceptualise how Connect is more actively 
engaging potential sponsors and members. At one end of the pipeline, Connect 
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directors are focused on pitching to potential members and sponsors and 'closing 
deals' for a commitment (subscription) to the network. At the other end, Connect's 
efforts are expected to provide benefits - particularly investment - for member 
companies and also provide sponsors with benefits, among them access to new 
technology companies joining the network. 
The effectiveness of this pipeline will be affected by a lack of investment in 
technology companies at one end that constrains the ability and willingness of 
companies to commit to joining the network because of the membership fee. As 
sponsors rely on the influx of these new companies within the network to establish 
relationships and assess their client potential, any impediment of new companies 
flowing into the network will affect sponsor benefits. Thus, pipeline inflow and 
outflow are influenced by sectoral conditions. 
The greatest impact on new technology companies since 2001 is the increased time 
required to secure an investment deal, from 3-6 months to 9-12 months, according to 
Ian MacDonald. Although Ian suggests the supply of money has remained relatively 
stable, he cautions that the longer time period for raising capital has increased the 
risk of exposure to Connect's member companies as competitive new opportunities 
develop and arise during this longer period of time. Thus the window of opportunity 
for companies has shortened. 
Chapter Eight identifies the effect of varymg technology market conditions on 
company membership retention since 1997, suggesting a paradox in that benefits of a 
supportive network may be most appropriate for new companies when market 
conditions are challenging, but they may not be able to afford Connect's higher 
membership fees. 
Connect CEO Ian MacDonald was asked to respond to this suggestion of a paradox. 
He notes that serious new ventures will commit while the less serious may tum away 
and states: 'if a new company cannot afford to spend £500 on Connect, they may /wt 
be worth the fime ... in other words, we want to attract the more seriolls companies'. 
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In reiterating Connect's new 'membership-based' model, Ian's asserts that 'if a 
company wants to get involved in the Connect network, they will have to pay for it'. 
Underlining Ian's assertion is Connect's more explicit objective of ensuring business 
opportunities to sponsors, suggesting a level of company member selectivity on the 
part of Connect. This rationale can be summed up by Ian's statement, "if we drive 
companies into Connect, what sponsors will follow? " Findings from Chapter Eight 
identified the growing expectations of sponsor returns on their membership - i.e. 
'deal-flow' while also identifying high value associated with network knowledge. 
Creating sponsor expectations of deal flow is dependent to a large degree on 
investment opportunities available for high potential companies to become sponsor 
clients. Already identified in Chapter Eight is the correlation between social and 
financial value and the fact that emerging investor groups in the network are 
individual members and other technology companies. This suggests that too 
selective an approach to matchmaking and focused value provision only to 
companies and sponsors runs the risk of loosing key value-adding elements of the 
network. 
Case study findings suggest that Connect needs to maintain interest in the network by 
experienced entrepreneurs and managers. Management and investment go hand-in-
hand with almost all case companies identifying the need for experienced 
commercial managing directors across all technology sectors. One problem for a 
biotechnology company, identified in the case studies, is finding not only 
experienced investors but also experienced managers in a sector where time-to-
market is so long. Lowering search costs for companies as they develop highlights 
the importance of a broad multi-stakeholder network constituency that continues to 
be attracted to the network. 
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11.2.4.1 'Plugging' New Companies into the Network 
Connect's mandate to increase value provision to member companies begins with an 
initial meeting with one of Connect's directors. Most prospective company members 
arrive at Connect with a technology in need of protection, a need to know about 
competition for their innovation and weaknesses in their business 'offering'. 
Upon a registration of interest by a prospective company member, Connect first 
establishes its criteria for a new company - that they confonn to the definition of a 
technology company (companies competing on the basis of proprietary technology or 
know how). An initial meeting is then set up with one of Connect's regional 
Directors to discuss the company's business model, i.e. where they are, where they 
want to go and who they needed to talk to - legal, financial, marketing, etc. Andrew 
McNair concedes that Connect is quite straightforward with prospective companies 
regarding their innovation potential and assessment of how Connect can assist them. 
Connect also attempts to make it clear that although the initial meeting (or follow-up 
meeting) is complementary, any initiation of assistance will require the company to 
join Connect. 
Once a company joins, it is then 'plugged into the network' by introductions to 
recurrent events, being set-up on the Connect website and being given preferential 
access to investment events 'springboard' and 'bootcamp'. These two investment 
events are aimed at solidifying the market opportunity and business proposition in 
preparing the company to present to serious investors at the annual Investment 
Conference. 
Making introductions on behalf of the company is one of the services provided by 
Connect. However Andrew cautions that this role could easily evolve into a non-
executive director role for Connect Directors, so care is taken in ensuring that 
guidance and direction does not become ongoing support and advice that the 
company becomes reliant on for their business decisions. 
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The initial one-on-one time spent with a new company member by Connect varies, 
according to Andrew. Although he does not closely monitor the hours spent with 
each company, Andrew takes the example of an Edinburgh University spin-out 
company who had received a SMART Award in 2002. Andrew brought in an active 
Connect company as a syndicate partner to assist the new company in proving their 
scientific principles and made contacts with potential investors on behalf of the 
company. Andrew estimates that he spent 3 days with the company during their first 
week as a Connect member. 
11.2.4.2 Universities 
Connect's transition to private company has not changed the benefit provision to 
universities~ providing them with a private-public network of commercialisation 
support, access to technology ideas and more direct support for investment. The 
benefit of the network for university spin-out~, Ian adds, is to provide a proactive 
community of support that the universities can use for their spin-out companies to 
'plug into'. This saves the universities time and resources by providing a ready-
made route to market for scientists and researchers attempting to exploit their 
innovations. At the same time, Connect allows university technology transfer offices 
to develop and utilise links to investors. 
However, the attitude taken by Connect in dealing with universities has changed 
since June 2001 according to Ian MacDonald. Previously, Connect went to 
universities In an attempt to persuade them to be 'more entrepreneurial' but Ian 
concedes that Connect can't change that, so Connect is now more focused on 
infonning the universities of its events and activities. 
Ian MacDonald describes technology transfer offices as essentially '[PR incubators' 
with the role of providing support for companies or potential ventures (clients) in 
which they have (or will have) an equity stake. He suggests that involvement with 
Connect is often motivated to gain access to people and resources they need in order 
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to realise value from these innovations. Essentially, this role is quite business-like 
and formal. 
Connect directors concede that some universities are much more receptive to 
Connect than others. Andrew McNair argues that some Scottish universities remain 
'owner-oriented' and the result is that negotiations over intellectual property (IP) 
take far too long. He cites two recent examples of spin-out companies that have 
experienced commercialisation constraints because their critical time-to-market 
technologies have been held up by IP negotiations. External negotiations with 
investors will not normally proceed unless there is a letter from the university 
outlining the position of the technology - i.e. the ownership, based on Andrew's 
experience working with university spin-outs. 
The Springboard event in fact was originally designed for university spin-outs and 
over 50% of presenting Springboard companies are universities spin-outs. 
Technology Briefing events are also designed to allow academics to present their 
work on innovations and to facilitate potential collaboration among academics active 
in the network. Findings from Chapter Eight, however, identify the low participation 
level of universities at these events that suggests the event objective of facilitating 
university-industry collaboration is not being realised. 
Andrew argues that another issue for some university technology transfer offices is 
their perception of ownership loss if academics attribute more value to Connect than 
to their own university commercialisation staff. This is misguided, Andrew asserts, 
because it is clear in Scotland that the IP always initially resides with the universities, 
providing universities with a natural link with academics. 
An ongoing challenge in commercialising spin-outs remains the ownership role of 
universities and the commercial needs of an emerging spin-out. A common 
expectation of all technology investors is to identify 'disruptive technologies' - those 
innovations that clearly will change the way things are done in a particular sector, 
according to Andrew McNair. Although investors may concede that the technology 
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IS prorruslng, they want to see market diligence, contact with customers and a 
sustainable business model with a product pipeline as prerequisites. Universities 
cannot provide all these requirements. 
11.2.4.3 Innovation Creators: Scientists and Researchers 
The role of Connect with academics and spin-out companies is significantly different 
than its role with university administrators and technology transfer personnel. 
Connect directors often advice academics on issues related to ownership of 
technologies, usually suggesting to academics to avoid lengthy, drawn-out arguments 
with their universities over equity position and ownership. As Andrew states, "give 
the university their 20% equity ... the most important thing is to get the technology 
signed over to the academic if a new company is the goal". 
Connect also identifies a 'confused academic syndrome' whereby academics are 
naive on commercialisation processes and confronted with an overwhelming amount 
of advice and information. One problem suggested by Andrew is that advice from 
technology transfer personnel may lack 'real-world reality', particularly when it 
comes to advising academics on private-sector investment processes. 
Since 2001, Connect directors identify a growing level of knowledge and assertion 
on the part of academics in commercialising their innovations in Scotland. One 
reason is the hands-on processes by which academics apply for funding - the Proof-
of-Concept Fund, Royal Society of Edinburgh Fellowships, etc - that encourages 
critical thinking about the technology and its relation to the market. This trend has 
also placed the technology transfer offices under more pressure to respond to more 
knowledge-based queries from their academics, Andrew argues. 
There is also a growing trend, Andrew sees, for younger academics - non-tenured 
academics, post-doctoral fellows, etc - to see a commercial career and leave the 
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university to start a company. This trend was identified in case studies in Chapter 
Nine. 
11.2.4.4 Complementary Initiatives 
Connect has made more explicit its positioning as a regional support program: 1) to 
develop connectonthenet.com as a knowledge portal for the Scottish technology-
business community; 2) to strengthen existing collaborative activity with initiatives 
such as Proof of Concept Fund and the Scottish Institute for Enterprise to maximise 
membership opportunities; and 3) to partner with related organisations and initiatives 
within the UK and Europe to stimulate additional opportunities for members and 
sponsors. 
Since 2001, Connect directors suggest that collaboration with other bodies 
supporting technology entrepreneurship has increased and improved. One 
explanation is that Connect, in providing a more focused business model, has 
identified boundaries and thus its limitations on where it provides value. Another 
explanation is the increasing accountability of Connect to its professional Board of 
Directors. As a public program, Connect was able to develop various programs 
without rigid monetary and performance guidelines, as Program Director Gillian 
Mayman states, Connect had "latitude without preconceived expectations". 
Connect's relationship with its larger public sponsors had previously placed Connect 
in the role as recipient to the mandates and expectations of these larger players, since 
they represented Connect's primary funding source. As a private company, Connect 
can operate autonomously and on a subcontract basis with these agencies, whereas 
previously, Connect provided information, advice and services on an 'as asked for 
basis' . 
Connect has changed somewhat as a private company, according to Dr. Keith 
Winton, ETF Director, who viewed Connect when it was based at Edinburgh 
University primarily as a program to link universities with the commercial world in 
Scotland. Keith now suggests - with Connect a private company external to the 
university - that Connect is now on the commercial side of the wall looking back at 
the universities rather than on the university side of the wall facing the commercial 
people. 
Although Keith suggests it is too early to tell, he sees Connect's new role as an 
'industry body' - with good contacts within the universities. Any improvements in 
linking these two sides will provide a much-needed service in Scotland, he adds. He 
also suggests that Connect 'in its old guise' may have been looked upon by some of 
the university technology transfer offices as direct competition. 
11.3 REGIONAL CHALLENGES TO TECHNOLOGY 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
The evolution of Connect in its first 6 years - 1997 to 2002 - has coincided with 
unpredictable global markets for technology as well as regional challenges peculiar 
to the UK and Scottish context. For example, Scottish policy makers view the 
biotechnology sector as a key to technology growth since the demise of the 
electronics industry in 2001 and 20024. Findings in Chapter Eight identify that 
technology market volatility is reflected in the varying levels of investment and types 
of sectors gaining investment as well as the level of Connect companies retaining 
memberships and no longer trading. 
The cyclical nature of the technology sector has not diminished sponsorship support 
for Connect as identified by high renewal rates discussed earlier. Connect 
Sponsorship Director Gillian Mayman gives one explanation of high sponsor 
retention. She suggests that Connect's founding sponsors provided optimistic visions 
of the future of the technology sector back in 1996/97 that justified their decisions to 
4 Biotechnology employs more than 24,000 people in Scotland in 430 organisations. Since 1.999. the level of growth in the 
industry in Scotland has been 30 per cent a year. almost double the European average (ScottIsh Enterpnse, 2(02). 
345 
become involved in Connect. At the same time, she suggests that many people did 
not understand the technology marketplace and it was this concern with not having a 
grasp of the industry that drew people to the Connect network. 
CEO Ian MacDonald suggests that another reason for sponsor vigilance in supporting 
technology is its importance to the Scottish economy that recognises, first of all, 
Scotland's over-dependency on foreign corporations and second, the high potential 
of economic benefits to be derived from Scotland's strong science and technology 
base. Ian suggests that under strong market conditions, sponsorship is distributed to 
a number of various support programs, but during a down-tum, the level of 
sponsorship will become highly selective. High retention confirms a longer-term 
focus and an indication of the growing maturity of the technology sector and its 
supporters in Scotland. 
Connect Director Andrew McNair argues that the technology community in Scotland 
has become more sophisticated since 1998 due to tangible, incremental 
improvements that include growing competition for young technology companies, as 
more investment has become available. Andrew identifies a noticeable shift in 
attitudes from those involved with the Investment Conference between 1998 and 
1999, and suggests that presenting companies were suddenly a lot more bullish about 
their options and opportunities. He also suggests that the power base has shifted 
somewhat from advisors and funders to these new companies and credits the quality 
of proposals and increased awareness by technology entrepreneurs regarding investor 
expectations. 
The entrepreneurial culture has changed particularly at the source of technology 
innovations, the Scottish academics, according to Gillian Mayman. She suggests that 
the traditional academic focus on the technologies themselves has evolved to the 
commercial applications of these technologies. A number of reasons may explain 
this change. Successful companies and wealth accumulation have provided role 
models for other academics and researchers. Academics have a greater awareness of 
what is required to commercialise their innovations. The role of technology transfer 
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departments has also gIven a greater awareness to the push toward applying 
university research. 
Professor John Wilson of DILAB suggests that with changes to academic life, such 
as less freedom to pursue research interests for example, more academics are 
pursuing commercial opportunities in the UK. At the same time, John remains in 
academia only because DILAB has yet to realise a viable market position, and he 
continues to balance his commercial and academic roles. Indeed, case studies 
identify a combination of 'push' and 'pull' factors influencing decisions to leave 
academia to start a new company. 
With success has come a greater cultural acceptance of the entrepreneur as a 
legitimate occupation in Scotland, according to Gillian Mayman. Successful 
entrepreneurs, with their experiences and lessons, now provide knowledge, social 
contacts and investment to new entrepreneurs and companies. However, evidence by 
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) suggests that entrepreneurship levels in 
the population of Scotland remain among the lowest in Europe5. 
Connect Director Dr. Andrew McNair describes cultural and social change in 
Scotland as "a slow process or a 'drip effect' when attempting to change the status 
quo". GEM Scotland provides evidence to suggest improvements are being made 
through educational tools to encourage younger people to become entrepreneurs 
(GEM Scotland 2002), while the Scottish Institute for Enterprise continues efforts to 
stimulate new venture creation by university science students. 
Not everyone agrees that change in Scotland is occurring fast enough. Sales Director 
Euan Robertson of case company 'Spektra' argues Scotland is 'abysmal' in knowing 
what other businesses are doing and suggests that many companies know more about 
what is going on in the US than in Scotland. He views the Scottish culture as a 
barrier, suggesting that "it is very un-Scottish; getting up there and telling others 
what your business idea is". He adds that people with money that have been 
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successful are looked upon with scepticism; as if to say "what did you have to do to 
earn that money". Being demure and keeping information to oneself, he adds, is 
hurting the development of a creative, innovative and adventurous economical 
climate in Scotland. 
Gareth and Scott of case company tYaba' describe the effects of Scottish investors 
being non-adventurous with their money. Scott concedes that since Yaba joined 
Connect, he has seen more venture capital available in Scotland. However, he 
suggests it is the same investors and they remain risk adverse, stating: "it is often the 
same venture capitalists ... companies are still not surviving because, even when they 
achieve milestones the investors often decide to pull the plug too early". 
Gareth and Scott add that investors should be realistic regarding outcomes from an 
initial round of funding- in other words, these funds should provide a few milestones, 
but should enable the company to "go and see what they can do with it". But they 
argue that investors cannot expect everything, and they suggest that initial financing 
is short-sighted in Scotland. Indeed, both Yaba and ExpressOn identified investor 
expectations as a significant limitation to their commercialisation efforts. 
Gareth suggests that many investors want to see a level of stubbornness and 
conviction from founders but argues that this can waste time and resources. He 
describes his experience in commercialising a new technology "like an assault 
course for the Royal Marines ... you have to demonstrate that you have the will to 
carry on". That is not necessarily the problem in Scotland, he adds, rather it is a 
clear identification of those actions that are wasteful and unnecessary and not helping 
the Scottish economy. During the commercialisation process, Gareth states what is 
really important is getting the right people to act on your behalf. He states "no 
matter how many support mechanisms there are, at the end of the day market forces 
and investors' feelings are what dominate". 
5 The Total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) rate for Scotland in 2001 was similar to that for 2000 - placing Scotland in the 
lowest of the three level of the 31 nations taking part in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM Scotland 2001). 
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Despite evidence of improvements in regional technology entrepreneurship, findings 
identify that there is still much more effort needed to link the university environment 
with the commercial one. Although an explicit objective of Connect is to involve 
research-intensive SMEs and larger Scottish-based corporations, economic data 
shows that Scotland's uptake of university innovations by SMEs and corporations 
remain among the lowest of UK regions6, identifying key problems in the industrial 
structure and its ability to leverage regionally emerging technology opportunities. 
11.3.1 Regional Opportunities 
A small population base in Scotland of 5 million people has been suggested as a 
major challenge for competing in a world market and commercialising high 
technology innovations and inventions from its home base. Former Connect Board 
Member Gordon McAndrew suggests that Scotland needs to recognise the 
limitations by being selective about the technologies that are commercialised. He 
suggests that it would be very difficult for Scotland to enter major aerospace 
industries, major chemical processing type industries, which have a lot of 
technology, simply because of the scale of them. 
Scotland's real niche can be in having centres of excellence7 that act as centres of 
innovation provision to third parties, according to Gordon. This could include a 
variety of commercialisation options such as inventing the products and selling 
them on to a distributor or licensing and manufacturing the product. Gordon sees 
the future opportunities lie in being able to be innovators through centres of 
excellence that can be very small or very large and potentially owned by multiple 
owners to achieve maximum impact on the Scottish economy. 
6 As a percentage of GOP, Scotland's business research and development expenditure is 0.53%, compared to 1.27% for the UK 
and an OECD average of 1.54%. Scotland is third-bottom in the list of UK regions in terms of new business start-ups, as 
measured by V AT registrations per head, and has been so, on average, for more than 10 years. Scotland's start-up rate per head 
is around 85% of the UK average (Scottish Executive, 2001). 
7 Scottish Executive announced the creation of three Intermediate Technology Centres (lTCs) in December 2002 that have an 
operational philosophy and mandate similar to those suggested by Gordon in June 2001. 
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One practical restriction in commercialising technologies is the area of management 
skills and human resources. Scotland traditionally has found a lot of its people 
wanted to work out of the country and therefore has been a feeder of skills. Gordon 
McAndrew suggests that Scotland has always had an outward-looking perspective 
because of limitations in prospects and salaries and the size of companies. 
Findings suggest that the pool of potential non-executive directors is small in 
Scotland with the same people seen to be involved in many companies. Gordon 
suggests the need for a larger 'gene pool' of experienced commercial managers as 
one of the greatest challenges for technology sectors in Scotland. Although organic 
growth may eventually accomplish this need, Gordon argues that the challenge is that 
existing technology companies must grow - i.e. Scotland must have some high-
growth technology successes - that allows for successful staff to 'spin-out' of these 
companies and be recycled among new companies. 
Even today, Gordon asserts that there are not many large companies in Scotland and 
thus not a need for many management skills at a top level. The acquisition of 
Scottish companies is a general trend and new companies often do not replace 
acquired companies. Gordon feels that Connect can play an important role in 
maintaining a register of people who might be appropriate as part of a management 
team but that Connect shouldn't be the provider of non-executive directors to new 
companies as a potential conflict of interest with its service provider sponsors. 
11.4 DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
Connect has evolved into a private company necessitating a self-sustaining revenue 
model in managing its network. Higher membership fees, growing expectations of 
deal flow by sponsors and the need to facilitate the entry of high potential member 
companies are drivers of this new management approach. The expectation is that 
tangible benefit delivery to sponsors and companies are more likely to be realised 
through a more mediated approach to reciprocal value exchange. 
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Greater value for money provision with the new model has seen Connect evolve into 
more of a mentor for new company members, a change to its original mandate to 
facilitate network interactions. The objective of this mentoring role is two-fold: 1) to 
identify relevant technology companies that have high potential and are relevant as 
potential clients for Connect's array of public and private sector sponsors, and; 2) to 
introduce and assist new company members, based on their requirements, in finding 
appropriate supportive agents, resources, information and knowledge with a 
customised approach to 'plugging them into the network'. 
The evolving network management role of Connect can be identified with growth 
phases in evolution models of the firm; more formal operational structures, a 
professional board of directors and increasing company performance targets related 
to revenues. Job descriptions and responsibilities have become more focused on 
service provision to attract and retain memberships. 
Overall, quantitative performance targets have emerged that are directly tied to the 
self-sustainability of Connect and its revenue generation. Qualitative targets identify 
the greater role for the Connect website in supporting sponsors and members and 
more active collaboration with regional complementary initiatives and other regional 
support networks. 
Since 2001, Connect's role with universities has become less active in promoting 
entrepreneurship and more focused on simply informing the universities of events 
and activities. Connect is rather more focused on the academics themselves, 
attempting to provide an 'honest broker' role in dealing with their respective 
universities and exposing them to external sources of support available in the 
network. 
Connect's evolution has coincided with a cyclical technology marketplace that has 
affected company membership retention. However, sponsorship retention has 
remained high, suggested by the importance given to technology entrepreneurship for 
Scotland's economic future by public and private institutions and their members. 
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Changes in the regional entrepreneurial culture are most identified with changes to 
academic entrepreneurship at the source of the technologies rather than the 
universities themselves. Successful companies and wealth accumulation have 
provided role models for other academics and researchers that provide a pull factor to 
leave the university and enter the commercial arena. Case study findings suggest 
that academics have a greater awareness of what is required to commercialise their 
innovations and changes to academic life, such as less freedom to pursue research 
interests, are providing a push factor. 
Technology compames from the Connect network identify ongomg 
commercialisation challenges that include a low-risk investment community and 
longer-view of investment, lack of available experienced commercial expertise, lack 
of local market demand factors, constraints from technology transfer offices and the 
lack of a vigorous entrepreneurial culture and churning of successful entrepreneurs 
and companies within Scotland. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
12.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter synthesises results from Chapters Eight through Eleven and applies 
them to the three sets of questions that has guided the research. 
12.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ON REGIONAL 
SUPPORT NETWORKS 
The first set of questions was related to network theory and practice and its 
relevance to a regional enterprise network as an intervention program. How is the 
network created; why and how does this network matter and more specifically - does 
a regional enterprise support network make a difference and to what extent? 
Further, how does this network change over time as suggested by evolutionary 
network theories? 
12.2.1 Network Creation and Formation 
Findings show that the creation of a regional network - Connect Scotland - cannot be 
traced to one single factor, such as a policy decision, common in public programs, to 
'correct' a perceived market problem or market failure but rather is traced to a 
combination of factors. 
Connect Scotland originated as an entrepreneurial event, based on an academic 
entrepreneur's vision and identification of a market opportunity. The market 
opportunity - to transfer a successful US model, Connect San Diego, to Scotland was 
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based on Ian MacDonald's view that similar circumstance were evident in Scotland 
in 1995 that existed a decade earlier in San Diego: the need to diversify a regional 
economy and stimulate high technology entrepreneurship. 
Following a common approach of an 'opportunistic entrepreneur', Ian immediately 
sought support from high-profile public and private supporters to lend credibility to 
the idea. Ian began his search using his most immediate circle of influence, 
Edinburgh University. Bypassing departmental hierarchies, he went to the 
university's principal, Sir Stewart Sutherland, and secured support and a home for 
the program. 
The Principal of Edinburgh University was instrumental in facilitating Connect's 
base in the Management School, partly because Connect San Diego was also based at 
a leading research university, the University of California, San Diego. A more 
important factor was realisation by the Principal of the potential role of Connect in 
championing a science and technology linkage between Scottish universities and the 
high technology sector in Scotland. As will be discussed later in the chapter, this 
championing role and effect has not been fully realised for a number of reasons. 
The spill-over effect of support from Scotland's leading research university lent 
credibility to the Connect concept and was a key factor in drawing in support from 
the other thirteen Scotland's universities within two years. Private sector support 
using one of Scotland's most visible and successful entrepreneurs also secured a 
critical mass of 20 private sponsors, although this was the result of leveraging the 
extensive business network of Martin Ritchie. High-profile public and private 
'legitimisation' of the concept created the momentum to build a Connect program in 
Scotland. 
Despite the entrepreneurial 'push' from Ian MacDonald and a successful model to 
emulate, creating another intervention program in Scotland could not have been 
realised without the market need or 'pull' evident in Scotland in 1995. Indeed, 
Martin Ritchie shifted from his initial negative impression of Connect; 'the last thing 
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Scotland needs is another support program' ~ to a realisation that no other agency in 
Scotland was 'pulling it all together'. Other agencies, such as Chambers of 
Commerce and business forums, were creating networks of professional 
communities. But Martin sensed the value of putting in a link between these 
professional communities, the link being the focus on high technology. 
A market need was supported by comparative research from Scottish Enterprise 
(1995) and other sources that identified poor networking between industry and 
academia and the absence of informal networks, mutual support and encouragement 
for entrepreneurship. Indeed, government documents from this period argue for the 
need to address inadequate regional support conditions in Scotland. 
Using Burt's theory of structural holes (1992), Scotland's technology community in 
the mid-1990s can be conceived as a network where people and institutions were 
unconnected. These 'holes' provided the opportunity for an investment in social 
capital and the Connect San Diego model was identified as an appropriate model to 
link together people and institutions and thus fill some of these structural holes. The 
Connect model would bring together regional supportive agents and technology 
opportunities, unlike more traditional forms of hands-on mentoring support and 
advice focused on individual companies. 
Ian MacDonald had aligned his idea of a Connect Scotland with a policy maker 
audience that was already aware of the relevance of the San Diego model to the 
Scottish context. Strong evidence of need is identified in evaluation literature as a 
common pre-condition of successful intervention programs (Patton 1990) and the 
original Connect San Diego model, with its emphasis on creating infrastructure 
conditions and networking, was particularly compelling for Scottish policy-makers 
and had in fact been identified as an appropriate model in public documents. 
A key formation factor and advantage over newly created support programs was the 
adoption of a network management model from Connect San Diego, many features 
of which Connect retains seven years on. This model was then piloted in the 
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Edinburgh region to 'prove the concept', and a successful pilot generated further 
support to duplicate program delivery across Scotland. 
A summary of key creation and formation factors of the regional network are shown 
below: 
12.2.2 
~ Network champion; providing the idea, entrepreneurial vision and drive; 
~ Compelling regional need for intervention; consensus that there IS a 
'problem' and actual absence of social capital and networking; 
~ Relevant network management model; transferability of Connect San 
Diego model and operational structure; 
~ Activating high profile public and private sector 'legitimisers'; 
~ Targets for stakeholder critical mass, mix and quality of events; 
~ Explicit identification of network stakeholders and benefits; 
~ Dedicated and competent management team; consistent personalities and 
interface for network participants and ability to promote concept 
regionally; and 
~ Regional representation and inclusion of stakeholders; people and 
institutions. 
Connect Constituency-building 
To attract and retain the regional communities supporting technology 
entrepreneurship and to stimulate their interactions, Connect explicitly states benefits 
to all these communities that establish preliminary expectations. Although 
categorised according to common characteristics, e.g. universities, private sponsors, 
member companies, each 'stakeholder' represents a set of expectations and 
motivations that first draw them to the network. 
Payment of annual membership to join the network implies that a decision to become 
a sponsor or member involves a cost-benefit analysis at some level. Theories of 
social capital (Granovetter 1982; Burt 1992) argue that people invest in social 
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opportunities from which they expect to gain or profit. Williamson (1985) suggests 
that transaction cost economics motivate entrepreneurs and enterprises to minimise 
communication, information search and other costs associated with seekin o 
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resources, capabilities and customers. On the other hand, Zajac and Olsen (1993: 
137) argue that transactions involve a 'joint value maximisation principle' whereby 
the focus is on exchange partners and the emphasis on collective value. 
Stakeholders also consider reciprocal value possibilities in meeting with Connect 
directors and attending their first events. Stakeholders bring to the network a history 
of business transaction relationships and associated expectations with regard to 
future business transactions, referred to by Berger et al (1995: 1999) as ' temporal 
embeddedness'. As individual or institutional interests are presented and the 
potential for mutual exchange explored, stakeholders cannot help but consider the 
costs and benefits of exchange. 
Of course, the logic of collective benefits does not preclude those motivated by self-
interest who do not invest resources in mutual gain. The free rider phenomenon may 
occur from a conscious decision not to contribute or the lack of resources to 
exchange (Olson 1965). Indeed, Connect directors identified their concern with 
some participants attending numerous events without committing to a membership. 
Although there is not direct evidence of the free rider phenomenon between 
stakeholder groups, survey feedback identified a low level of social interaction from 
some university commercialisation participants. 
Findings support Williamson's transaction cost argument that Scottish technology 
companies are attempting to minimise search costs when considering the high level 
of network flow-through of company members after one year, taking into account 
start-up failure rates described in Chapter Eight. Heightened market uncertainty for 
new technology-based companies places a premium on the ability of entrepreneurs to 
integrate specialist knowledge and access expertise from a variety of local sources. 
Yet, entrepreneurs and new companies 'searching around' invest little social capital 
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and weak intennediary ties between Connect and these new companies allow them to 
easily disengage from the network when opportunities are realised or are not evident. 
Findings suggest that consideration of mutual exchange transactions and benefits 
extend to all stakeholders within the network, rather than simply new technology 
companies. Findings show that sponsor membership retention within the network 
remains high despite a lack of direct evidence of 'deal flow', with other benefits, 
notably knowledge value identified as important to sponsors. 
But sponsors, it is argued, have developed strong intermediary ties with Connect 
because of a commitment of social capital as more permanent entities within the 
regional community. Sponsors are amongst peers, colleagues and competitors that 
together provide a level of corporate citizenship in support of regional technology 
entrepreneurship. These findings lend support to Zajac and Olsen's 'joint value 
maximisation principle' and the notion of collective value in explaining sponsor 
retention in the network. 
Success of Connect's multi-stakeholder constituency is contingent on maintaining a 
relatively stable private and public sponsorship base. This sponsorship base provides 
a level of 'embeddedness' (Granovetter 1982), that reflects established social capital, 
resources and capabilities available in the network in addition to the role of Connect 
in facilitating exchange and generating an appropriate flow-through of technology 
compames. 
12.2.3 Network Management 
Connect manages what network theorists argue is the fundamental benefit of 
networks - the linkages and contact among people and institutions that provides 
opportunities for exchange of valued resources, including information, knowledge, 
skills, expertise and investment (Starr and MacMillan, 1990). As mentioned earlier, 
Connect's fonnal network governance activities began with identifying the attributes 
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of each stakeholder category (private sector sponsor, university, technology 
company, others) and promotion of explicit benefits that would attract them to the 
network. 
Findings show that knowledge quality, relevance and newness delivered through 
ongoing event topics by Connect attracts and maintains the multi-stakeholder 
constituency. By gathering different communities together, Connect creates an 
"integrated learning environment". But Connect staff at events also playa role in 
stimulating 'connections' among and between stakeholders through introductions, 
Indeed, this role is played also by 'regulars', those long-standing stakeholders that 
welcome new faces to events. 
Findings support a transactional economics argument that Connect's 'intermediary 
role' reduces the overall cost of search for individuals seeking resources and 
capabilities and for institutions and overall stakeholder communities at the regional 
level supporting technology entrepreneurship (Casson 1997). A value for money 
assessment in Chapter Eight identified a low overall cost to managing the network. 
Comparison of these costs with other support agencies, technology transfer offices 
and professional development courses suggests Connect is good value for money in 
return for these mult-stakeholder benefits. 
Further, the identified impartiality and political neutrality of Connect with its 
stakeholders creates a bond of trust that facilitates linkages and exchange between 
institutions and individuals that may not otherwise interact at this level. 
An ongoing program of recurrent events reinforces interaction, knowledge transfer 
and reciprocal value exchange between and among this multi-stakeholder 
constituency. Connect's recurrent events can be thought of as channels for migratory 
knowledge (Badaracco 1991); knowledge that is easily transferable within a region to 
various locations (Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh, Glasgow) and to a similar 
stakeholder audience. 
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Replicating this knowledge transfer mechanism to four locations in Scotland 
provides a representative linkage (Eisenberg et al 1985) for Connect in promoting 
the network but also creates consistency of information flow throughout the region to 
similar categories of stakeholders, i.e. sponsors, universities and technology 
entrepreneurs and companies. 
Each of these regional events, involving a similar stakeholder audience mix, provides 
a level of institutional linkage (Eisenberg et al 1985) where information and 
potential resources and capabilities are exchanged without the involvement of the 
same representative personalities. Stimulating institutional linkages is an essential 
element of Connect's mission, particularly between research institutions and 
industry, that is reflected in event objectives and participant 'mix' targets. Indeed, 
stakeholders confirm collaboration is being stimulated among institutions at events 
through the development of client, service provider and partner contacts. 
Feedback from university spin-out companies identify the importance of personal 
linkages rather than institutional linkages in representing their own potential 
commercial interests at recurrent events and the ability to socialise with people 
external to the university. Indeed, university case study respondents identify the 
importance of external advice, contacts and knowledge obtained from people other 
than institutional technology transfer personnel, also in attendance at events. 
Findings suggest that the ability of academic entrepreneurs to bypass university 
technology transfer offices as a first port-of-call is perceived by some universities to 
undermine their control of commercialisation efforts, and is among the factors seen 
to contribute to a weak linkage between some universities and Connect. 
Developing individual social capital as a new entrepreneur is particularly important 
in the Scottish context. Technology entrepreneurship is highly concentrated 
geographically in the 'Silicon Glen' corridor, a 45-minute drive between Glasgow 
and Edinburgh, and this close proximity breeds familiarity among innovators, 
entrepreneurs and young companies. 
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As well, the small number and proximity of service providers and investors means 
that many of these people know each other through professional contacts. Dense 
social contacts among those 'holding resources' highlights the importance of 'who 
you know' in Scotland. Newly emerging entrepreneurs in the Scottish commercial 
scene, it can be argued, possess little power and legitimacy to engage in exchange 
activities until they can leverage an adequate level of social capital (e.g. Sharman et 
a11991~ Cooper and Folta 2000). 
Managing an appropriate mlX of stakeholders to stimulate multi-stakeholder 
exchange is a primary network management role. Already identified are benefit 
expectations by all stakeholders within the network that creates a level of reciprocal 
value exchange, dependent on a balanced mix of stakeholders at events. For 
sponsors and investors, identifying promising new technologies and business 
proposals is available with the presence of scientists and academic entrepreneurs at 
events from all Scottish universities and most research institutions. Conversely, 
access to relevant expertise and experience for 'intelligent selection' and for 
successful mentoring is available for those forming new companies with the presence 
of public and private sponsors, university technology transfer personnel and 
individual members. 
Strengthening Connect's network intermediation role is a 'unique selling point' 
distinguishing Connect from other networks and most other agencies. Connect takes 
an active role in linking technology companies with investors through its investment 
events that generate significant tangible and intangible benefits (identified by 80% of 
respondent companies). This role provides Connect with high community visibility 
and credibility among sponsors and policy-makers. The Investment Conference 
benefits from a first-mover advantage as a national investment forum devoted 
exclusively to high-potential technology companies without bias to technology 
sector. Indeed, the Connect concept and global network is promoted through the 
Investment Conference with the presence of an international investor audience. 
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The demise of investment in 2002 for technology sectors in general was reflected in 
overall low levels of investment generated at the Investment Conference , 
demonstrating the significant effects of market conditions for entry of new 
technology companies (Learned 1992; Audretsch 1995). However, investment 
survey findings in Chapter Eight identify that under these conditions, Connect 
investment events play a key role when technology sectors experience economic 
down-turns resulting in shifts in commercial interests from one sector to another. 
Connect sponsors and members stress the importance of Connect as a dedicated 
forum for ongoing technology promotion that can ride out volatile market conditions 
and allow prospective new companies to be identified and social relations developed 
that can accelerate entry into the market once sectoral conditions improve. Findings 
also identify the importance of recurrent events in providing initial social contact 
between local investors and those involved with emerging technology opportunities 
prior to the Investment Conference that can also speed up the investment process. 
12.2.4 Network Benefits and Value Flows 
Findings after five years identify that the most important network benefits for all 
stakeholders are social networking opportunities among institutions and people, 
delivering high-quality business-orientated knowledge and preparing and exposing 
promising technology companies to investors. 
Findings identify that this social value is evolving from social 'business-inclusion' 
indicators of 'meeting interesting people' and 'feeling part of a network' to more 
'business-generating' social indicators of 'meeting potential backers of one's idea' 
and 'receiving valuable advice'. These findings show the Connect network is 
improving the level of social capital developed regionally and the quality of social 
exchange between entrepreneurs, investors and others and the provision and 
receiving of valuable financial information. 
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A key finding identifies that gammg investment within the network is strongly 
correlated with development of positive social relations. This suggests that 
established social ties provide the atmosphere of credibility and trust that are 
considered prerequisites for knowledge transfer and development of business 
relationships that include securing investment. Introductions by third parties, 
identified in case studies, is an important factor in establishing contacts with 
investors at recurrent events and being introduced to new business prospects. 
The above findings may explain the relationship between the low levels of university 
financial and social value identified in the 1999 survey and the dramatic increase in 
social value by universities in 2001. Perhaps technology transfer personnel are 
consciously more actively engaged in social interactions leading to investment in 
2001. However, another factor contributing to low university perceptions of 
financial value may involve the attitudes of investors to universities. Stakeholders 
identify that certain Scottish universities are difficult to deal with, e.g. over-valuing 
their technologies or seeking unrealistic partnership terms, suggesting that investors 
may be more attracted to technology opportunities outside uni versity control. 
Financial and knowledge value flows have significantly increased in the second 
survey to support network evolution literature suggesting that social interaction and 
acquaintances tend to precede exchanges and collaborations involving resources 
(Larson and Starr 1993). Knowledge value for sponsors and universities are 
particularly highly rated and findings identify that sponsors explicitly utilise the 
network events as an informal educational forum for staff and to remain up-to-date 
on technology knowledge. 
The emerging role of 'individual' stakeholders, many identified as angel investors, is 
increasing the level of financial value flows within the network. Personal 
investments are occurring alongside public seed schemes and professional venture 
capitalists, facilitated by early knowledge of and contact with emerging technology 
opportunities identified through network participation (Mason and Hamson 1996). 
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Findings do not support literature suggestions that would imply the Connect network 
evolving towards more strategic interactions (Butler and Hanson 1991) primarily 
because networking activities are not between existing companies but rather among 
supportive agents and emerging technology opportunities. This ongoing 'boundary' 
of network evolution relates to the intermediary role of Connect in facilitating social, 
knowledge and financial value focused on new companies. Findings identify 
successful companies exiting the network, having identified Connect's diminishino 
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relevance to them in a more mature stage of growth. 
12.2.5 Evolving Network Management Model and Effects 
Findings identify various 'change drivers' that resulted in the decision by Connect 
directors to pursue a private sector network management model after six years as a 
university-based, primarily publicly supported program. The desire for greater 
autonomy over its activities, bureaucratic constraints of university administration, 
perceptions of Connect as an Edinburgh University program and risk of reliance on 
public funds were among the main reasons to leave the university. 
A key driver for change was the perception by CEO Ian MacDonald and the Connect 
board that a regional support constituency was now developed, and greater value 
needed to be leveraged to realise the network's potential. This could only be 
achieved as a private company rather than a university-based program. 
The network structure has increased in formalisation and standardisation, with 
activities by staff more performance-oriented and communication efficiencies 
provided by the Connect website. These changes reflect evolutionary stages of the 
firm (e.g. Mount et a11993; Bhide 1999) whereby structures become more stable and 
formal over time. Connect is answerable to a professional board of directors that has 
created a tighter assessment of company activities on a cost-benefit basis. 
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An important question regarding the consolidation of the network is whether or not 
this is a self-imposed strategic limitation based on the discrepancy between 
Connect's original intentions and their realisation. Maintaining a high level of 
relevance across technology sectors has been challenged by Connect's limited 
resources. Feedback from 2001 stakeholders clearly identifies growing concerns 
among certain sectors regarding a focus on certain sectors, e.g. software that 
comprises the highest proportion of members. Positioning Connect between 
universities and industry has not been fully realised in part because of university 
perceptions of Connect as a threat and the absence of industry linkages available for 
collaborati on. 
Increasing value provision in return for higher membership fees has resulted in 
changes to how Connect deals with sponsors and companies. Connect's role as 
network manager has evolved from one of 'facilitation and encouragement of 
interactions' among regional support agents to a more active role in 'mentoring and 
intermediating', in particular between sponsors and new technology companies. 
To provide greater value to its company members, Connect has adopted a 'lifecycle 
format' for its events in an attempt to align knowledge topics to new companies as 
they evolve through their formation processes. Indeed, Connect has worked with the 
Proof-of-Concept Fund to co-ordinate joint activities on behalf of emerging 
technology project arising out of the Scottish Universities. The advantage for 
sponsors with this format is to identify where companies are in their formation 
processes according to events they attend. 
For sponsors, Connect is attempting to identify and attract high-potential technology 
companies with the logic that sponsors seeking these high potential clients will be 
attracted as well. However, one concern with this approach is predicting the 
potential of a new company to survive and grow as no one factor offers a predictive 
technique (Storey 1993). 
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Without a reasonably accurate basis for being selective l , it could also be argued that 
it is difficult to differentiate between needs for support and assistance on behalf of 
the new company (Home et ai. 1992: 65). The volatility and uncertainty of 
technology sectors, suggested by membership retention data, shows that Connect 
cannot confirm to sponsors from one year to the next the level or qualify of 
technology company membership. However, an advantage of Connect in this regard 
is that the network accommodates companies from a cross-section of technology 
sectors, although this provision is challenged as discussed earlier. 
Findings suggest that increasing selectivity to high potential technology opportunities 
and preoccupation in ensuring sponsor client flow could compromise network 
stakeholder mix and reciprocal value exchange. Using Granovetter's theory of 
network ties (1982), people with 'weak ties' are less likely to be connected to others, 
or are embedded in a structural hole. Although a disadvantage of weak ties is lack of 
access to 'network flow's of information and exchange opportunities, an advantage 
of weak ties suggested by Granovetter and Burt is that information obtained from 
weak ties is more likely to be unique and less likely to be redundant. This diversity 
of information from weak ties is used to explain the introduction of innovations into 
organisations. 
The implications of structural holes and weak ties for Connect relate to Connect's 
membership structure and the level of inflow-outflow of new sponsors and members. 
In its previous business model to June 2001, Connect allowed for an 'other' category 
of network participants to derive value from the network without a corresponding 
membership commitment. Inflow and outflow of participants to events was 
relatively unrestricted, the former influenced by expected benefits and the latter by 
the degree to which these benefits were realised. 
1 Venture capitalists and other investor members of the network undertake this role but remains a high-risk activity even for 
these 'selection specialists'. 
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Loss of scope of infonnation and knowledge available within the network could 
affect the level of intangible benefits flowing between and among a broad array of 
stakeholders. Loss of intangible benefits may result in two possibilities. The first is 
a loss of what Granovetter suggests is unique and non-redundant infonnation from 
weak ties between people. The significance of intangible benefits is shown in the 
variety of social, knowledge and financial value flow benefits deriving from 
stakeholder exchange. 
The second possibility is that other support programs emerge to fill this gap. Indeed, 
arguments could be made for a 'new' infonnal network based on the notion of 
Granovetter's weak ties and distinctions between fonnal and emergent networks by 
Aldrich (1976) who suggests that naturally occurring networks capture more of the 
important aspects of communication rather than imposed or managed networks. 
Another possibility, identified by Dr. Keith Winton of Edinburgh Technology Fund, 
is that other support initiatives will accommodate this need, much like Connect has 
done to support university spin-outs. 
These findings counter Butler and Hanson's suggestion that networks are highly 
dynamic, the results of interchanging actors and knowledge. The Connect network, 
in fact, is becoming more stable with pre-selection of matched sponsors and 
members and fonnal knowledge intennediation. The potential loss of unscheduled 
attendees and non-members dropping into the network, a more selective network 
entry process and greater efforts to retain fee-paying sponsors runs the risk of loosing 
dynamism in flows of infonnation, knowledge, resources and capabilities associated 
with non-redundant network actors (Aldrich 1976; Granovetter 1982). 
Further evolution of Connect's network management role could result in a 'threshold 
crossing' whereby stakeholders and indeed private sponsors identify Connect as a 
consulting company incubating new technology companies. This would compromise 
its 'anns-Iength relationship between academia and industry in Scotland and would 
constitute a 'conflict of interest' with its private and public sector sponsors. 
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Findings suggest that a key challenge for Connect remains to ensure the right mix of 
people to fulfil these objectives and ensure a balance of altruistic outcomes on behalf 
of entrepreneurs and new companies on the one hand and business-generating 
outcomes on the other hand. The potential loss of intangible benefits within the 
regional network is highlighted again as a key concern with Connect's new network 
management model. 
At the same time, Connect's core competencies and critical success factors remain 
despite the change in its network management model. It takes a medium to longer-
term view of support for technology entrepreneurship and provides a progressive 
forum to support commercialisation efforts of new technology companies that leads 
the best of these companies to present at the Investment Conference. Similar to 
evolutionary stages of the firm, Connect demonstrates an ability to adjust and adapt 
to changing external circumstances on the one hand and needs of its network 
constituency on the other. Connect continues to remain remarkably clear of political 
overtones in what can be argued is a politicised support environment in Scotland. 
12.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ON NETWORK EFFECTS 
FOR TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
The second set of research questions relates to technology companies. What specific 
commercialisation difficulties are faced by new technology companies in a particular 
region that justifies the need for support and how can benefits be identified and 
attributed to involvement within the network? Are benefits of a network-based 
support initiative similar to network benefits identified in other studies, e.g. social 
capital effects, knowledge transfer, business credibility, access to resources not held 
internally, etc? 
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12.3.1 Commercialisation Challenges for New Technology 
Companies 
Case studies identify specific issues facing Scottish technology compames and 
insights into the justification of Connect and other complementary support initiatives. 
Accepting the differences caused by diversity in core technology, the lessons to be 
derived from the formation of the six case companies are remarkably similar: 
o All compames started from the position of possessing a technology that was 
innovative but was in the relatively early stage of a fully developing marketable 
product. 
o Initially there was a crucial role for typically one or two individuals, who having 
perceived the opportunity, remained the 'driving force' behind the project until, at 
least, other professional staff were brought in who could share in and contribute 
to the realisation of this vision. The strong socio-psychological characteristics of 
company founders were identified as critically important in countering 
constraints, investment gaps and institutional issues when dealing with 
universities over ownership. 
o Teambuilding was initiated early by some founders based on their perceived 
commercial and technical limitations, while for others, it was externally initiated 
as a pre-condition for investment. Either way, teambuilding was identified as a 
vital part of each company's growth success. 
o Technology development and commercial development were identified as 
simultaneous activities; one cannot be ignored while focusing on the other. 
Particularly for biotechnology companies (Yaba and ExpressOn), pressures to 
verify technologies, identify markets, secure customers and secure funding from 
a select group of potential investors made managing formation and growth 
processes more challenging to founders. 
o By spending time developing a suitable core technology, companies were able to 
customise their products for individual niche market places relatively quickly. 
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o Early stage or 'seed' funding was relatively easy to obtain, although the 
negotiation and filing procedures caused delays. Later difficulties arose when 
technological 'milestones' were not being achieved. 
o Particularly when private investment was involved, companies needed to pay 
careful attention to developing a clear and realistic relationship between 
themselves and their financiers, concerning what is obtainable in the short-term, 
necessary in the long-term and what they were giving up. 
o When challenged by investment delays or technological difficulties, these 
successful companies demonstrated an ability to objectively reflect upon their 
long-term strategic direction. 
o In the early stages, each company was sensitive to the importance of developing 
informal social relationships as a way of establishing credibility in the business 
community and seeking new resources; this prompted them to join Connect. 
Case companies reflected high variation in approaches to seeking investment and 
the use of investment mechanisms, although public schemes are a common feature 
of early stage funds. Access to seed funding was not a constraint for all six case 
companies, with SMART awards and ETF the predominant seed schemes used by 
university spin-outs. 
The funding gaps were significant between seed funding and second and subsequent 
rounds of funding for case companies. These funding gaps delayed for most of the 
case companies development of their core technologies into new applications and 
products, threatening at least in the minds of founders their perceived 'first-mover' 
market advantage. In some cases, further technology development was a necessary 
condition in attracting further investment but for other companies, it involved 
foreseeing the need to protect an existing market position. 
Findings reveal that opportunities to exploit the innovation were constrained 
primarily by commercialisation difficulties. For companies without commercial 
skills, access to investment came with stringent conditions to reduce risk, resulting in 
tight target milestones and loss of ownership and some control, as was the case for 
370 
ExpressOn in securing venture capital investment. Another commonly cited investor 
requirement was to bring in experienced managers. Stakeholders also identify the 
constraint in Scotland of finding experienced managers and securing this level of 
expertise. Indeed, gaining access to experienced commercial specialists was 
expressed by companies as a key reason for joining Connect. 
Findings identify vanous problems in the development of clear and mutually 
supportive relationships with venture capital investors, supporting Bullock's (1984) 
observation that a constraint in spin-out formation is the ability of the financial and 
business services community to understand and support young advanced technology 
enterprises. Particularly for biotechnology companies, Yaba and ExpressOn, a 
longer perceived risk-return horizon required these companies to develop their 
technology further to appease investor concerns. Indeed, a suggested limitation in 
regional investors interested or knowledgeable in biotechnology required these 
companies to undergo greater scrutiny and due diligence than the other case 
compames. 
The introduction of private investment was identified by companies as a point where 
founders reflected on what they aspired to achieve from the company in light of 
investor expectations. This required developing a clear and realistic relationship 
between each of the parties, concerning what is obtainable in the short-tenn and 
necessary in the long-term. Indeed, for founders of Yaba and AXEON, such a period 
of reflection was identified as crucial for the clear and successful strategic 
development of the company. 
Challenges in securing IPR from universities tainted somewhat the initial support 
received and compromised the building or maintenance of strong relationships 
between the spin-out company and university. Most significant is the apparent dual 
role performed by technology transfer offices, on the one hand providing advice and 
support in contract research but shifting to an adversarial position on the other hand 
once discussions of ownership commence. Findings suggest inherent problems in 
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the processes and procedures between some Scottish uni versi ties and their 
commercially active scientists to transfer ownership and form new companies. 
Despite the assertion by various university technology transfer respondents that "we 
take the primary role in forming spin-out companies ", findings show that spin-out 
companies 'engineer' their own formation processes, beginning with disengagement 
activities to leave the university. Five of the six case companies examined were 
either spin-out companies from Scottish universities or drew heavily from them for 
their core technology and staff. 
The six case companies represent active attempts to engineer their own 'support 
constituencies' that reflects their vision of the market opportunity. This vision 
ranged from a high-risk strategy undertaken by a 'stereotypical market intermediary' 
motivated by profit (AXEON) to a lower-risk strategy by academic entrepreneurs 
who gradually transferred their efforts into forming a company, after careful cost-
benefit analysis and an external verification of the value of the idea (Intrallect). 
However, a pre-conceived search for resources and capabilities suggested in the 
literature does not explain how case spin-out companies have used the Connect 
network. Each of the four university spin-outs were not created with the original 
objective of bringing together diverse resources and capabilities but were explicitly 
mobilising a wider range of resources as the viability of a new company became 
more apparent. 
The use of 'sustaining strategies' points to a trade-off dilemma, where founders have 
determined to exit the university, but cannot until it is economically viable. These 
strategies were undertaken to 'survive' between seed funding and subsequent 
investment and involved maintaining academic positions, pursuing contract research 
and identifying and securing other public funding schemes. These sustaining 
strategies are suggested in Bullock's 'development path of risk' model (1984) of 
MIT spin-off companies that use consultancy work for cash flow, to acquire 
specialised knowledge on clients and acquire business experience in early stages. In 
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the case ofAXEON, these strategies were not available; therefore the company 
diversified its investment sources in early fonnation to include personal savings, debt 
capital and various private investment partners. 
12.3.2 Network Benefits to Companies 
Case study findings lend support to Sedaitis's view (1997: 142) that "the founding 
network reproduces itself in the organisation it creates, facilitating a different type of 
organisational structure and strategy". Connect facilitates, in the Scottish context, 
technology-based companies that may not necessarily be identified as 'alternative to 
markets and vertically integrated companies' but nevertheless display an adoptive 
strategy of resource acquisition facilitated by the Connect network. 
Taking case company Expresson Bio-systems Ltd as an example, the following 
commercial activities and primary contributors reflect a network process: 
o Initial company formation advice - Connect 
o Initial legal structure - University of Edinburgh 
o Initial Plant and Equipment - University of Edinburgh 
o SEED Funding - UK Enterprise Challenge (Edinburgh Technology Fund) 
o First paid salary - RSE Fellowship 
o Business knowledge - Connect 
o Second round investors identified - Connect 
o Business premises - Roslin Biocentre 
o 2nd and 3rd round financing - Venture Capital Consortium 
Connect has provided for ExpressOn, in essence, an active intermediary role 
whereby people were identified and recommended that would be appropriate to 
company formation requirements as this requirements emerged. The host 
universities did not consistently play this role for ExpresssOn or for the other three 
spin-out companies. Rather, it was identified that university efforts became more 
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focused on securing a return on the technology as it became apparent that a company 
was attempting to spin-out. 
For spin-out compames and particularly academics with little commercial 
experience, an additional challenge to technological development is the challenge of 
forming a new company at the same time. Connect was identified as providing the 
greatest value in commercialisation support by providing case companies with the 
opportunity to search, filter, assimilate and integrate knowledge from a variety of 
sources through network participation. In effect, 'transaction costs' of reputation 
building and the learning curve are subsidised through their access to Connect's 
established and credible network and ongoing network activities. Connect reduces 
the 'search' by technology companies for technological and business knowledge and 
access to skilled labor for companies undergoing growth as identified by Spektra. 
Collaboration between new compames and other stakeholders in the Connect 
network is motivated by the differential distribution of resources and capabilities 
available among stakeholders in the network and those being sought by these new 
companies. The uncertainty of company viability in the early formation processes is 
related to the notion of 'commercialisation as an interactive learning process' 
(Asheim and Cooke 1999). This process is associated with a complex and 
continually changing array of both technological opportunities (and threats) and 
market opportunities (and threats), linked to patterns of new product development, 
commercialisation and adoption/diffusion. 
These findings suggest that Connect supports 'accelerated learning' amongst its 
technology companies. The ability of emerging technology companies to 
continuously adapt their core technology to evolving markets or investor 
requirements, to explore and build partnerships with other technology developers, to 
make informed assessments of available sources of investment, to find specific 
sources of advice on the managerial development of their companies and in general 
to fill critical gaps in their own knowledge have been enhanced by Connect (Oakey 
el a11990; North and Smallbone 1996; Malecki 1997). 
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Case companies demonstrate the need for "mobilisation of a team of different 
competencies" and Connect is identified with facilitating the building of these 
competencies. Connect facilitates network benefits indirectly to new technology 
innovations and companies that are 'immersed' among supportive resources, with the 
network, similar to a locality, a nexus of 'relational assets' (Storper 1997). In 
identifying and attracting a variety of supporti ve agents to the network whom possess 
relevant knowledge and resources, Connect makes the network attractive for new 
entrepreneurs and their technologies while stimulating the exchange of information, 
knowledge and other resources among other stakeholders. 
Case companies also identify Connect's value in facilitating transitions towards 
more formal business management processes, encouraging knowledge provision, 
sharing experiences and identifying those with necessary resources and capabilities, 
rather than simply providing services in response to demand, characteristic of other 
complementary initiatives. 
Findings identify that for technology companies, Connect provides the most value 
during early formation activities and that this value lessens over time. Case company 
Spektra, for example, identifies the 'gradual diminishing value' of Connect as 
company growth and evolving challenges necessitate new skills and resources that 
pushed staff to seek other forums and networks. All three Directors of Spektra 
identify steep personal knowledge curves whereby information and knowledge on 
forming companies was appropriate and readily absorbed as active participants of 
Connect events. Company credibility and reputation building was also critical in the 
early stages of their involvement with Connect, but these directors concede that they 
have moved on to become members of other support communities. 
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12.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ON CONNECT AMONG 
OTHER INITIATIVES AND REGIONAL FACTORS 
The third set of research questions related to Connect as one support initiative 
among others within the region. What is Connect's support role among other 
identified complementary support initiatives and how do they operate as elements of 
a National System of Innovation (NIS), or more specifically, a regional system of 
innovation? What external factors are evident that directly affect intervention and 
support in the region? 
Consideration of the Connect network as part of a regional or national innovation 
system (NIS) suggests that Connect is interconnected with other institutions that 
jointly determine the generation and diffusion of technologies. Although measuring 
the efficiency of a Scottish NIS is difficult and beyond the scope of this research, 
Charles et al (2000) identify challenges of evaluating a regional innovation and 
technology transfer strategy that include overlap among service suppliers. They 
further suggest that an evolutionary view of evaluation emphasises relative rather 
than absolute impact changes or how far have improvements been made from a 
starting position rather than how much impact was achieved. 
In consideration of pre-conditions for technology entrepreneurship prior to Connect 
Scotland, what has been identified in this research are pieces of evidence showing 
Connect's role in facilitating interactions between elements of the Scottish 
innovation system. Already discussed has been facilitation of social, knowledge and 
financial value among institutional and personal linkages within the Connect 
network. 
Since Connect began in 1996, Scotland has developed an investment community that 
includes a more pro-active angel network, more venture capital funds and a greater 
willingness from both formal and informal investors to provide investment advice to 
new entrepreneurs and start-up companies. This effect has occurred in response to 
investment and new company successes, particularly high profile new Scottish 
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companIes such as Spektra and AXEON. Connect's Investment Conference has 
emerged as the pre-eminent technology investment conference and is complemented 
by the recurrent events facilitating many of the social and knowledge values leading 
to investment opportunities. 
Findings identify growing competition for young technology companies by increased 
investment available and at the same time, a growing knowledgeable and assertive 
community of new technology companies, scientists and entrepreneurs that 
understand the value of their technologies. Indeed, the research found evidence that 
the quality of individual technology start-ups has improved in Scotland through the 
efforts of Connect and complementary initiatives. The parallel development of 
seedcom funding through the Proof-of-Concept Fund, ETF and RSE Fellowship 
Scheme has influenced this trend. Survey and case results demonstrate that 
knowledge of technologies, their commercialisation and the profile raising of various 
technology sectors have been advanced through Connect. 
Multiple points of entry and confusion over features and benefits of various support 
initiatives available in Scotland point to the absence of synergy among 
complementary initiatives in support provision that continues to challenge Connect 
and Scottish policy-makers in general. This is not a surprise, given that each of these 
initiatives has emerged within a particular socio-political context. Creating a co-
ordinated and integrated set of support initiatives would involve the restructuring and 
integration of these services at one level and acceptance by various institutions and 
agencies of an integrated support system. Yet, stakeholders argue for the need to 
clarify the boundaries between these initiatives and Connect and the attributes of 
each complementary initiative within an integrated support environment. 
Findings already point out that Connect provides a transition environment for 
companies over time as they develop commercialisation competencies. This role 
contrasts with the provision of complementary support initiative benefits that are 
finite, time-sensitive and measurable, for example, the RSE award, SMART award, 
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ETF fund or POC fund, and that enable development of specific commercialisation 
competencies. 
The co-ordination of complementary initiatives is gradually occurring, most recently 
between Connect and the Proof-of-Concept Fund and Connect and the Scottish 
Institute for Enterprise (SIE). The identification of Connect as a neutral forum and a 
hub for other complementary initiatives suggests that Connect could be promoted as 
a first port-of-call for young Scottish technology companies, conceding that 
university spin-outs would first contact their technology transfer offices. 
However, an important factor in any attempt to co-ordinate a Scottish NIS is the 
strong 'paternal' role played by Scottish Enterprise in regional economic 
development and its tendency to create new programs and initiatives without direct 
collaboration with non-agency bodies. The role of SE with other support initiatives 
and the transparency of its provision of value require further examination and 
discussion. 
Connect stakeholders argue that Connect must ride out the challenges in the 
technology sector, not stagnate and continue to leverage Connect's brand and their 
new tag line "fast-track for technology business". Returning to the original 
justification for Connect Scotland, findings substantiate that Connect has made a 
difference in reversing earlier claims that for Scotland, compared to successful 
technology regions, knowledgeable investors and access to commercialisation 
specialists were underdeveloped (Scottish Enterprise 1996). 
Connect's future collaboration possibilities are linking with global complementary 
initiatives in the US, UK, Sweden, Norway and Denmark that all share a common 
ethos but have no formal links between each other. Connect Scotland in the future 
may take a leadership role in integrating the Connect network so that resources can 
be leveraged to support geographically-diverse technology companies. The branded 
Connect Scotland website is expected to also provide a portal for investment 
interaction among the Connects in the UK - Scotland, Warwick and Yorkshire. 
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12.4.1 Regional Challenges 
Findings suggest that the Connect network and various complementary initiatives 
comprise some but not all of the key elements identified by Van de Yen (1993) as 
comprising an 'entrepreneurial infrastructure'. As Van de Yen cautions, "while 
entrepreneurial infrastructures are critically necessary, such mechanisms-once in 
place-are not sufficient conditions for fostering the development of 
commercialisation of technological innovations". 
One challenge remains a weak entrepreneurial culture in Scottish society and among 
its research institutions in particular. Findings suggest that stimulating academic 
entrepreneurship, despite the focus by Connect and SIB on science students, is 
constrained by a UK research tradition based on published research as the 
cornerstone for advancement and career reputation. Despite the high volume and 
quality of science and technology knowledge creation in Scotland, the impact of 
Connect and other complementary support initiatives on technology entrepreneurship 
cannot possibly overcome shortcomings in entrepreneurial climate both within 
knowledge creation institutions and in the regional community in general (Malecki 
1997). 
Indeed, overcoming regional shortcomings requires inroads into a number of areas 
identified in this research. One factor constraining development of a supportive 
regional infrastructure for technology entrepreneurship is the weak university-
industry linkages in Scotland that has shown little evidence of improvement during 
the course of this research. Economic data shows that Scotland's uptake of 
university innovations by SMEs and corporations are among the lowest of UK 
regions. Indeed, this thesis argues that policy-makers in Scotland have not provided 
an integrated long-term vision to develop the 'demand pull' capacity and capability 
of Scotland's technology-based industrial structure with the 'technology push' 
knowledge creation side already identified as strong. 
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The question of whether the requisite 'critical mass' of particular knowledge and 
expertise can ever evolve in the Scottish region, regardless of the activities of 
Connect remains a critical issue. Connect San Diego Co-Founder, Mary Walshok, 
cautions that university-industry partnerships require a policy environment 
supportive of economic growth and consistent with the regional infrastructure. 
Findings identify sources of problems on the university side of the university-
industry linkage. Connect spin-out companies that have dealt with technology 
transfer offices argue that the primary focus of universities is to maximise returns 
that can compromise the wider implications and economic potential of the 
technology. Most universities have created revenue targets and other output 
milestones that establish certain commercialisation practices that may not require or 
motivate active engagement with external commercialisation initiatives. 
Findings identify concerns by senior directors of complementary support initiatives 
and other institutions regarding the potential conflict of interest of universities 
supporting their staff in exploiting university innovations. Indeed, the changing role 
from 'supportive to adversarial' is identified by case companies, resulting in 
negative experiences of securing ownership and perceptions of a general lack of 
support for forming new companies by some universities. 
Survey findings show that universities demonstrate a low level of reciprocal value 
exchange that may be explained by their search for measurable benefits like 
investment and an acknowledgement by other stakeholders that universities are not 
seeking reciprocal value. Indeed, university perceptions of financial value remain 
the lowest among stakeholders. It is argued that further effort is required by Connect 
and its university sponsors to link the university environment with the commercial 
one in supporting new technology companies in Scotland. 
Survey findings provide evidence that poor collaboration between new technology 
companies attempting to commercialise university technologies limits the creation of 
joint projects between industry and research universities. The experience of 
380 
AXEON, for example, identifies a 'dismissive' attitude by a number of Scottish 
universities when approached by an experienced entrepreneur like Hamish Grant 
seeking to licence university technologies. 
Findings identify a gradual building process for technology entrepreneurship in 
Scotland that are linked to cultural and social change. Despite challenges previously 
suggested confronting Scotland's technology development, findings suggest that 
enthusiasm and support for technology entrepreneurship throughout Scotland has 
grown over the time frame of this research (1999-2002). At the same time, 2002 saw 
the demise of investment for high technology, and Connect's role of maintaining an 




CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
13.1 THESIS SUMMARY 
This thesis evaluated a regional support network for technology entrepreneurship in 
the United Kingdom, Connect Scotland, and examined the creation, fonnation, 
growth and impact of the network and its evolution from a public to a private sector 
model. This chapter concludes the thesis by first providing a summary then 
discussing its theoretical, practical and policy-related contributions, limitations and 
future research. 
The research adopted the proposition that research on a regional support network for 
technology entrepreneurship requires a broad, multi-theoretical approach to the 
literature. Most appropriate were socio-economic accounts of technology creation 
and development, commercialisation and exploitation drivers, the role of the 
entrepreneur, collective action and risk-sharing, theories of enterprise creation and 
evolutionary phases of growth. 
Broadly, the research identifies high priority gIven to technology-based 
entrepreneurship by public and private sectors - e.g. corporations, universities, 
regions and nations - to improve competitiveness, counter decreasing public funding 
support and diversify the regional industrial base, among other factors. High 
expectations are tempered by a myriad of suggested challenges to commercialising 
technologies and creating new companies to exploit these technologies. These 
challenges include volatile market conditions, high levels of risk, e.g. short product 
Iifecycles and long time horizons for investment returns, high development costs and 
complexities in creating a marketable product. 
This thesis takes the proposition that the spread of technological innovations and 
commercial success is a function of the support that innovators and entrepreneurs can 
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draw from other actors, the interactions among these support actors as well as 
industry conditions. The research draws upon national systems of innovation, 
agglomeration economies, studies of high-technology clusters and regional 
'innovati ve milieu and entrepreneurial networks. 
The research problem emerged in identifying market intervention for technology 
entrepreneurship, and in particular, regional intervention, where conditions and 
elements characterising successful technology regions like Silicon Valley are absent 
and must therefore be created and developed. Connect Scotland was chosen as a 
relevant case study to establish evidence of the value and impact of a regional 
support network in supporting technology-based entrepreneurship, with Scotland an 
appropriate region of study based on a strong science and technology base but 
identified low levels of enterprise creation and entrepreneurship. This thesis also 
focused on the relevance of network theory to regional networks and the role of the 
network among other regional support initiatives comprising a regional system of 
support. 
The research defined Connect Scotland as a formal, managed network co-ordinating 
activities that draw institutional and individual actors to socially engage and develop 
relations that contribute to their own development, that of new technology companies 
and a sense of mutual obligation to regional development. Following a pilot study of 
Connect, the network was conceived as a socio-commercial constituency 
encompassing the interrelation and interactions between key players supporting the 
transformation of technological innovations into new enterprises. The pilot study 
also revealed attribution difficulties in measuring quantitative targets and identified 
the need to examine the network, its stakeholders and technology companies as units 
of analysis evolving over time within a regional support constituency. 
This thesis adopted a participant-observation and action research design, identified as 
most appropriate when studying change and one is evaluating an intervention 
technique. Also developed was a constituency-building model to identify, describe 
and evaluate multiple components of the network, the interrelations and interactions 
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between them and changes to these components and processes over time. 
This research approach examined factors contributing to the creation and 
development of the network since 1997 and network benefits and value as judged by 
stakeholders during this period. Six case studies revealed commercialisation 
processes and difficulties that informed the need for intervention, how network value 
was realised and drawn into processes of enterprise formation and growth and the 
effects of complementary support initiatives and regional external factors. 
This thesis examined almost half of the Connect Scotland stakeholder constituency to 
establish conceptual, practical and methodological insights into the creation, 
formation, evolution, operations and benefits of a support network and its role 
amongst other initiatives supporting regional technology entrepreneurship. 
13.2 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
In line with stated research aims and questions this thesis investigated a regional 
support network for technology entrepreneurship. In doing so, this work has made 
several contributions to the evaluation of regional support networks, network theory 
and insights into the creation, formation and evolution of support networks, practical 
insights into network management and policy-related insights into the role of 
networks in regional support and amongst complementary support initiatives. 
13.2.1 Conceptual Contributions 
This thesis has demonstrated the relevance of Molina's 'sociotechnical 
constituencies' model as it applies to describing and evaluating a regional 
constituency not so much involved in technical development as much as commercial 
development (Molina 1990). The fundamental conceptual underpinning of Molina's 
model is the dynamic ensembles of social constituents shaping each other in the 
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course of creating, producing and diffusing specific technologies. Moving further 
towards the market application of technological development, the model has been 
adapted in this thesis to refocus Molina's model to the social constituents creating, 
producing and supporting the 'transformation' of technologies into new enterprises. 
Molina's model is complementary as well to the firm-level analysis adopted in this 
thesis by suggesting that conditions of commercial, technical and social uncertainty 
shape the motivations, interactions and choices of network engagement and 
translation of benefits from the network to the firm. 
The constituency-building model addresses what Tichey et al (1979:507) describe as 
the key methodological challenge to evaluating business networks: " ... a coherent 
framework and accompanying methods of analysis that are capable of capturing 
both prescribed and emergent processes". The constituency-building model and 
action research design demonstrates explanatory power and relevance in capturing 
the cumulative actions and diffusion effects of formal network management by 
Connect and the benefits for all its stakeholders that represent a regional depository 
of knowledge, capabilities and resources evolving over time. 
This research found that a strong perception among stakeholders of Connect as a 
neutral social environment and the absence of a highly competitive external business 
environment diminishes competitive interaction, resulting in a more collaborative 
support constituency than perhaps expected in more dynamic and competitive 
economic regions. Molina emphasises that the balance between collaborative and 
competitive interaction will fundamentally affect the evolution and dynamism of the 
resulting sociotechnical constituency. The evolution of Connect to a private 
company may affect this neutral perception as the model takes on more 
characteristics of a consultancy. 
As suggested above, Connect represents a conscious attempt to construct and manage 
a socio-commercial constituency rather than socio-technical one that first stimulates 
mobilisation of various support actors through a portfolio of knowledge, then 
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facilities the exchange of diverse capabilities through an evolving level of social 
engineering of constituents. Call on' s Techno-economic network (TEN) concept 
within actor network theory emphasises successful mobilisation of scientific , 
technical and market actors and the distinctive 'translational' or intermediary 
interactions between them that contribute to supporting a socio-technical objective 
(Callon 1992). Callon emphasises that when translational interactions become more 
predictable and aligned, the network is more stability or 'irreversible' and 
quantification and black-boxing' of the network is possible. 
Research finds that the Connect network is becoming more stable with pre-selection 
of matched sponsors and members and formal knowledge intermediation, countering 
the view that networks are highly dynamic, the results of interchanging actors and 
knowledge (Butler and Hanson 1991). The potential loss of unscheduled attendees 
and non-members dropping into the network, a more selective network entry process 
and greater efforts to retain fee-paying sponsors suggests the loss of dynamism in 
flows of information, knowledge, resources and capabilities associated with non-
redundant network actors (Aldrich 1976; Granovetter 1982). 
Connect's evolving network management model demonstrates, as Callon suggests, a 
more predictable and stable network whose structure and function is more 
predictable. Indeed, the emulation of Connect Scotland's model more recently to 
Warwick and Yorkshire in England suggests the 'black-boxing' of a network for 
duplication, with necessary customisation to suit regional conditions. 
The thesis has identified that Connect's evolution as a support constituency is similar 
to evolutionary phases identified in theories of the firm (e.g Mount et al 1993; Bhide 
2000). Creation and formation phases are dependent on establishing early program 
credibility and a critical mass of prominent network participants particularly in a 
region where intervention and support are commonplace. This phase relies on the 
entrepreneurial drive and vision sharing to instigate formation processes and begin to 
build the programmatic constituency. Similarly, network growth has increased 
formalisation of procedures, performance standards for staff and accountability to a 
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professional board within the management structure. This thesis identifies that 
Connect as an increasingly stable constituency is selective in its value provision 
necessitated by a self-sustaining revenue model of network membership. 
This research confirms the importance of 'flows of value' -social, knowledge and 
financial - that attract and maintain a constituency membership over time. These 
value flows have been shown to change over time, contingent on the mix of 
stakeholders engaged, accumulated institutional and individual embeddedness in the 
network, intensity of network management intermediation and economic conditions 
for the various technology sectors active in the network. The research identified that 
social value remains stable as the strongest perception by stakeholders of the network 
but that knowledge and financial value have proportionally increased over a two-year 
period. 
This thesis confirmed that social capital is a precursor to knowledge and financial 
value exchange as hypothesised by Larson and Starr (1993), but demonstrates 
variation according to stakeholder value expectations and benefit experiences. A key 
finding identifies that gaining investment within the network is strongly correlated 
with development of positive social relations. 
This thesis has identified that networks generate value flows among social 
constituents that can be managed by intermediation efforts over time. Evolutionary 
theories of networks suggest that actors mobilise their own capabilities and engage 
within various networks - informal and formal, social and business, technical and 
strategic, etc. - based on their resource and capability requirements that change over 
time. In the Connect network, value flows reflect a combination of self-managed 
exchange expectations motivating actors' levels of social engagement and 
intermediated value provision in the form of technical and commercial knowledge 
provided by Connect that ensures social proximity of these actors. 
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13.2.2 Practical Contributions 
The work forwards a definition of the regional support network Connect Scotland 
based on its structure and activities: "an integrated and co-ordinated set of fonnal 
network activities that stimulate fee-paying institutional and individual actors to 
socially engage and develop ongoing economic and non-economic relations that 
contribute to their own development, that of new companies and a sense of mutual 
obligation to regional development". 
The research shows that successful creation and fonnation of the Connect regional 
network cannot be attributed to anyone factor, but rather reflects a 'progression of 
key formation milestones'. Clearly, an explicit and commonly shared consensus 
among key regional stakeholders - policy-makers, knowledge creators, the business 
community - that intervention for technology entrepreneurship is needed provides the 
'demand pull' for such a program. 
A key research finding shows that stimulating and sustaining a regional support 
network requires benefit provision to all stakeholders of the network, rather than 
simply new technology companies, in order to attract, retain and facilitate exchange 
between supportive agents that display low levels of interaction without intervention. 
This thesis establishes the notion of 'managed reciprocal value exchange' that 
identifies the importance of Connect as a network manager that first of all explicitly 
creates expectations of network benefits to all stakeholders. Reciprocal value 
exchange motivates knowledge transfer between and among network participants 
with this exchange stimulated by network events and mediated by Connect's 
directors and credible network actors providing introductions on behalf of new 
network entrants. 
The research identifies an advantage of fonnal regional network management over 
infonnal and unmanaged networks in the provision of consistent, up-to-date and 
relevant knowledge delivered across the region to a diverse audience supporting 
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technology entrepreneurship. This thesis also found that network value is dependent 
on the right mix of stakeholders at events that facilitates the level and opportunity of 
benefit from knowledge exchange. 
Findings show that meaningful and valued exchange between stakeholders is 
influenced by their perception of the network as a neutral, apolitical and effective 
social environment. This level of trust within the network has a significant impact on 
the level of value flow and sustainability of the network over time. Private sector 
sponsors and universities, for example, compete among each other in a small 
geographic region like Scotland, yet are all equal members within the network, 
where Connect aggregates a certain level of tolerance and equality among all 
stakeholders. 
The thesis identifies stakeholder differences in networking behaviour. New 
technology-relevant knowledge acquisition motivates attendance to recurrent events 
by sponsors in particular, with the use of the network as a knowledge forum 
countering low levels of client 'deal-flow'. Commercial and business-related 
knowledge is being most sought by technology companies and to a lesser extent 
universities, with both these stakeholder groups actively seeking investors and the 
formation of business relationships. Findings identify low levels of reciprocal value 
exchange between universities and sponsors and universities and technology 
companies, suggested by a preoccupation by universities in seeking investors. 
Findings suggest that technology compames use the network as 'discriminating 
consumers' and self-manage social, knowledge and financial provision within the 
network by engineering their own 'support constituencies' that reflects their vision of 
the market opportunity. Motivations for networking among case companies were 
primarily commercial rather than technical, beginning with the building up of social 
capital while formulating their commercial strategies. Lessons of case companies 
found that the lack of commercial resources and capabilities within the region rather 
than technical issues constrained formation processes of new technology companies. 
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The research found that Connect provided an ongoing supportive forum as emerging 
technology companies acquired and developed complementary resources and 
capabilities, unlike finite and measured 'commercialisation enablers' such as seed and 
proof-of-concept funds. The network remains available as a supportive environment 
as technology companies transform into different entities and benefit from the social 
capital they have already developed to leverage value from the network. 
Research suggests that network management activities will leverage greater tangible 
benefits from the network in response to increasing the reliance on membership fees. 
Findings show transition from a facilitator role to mentor and intermediary of 
reciprocal benefits to increase value between sponsors and technology company 
members, suggesting an increase in network selectivity for high-potential clients and 
appropriate sponsors. 
Findings suggest that potential loss of dynamic and unpredictable flows of 
information and knowledge, new actors, linkages and collaborations resulting from 
more exclusive network access may decrease the intangible benefits and non-
redundant 'weak tie' benefits generated regionally and to existing network sponsors 
and members specifically. Less inclusion and more stabilisation could also hinder 
the formation of new networks resulting from Connect's need to ensure its 
prominence as Scotland's technology network. 
This thesis identifies increasing collaboration and strategic alliances with other 
agencies by Connect, confirming a further evolutionary phase of maturing firms. 
One explanation is that Connect, in providing a more focused network model, has 
identified boundaries and thus its limitations on where it provides value. Another 
explanation is the increasing accountability of Connect to a professional board of 
Directors to identify all activities on a cost-benefit basis. 
This thesis suggests that evolving preoccupation with network value provision to 
sponsors and members could result in a 'threshold crossing' whereby stakeholders 
and indeed private sponsors identify Connect as a consulting company incubating 
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new technology companies. This would compromise its 'arms-length relationship 
between academia and industry in Scotland and would constitute a 'conflict of 
interest' with its private and public sector sponsors. 
This thesis suggests that one role of the network intermediary is to monitor its 
relevance and value to its stakeholders and adapt its events and activities on the basis 
of this information. Indeed, Connect adopted various recommendations I from the 
'real-time' evaluation by a third party that has provided a level of objectivity and 
critical analysis. Network directors are ideally placed to gather feedback on an 
ongoing basis and effect change as required, and this thesis has generated data 
collection and analysis, survey, interview and case study tools that Connect can use 
to develop its own ongoing monitoring and evaluation process. 
Findings suggests that the systematic monitoring and evaluation of Connect should 
also be undertaken in co-ordination with other technology-focused support 
initiatives, not only to benefit these programs and stakeholders but to create an 
openly accepted culture of evaluation. 
Research found that overail, Connect is a successful regional support network that 
demonstrates flexibility and adaptation to change according to internal and external 
pressures without compromising its original mission and objectives, despite shifts in 
its value provision. It remains neutral and apolitical by bringing together 
independent resources, public and private, with the criteria being that the capabilities, 
resources and know-how are compatible with supporting new technology companies. 
13.2.3 Policy Contributions 
This thesis contributes several policy-related insights. First is the issue of 
commercialisation difficulties facing new Scottish technology companies. This 
thesis found that the 'business-forming conditions', rather than technology 
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development setbacks, were key constraints taking the fonn of administrati\'e 
inefficiencies, unclear technology transfer policies and uncertain partner 
expectations. 
Regional competencies to respond to technology development opportunities in a 
collaborative and timely fashion are shown to be weak. Despite the success to date 
of case companies, most identified pathway constraints arise from misinterpreting the 
technology and its market potential, disagreements over technology ownership, low 
levels of encouragement to start a company and funding gaps partly linked to risk-
adverse investors and a lack of bio-technology savvy investors. This thesis suggests 
greater transparency by universities in how they support academics in enterprise 
creation. Indeed, this research suggests the need for explicit acknowledgement of the 
role of Scottish universities in economic development. 
Research identifies multiple points of entry and confusion over features and benefits 
of various support initiatives available in Scotland. Removing commercialisation 
barriers requires a co-ordinated effort among complementary support initiatives that 
in fact should be delivered and operated effectively as part of a wider support 
network offering the fullest range of clearly demarcated services. This appears to be 
the role and responsibility of the national agency Scottish Enterprise. 
Policy-makers should critically exmrune the 'institutional inertia' of Scottish 
Enterprise and the alignment of a myriad of public institutional objectives with the 
actual needs for support of technology-based entrepreneurship regionally. What is 
apparent from findings is the inconsistency of services that leave gaps filled by other 
agencies and an identified lack of trust among complementary support initiatives due 
in part to competition, real and perceived, from Scottish Enterprise. Indeed, there is 
an argument that each complementary support initiative be able to translate its 
objectives into activities and finally outcomes, benefits or value that can then be 
examined, co-ordinated and promoted at the regional level. 
1 Regular monitoring of event participation data, stakeholder feedback on network value, specific recommendations for event 
improvement and role among complementary initiatives, etc. 
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While it is conceded that social engineering of dispersed support initiatives and 
research institutions is a challenging task, much of the infrastructure to more 
effectively support technology entrepreneurship is already available. This thesis 
suggests the untapped potential to leverage existing 'commercialisation enabler' 
initiatives such as Proof-of-Concept, RSE Fellowships, SMART and ETF that are 
highly valued by new companies, and place them within a wider supportive delivery 
system. 
Findings suggest the need for support mechanisms to be in the least co-ordinated 
through a common 'neutral reception portal'. Although Connect offers suitable 
characteristics for this intermediary role, this thesis argues that Connect is now 'part 
of the jigsaw'. Connect's recent transition from facilitator to relationship broker 
between sponsors and members suggests that this interface role may not be in 
Connect's interests as a private company, not to mention its stated frustration of 
operating within an 'integrated' Scottish support environment. 
The thesis identified a direct regional economic development role played by the 
Connect network in attracting investment to the region and directly assisting 
promising new technology companies in becoming investor-ready. This thesis 
suggests that Connect is positively influencing conditions to support technology 
entrepreneurship by offering a consistent mandate of support, regional knowledge 
transfer, integrated intervention provision with complementary support initiatives 
and the stimulation of commercial agents to assist new technology companies. 
This research suggests limitations to the regional economic role of Connect as a 
support network with the absence of any identifiable level of industrial actors, 
compromising the promise of developing a strong national system of innovation. 
With Scotland's industrial base becoming increasingly service-oriented, the explicit 
expectations by policy-makes of creating indigenous technology companies across 
various technology sectors appears contrary to what is actually transpiring. 
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13.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
This thesis suggests that although Connect has been successful in increasing 
'connectivity' between relevant constituencies responsible for supporting new 
technology companies, it is difficult to assess the degree to which this connectivity 
would have evolved in the absence of Connect. 
One limitation of the research is that other similar comparable networks have not 
been identified. This thesis concedes that network participants are interacting among 
other support initiatives in the region and outside as well so a further question is the 
way these network participants co-evolve with and among other networks. One issue 
is defining boundaries when network members are also members of other networks 
and associations also generating social capital, knowledge and more tangible 
benefits. For analytical purposes, incorporating the network as part of a Scottish NSI 
would allow examination of the wider context of the environment in which new 
technology companies compete and are enabled or constrained. 
Another limitation to the research is that the constituency-building framework and 
research design has focused on a particular perspective using a holistic point of view. 
The network in fact is constituted among the wider community but methodological 
considerations limited the evaluation of the wider regional support environment as 
noted earlier. However, this research approach has allowed for the partitioning of a 
complex area of study and established some limits to the research. 
This thesis has also not tracked the outcomes of repeated network interactions and 
the development of relationships and collaboration has not been tracked. Indeed, the 
dynamic nature of relationships is assumed and value constructs of social, knowledge 
and financial value are accumulated from a historical perspective and provide an 
output measure of positive outcomes attributed to individuals, companies, 
stakeholder categories and the network overall. 
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Although consideration was given to follow the same stakeholder sample over two 
time periods to establish perceptions of value change, the issue of panel selection 
bias was considered. Those remaining in the network would be expected to state 
improvements. Further, due to the expected outflow of stakeholders from the 
network, loss of original samples would impact the rate of return and limit the 
success of a follow-up survey. 
13.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Various research opportunities are related to improving the evaluation methodology. 
Future research could be undertaken using factor analysis to examine the possible 
underlying structure in the social, knowledge and financial sets of interrelated 
variables of network value. Factor analysis would be used to confirm whether the 
indicators developed for each dimension (social, knowledge, financial) are related to 
each other. However, this level of analysis was not included in this research because 
the focus was on describing how stakeholder groups are distributed in relation to 
perceived value of Connect. 
Another relevant area of future research is examining Scotland as a national system 
of innovations (NSI) through the constituency-building model, in which the NSI is 
placed at the centre of the model and elements are drawn out as a combination of 
regional, institutional, organisational and individual actors, activities, processes and 
mechanisms. This would assist in determining a regional pattern of support and a 
regional pattern of successful new technology companies, settlement and localising 
of companies, success or failures and growth outputs and evidence of clustering and 
industrial pattern changes. 
An evolutionary approach to examining Scotland as a NSI, similar to this evaluation, 
would account for the expectations, perceived benefits and value flows between and 
among complementary initiatives and effects on technology companies. However, 
further evolutionary theory elements would be activated in studying growing 
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enterprises such as path-dependency, management systems, technology and market 
diversification etc. 
Another research area of promise is to consider Birley's (1985) assertion that choice 
of networks is key in understanding the nature of companies. It is postulated that 
following up on Connect 'graduate' companies such as Spektra and AXEON could 
identify a 'next level' of company challenges, gaps and available opportunities for 
support. 
The potential of adopting the evaluation methodology to other regions is already 
being explored. However, it is conceded that evaluating in another context requires a 
similar initial examination of network elements and processes prior to evaluation. 
Much interest has been expressed regarding the ongoing adaptation, improvement 
and use of a real-time, action research-oriented framework that provides both 
component and holistic evaluation possibilities and insights. Connect San Diego has 
expressed interest in adopting the evaluation methodology for the Global Connect 
Alliance. The Proof-of-Concept Fund is also interested in its application for 
evaluating developing technologies and their exploitation processes over time. 
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APPENDIX A: NETWORK VALUE SURVEY 
connect 
Participant Survey 
(Fax return 0131 651 1778) 
[This survey is part of research to monitor the evolution and impact of the CONNECT 
programme of activities. Your feedback will provide valuable information on the 
programme. Names of individuals and companies will NOT be associated with any 
information and comments provided in this survey] 
(For reference only) 
Participant Name _____________________ _ 
Organisation _______________________ _ 
Occupation _______________________ _ 
1. What is your affiliation to CONNECT? (Please circle) 
Sponsor: Private/UniversitylPublic Company Member Individual Member 
Non-Member Other: (Please state) _______ _ 
2. How many CONNECT events have you attended? (please circle) 
Meet the Entrepreneur 1 2 3-5 6-9 10 or more 
Enterprise Workshop 1 2 3-5 6-9 10 or more 
Technology Briefing 1 2 3-5 6-9 10 or more 
Springboard event 1 2 3-5 6-9 10 or more 
Recruitment event 1 2 3-5 6-9 10 or more 
Investment Conference 1 2 3-5 6-9 10 or more 
3. How do you rate the overall quality of CONNECT events you have attended? (please 
circle) 
Poor Moderate None Good Very Good Excellent 
42~ 
4. We wish to establish the benefit of your participation in CONNECT events for vou 
or your organisation. Using the following scale below, please answer the follO\\i~g 
questions according to the rating scale below. ~ 
1 (not at all) ~ (to some extent) J (most definitely) 
~ (not so far) ~ (not so far, but I expect to in the future) 
~ (this question is not relevant to me) 
SOCIAL VALUE 1 to 6 
1 .I met interesting people who share my interests and concerns 
2. I feel part of a network of people for advice and contact 
3. I have established contacts with potential clients 
~--
4. I have established contacts with potential suppliers of services 
---- ."---
5. I have established contacts with potential partners 
6. I met people looking to provide me with valuable advice 
7. I met people who will back and invest in my idea or product 
KNOWLEDGE VALUE 1 to 6 
8. I have learnt relevant information for my business 
9. I have introduced my technology/product to a highly relevant audience 
10 I have learnt about new technologies/developments important to my business 
11 I have learnt about how to protect my intellectual capital (e.g., IPR, licensing) 
12 I have learnt new management and business skills 
13 I have learnt about training and support opportunities 
FINANCIAL VALUE 1 to 6 
14. I have made good contacts with entrepreneurs 
15. I have made good contacts with investors; venture capitalists and angel investo 
16. I have given valuable financial information to a new business 
-----
17. I have obtained valuable financial information 
18. I have learnt about the financial value I . 
19. I have invested in a new technology or product 
-- --- ~--






5. Please provide comments regarding the value of CONNECT to you and your 
organisation/company and any other comments that you feel are relevant or important~ 








Survey sampling is based on identifying two different stakeholder group at two 
different times but who possess similar network participation experience and are 
likely to be the most informative about the value flows generated by the Conne t 
network. 
"Expanded Rings" Approach to Identifying Most Active Stakeholders 
TIDRD RING OF ONSTITUENTS 
Participants 0 3-5 event 
ec rent 
participants to events 
(ten or more 
attendances) 
Table B.2 below identifies the relative similarity of network activity Ie el b t we n 
the two samples. Most relevant is the higher levels of attendance (10 or m re ev nt 
among the majority of the sample in 1999 and 2001 (46% and 57% re pectI el and 
attendance to 6-9 events (33% and 35% respectively). 
Table B.2: Network Participation Levels of Survey Respondents 
Surv~y Attendance to Events Count Percent 
1999 3-5 events 13 20.9% 
6-9 events 22 32.8% 
10 or more events 31 46.3% 
TOTAL 67 100.0% 
/ , 
" ';,:(::,:, ' /' 
" .-
2001 3-5 events 4 8.2% 
6-9 events 17 34.7% 
10 or more events 28 57.1% 
TOTAL 49 100.0% 
Table B.l identifies a similar stakeholder proportion of stakeholder representation 
between the two samples. The small sample size of the individual/other category has 
been identified in the findings. The size of the university sample is related to the low 
total number of universities (14). 
Table B.1: Survey Response Rate by Stakeholder Category 
; <:C~t~gpry Xe~t # of SurVeys % of Total 
'~.~:;.' . :':::' .;: .'. 
Sponsors 1999 14 20 
2001 10 21 
.... , ," 
, >', 
U ni versities 1999 8 12 
2001 6 13 
Companies 1999 45 65 
2001 24 51 
: 
IndividuaVOther 1999 2 3 
2001 7 15 
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APPENDIX C: 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (1999-2002) 
Date(s): Interviewee Interview Obejctive(s) 
Oct, 1999, May Ian MacDonald, CEO, Connect Creation, origins of Connect, 
2001, June 2002, Scotland network evolution, spin-out, 
ongoing complementary initiatives 
Oct, 1999 Martin Ritchie, Former Chairman, Creation, origins of Connect 
Connect Scotland 
Nov, 1999 J anine Renton, Connect Value of network to sponsors, 
Private Sponsor recommendations 
Feb 2000 Jandy Stevenson, Connect Private Value of network to sponsors, 
Sponsor recommendations 
Feb 2000, April Susan Morrison, Connect North Network evolution, spin-out, 
2001, June 2002 Director complementary initiatives 
Feb 2000, May Andrew McNair, Connect West Creation, origins of Connect, 
2001, June 2002 Director network evolution, spin-out, 
com~lementary initiatives 
Oct, 1999, May Gillian Mayman, Connect Creation, origins of Connect, 
2001, June 2002 Director network evolution, spin-out, 
complementary initiatives 
August 2000, Feb Mary Walshok, Connect San Creation, origins of Connect, 
2003 Diego evolution of Connect 
June 2001 Gordon McAndrew, Sponsor and Network evolution, Complementary 
former Connect board member ini tiati ves 
Feb 2000 Bill Cook, Connect Public sector Value of network, 
Sponsor recommendations 
November 1999, Bob Smailes, Director ERI University technology transfer 
June 2001 
Sept 2001 Cathy Garner, Glasgow University technology transfer 
Research&Enterprise 
Feb,2000 Pamela Symes, Scottish Complementary initiatives 
Enterprise 
May 2002 Keith Winton, ETF Creation, origins of Connect, 
network evolution, Complementary 
lni tiati ves 
June 2002 John Withers, Roslin Institute Complementary Ini tiati ves 
Sept 2001, May Eleanor Taylor, POC fund Complementary Initiatives 
2002 
June 2001 Carl Togeri (SIE) Complementary_ Initiatives 
Sept, 2002 Professor James Fleck, Director, Creation, origins of Connect 




SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FORMAT 
The primary objective of the interview is to ascertain facts and details from the 
individual that contribute to a more thorough understanding of Connect. The 
interview methodology is intended to triangulate facts and perceptions from key 
players and stakeholders regarding Connect's inception, objecti ves, and deli verables 
with survey and case findings. 
STRUCTURED QUESTIONS: 
1. What was your first contact or experience with CONNECT? 
2. What was you initial impression about CONNECT? (as a concept, as a viable 
program) 
3. How has your impressiQn of CONNECT changed; from the initial impression 
through to your impression today? 
4. What do you feel are key factors that have allowed CONNECT to become 
established and accepted in Scotland? 
5. Who do you feel are the key people making CONNECT work and why are they 
important? 
6. What are your thoughts regarding the primary intention or mandate of 
CONNECT and what problems are being addressed by CONNECT? 
7. Is CONNECT achieving those intentions just mentioned by you? 
8. What are the features of CONNECT that make the program unique or distinct 
from other support programs in Scotland? 
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APPENDIX E: 
SURVEY STAKEHOLDERS INTERVIEWED (52) 
- - 00 survey respon ents III 
CA~OOR¥ ''''~ik~Z'~~¥ - ' OOMPANY CONTACT ," 'I"~ -
1999- n-36 (54% f d 1991) 
.jC ~ 
Sponsor Scottish Enterprise Pamela Symes 
Sponsor KPMG Jandy Stevenson 
Sponsor Grampian Enterprise Tony Althous 
Sponsor (Grampian) Helen Watts 
Sponsor Melville Craig Group Niahm Donellan 
Sponsor WL Ventures Kathy Greenwood 
Sponsor Ernst and Young Janine Renton 
Sponsor Ayrshire New Venture Christine Fox 
Centre 
Sponsor Dumbartonshire Enterprise Scott Skinner 
Ritchie Malloch 
Sponsor Murgitroyd and Company James Brown 
Sponsor Bird Semple Chris Nicol 
Craig Stirling 
Sponsor Forth Valley Enterprise Bill Cook 
University University of Glasgow Moe Thuzar 
University University of Edinburgh Ewan Chimside 
University Napier University Andrew Sijan 
University University of Stirling Barbara Blaney 
University University of Aberdeen Helen MacDonald 
University Glasgow Caledonian Frank Bell 
Company Starttech Partners Gordon Eadie 
Company Rowett Shane Maloney 
Company AMEC Peter Varnplew 
Company Cognetic Creations Paul Wilson 
Company Zenocean Ian Stuart 
Company Auvation Bill Melvin 
Company Yaba Scott Johnston 
Company Spectra Craig Campbell 
Company (Spectra) Janice Hunter 
Company Spektra Systems Gordon Stuart 
Company Safedip Ian Parsons 
Company Edinburgh Bioparks Ian leslIe 
Company Kelvin Nanotechnology Simon Hicks 
Company Bioadvemtures Shane Booth 
Company Axeon Ltd Harnish Grant 
Company AURIS Ltd Liz Rattray 
Company Voxar Andrew Bissell 
Individual Whitelaw Wells John Ritchie 
2001 : n= 16 (33% f 00 survey respon d . 2001) ents In 
'·"';;~im;~:j:Mi@i\;1~(jID:.&¥ ~,:~ ji,.· ...• COMPA~ CONTACT . ',. . .{" ., , . , .... ' ." .L .... w i"x", . "". 
Sponsor Ernst and Young Janine Renton 
Sponsor Ayrshire New Venture Christine Fox 
Centre 
Sponsor Dumbartonshire Scott Skinner 
Enterprise 
Sponsor , Murgitroyd and James Brown 
Company 
Sponsor Royal Bank of Scotland Donald Rankin 
Sponsor Bird Semple Chris Nicol 
University U ni versity of Paisley Caroline MacDonald 
University Glasgow Caledonian Frank Bell 
Glasgow 
Sponsor Forth Valley Enterprise Bill Cook 
University Queen Margaret College Kenneth Purves 
Company Kelvin Nanotechnology Simon Hick 
Company AURIS Ltd Liz Rattray 
Company Bioadverntures Shane Booth 
Company Axeon Ltd Hamish Grant 
Company Voxar Andrew Bi ell 
Rob MacKean 




CONNECT 'INVESTMENT CONFERENCE' SURVEY RESULTS 
# 
2 
(35/88; response rate of 40%) 
Year Did you directly or indirectly gain investment through 
your participation in the Connect Investment Conference? 
1998 "No investment; I don't think we were ready for external 
investment at that time, and did not pursue any of the leads 
generated" . 
1998 "Yes; we indirectly raised £850,00 which was split 50:50 debt 
and grant which was 85% of amount asked for at conference" 









"We indirectly gained investment from the conference and gained 
other intangible benefits. We did not raise money as a direct 
result of conference. 
"Probably. We were not fund raising at the time of the 
Investment Conference, but we knew that we would by shortly (9 
months later). Our CEO presented at the conference and we 
showed a demo of our products in a syndicate room that was 
attended by a number of potential investors. Out of these I would 
probably cite the subsequent investment by the [certain fund] as 
being assisted by the investment conference". 
Yes. One of the critical elements of the investment conference 
for us was to start the ball rolling and to build on momentum from 
there. The VC community does tend to act locally and it was 
critical for us to keep [VC firm] and Scottish Enterprise on side. 
The other two VC funds at the investment conference who 
invested in us really came on the back of the original two 
investments and their follow-through 
No. "I do believe that the forum is a useful concept for young 
Scottish companies". 
"To an extend we did benefit directly, and certainly indirectly. 
However, we presented at several other investment conferences 
and to private individuals ... and our funding was probably as a 
result of more than one specific presentation". 
"At the time of the conference, initial investment was well 
underway; however our main 2nd round investor was present and 
expressed interest in being involved, which he did a year later". 
"Indirectly. We got £100,000 from a [certain] fund [based on one 
person talking after their presentation] saying that he was 
interested in putting in this sum, negotiations followed quickly 
after; [investment] people were in the audience 
"We derived great benefits from the Connect conference, most 
indirectly, as we subsequently secured investment, but not via any 
of the Connect companies. However, the process was an 
Is there a level of 
investment (% of 
amount sought or £ 
amount) that you can 
directly attribute to YOllr 
participation in the 
Conference? 
No 
"We did not gain any as a 
result of involvement with 
the Conference". 
"Yes; over approximately 
£365,000 of funds raised 
between 1999 and 2000 
could be attributed to the 
conference participation". 
"The [fund] investment 
accounted for 
approximately 10% of the 
investment amount we 
were seeking at that time". 
1.5 million 
No 
"Perhaps one-quarter of 
our early funding arose 
from Connect". 
"50% of original amount 
sought". 
"Investment of £ 1.5 
million later from people 
in the audience". 









"No. We enjoyed and learned from the experience of presenting i 
at the conference. The value of the networking opportunities and 
the lifting of our profile are incalculable". 
"No. Our business concept was a start-up business, perhaps not 
ideally suited to the conference audience. The only benefit apart 
from the exposure to potential investors was it did focus our 
attention more on the planning of the business". 
"No. We are currently in the process of fund-raising. None of the 
VCs we are currently in discussions with came directly or 
indirectly via the Connect Conference. However, it was a very 
good conference to help raise our profile". 
"No. We have received in excess of £1 million of funding since 
the Connect conference, but none of it was as a direct result. The 
indirect amount is more difficult as the public relations (PR) 
cannot be quantified. 
Yes. I have no criticism of the conference and believe that I 
failed to raise the £1 million due to core investor jitters and by 
being over valued (pre-sales)". 
"No direct investment came out of the presentation. It was a little 
too early to be asking for £1 million as the company was still 
quite embryonic. We did learn the sort of things needed to move 
the company forward though and today we are much more 
substantial. 
"No, we did not achieve anything from participating at the event 
apart from a brief flurry of PR. We have not raised any funds 
"Yes. I pitched for £ 1 
million based on a 
company valuation of £4 
million and only raised 
£100,000 and couldn't find 
a lead investor". 
directly or indirectly". ~ ____ +-~ __ ~ ____ ~________ L-________________________________ -+ ___________________ ~_ 
2000 "We have not as yet gained any investment into our company 
despite considerable effort by both ourselves and our corporate 





the conference and it provided a platform for follow-up that we 
have done rigorously. We could have achieved the same lack of 
success without the cost and time required to participate in the 
conference though. We are still actively talking to 3 potential 
investors where the lead organisation was not at the conference. 
"Presentation at the Conference was a key element in raising 
finance (and profile) of the company. Though the deal is yet to be 
closed, the conference was instrumental in making connections 
with 2 syndicate members. [Our company] was late III 
participating in the conference; hence the instrumental role played 
by the event is even more appreciated". 
"Indirectly gained benefits by helping close and gaining more 
control over a deal that we already had in place". 
We did not raise any investment from the conference. Our belief 
was that it was not the right type of forum for a company such as 
us, which has been established for 10 years, but has remained 
No 
"If concluded (imminent) 
then 100% of financing 
sought will be raised". 
"Connect didn't help 
contribute to the amount, 
but it helped in many other 
small ways, including 
understanding the 
investment raising process 
and allowing [our 
company] to understand 
that it was III a strong 
l~osition for negotiation". 
small and is now looking for a small amount of mezzanine I 
L ___ L ____ .-L~fu~n~d~i.!!.ng.~.~T~h~e~at~tr~a~c~ti~o~n~o~f~C~o~nn~e~c~t~w~a~s~th~e~l~im~it~e::::d......:t:.:.:im.::..::..e......:w..:...:e=__.;..:h=ad=___.L _____________________ J 
.+32 
23 2001 
to put into the fund raising to gain access to a group of investores 
No, I am afraid we did not have any investment leads after the 
conference. 
24 2001 Unfortunately we have nor received investment through Connect 
or elsewhere. 
25 2001 We received no interest or investment as a result of the 
conference. 
26 2001 Answer to both questions sadly for us was no - hence its demise. 
27 2001 We did get benefits in terms of exposure to the VC community 
and assistance in refining our sales pitch. But we didn't get 
investment from the conference. 
28 2001 No, we had closed a funding round the week before and were 
primarily using the investment conference to generate profile for 
the company. However, we previously presented at Springboard 
which directly resulted in us receiving two funding offers, so the 
system definitely works. 
--
29 2001 We have not received any investment so far, but can let you know 
whether any contacts made at the investment conference are 
attributable. 
2001 -. 30 While the conference helped to raise the profile of the company 
I within the financial community, it didn't help with our fund-
raising efforts. 
31 2001 Our company derived great benefit from the Connect process, 
mostly indirectly, as we subsequently secured investment. The 
process was an invaluable pre-cursor to the first-round funding 
we finally secured. 
32 2001 We haven't yet closed any additional funds. 
33 2001 We had initiated discussions with [VC firm] but had not met them I cannot attribute a specific 
at the time of the 1999 event. The event itself was the first time amount exclusively to the 
we got together and we did receive funding Connect event but we 
raised 2.5 million from 
two VC firms. 
34 2001 The presentation at the investment conference was instrumental in We have attracted 80% of 
us attracting equity investment - no question. As well, the the equity investment 
process of applying as a candidate presenting company is of solicited and hope to plug 
benefit. It enables a critical assessment of the application so the gap by grant assistance. 
enabling the company to get its case together. This I have found 
to be of immense value 
35 2001 We did not directly or indirectly obtain investment through the 
investment conference. Investment came much later when our 
company merged with [another company] to become [a third 
company]. Overall Connect has been a very useful organisation 






CASE STUDY PRE-INTERVIEW LEITER 
Mr. Scott Johnstone 
Marketing Director 
Yaba Ltd 
Dear Mr. Johnstone, 
I very much appreciate your willingness to participate as a case study company in 
evluating. As a first step, I would like to request any readily available information 
you can provide so that we can gain more familiarity with your company, including: 
1. How the company came into being. 
2 ... History and evolution of company 
• Milestones and challenges in technology and company development 
3. Organisational structure 





5. Effects of support progra.ms in addition to Connect 
I would like to interview you at your earliest possible convenience and will travel to 
meet you at your preferred location. You may wish to give some thought to other 
people I can talk with that can provide further information on the above areas. I 
suspect that much of the information will come from yourself, particularly in 
reference to your ongoing relationship with the Connect program and its effects on 
you company. 






SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FORMAT FOR POST SPIN-
OUT ASSESSEMENT TO CONNECT DIRECTORS (MAY 2002) 
1. You've been a spin-out company now for almost one year. 
• What do you feel are the key milestones for Connect over this last year? 
• What have been the key challenges? 
• What has been the key changes to Connect's business model since June 2001 and 
why? 
2. Could you discuss the membership package for new companies? 
• Why, what are your targets and how many companies are signed up to 
date? 
3. You have identified 5 key 'network effectiveness' aims. How will this effectiveness be 
established or measured? 
• Are the objectives of recurrent events still the same? 
• The relationship with universities: what processes are involved in 
developing Connect as an effective outreach mechanism for spin-out 
and collaborative project development? How is Connect working with 
the universities? 
• What are the strategies to ensure return on investment for sponsors? 
What are the expectations of public sponsors? 
• How does connectonthenet.com fit in? 
4. What changes in Scotland are affecting Connect as a private-sector driven enterprise 
support network? 
5. What are the issues of 4managing' a formal regional enterprise support network; i.e. 
having three regions, what are the differences between the regions and the effect on 
program delivery and support? 
6. What lessons would you suggest are applicable for other enterprise support networks in 
general (applicability to other regional programs)? 
7. How would you describe the STRENof network ties between those seeking resources 
and those providing resources in the network, i.e. sponsors (public vs private) and 
member companies? 
8. How would you describe Connect's SWOT strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats at present? 
9. What are the key reasons for tech entrepreneurs corning to Connect-has this changed in 
the last 5 years? 
10. Is a flow-through of tech companies occurring, i.e. moving on from Connect, and what 
other networks pick up where Connect leaves off, i.e entrepreneurial exchange? 
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APPENDIX I: 
COMPLEMENTARY SUPPORT MECHANISMS: 
Public SEED Funding Schemes 
Type of Scheme: Public 
Name: PROOF OF CONCEPT FUND 
Region: Scotland 
Years in existence: 4 years (since 1999) 
Contact information: 
Web-site: www.scottish-entergrise.comlQroofofconceQtfundl 
Contact person: Eleanor Taylor 
Tel: 0141 2282246 
Stated objectives: To allow academic innovative thinking at a pre-development, conceptual stage to 
be developed for the marketplace and used as a basis for growing new companies. 
Expected outcomes: No private funding is required but the output of the research i expected to 
attract significant private investment and lead to commercial (not further research) activity. 
Eligibility criteria: Available to universities, research institutes and National Health Service (NH ) 
Trusts in Scotland. Candidates will be assessed using the following criteria: 
• Economic impact on Scotland 
• Existing IPR 
• Competitive advantage through innovation 
• Commercial exploitation 
• Collaboration with other emerging technologies and clusters 
• Project cost and duration 
• Other funding 
Funding partners: Scottish Enterprise (Scottish Executive) 
Results to date: Rounds 1, 2 and 3 (closing October 2001) 
From Round 1 eight Science and technology projects were accepted for PoC funding from 83 
applications, which totalled over £20 million worth of bids. 
Round 2 had 126 proposals, 36 projects were awarded. Up to £5 million is available for funding 
projects in round 3 including up to £600,000 for other emerging technologies. 
Total projects: 50 plus projects (out of 209 applications) 
Funds provided: Total fund is £29 million 
Average funds per project: Up to 100% grant of between £50,000 - £200,000 (e erhead ) i 
available for 2 years. 
436 
Issues with scheme: Finite, with third and final round being competing in 2001. 
Showcase project: Rowett Institute was awarded £360,000 proof of concept funding from S otti h 
Enterprise in April 2001. The Rowett Research Institute based in Aberdeen was a\ arded a total of 
over £360,000 from the Scottish Enterprise Proof of Concept Fund for three projects. The idea for the 
Rowett projects have been generated from the fundamental research carried out at the Institute, and the 
funding will enable further essential research to be undertaken before the commercial potential of the 
product can be investigated. 
Says Professor Peter Morgan, Director of the Rowett Research Institute. "The Proof of Concept 
funding clearly fills a gap in the process of exploiting research outputs. Gaining funding for three 
projects is a clear marker of the quality and relevance of the Rowett's research programme". 
Contact Sue Bird, PR Manager, Rowett Research Institute, Tel: 01224716668, mobile: 07711 093417 
Assessment of effectiveness of scheme: 
According to Eleanor Taylor, Manager of the Proof of Concept Fund, companies throughout Scotland 
are now being founding solely on the work of research scientists. She states that the fund offer 
maximum flexibility to applicants and tries to complete the decision-making process within 10 week. 
The fund can be accessed through the internet. 
Type of Scheme: Mixed (public-private) 
Name: EDINBURGH TECHNOLOGY FUND (UNIVERSITY CHALLENGE FUND) 
Region: Edinburgh research institutions 
Years in existence: 4 (since 1999) 
Contact information: Roslin Biocentre, Roslin, UK, EH25 9PS 
website: http://www.ed-tech-fund.ed.ac.uk 
Contact person: Dr Keith Winton 
e-mail: etf@ed.ac.uk 
Tel: 0131 5274545 Fax: 0131-5274546 
Stated objectives: ETF targets the world-class research community in and around Edinburgh, 
seeking to invest money in emerging technologies, and research entrep~ene~s, ~at de~onstrate the 
potential to establish new commercial opportunities capable of ge~eratIng ~lgmfic~nt Income to be 
returned to the community. ETF seeks to help Research groups budd on theIr own mternal strength 
through innovative approaches to leveraging resources for co~petitive adva.ntage. To addres the very 
early stage funding gap that is a barrier to transfer of emergmg technologIes from the UK Research 
base into commercialisation. 
Expected outcomes: 
1. To create clusters of new company start-ups 
2. Improving licensing portfolios at each of the members of the consortium 
Eligibility criteria: 
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• Applicants must be members of staff of, or students registered with one of the me b . " f ' m er mstltutlOns 0 the ETF Consortium. 
• Excepti~nally, applicants ~ay be companies previously set up to exploit the technology of a I 
ConsortIUm m~mber, provided that. the. institution still has a substantial share holding in the I 
company,. ~roJ~cts m~st have the objective of elucidating both the technical development and the 
commercialIsation options. Members of staff of any ETF Consortium member 
• Students registered with any member Companies controlled by a Consortium member. 
Funds will be made available as unsecured loans or reimbursable grants. At the discretion of ETF, 
these loans (or grants) may be converted into equity in the event of a company being established to 
exploit the releva~t t~ch.nology. Alternatively, the loans will be repayable in the event that the recipient 
secures commercialIsation of the technology. Payment regimes will be based on revenue to the 
recipient of the loan and will be calculated on the amount of the loan and the repayment period. 
Normally, the total repayment will be limited to twice the amount of the monies advanced by ETF. 
Funding partners: 
• University of Edinburgh 
• Moredun Research Foundation 
• Roslin Research Institute 
• UK Astronomy Technology Centre 
• Edinburgh Station of the British Geological Society 
• Office of Science and Technology; European Commission, ERDF Programme 
• Lothian and Edinburgh Enterprise Ltd 
• City of Edinburgh Council-Midlothian Council 
• Edinburgh Technology Transfer Centre 
A verage funds per project: £200,000 
Issues with scheme: All intellectual property created or developed during the course of a project 
supported by ETF will become the property of the Institution or Company promoting the project. The 
ownership of all background intellectual property brought to the project will be unaffected by the ETF 
investment. As a minimum requirement, there will be an obligation on the Institution or Company 
receiving an investment to grant a licence, with the right to sub-licence, to any background and project 
results, to any third party through which commercialisation of technologies supported by the 
investment is ultimately effected. 
Funding may be used to develop prototypes, proof of technical feasibility and/or perform market 
research. Funds may not be applied to the purchase of equipment or solely for the purpose of 
conducting marketing feasibility studies or preparing marketing plans. Developing sales or marketing 
efforts will not be considered eligible since this would imply that the technology has been well-enough 
defined to already be marketable. 
In general for ETF Investments, applicants are required to demonstrate their commitment to the 
commercialisation of technologies either through providing inputs from their own resources or through 
leveraging contributions from other sources. Matching funds may either be cash or in-kind 
contributions on which a monetary value can be placed. For Technology and Business Assessment 
Investments, no matching contributions are required for the first £10,000 of costs. Applicants must 
meet all costs over and above that figure. 
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This paper reports on an international comparison of three organisations established to 
promote new business start-ups in the USA, UK and Canada. A 'knowledge-based' approach 
is adopted to examine how networks of would-be entrepreneurs, interact with networks of 
experienced entrepreneurs and managers, venture capitalists, technical experts, consultants, 
IPR lawyers and other specialists. This interaction is promoted and mediated at the local level 
by the three organisations at the centre of the study: the Austin Technology Incubator (A TI), 
Texas; Connect, Edinburgh; and the Canadian Environmental Technology Advancement 
Corporation (CETAC-West) in Canada. These act as local network-nodes or 'knowledge 
integrators', as well as 'incubating' new ventures to increase the new business 'birth rate' in 
their respective regions. 
The comparison is based on interviews and secondary data that describe the initiation, 
development, operation and local impact of these organisations. Findings stress the 
importance of the regional context as a source of particular kinds of knowledge and expertise 
that may promote or inhibit new technology-based business start-ups. In particular: the scale, 
scope and quality of ideas and business proposals in local networks; the availability of relevant 
expertise and experience for 'intelligent selection' and for successful mentoring; the nature of 
rewards and incentives for all players; and the importance of local champions or figureheads, 
are all factors that help explain differences across the example regions. 
The paper combines a variety of conceptual approaches around the idea of regional 
knowledge networks which underpin 'distributed innovation'. Heightened technological and 
market uncertainty for new technology-based firms places a premium on the ability of 
entrepreneurs to integrate specialist knowledge and utilise expertise from a variety of local 
sources. Despite differences in the scale, scope and effectiveness of their efforts we conclude 
that all three organisations are supporting 'accelerated learning' amongst entrepreneurs. 
R&D Management 33, 2, 2003. ~0 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2003. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
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Introduction 
T his paper provides an international compar-ison of local entrepreneurship promotion in 
three countries, Canada, the UK and the USA. 
The Canadian Environmental Technology Ad-
vancement Corporation (CET AC), Connect 
Scotland and the Austin Technology Incubator 
in Texas are three public-private organisations all 
focused on the promotion of entrepreneurship 
and new business start-ups in their respective 
regions. 
A 'knowledge-based' approach is adopted to 
examine how networks of would-be entrepre-
neurs,' interact with networks of experienced 
entrepreneurs and managers, venture capitalists, 
technical experts, consultants, IPR lawyers and 
other specialists. This interaction is promoted and 
mediated at the local level by the three organisa-
tions at the centre of the study. The focus of 
this paper is to examine and compare the 
initiation, development, operational mechanisms 
and resulting 'impact' of these organisations. 
What mechanisms, activities and events have they 
used to enhance regional 'connectivity' and how 
have the different regional contexts influenced 
their ability to support new technology-based 
ventures? 
CETAC offers a combination of management, 
marketing, and technical support directed to-
wards helping new ventures attract financing and 
successfully launch their products into domestic 
and international markets. Connect, similar to 
the Canadian business development model, has 
focused resources through a specific strategy at 
improving the birth rate and early development 
of new enterprises. Connect is also focused on 
attempting to improve what is generally regarded 
as a low entrepreneurial culture in Scotland 
compared to the USA and Canada (Scottish 
Enterprise, 1993, 1996). 
CETAC is more interventionist than Connect, 
in that it actively seeks financing for selected 
technology-based firms and engages in manage-
ment mentoring. Connect currently limits itself to 
'improving connectivity', bringing entrepreneurs, 
venture capitalists and other specialists and 
professionals together to generate the synergies 
needed for new business development. The ATI is 
the most interventionist of the three in that it not 
only encourages the required networking but it 
selects new ventures and 'incubates' the most 
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promising, providing infrastructure and in-house 
support to improve the chances of success. 
Just as the related studies described below 
come from a range of literatures, this paper 
contributes to a number of related fields of 
enquiry. Clearly there is a regional economic 
development dimension and a related policy 
aspect of the study centred on the justification 
for, and effectiveness of, supportive mechanisms 
for entrepreneurship and enterprise creation. The 
extensive literature on 'agglomeration economies' 
and more recent studies of high-technology 
'clusters' and regional 'innovative milieu' provide 
the relevant context at this 'regional networks' 
level. 
There is also a management dimension and a 
promising confluence of different approaches is 
currently taking place which this paper aims to 
contribute towards. The distinctive literatures on 
entrepreneurship, R&D and technology manage-
ment and innovation studies are, in combination, 
providing better insights into an understanding of 
the genesis and evolution of new technology-
based ventures. Added to this is the emerging 
field of 'knowledge management' studies and, in 
particular, analyses that have looked at intra-firm 
and inter-firm mechanisms for knowledge-sharing 
and 'knowledge-integration'. These newer ap-
proaches provide insights into the kinds of 
entrepreneurial and innovation networks that 
are of interest here. 
This study 
The comparison described here is based on case 
studies of the above organisations, compiled by 
the authors through a combination of question-
naires, site visits, structured interviews and 
secondary data. The most comprehensive study 
has been made of Connect, commissioned and 
funded by the Scottish Higher Education Fund-
ing Council (SHEFC) partly to measure the 
regional impact of the organisation on behalf of 
stakeholders and regional policymakers. The 
Connect study has involved all of the above 
methods of data collection with members of 
Connect, stakeholder organisations, professional 
service firms, venture capital firms and associated 
new ventures all included in the empirical study. 
In addition to assessing the growth and develop-
ment of Connect as an organisation, a total or 
l0 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003 
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113 members of Connect were interviewed and 
surveyed to determine the perceived value derived 
from the Connect programme, and case studies 
were completed on six technology companies. 
The CET AC-West study also involved struc-
tured interviews in Canada and benefits from the 
insights gained by one of the authors of this paper 
(Geoff Gregson) who worked in the organisation 
in 1998. Further information for CET AC has 
come from the co-author's MSc dissertation 
assessing CETAC (Gregson, 1999) and a number 
of CET AC working documents (see bibliogra-
phy). 
The study of the ATI in Austin is the least 
comprehensive of the three, compiled through site 
visits, unstructured interviews and a number of 
secondary studies. It does benefit from the reports 
and academic papers produced by key members 
of the ATI and IC2 organisations on the on the 
'Austin high-tech growth phenomenon' and on 
the part played by these network facilitators in 
promoting new businesses (see below). 
The paper's international comparison comes 
with a qualification on generalising results. It is 
acknowledged that programmes and policies start 
out with different objectives and will achieve 
different results based on the characteristics of 
each region. Networks operate very differently 
according to the specific economic, social, poli-
tical and cultural contexts that make up different 
regIOns (Curran and Blackburn, 1994; Morgan, 
1997). 
Regional knowledge networks 
This paper attempts to combine a variety of 
conceptual approaches around the idea of regio-
nal knowledge networks. 
Innovation studies 
The innovation process at the heart of new start-
ups is seen as a collective, evolving endeavour, 
taking place across interconnected networks, in 
contrast with the more usual idea of a single 
owner-manager with a 'ready-to-sell' business 
idea. Multimedia and online products and 
services generated by the convergence of IT, 
telecoms and consumer electronics provide the 
obvious examples in which rapid technological 
change, coupled with newly-emerging markets 
I!l Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003 
KnOll'iedge networks 
increase the level of uncertainty for ne\\· technol-
ogy-based firms (Oakey et al., 1999). 
Taking an evolutionary economics perspective 
Metcalfe in Archibugi and Michie (1997) links the 
need for market intervention to support innova-
tive capacity with 'information asymmmetries' 
which are heightened in times of rapid change. 
These also emphasise the importance of networks 
for information, knowledge and expertise to 
maintain adaptability and survival. 
For start-ups attempting to commercialise new 
internet or e-commerce related products or 
services, for example, a complex and continually 
changing array of both technological opportu-
nities and threats and market opportunities and 
threats places a premium on 'integrative mechan-
isms' for combining relevant knowledge from 
various 'knowledge networks' to steer the re-
search, development and commercialisation pro-
cess (Collinson, 2000). Innovation is where 
technological and market opportunities coincide 
and in these kinds of highly dynamic environ-
ments it is more usefully viewed as an interactive 
learning process. The 'interactive' or 'coupling' 
model of innovation, as opposed to the 'linear 
model', has been shown to be more appropriate 
in such contexts (Asheim and Cooke in Malecki 
and Oinas, 1999). 
Recent research, extending the field of innova-
tion studies, has focused on 'distributed innova-
tion', where contributing organisations 
coordinate their efforts to create new products, 
processes and often (as in the context discussed 
here) new enterprises. A core research theme at 
the Centre for Research on Innovation and 
Competition (CRIC) at the University of Man-
chester, is to examine the 'collective action 
amongst firms in a distributed innovation net-
work which cannot be reduced to market 
transactions and formal contracts'. CRIC sug-
gests that priority should be given to research in 
three areas (Coombs, 2001; Metcalfe. 2000), all of 
which are addressed in this paper: 
1. The coordination mechanisms that facilitate 
innovation networks; 
2. The risks and incentives for network p;lrtici-
pants; 
3. The competitive advantages, demonstrated by 
the additional returns to members, which 
result from 'superior' networks and/or highly 
efficient coordination mechani-;lll\ 
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Knowledge-based approaches 
The above emphasis on 'integrative mechanisms' 
parallels the concept of 'integrative capabilities' 
in the context of individual firms, reflecting the 
varied efficiency and effectiveness with which 
large corporations manage the intra-firm ex-
change, development and application of specialist 
knowledge for innovation (Collinson, 200 I, 1999, 
1997; Iansiti, 1995; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Teece, 
1998). 
High levels of uncertainty for new technology-
based firms again place a premium on networks 
as a means through which entrepreneurs can 
update knowledge and test the validity of their 
own ideas about commercialisable technologies 
and products and necessary alignments and 
partnerships with 'experienced experts' (Bruderl 
and Preisendorfer, 1998). 
Entrepreneurial network theory that suggests 
that strength, complexity and diversity of business 
relationships influence newly formed enterprise 
performance, resulting in improvement of the 
longer term chances of firm survival and growth 
(Shahidi, 1998; Tremblay, 1998). Monsted (1993) 
distinguishes between three types of networks, 
with each serving a different function for the 
entrepreneur: networks for service and assistance; 
networks for information and structuring, parti-
cularly for knowledge about whom to contact for 
a specific purpose; and networks for entrepreneur-
ship and product development. In addition to a 
supply of resources, networks provide social 
support and self-confidence and strategic capacity 
to learn and organise for new activities (Johan-
nisson, 1995). Effective network participation, 
however, requires communication skills, trust, 
co-operativeness and other capabilities in the 
entrepreneur (Pihkala et al., 1999). 
Again the importance of informal social inter-
action as a starting point to knowledge acquisi-
tion for the entrepreneur is stressed. Initial 
contacts from social networks evolve into busi-
ness-focused networks, and then into strategic 
networks, which allow firms to innovate and to 
thrive by their links to other organisations 
(Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Butler and Hansen, 
1991; Dubini and Aldrich, 1991; Falemo, 1989; 
Flynn, 1993; J ohannisson, 2000). Experienced 
entrepreneurs share a variety of business knowl-
edge that is essential in operating a business, from 
sources of finance to internal HRM management. 
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During the start-up phase entrepreneurs parti-
cularly need to mobilise 'social resources' because 
of liabilities that include size, lack of market 
legitimacy and newness (Sharman et al., 1991; 
Starr and MacMillan, 1991). Small enterprises 
are also more likely to rely on entrepreneurs who 
have the development of the local community and 
its firms as a goal (Cromie, et al., '1993; 
10hannisson and Nilsson, 1989; Johannisson, 
1990). These provide reasons for the effectiveness 
of good mentoring for start-ups, shown by 
Deakins et at. (1998). 
Small, start-up firms are arguably constrained 
far more by knowledge limitations than by 
financial limitations. Networks mayor not act 
as the source of several kinds of critical knowl-
edge or expertise, particularly (as found in 
Collinson, 2000): 
• strategic: helping them match technological 
and market opportunities 
• managerial: supporting the human-resourcing, 
organisation and financing of the new enter-
pnse 
• technical: assisting wi th design and develop-
ment or core products and relevant technical 
alliances 
Clearly the issue of 'strategic choice' is central for 
entrepreneurs and the first theme above has been 
a strong focus in the strategy literature for some 
time. Knowledge assimilation to inform decisions 
regarding finite resource-allocation, from the 
selection of target markets to investment in 
emerging technologies, is a strong determinant 
of success (Child, 1972). 
Various knowledge-based approaches focus on 
different characteristics of knowledge in different 
organisational contexts. A central theme is the 
differentiation between tacit and explicit or 
codified knowledge, initiated by Polanyi (1966), 
which has given us insights into the relative ease 
or difficulty of transferring different kinds of 
knowledge within or across different kinds of 
organisational contexts. Context-specificity and 
organisational 'embeddedness' are also important 
and relate to the 'distinctiveness' of particular 
firms, or inter-firm net works, from which they 
may gain a relative competitive advantage. 
Nonaka's concept of 'knowledge-creation' (:'\(111-
aka and Takeuchi, 1995), for example, is built 
around these themes. Similarly, Coombs and Hull 
(1997) examine knowledge accumulation mechan-
(~, Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003 
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isms, interface mechanisms and deployment 
mechanisms in the context of innovation net-
works. Howells (2000) also connects innovation 
systems and knowledge systems effectively. 
Analysis of practical managerial issues that are 
of direct relevance to entrepreneurs, such as how 
to access particular kinds of specialist knowledge 
to support a new enterprise, requires an under-
standing of more complex factors, such as the 
incentives for knowledge-sharing, as well as the 
relative ease or difficulty of knowledge transfer. 
The value or 'tradability' of different kinds of 
knowledge in different contexts (Fleck in Wil-
liams et al., 1998) and the long-standing link 
made between knowledge and power are impor-
tant factors directing flows of knowledge in 
networks (Hislop and Newell, 2000). The notion 
of 'social capital' has long been used to encom-
pass many aspects of the socially-constructed and 
mediated nature of knowledge and expertise 
(Fincham et al., 1994). 
Regional knowledge networks and market 
intervention for local developm~nt 
The differences between the three organisations 
in this study are also explored in the context of 
the theoretical and empirical work on high-
I 
technology 'clusters', 'agglomeration economies' 
or 'innovative milieu'. 
Innovation studies have examined the distinc-
tiveness of regional institutional infrastructures 
and mechanisms for interaction and coordination 
mainly through contrasting 'national systems of 
innovation' (Edquist, 1997, Freeman, 1995; 
Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). But another, 
broader and deeper research tradition which 
often comes under the umbrella term of 'econom-
ic geography', has been concerned with agglom-
eration economies and the regional implications 
of networks for much longer (Coe and Townsend, 
1998; Cooke et at., 1998; Cooke, 1996; Malecki 
and Oinas, 1999; Oakey et al., 1999). Both have 
strong links with regional economic oevelopment 
policy literature. 
The abovementioned notion that: participants 
in effective and efficient innovation networks 
reap 'additional returns' from the associated 
competitive advantages is parall~led in the 
regional economic development policy literature 
(Huggins, 2000; Ritsila, 1999; Gibb, 1993). For a 
ill BlackwdJ Publishing Ltd 2003 
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long time regional economic development agen-
cies all over the world have invested public money 
into schemes to facilitate and strengthen parti-
cular kinds of local networks in the belief that 
these support local competitive advantages and 
give rise to additional capital investment, employ-
ment and higher new business birth-rates. 
The Silicon Valley region of California pro-
vided one of the first 'ideal models' with high 
levels of technology-based enterprises underpin-
ning a dynamic, high-growth regional economy 
that other regions sought to emulate. Studies 
(such as Saxenian, 1994) again point to the 
institutional and social characteristics and the 
nature of technical expertise networks in the 
region as key factors promoting entrepreneurial 
flexibility and perhaps limiting the transferability 
of the model to other regions. 
The central questions still remain within the 
on-going debate on the role of governments in 
supporting this kind of economic growth at the 
regional level. What degree of intervention in the 
'invisible hand' of the market should govern-
ment's support? Can and should public sector 
organisations be involved in 'picking winners'? 
What kinds of mechanisms are effective in 
developing the 'requisite connectivity' to stimulate 
new business growth? 
In keeping with the knowledge-based approach 
advocated here this study focuses on the mechan-
isms used by three public-private organisations to 
build and support networks of specialist knowl-
edge to promote local entrepreneurship. Figure I 
illustrates some of the main components of the 
regional networks examined, including a repre-
sentation of the network of would-be entrepre-
neurs across various industries, technologies and 
markets, with new business propositions. The 
overall 'pipeline' represents the 'natural selection' 
process or 'decay rate' as eventual success-stories 
evolve from business plans to full corporations 
and failed enterprises exit. The stages depict the 
main kinds of intervention practiced by the three 
organisations in this study. 
Stage J. All three organisations are involved in 
activities that stimulate the overall degree of 
interaction and networking amongst entrepre-
neurs, financiers and venture capitalists, intellec-
tual property rights (IPR) experts and other legal 
specialists, professional managers, technical spe-
cialists etc. in the local region. The aim is to 
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Figure I , Knowledge networks and stages of intervention for new business formation, 
maximise regional 'connectivity' to improve the 
level of network interactions likely to lead to the 
formation of new businesses. Connect is limited 
to Stage I activities only and CETAC-WEST is 
more focused than both the other organisations 
on Stages 2 and 3. 
Stage 2 and 3. CETAC-West and ATI select 
particular business propositions for hands-on 
development and 'mentoring'. In this role they 
rely on a second local network of associated 
'experts ' of the kinds listed above which they 
coordinate and co-opt to advise on new business 
potential, filtering the most promising for further 
attention, and engage to directly assist the 
development of the new business. 
The regional availability of certain kinds of 
experience and expertise, the breadth, depth and 
'quality' of this second network, combined with 
the effectiveness of the mechanisms used to 
coordinate and co-opt its members for both 
'informed ' selection and value-added mentoring 
jointly determine the success of the overall 
proces . The various activities involved in each 
f these stages can be more or less easily 
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measured in terms of their effectiveness and local 
impact and we will return to this issue below in 
our comparison. 
Entrepreneurship-support organisations: 
an international comparison 
Each of the three organisations, CET AC, Con-
nect and A TI, will be examined according to their 
origins, mandate and objectives (section 2.2), 
operational mechanisms (2.3) and result (2.4). 
Section 2.5 provides an analysis of the impact of 
each program and provides insights into ho\ 
these organisations are effective as knowledge 
network promoters. 
Origins, mandates and objective 
Table I compare the orig1l1 of each of the tim; 
regional network organisatIOn tudied. able_ 
their central ml sion and objectJ\c < nd able J 
their organisational network and partner hip 
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Table 1. Origins. 
Connect 
The rationale for Connect is based 
on research evidence (Scottish En-
terprise, 1993, 1996) that the devel-
opment of high growth and high 
technology enterprises requires in-
teraction between the university 
sector, large corporations, emerging 
companies, regional government 
and support groups. Connect was 
developed against a background of 
the Technology Ventures Strategy. 
Technology Ventures broad aim is 
to establish new businesses and jobs 
within Scotland and is based at 
Scottish Enterprise. Technology 
Ventures itself was created as a 
result of a Commercialisation En-
quiry conducted jointly by the 
Scottish Office and the Royal So-
ciety of Edinburgh. 
Connect was located at the Man-
agement School following strong 
support from the University of 
Edinburgh and its Principal for the 
notion of Connect. The original 
champion of Connect is Ian McDo-
nald. Since January 1996, he has 
been solely responsible for cham-
pioning a Scottish version of the 
original San Diego Connect project. 
He personally enrolled the support 
of a number of founding sponsors 
largely drawn from the private 
sector. 
IRADM : 03302008 I 
CETAC 
The primary rationale of CETAC is 
to assist start-up new ventures in 
building better businesses around 
their environmental technologies. 
Projects are typically at the early 
stages of commercialisation, namely 
concept or development. The focus 
is on bridging the distance between 
research and development and suc-
cessful market launch. 
A second rationale for CET AC-
West is its role as champion in the 
environmental technology sector. 
CETAC-West has identified the 
need for the environmental sector 
to acquire stronger managers and 
has developed initiatives to address 
that need. 
CET AC is a federal government-
initiated support program seeking 
global solutions developed in the 
Canadian context that reduce com-
mercial cycle time, thus reducing 
overall project costs and lowering 
investment risk. There is encourage-
ment of strong industry participa-
tion to increase the rate of growth 
of the environmental technology 
industry and generating wealth 
within Canada. CETAC (west) is 
responsible for the four western 
provinces; Manitoba, Saskatche-
wan, Alberta and British Columbia. 
Knowledge netll'orks 
ATI 
The Austin Technology Incubator 
(A TI) was launched in 1989 at the 
University of Texas at Austin, 
through its IC::! (,Innovation, Crea-
tivity, Capital') Institute. Initial 
funding was from The University 
of Texas at Austin, the Greater 
Austin Chamber of Commerce, the 
City of Austin, Travis County, and 
local businesses with a remit to 
promote the growth of new science 
and technology-based enterprises. 
The ATI was co-founded by Uni-
versity academic Dr George Koz-
metsky, who was associated with 
the founding of the Dell Corpora-
tion (now with revenues of $25 
billion) by an Austin student, Mi-
chael Dell in 1984. He was a 
founding Director of IC2 and a 
central 'node' in the academic, 
business and public sector (primar-
ily the Greater Austin Chamber of 
Commerce and the City of Austin) 
networks that promote start-ups in 
the Austin region. 
As an incubator ATI provides 
facilities, finance and guidance to 
fledgling firms in return for an 
equity stake. It began with 4,000 
sq. ft. in 1989 and now occupies 
50,000. Proposals for new ventures 
are 'filtered' by a panel of experts. 
Those that are accepted are located 
within the incubator for 'nurturing'. 
Figures 2-4 then map out these networks 
graphically. 
of participants and maintain a continuous flow of 
learning among stakeholders: These events are 
enterprise workshops. an audience with ... , and 
technology briefings - the first two focused on 
enhancing general managerial skills and stimulat-
ing learning from the experience of others, 
whereas technology briefings provide a forum for 
actual business processes of collaboration to be 
initiated. 
Operational mechanisms 
Connect. Table 4 shows the activities and events 
that include briefings, lectures, courses, work-
shops, conferences, technical and social support. 
The six Connect events shown in Table 4 are 
expected to play a role for specific target 
audiences and they all combine to fulfil the 
targets of the overall programme. 
There are three recurring types of events that 
are considered core activities for Connect, in that 
they are intended to involve the greatest number 
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003 
Table 4 shows three additional types of events: 
two annual conferences (Investment and Partner-
ship) and the Springboard Workshop delivered 
on a flexible but less than frequent basis.' 
An important aspect of recruiting new com-
pany members is scanning a variety of sources for 
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Table 2. Mission and objectives. 
Connect 
The notion of constituency is sy-
nonymous with CONNECT, as its 
core competency appears to be 
networking individuals and organi-
sations. The original aim was to 
provide ' ... an infrastructure which 
academics can use to better under-
stand the needs of industrial and 
financial sectors, and to commer-
cialise their research' (Proposal to 
the Principals/Directors of Higher 
Education Institutions funded by 
the Scottish Higher Education 
Funding Council, 21 July 1997). 
To support the creation, development 
and growth of technology-based en-
terprise throughout Scotland. 
I. Develop and educate an expert 
infrastructure that understands and 
supports the needs of technology-
based venture; 
2. Facilitate and support the trans-
fer of technology from the Scottish 
science base to new and existing 
firms, either by spin-out or through 
collaborative projects; 
3. Enhance the ability of new and 
existing firms to secure finance; 
4. Educate entrepreneurs about 
business development and issues 
germane to their industries; 
5. Help entrepreneurs to define new 
businesses and whether they should 
start them. 
CETAC 
An important philosophy of CE-
TAC-West is that 'the corporation 
makes winners, it does not pick 
winners'. It is expected that the 
market, and investors, not CE-
TAC-West, should pick the win-
ners. One of the key features of the 
CETAC-West process is that pro-
jects are analyzed from the inves-
tor's perspective. 
CETAC-West will guide small and 
medium sized technology-based en-
vironmental enterprises through a 
market driven commercialisation 
process to domestic and international 
markets. 
1. Add the best value to technology 
development projects by using ex-
perienced men to ring and procuring 
the best available expertise; 
2. Bring experienced management 
and private capital to the environ-
mental technology sector in all 
western Canadian provinces; 
3. follow through, thus making 
our clients successful and generat-
ing revenue for CETAC-West by 
enabling our clients to pay fees out 
of finances attracted to their pro-
jects. 
ATI 
The A TI's mission is to 'provide 
business resources and professional 
services that assist its technology 
startups to compete in the global 
marketplace '. 
Alongside this it also has a regional 
development remit linked to the 
policy mandates of local business 
organisations to 'develop an infra-
structure for regional economic de-
velopment while building technology-
based firms to provide high-tech and 
value addedjobs in the city of Austill 
and Travis CoulIly.' 
I. Maintain a rigorous selection 
process to pick the most promising 
new technology-based ventures 
from proposals. 
2. 'Accelerate learning' by provid-
ing selected ventures with access to 
the most appropriate mentoring 
support, financial resources, man-
agerial, technical and other specia-
list expertise. 
3. Leverage economies of scale 
across all resident firms in dealings 
with suppliers and service provi-
ders. 
4. Promote regional economic ben-
efits by maximising rate of success-
ful start-ups. 
companies that Connect staff views as relevant 
for membership. The Connect database of 
contact firms is thus constantly expanding. 
Thus, unlike Connect, where the network is 
broad and composed of large numbers of non-
specific stakeholders, CET AC creates a network 
specifically customised around the entrepreneur 
and the requirements for the project. 
Figure 5 illustrates the range the delivery and 
communication interface and feedback processes 
used by Connect. 
CETAC. CETAC has adopted a 'mentoring' 
approach to working with clients, and delivers 
services designed to make new ventures finance-
able. CET AC has created a commercialisation 
process that includes a 5-step project assessment 
model designed to move each new venture 
through sequential phases (Table 5). The goal is 
to assist the entrepreneur in developing the 
venture to a point where the project is considered 
financeable, and then to expose the new venture 
to potential investors, who will choose those 
ventures considered worthy of investment. 
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CETAC has segregated its activities into two 
broad categories: core and non-core programmes 
and services. The core business comprises direct 
services to enterprises aimed at assisting them to 
achieve commercialisation of environmental tech-
nologies. The key focus of core services is to build 
a stronger enterprise to allow the entrepreneur to 
be better prepared to attract financing and 
utilise the funds raised. Improving management 
capabilities is an important part of the core 
services. 
The CETAC core commercialisation process 
applies to projects at all stages of commercialisa-
tion. It is an iterative process consisting of several 
~l Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003 
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Table 3. Organisational networks: partners and stakeholders. 
Connect 
Connect has a total of 54 sponsors, 
that pay £3000 per year to support 
the programme. These include all 14 
Scottish universities, nine public 
sector companies, five private com-
panies, nine consulting firms, eight 
law firms and nine financial firms. 
Sponsors are primary shareholders; 
providing input and guidance re-
garding Connect events and activ-
ities. 
There are approximately 100 com-
panies that are members of Connect 
and 35 individual members. They 
pay £ I 00 per year in exchange for 
membership. 
There has been a five-fold increase 
in members of Connect between 
1997 and 2000. 
CETAC 
The original stakeholders are the 
Canadian federal government and 
the four western provinces. 
CETAC-West utilises various part-
ners, from both the private and 
public sectors, to assist in verifying 
the technologies of each new ven-
ture, with the goal of attracting 
financing to pilot the technology. If 
success can be demonstrated with 
the pilot, further financing may be 
available from private investors. 
The pilot, therefore, stimulates 
other activities. These technical 
linkages allow CET AC to concen-
trate on moving the project forward 
while technology is verified with 
other agencies. 
The private sector plays a key role 
in mentoring clients to develop 
managerial skills and project strat-
egy. CETAC has developed a team 
of business leaders that are brought 
in to form a 'round-table' or forum, 
to discuss project strategy with each 
client, following the evaluation of 
the project by a CETAC-West 
analyst. The advice can range from 
discussion of financial issues to 
marketing strategy, and the round 
table attendees are selected from a 
pool of CETAC advisors according 




The ATI occupies university space in 
the northwest of Austin. Member 
company fees and grants from the 
City of Austin and the Greater 
Austin Chamber of Commerce fund 
it. One percent of all member com-
panies' equity is also given to ATI. 
The A TI's 60 graduate and 19 
resident companies have: created 
over 2000 jobs; generated cumula-
tively over $900 million in revenue 
from 1989 to 2000, and; raised over 
$300 million in capital in eleven 
years. Five firms from the incubator 
have gone pUblic. 
Member firms and organisations of 
the various networks and associa-
tions constitute a broad base of 
partners and stakeholders. Members 
provide the 'intellectual capital' used 
to filter new venture proposals and 
mentor start-ups that are resident at 
ATI. These include: the Capital Net-
work (fCN), 'matching entrepre-
neurial ventures with investment 
capital'; the Austin Software Council; 
the Texas E-Commerce Association; 
and the broader 'Knowledge Net-
work'. 
IC2 also has a 'Fellows' network 
which extends abroad and the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin lies at the 
centre of a range of related specialist 
networks. 
steps: environmental business opportunity assess-
ments, strategy development, making projects 
'financeable' and bringing financing to projects. 
Through the use of this process, gaps are 
identified in each project's ability to meet finan-
cing criteria. Project strategy, with assistance 
from appropriate mentors chosen by CETAC, is 
developed to fill those gaps and to commercialise 
the project, and the client is assisted in locating 
investment capital. The core service process is 
shown in Figure 6 below. 
and provides a range of support services to those 
it sees as having the most potential. Each year the 
ATI receives about 200 enquiries from potential 
entrants and about 75 executive summaries of full 
business plans. About half are selected for 
analysis by the experts on the 'Success Commit-
tee' made up of venture capitalists, technologists 
and other successful entrepreneurs (the member-
ship is listed at: http://www.ic2-ati.org/abou-
tus.htm). 
AT!. The A TI is involved in picking, developing 
and hosting 'winners' as well as promoting local 
entrepreneurial network connectivity. It filters 
and selects new ventures to host in the incubator 
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003 
In the next stage a second panel of experts 
reviews the full business plans of the remaining 
firms and meets with the entrepreneurs them-
selves. Fewer than ten firms each year make it 
through this stage to be accepted into the 
incubator. The same panel evolves into an 
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Figure 2. Connect partnership network. 
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Figure 3. CET AC partnership network. 
advisory group with face-to-face feedback with 
individual managers for an initial phase of 
'diagnostics and planning'. A TI staff and mem-
bers of the various associated networks act as 
mentors throughout the period of the new firm's 
stay at the incubator and usually aft~r firms have 
left. 
A range of services are offered, to resident 
firms, as shown in Figure 7. Strategy' consultancy 
by ATI or external experts helps guide the 
managers of the new venture in terms of 









Early Stage Inventors 
SME's 
financing, product/ service focus, technological 
development, market research and so on. HRM 
assistance covers recruitment, placement of stu-
dent interns and help with the legal aspects of 
employment. The A TI also has in-house market-
ing and public relations expertise and creates 
publicity for resident finns. One of the central 
roles is to assist with financing, particularly 
through membership of The Capital Network. 2 
The A TI provides 'turnkey' office space, telecoms 
and computing facilities and other necessary 
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003 
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Figure 4. The A TI partnership network. 
infrastructure. The 'Know-how Network' is 
comprised of professional service providers such 
as IPR lawyers, management consultants, IT 
services firms and trade advisers, to which 
resident companies have access. The group of 
A TI firms generate also some economies of scale 
from suppliers of shared services and through 
schemes such as the Technology Incubator Trust, 
an employee benefits package that covers a 
number of companies. 
In return for all this the ATI charges for office 
space and hosting the new firms, although costs 
are generally lower than local rents. The Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin owns the property and 
loans it to ATI at no cost. ATI brings in other 
funds to pay for remaining costs, in particular it 
takes an undisclosed percentage of equity in the 
firms that it hosts, to 'capture the upside' once 
they go public. 
What makes the A TI much more than an 
infrastructure-provider is the range of networking 
events in which resident firms participate. Related 
,(') Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003 
outreach activities and programmes include The 
Capital Network; The Austin Software Council 
(set up in 1992); The Austin Multimedia Incu-
bator; The Texas E-commerce Association; the 
Global Ventures Programme (supporting the 
international expansion of new firms) and a 
range of academic networks mainly via IC2 . 
These support specialist meetings and events, 
adding to a more general series of entrepreneur-
ship-related activities. 
Norman Caderlan, Director of ATI in 1999, 
describes the incubator as an 'intellectual venture 
capital firm', adding value through the intellec-
tual development of enterprises. He lists three 
major benefits that resident companies gain from 
the organisation: 
I. Credibility through assocIatIOn with A TI. 
Firms that have passed the A TI selection 
process are given preferential attention by 
finance companies and other supporting orga-
nisations 
R&D Managcmcnt 33, 2, 2003 I :Il) 
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Table4. Connect's operational mechanisms: events. 
Type of event 
Technology briefings 
Enterprise workshops 





Forum for institutional researchers to 
present their work and research activities 
to Connect sponsors and technology 
companies. 
Workshops bringing together technol-
ogy companies and researchers with 
advisors and business professionals 
Technology entrepreneurs discuss the 
development of their businesses, their 
successes and failures and their views of 
what it takes to succeed. 
Forum for individual/businesses to pre-
sent, in confidence, their technological 
concepts, proposed business strategy or 
business plans to an appropriate expert 
panel 
Annual venture capital investment con-
ference 
Annual Corporate Partnership Confer-
ence present institutional research to an 
audience of industrialists and businesses 







Figure 5. Delivery and Gommunication interface for Connect. 
Results 
Objective 
To enhance understanding and faCIlitate 
technology transfer 
To develop management skill of both 
technological entrepreneurs and entre-
preneurial technologists 
Learning from the experience of other 
and discussing development of their own 
businesses 
To provide the entrepreneur or academic 
with practical, realistic and expert advice 
and recommendations 
To provide the opportunity for technol-
ogy companies seeking finance to pre-
sent to an international audience of 
investors . 
To assist in the exploitation of the 
research through partnerships, joint 
ventures, new company creation 
Web site 
Face-to face 
2. Access to the A TI network of expertise and to 
the other associated local and global networks 
3. Faster growth, in that firms make fewer 
mistakes when they are able to draw on the 
experience of other entrepreneurs, technical 
experts, venture capitalists and academics 
that have studied the commercialisation 
process. 
Connect. Connect has created impact targe t -
focused on three themes: 
200 R&D Aiallagement 33, 2, 2003 
• number of event and audience mi . ( l kc-
holder attendance expected to event) . 
• number of technolog) comp nle - l.:cur ing 
development/growth fundin g, 
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Table 5. CET AC commercialisation model. 
Phases -+ Functionsl Concept Development Testing Field Trial Launch Re\ le\\ 
Management Champion Expertise Team Leadership Infrastructure Profit Centre 
Market Research Sponsor Demo. First Users Expansion Competition 
Technology Feasibility Engineer Prototype Pilot Production Modification 
Finance Seed Start-up Bridge Revenues Profits Sustainability 
Eligibility criteria 
Opportunity Evaluation Project Execution Strategy 




CETAC-WEST Core Activities: 
• Feasibility Studies 
• Marketing Studies 
• Technical Assessments 
• Research Funding Applications 
• Research Tax Credit Application 
• Prototype Development and Testing 
o Field Testing and Client Demonstration 
.. Business Plans 
• Partnering 
• Mentoring 
CAPIT AL into the 
Environmental Industry 







Initial Public Offering 
JC Fund 
Figure 6. CET AC-west operational mechanisms: core and non-core services . 
• number of spin-out companies, collaborations 
and associated jobs created. 
Assessment of the first theme, events and 
audience mix, for Connect has been relatively 
straightforward and figures show an increase in 
number of events (from 27 in 1997 to 49 in 2000) 
and participants as the Connect network has 
evolved (Gregson et ai., 2000). Assessment of the 
remaining two themes has been more difficult. 
This prompted the need to adopt more detailed 
metrics to understand Connect's impact and 
value. Three 'value flows', social, knowledge 
and financial, were identified from Connect's 
own objectives. These relate to Connect events 
listed in Table 4. 
t{'l Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003 
Participants were surveyed on their rating of 
the importance of these three value components 
and their responses are shown in Figure 8 and 
clearly shows the importance of social value in 
attending Connect events for all stakeholders. 
This suggests that at the time of the evaluation 
the greatest impact of Connect has been on 
social networking. This is consistent with the 
logical evolution of networks where social inter-
actions and acquaintances tend to precede the 
exchanges and collaborations involving specific 
knowledge and financial value. A test for the 
evolution of the Connect programme will be to 
increase the knowledge and fill~lI1cial value 
delivered by the programme as percei\'l~d hy thl? 
stakeholders. 
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STRATEGY 
CEO Mentors; Advisory Review Panels; In-house Consulting 
~ • t FINANCING HR MARKETING & 
PR 
• Insurance and 
• Referrals to funding benefit package • In-house PR 
sources • Student interns • Market research 
• TCN / Angel • Recruitment • Press contacts 











Turn-key office solution; Telecom, Networking; Office services; Office Depot, 
IT discounts; Office space, Conference rooms . 








Most Definite Most Definite & To 
Some Extent 
OS 0 ci al II Know ledge 0 Financial 
Figure 8. Perceived value (%) from attendance at 
Connect events (n = 69). 
The survey also showed that Connect events 
were facilitating the transfer of business-related 
information across sectors and local constituen-
cies. This included 'market awareness, who are 
the players, business angels/venture capitalists, 
etc. and what is innovative in Scotland' . Compa-
nies also identified significant value in hearing 
about other experiences of new business develop-
ment (Gregson et al., 2000). However, there is 
little evidence that participants are using the 
20_ R&D ManagclIlcnt 33, 2, 2003 
networking events to actively obtain financial 
backing or invest in new businesses. This sugge t 
that contacts are being made but investment 
have not materialised (as yet). 
CETAC. CETAC's impact targets have been 
primarily financial (left column of Table 6). 
Similar to Connect it is difficult to determine 
direct effects of CET AC activities on investment 
and employment when entrepreneurs are also 
involved in other networks of support. Delivery 
of commercialisation services, combined with the 
comprehensive networking within the investor 
community, have resulted in achievement of 
corporate objectives in each of the last four year 
of CETAC operations. Over 150 new enterpri e 
have become successful ventures, and capital has 
been raised to the amount of over CDN$5 
million. 
CET AC has established a large network of 
clientele that has facilitated an increa ing numbt:r 
of new clients through existing client referral ' and 
the development of repeat bu ine . Taking int 
consideration those fund directly inve ted into 
new ventures as well a all other contract nd 
support acquired by CET C, the corporation ha . 
leveraged another $5 mlliton (e tlmatcd) ~ r 
We tern Canada' emlronmental .cct r o\'L:r 
( Blackwell Pubh hlng 1 td • 
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Table 6. Financial impact of CET AC (west). 
Projects: 
Project opportunities reviewed 
Projects developed and pending 
Average project size (per phase) 
Financial benefit to Western Canada: 
Environment Canada funds invested 
Provincial government contribution 
Federal government contracts 
Government and industry contributions 
Private capital raised 
Value of partnerships/alliances formed 




















Estimated number of full time jobs generated in high technology sector 






Export sales to government funds 
Other funds and in-kind contributions to environment Canada Investment 
20 
1.5 
and above contributions received from Environ-
ment Canada under the initial contract. 
CETAC has also assisted certain clients in 
en tering international markets by facilitating 
strategic alliances, disseminating company infor-
mation to Canadian embassies around the world, 
and in one case, supporting a ·client in his 
international marketing effort with tije result that 
he negotiated a contract worth approximately 
CDN$70 million. 
A TI. Compared to the Connect and CET AC-
West studies, this research has collected far less 
objective data on the 'success' of the ATI, or the 
value it adds to the Austin region. According to 
Joel Wiggins, Director of Operations at ATI, 
speaking in September 1999, the ATI enjoys a 
'90% success rate', but comparable benchmarks 
are difficult to establish. 
The consistent expansion of the organisation 
and its move in 1995 into a 40,000 sq. ft. 
dedicated office building for hosting up to 30 
new ventures at anyone time indicates that it is 
fulfilling an important role. In its first ten years to 
1999, a total of 95 companies have moved in (the 
longest stay was for three years) and about one-
third have left without 'graduating' .. 
Published data on the A TI states that from 
1989 to 2000 its 60 graduate and I 19 resident 
companies have created over 2000 jobs and 
generated cumulatively over $900 million in 
\lc1 Black well Publishing Ltd 2003 
revenue. AT! firms have raised over $300 million 
in capital in 11 years, including five companies 
that have gone public. 
Both the incubator organisation and its resi-
dent firms have received public recognition 
through the years. One firm, 'Exterprise', won 
the 'National Business Incubation Association's 
Incubator Client of the Year Award' in the 
technology category for 2000 and another, 
'Infoglide Corporation', received the 'NBIA 
Outstanding Technology Client of the Year' for 
1999. The A TI itself won the' Randall M. Whaley 
Incubator of the Year Award' from the NBIA in 
1994 and the 1996 'Justin Morrill Award by the 
Technology Transfer Society'. It has also played a 
central role in founding three more incubators 
around the US as well as the Austin Multimedia 
Incubator in Texas. 
The Austin region has enjoyed phenomenal 
growth of technology-based firms in the 1990s, 
particularly linked to the evolution of Dell 
Computers, established by Michael Dell in 1984 
while a student at the University of Texas, Austin 
and now the third-largest PC company in the 
world. 3 The degree to which the ATI, its partner 
organisations and affiliated networks have con-
tributed to this growth is difficult, if not 
impossible to measure. 
The case of the abovementioned lnfoglide. 
amongst others, does provide some insights into 
the contribution of A TI. This firm was estab-
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lished in 1991 to develop software to search and 
pattern-match across large, complex databases. 
After shifting its target market away from police 
databases to focus on the more promising 
insurance fraud market Infoglide entered the 
A TI in 1997. By 1999 it had grown to 30 
employees and had received buyout offers in 
excess of $100 million in the heyday of 'dot.com 
fever'. In 2000 it had grown to 75 employees but 
dropped rapidly to 24 as part of the general 
collapse of dot.com start-ups, but still managed 
to attract its third round of venture finance 
totalling $21.7 million. It has been seen as a 
successful, sustainable venture and the founding 
managers point to a number of critical contribu-
tions made by the A TI network. 
Beyond office space Infoglide gained support in 
developing a formal organisation structure and a 
professional business plan to attract finance. This 
support partly came from the appointment of an 
experienced CEO hired through the ATI net-
work, proposed by A TI mentors. This led to 
enhanced credibility amongst venture capital 
firms as well as improved connections to a 
broader range of sources of venture capital. 
A TI provided additional marketing for the 
product via its range of publications (particularly 
when Infoglide software was used successfully to 
break an insurance fraud ring). Technical part-
nerships were developed with specialist hardware 
and software firms via A TI and related IT and 
software industry network members to aid the 
development of the core products and help 
explore market demand for related applications. 
Discussion 
This study has examined how three organisations, 
the Austin Technology Incubator (A TI), Texas, 
CONNECT, Edinburgh, and CETAC-West in 
Canada have promoted and mediated the con-
nections and interactions between various stake-
holders in high-technology entrepreneurship in 
their respective regions. In their overarching aim 
to improve business birth-rates and the success of 
fledgling ventures in their regions they have 
promoted certain kinds of networking to improve 
interaction between entrepreneurs and financiers, 
and various technical, managerial and profes-
sional specialists (Stage 1 in Figure I). In the case 
of ATI and CETAC-West they have also 
204 R&D Management JJ, 2, 2003 
established programmes to select likely 'winners' 
and provide infrastructure and mentoring, speci-
fically guiding enterprises and connecting entre-
preneurs with specialist expertise to assist in their 
successful development. 
Obvious differences in the scope, remit and 
scale of these organisations make direct compar-
isons less straightforward than we would have 
liked. This study has effectively mapped out the 
mechanisms used by the three organisations to 
stimulate entrepreneurship in the respective re-
gions and provides an insight into important 
regional differences. Measuring the impact and 
influence of their market intervention however is 
problematic, both individually and compara-
tively. 
There is convincing evidence that all three 
organisations significantly increase interaction 
between the relevant constituencies responsible 
for new business development. The range of 
events organised by these network facilitators, 
including conferences, seminars, and smaller-
scale meetings, alongside their operation as net-
work 'nodes' linking entrepreneurs with various 
sources of specialist knowledge, increases the 
volume and variety of regional 'interconnectiv-
ity'. This in turn increases the opportunities for 
the required fusion of entrepreneurs' ideas, 
complementary technical and market knowledge, 
managerial knowledge and finance. It maybe 
impossible to assess the degree to which this 
connectivity would have evolved in the absence of 
these organisations. It is also clear that CET AC 
and the ATI can legitimately claim to have 
successfully supported the nurturing of new 
technology-based businesses, but a thorough 
'cost-benefit' measurement of the relative con-
tribution to the regional business birth-rate does 
not appear to be feasible. 
Building on the combination of literatures 
reviewed in this paper our conclusion is that the 
contribution of these organisations can be best 
conceptualised by the term 'accelerated learning'. 
The ability of local entrepreneurs to continuously 
and successfully adapt their core technology or 
product idea to evolving markets, to explore and 
build partnerships with other technology devel-
opers, to make informed assessments of available 
sources of finance, to find specific sources of 
advice on the constitution and managerial devel-
opment of their ventures and in general to fill 
critical gaps in their own knowledge. has been 
£1 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003 
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enhanced by the activities of Connect in Scotland, 
the ATI in Texas and CETAC-West in Canada. 
The 'integrative capabilities' of local entrepre-
neurs, their ability to search, filter, assimilate and 
integrate knowledge from a huge variety of 
sources has been improved by the activities of 
these three organisations. The huge 'transaction 
costs' which make the learning curve that much 
steeper and the process of reputation-building so 
much harder for such firms are subsidised 
through their access to these established and 
credible networks and continuous networking 
activities. 
At the policy level therefore we support the 
view that although it is 'unrealistic' to assume 
that firms will cluster around universities 
(Malecki, 1997), university-based organisations 
like these make a positive contribution to the 
'triple-helix' (Debackere and Van Looey, 2001), 
linking centres of knowledge to business and 
government agencies. Combining this with the 
above conclusion that a cost-benefit assessment 
of the public money that goes into such initiatives 
may not even be possible leaves regional devel-
opment agencies with something of a dilemma. 
The enthusiasm amongst policymakers across the 
developed and less-developed world for pouring 
efforts and resources into stimulating local high-
technology clusters may only be justifiable as a 
'leap of faith'. 
Beyond the activities of these organisations, 
however, the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
both kinds of networks depicted in Figure 1 
underpin the overall potential of the innovation 
systems in these respective regions. This includes 
what has been termed 'institutional thickness' in 
the literature (Malecki and Oinas, 1999) which 
influences the volume and variety of entrepre-
neurial learning that can take place locally. In the 
case of Scotland, this comparison supports other 
studies that show some important weaknesses in 
the region. These include a lack of venture capital 
and inadequate mechanisms for investing in small 
firms, a shortage of small firm management 
expertise in strategic high-technology sectors, a 
lack of interaction and common purpose between 
academia and industry, and a weak 'entrepre-
neurial culture' (Collinson, 2000; Danson, 1996; 
Reid, 1997, Scottish Enterprise, 1999). The 
question of whether the requisite 'critical mass' 
of particular knowledge and expertise can ever 
evolve in the Scottish region, regardless of the 
~C) Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003 
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activities of agencies like Connect remains a real 
Issue. 
Further important regional differences were 
highlighted in this study, providing insights into 
the relative effectiveness of and limits to the 
network-building activities of the organisations 
studied. It is clear that Connect, based at the 
University of Edinburgh, could evolve to take on 
the role of a 'Stage 2' and 'Stage 3' organisation, 
selecting, mentoring and incubating high-poten-
tial enterprises in the style of the university-based 
ATI. The 'arms-length' relationship between 
academia and industry in Scotland, compared 
to the USA, however is likely to limit its 
effectiveness in such a role. 
An important cultural and institutional char-
acteristic underpinning the success of A TL 
according to interviewees, is the ease of interac-
tion, knowledge-exchange and network develop-
ment between the University of Texas at Austin, 
local entrepreneurs and local industry (and 
regional government agencies). Moreover, an 
obvious 'gel' creating the sense of common 
purpose and the impetus to build connections 
lies in the way participants commonly take equity 
stakes in new ventures. Shares in new ventures are 
sometimes a direct reward for contributing 
valuable or 'tradable' knowledge and expertise, 
or for providing infrastructure and facilities, as in 
the case of the A TI (and ultimately its owner, the 
University of Texas). Alternatively network 
participants may make personal investments 
alongside professional venture capitalists, guided 
by their direct knowledge of emerging ventures 
gained through networking activities (Mason and 
Harrison, 1996). Social capital and specific 
contributions of useful knowledge are rewarded 
with 'privileged' access to investment intelligence. 
Without equity participation academics in the 
Scottish context have little or no incentive to 
contribute to commercialisation activities and 
University institutions actively maintain barriers 
with industry, to retain their independence. 
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Notes 
I. Notification of events is sent out through Jargon, 
the Connect newsletter that keeps members and 
sponsors abreast of developments and news regard-
ing events, workshops etc. 
2. The Capital Network is seen as one of the most 
important connections. At its centre is a 'match-
making' service which uses a database of investors, 
listing their profiles and their ideal target firms, to 
whom entrepreneurs send proposals. The Capital 
Network organises a range of Venture Capital 
conferences where 20-25 companies are selected to 
present to potential financiers. IC2 and the A TI put 
forward companies and help entrepreneurs structure 
their proposals and presentations. Education pro-
grammes in association with the University of Texas 
at Austin help entrepreneurs develop business 
I, 
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planning and management capabilities (often tar-
geted at helping 'technologists manage'). 
3. In this decade the region added 'more information 
technology jobs than Silicon Valley; Boston's Route 
128; or Research Triangle, North Carolina'. The 
November 23, 1998, issue of Fortune ranked Austin 
#1 as the 'Best US city for business and wealth 
creation', cited for fostering entrepreneurship. Aus-
tin's technology-based economy centres on electro-
nics and semiconductors, computers and 
peripherals, and software, with emerging strengths 
in the film and music industries, multimedia, 
biomedical products, logistics and distribution, 
and transaction services. With three billion-dollar 
plants, Austin has the largest concentration of 
semiconductor production in the USA. The Greater 
Austin Region has the highest rate of patent filings 
per capita in the USA and of the 57 publicly held 
companies in Austin, 32 have staged their IPQ, 
since 1994 (http://www.ic2.org).Please supply the 
details. Please supply the details. 
l" Blad:wdl Publishing Ltd 2003 
ir~ 
bwuk_RADM_0330200S.Pdf II Web 1112/17/20022:01 ·;9 PM ~ 231797 Print ~ 12·17 2802 1:08:0' ,~: 333433: 
-
Int. J. Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management. Vol. x: No. x: 2002 
Real-time evaluation methodology as learning 
instrument in high-technology SME support networks 
Alfonso Molina 
Technology Management and Policy Program (TechMaPP), 
School of Management, The University of Edinburgh, Old Surgeon's 
Hall, High School Yards, Edinburgh EH 1 9JY, UK 
E-mail: A.Molina@ed.ac.uk 
Geoffrey Gregson 
Technology Management and Policy Program (TechMaPP), 
School of Management, The University of Edinburgh, Old Surgeon's 
Hall, High School Yards, Edinburgh EHI 9JY, UK 
E-mail: Geoff.Gregson@ed.ac.uk 
_Abstract: This paper focuses on the philosophy and implementation of an 
evaluation approach used as a learning instrument in the evolution of a major 
enterprise support network in the UK: Connect Scotland. The Connect real-
time evaluation methodology has distinguished and assessed the value flows 
delivered by the program as perceived by its stakeholders. It has done so not in 
a post-mortem fashion but in real-time fashion (i.e., during the program), with 
the aim of capturing strengths and weaknesses and contributing to its further 
development. 
The paper discusses the importance of support networks for enterprise 
development then looks at some of the concepts and limitations facing the 
evaluation of enterprise support networks. This is followed by a detailed 
analysis of the real-time evaluation methodology used in Connect Scotland, 
including an examination of the Connect program itself. The paper then 
summarises the key results of the value-flows of Connect as perceived by the 
stakeholders, before ending with a discussion on value for money and key 
recommendations. 
Keywords: SME support networks; real-time evaluation methodology; 
constituency-building; value flows; CONNECT constituency 
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Molina, A. and 
Gregson, G. (2002) 'Real-time evaluation methodology as learning 
instrument in high-technology SME support networks', Int. 1. 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management, Vol. X, No. Y, pp.OOO-OOO. 
Biographical notes: AUTHORS: PLEASE PROVIDE BRIEF 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES (APPROX. 100 WORDS) 
Copyright © 2002 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. 
1 
-
A. Molina and G. Gregson 
1 Introduction 
This paper focuses on the philosophy and implementation of an evaluation approach used 
as a learning instrument in the evolution of a major enterprise support network in the UK: 
Connect Scotland. The Connect real-time evaluation methodology has distinguished and 
assessed the value flows delivered by the program as perceived by its stakeholders. It has 
done so not in a post-mortem fashion (i.e., after the end of the program) but in real-time 
fashion (Le., during the program), with the aim of capturing strengths and weaknesses 
and contributing to its further development. 
The structure of the paper, first, discusses briefly the importance of support networks 
for enterprise development, then looks at some of the concepts and limitations facing the 
evaluation of enterprise support networks. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the 
real-time evaluation methodology used in Connect Scotland, including an examination of 
the Connect program itself. A further section summarises the key results of the value-
flows of Connect as perceived by the stakeholders. The paper ends with a discussion on 
value for money and key recommendations. 
2 Rationale for support programs 
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of support programs for stimulating the 
formation of new technology ventures in many countries. Amongst the best known are 
the Austin Texas incubator, the Connect San Diego and the industrial cluster programs of 
the Basque Country (Spain) and Scotland. The frequent target for these initiatives is the 
high technology sector, viewed by policy-makers as promissory of major long-term 
economic benefits. High technology companies are perceived as having greater growth 
potential than conventional firms that can lead to significant regional economic 
prosperity [1-3]. High technology firms have also been viewed as corrective for 
unemployment caused by the decline in traditional industries [4]. 
The most common argument used to justify support programs is the high rates of 
business start-ups that experience early failure. Factors that contribute to failure can be 
seen at both the firm level and in the external environment. At the firm level, 
commercialisation complexities in starting a high technology company, it is argued, 
require specific supportive mechanisms that not only improve survival but lead to 
growth. More start-up successes and growing firms can result in increased employment, a 
stronger high technology sector and spillover effects that combine to contribute to 
economic prosperity. Failure at the external level relates to lack of supportive elements 
for firms. Research on successful high technology regions, such as Silicon Valley, 
Cambridge, UK and Cambridge, Massachusetts points out the critical importance of a 
supportive infrastructure for new and growing firms. These elements include tax 
incentives, the provision of business parks and programs that facilitate supportive agents 
that understand the needs and requirements of emerging and existing firms. Government 
intervention, it is argued, is required that stimulates creation of supportive agents and 
thus a critical mass of competitive firms can be established that make an impact on the 
regional economy. 
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3 Enterprise support networks 
The stimulation of 'enterprise support networks' is a common strategy designed to create 
and develop a supportive infrastructure for high technology companies, or an 
'entrepreneurial infrastructure' [5]. It is based on entrepreneurial network theory that 
suggests that strength, complexity and diversity of business relationships influence newly 
formed firm performance, resulting in improvement of the 10'nger term chances of firm 
survival and growth [6]. 
Similarly, the literature on 'industrial districts' puts forward the argument that there 
are a certain number of invisible factors that are favourable to economic development, 
such as the constitution of networks and the development of confidence and close 
relationships between firms [7] .Malechi and Todtling [8] assert that network creation is a 
growing policy prescription for regions where networks have failed to emerge. 
, A body of research literature stresses the importance of informal social contact as a 
starting point to knowledge acquisition for the entrepreneur. Initial contacts from social 
networks evolve into business-focused networks, and then into strategic networks, which 
allow firms to innovate and to thrive by their links to other organizations [9-12]. 
Monsted [13] distinguishes between three types of networks, with each serving a 
different function for the entrepreneur: 
networks for service and assistance; 
2 networks for information and structuring, particularly for knowledge about whom to 
contact for a specific purpos~; and 
3 networks for entrepreneurship and product development. 
Sanberg and Logan [14] found that an entrepreneur's 'network' really comprises multiple 
networks defined by the resources each network provides. They argue that the 
entrepreneur who fails to make this distinction, directing energies toward developing an 
undifferentiated "network", is less likely to acquire critical resources than is one who 
targets their most effective sources. One question that Sanberg and Logan propose is not 
whether networks are required for co-ordination, but under what conditions they work 
best. Larson (1991) found that the entrepreneurial firm's ability to identify, cultivate and 
manage a network partnership is an essential condition for survival and success. 
A body of research has shown that entrepreneurs gain access to resources and 
information through their networks to start-up, develop and grow enterprises 
[10,16.17.18]. In addition to a supply of resources, networks provide social support and 
self-confidence and strategic capacity to learn and organise for new activities [18]. Best 
[19] suggests that networks are preferable to markets because they involve more social 
contact and encourage information to be shared, they are more co-operative and less 
competitive and they reinforce the sense of mutual obligation on which society depends. 
Pihkala et al [20] suggest that networking involves a variety of capabilities, including 
communicating skills, cooperativeness, ability to share a vision, trust, ability to act as a 
network broker, customer orientation, ability to use market information, knowledge of 
cooperative agreements and market orientation. Many of the higher order competencies 
required to operate a successful new venture are learned from other successful 
businesses. Previous entrepreneurs may share their knowledge that is essential in 
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operating a business, such as regulations, taxes, accounting, suppliers custom d 
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Networks may be particularly important at the start-up phase. Starr and MacMillan 
argue that the entrepreneur needs to mobilise 'social resources' because of liabilities that 
include size,. lack of market legitimacy and newness. Sharman et al [21] state that, for 
entrepreneunal ventures, networks can contribute positively to gaining organisational 
legitimacy and to developing a desirable marketplace reputation. 
4 Evaluating support networks 
Much of the debate over support for high technology questions the effectiveness of 
support strategies. While difficult to quantify, the quality and the value added by support 
initiatives reflect great variation from country to country, and even from location to 
location in a given country [I]. These authors suggest that there is a need to compile and 
publicise the 'best practices' in each country and internationally, to provide a benchmark, 
and also to avoid duplication of effort and control confusing signals from the myriad of 
entities operating in this field. 
There is little evaluation research specifically on constituency-building or network 
progr~ [22] similar to Connect Scotland, despite the fact that many have been 
operating for over a decade in high technology 'regions' of North America and Western 
Europe. 10hannisson [22] points out a number of methodological problems associated 
with analysing networks. He suggests that networks are often taken for granted and not 
fully appreciated, in part because of the social or informal character of many networks. A 
related issue is the difficulties in establishing a causal relationship between networking 
and enterprise performance. ' 
A key factor in evaluating program effectiveness is the purpose and motivation for 
evaluation. An evaluation methodology for any intervention program requires a defined 
purpose as well as scaleable and appropriate assessment objectives. Different 
organisations may have different motives for undertaking and commissioning 
evaluations. Public accountability may emphasise a cost-benefit analysis and level of 
performance measurement for program delivery. 
Much evaluation research has arisen from a rather narrowly based concern to ensure 
that public program represent 'good' value for money. Many evaluations are concerned 
fundamentally with assessing the success or failure of programs [24]. Few evaluations are 
able to provide definitive evidence regarding 'success', mainly because of the complexity 
of methodological issues that confront researchers, according to Gregory and Martin [3]. 
Success may be determined in absolute or differential terms. The measurement of 
impacts present particular problems because of the way in which evaluators adopt various 
definitions of what constitutes success, i.e., job creation, firm growth or firm survival 
rates. 
Deakins et al. [2] note that research on business development support programs is too 
often carried out retrospectively; giving little or no opportunity to compare the 
differences that such support has made to the objectives and managerial ability 9f clients 
involved in the program of support. In the same vein, studies of support programs have 
pointed to a consistent lack of internal monitoring and information-gathering mechanisms 
that make it very difficult to evaluate results and impacts. 
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Alford [25] stresses that evaluators require high quality primary data, and the 
program administrators rarely assemble it adequately. Few program evaluations have 
included both qualitative and quantitative measures of 'process-oriented' outcomes and 
as a result some evaluators have found themselves unable to advise on improving 
program design to enhance effectiveness [3]. Individuals and groups may require 
evaluation systems that continually audit the delivery of services and their outcomes, and 
provide evidence of effectiveness to aid in their decision-making [24]. 
Patton [26] points out that process evaluations are aimed at understanding the internal 
dynamics of program operations, and typically require a detailed description of program 
operations. Process analysis asks how the program works with emphasis on identifying 
ways of improving program design and delivery, and is typically qualitative in approach 
[27]. A process evaluation requires sensitivity to both qualitative and quantitative change 
in programs throughout their development, and means becoming intimately acquainted 
with the details of the program [26]. 
Patton suggests that process evaluations permit decision makers and information 
users to understand the dynamics of program operations, shedding light on the extent to 
which the program is operating the way it is supposed to be operating. They are also 
useful for revealing areas in which programs can be improved as well as highlighting 
those strengths that should be preserved. Patton cites two other uses of process 
evaluations. They permit people not intimately involved in the program-external funders, 
public officials and external agencies-to understand how the program operates. As well. 
they are particularly useful for dissemination and replication of programs under 
conditions where a program has served as a demonstration project or is considered to be a 
model worthy of replication at another site. The real-time evaluation of Connect Scotland 
offers a particular way of realising the spirit of process evaluation. 
4.1 Some basic criteria for program evaluation 
An analysis of the evaluation literature concerned with support programs shows that there 
are at least four major criteria to be fulfilled in a process evaluation. These are: 
An evaluation methodology for any support program requires a defined purpose as 
well as scaleable and appropriate assessment objectives in terms of both process and 
outcomes. 
2 A process evaluation requires sensitivity to both qualitative and quantitative change 
in programs throughout their development, and means becoming intimately 
acquainted with the details of the program. 
3 If the results of an evaluation are to gain widespread acceptance and credibility in the 
public domain, it is essential that a full range of stakeholder perspectives be 
incorporated into the research design. This suggests incorporating a measure of the 
'value' that stakeholders perceive from exposure to the program, and preferably how 
that perceived value changes over the time of the program. 
4 If a phenomenon under investigation is complex, information-rich cases are useful in 
learning a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the 
evaluation. This is difficult to achieve and requires a level of analysis that focuses on 
each company (micro-firm level). 
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Drawing together evaluation results, establishing effectiveness and credibility and 
improving the program's delivery and process are seen as important challenges for most 
evaluations. As we shall see, the real-time evaluation of Connect Scotland tries to 
incorporate all these criteria in its design and implementation. Before entering into the 
discussion on the methodology, however, the paper will review the rise and development 
of the Connect Scotland constituency. 
5 Rise, development, aims and mechanisms of the Connect Scotland 
Program 
5.1 Origin of Connect Scotland concept 
Connect is a story of transfer of entrepreneurship; its origins have evolved from Connect 
San Diego. In February of 1995 Ian MacDonald had an initial idea of researching US 
business links and support programs as part of his PhD. This research took him to 
Washington DC, where MacDonald first heard of a project operating in San Diego called 
Connect. He got in touch with the Connect San Diego Program Director, Dr. Abigail 
Barrow, who had spent some time working and researching in Edinburgh. From this 
meeti.!!&...it was proposed that in a further visit to the US, MacDonald would visit Connect 
in San Diego. Upon his return to the US, he spent a month interviewing various 
individuals involved with the Connect network. This research gave rise to the strong 
opinion by MacDonald that a similar style of organisation could play a significant role 
within the Scottish business arena. 
Initial efforts began in January 1996, focusing on creating both awareness and 
support for a Scottish version of the original San Diego Connect project. One of the first 
people Ian sought for consul and discussion on the concept was Martin Ritchie, a 
successful Scottish entrepreneur whose support, MacDonald thought, would provide 
initial credibility in developing a supportive infrastructure in this critical early stage. 
From this point, founding sponsors were identified and secured, largely drawn from the 
private sector. Connect found a home at the Management School following strong 
support from the University of Edinburgh. In their interviews, both MacDonald and 
Martin Ritchie allude to the critical support from Sir Stewart Sutherland, the Principal of 
the University of Edinburgh, who facilitated Connect locating the program at the 
Management School. 
5.2 Initial Connect's formalisation steps 
The initial steps of formal ising the creation of the Connect program were taken in 1995 at 
the University of Edinburgh. In 1996, a proposal was submitted to the Scottish Higher 
Education Funding Council (SHEFC) [28] for the start of a pilot program of activity and 
events initially focused on the Lothian and Fife region. In this 1996 proposal, it was made 
clear that the intention was for the activities of Connect to be eventually extended to 
other regions within Scotland. This intention was realised through a further proposal in 
1997, with the result that the program expanded nationally to become Connect Scotland 
[29]. 
The Connect concept conformed to one of the key themes in SHEFC's 1995 
Corporate Plan, namely, "to develop the responsiveness and vitality of the research base 
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in Scottish higher education, and to work with higher education institutions and other 
agencies in contributing to economic competitiveness and the quality of life." More 
specifically it confonned to a critical objective within this theme, "to develop further 
links between Scottish higher education institutions and industry and commerce" [29]. 
Most importantly, the development of a Connect program in Scotland was a central 
recommendation given in the Technology Ventures strategy document published on 
28 August 1996. 
This document built on the earlier Commercialisation Enquiry conducted by Scottish 
Enterprise (SE) and the Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE) and identified a wide range of 
factors requiring attention to help nurture a technology ventures culture and economy in 
Scotland. It also proposed avenues to tackle the problem, amongst them, the 
establishment of "a networking and business support infrastructure to generate effective 
academic-industry links facilitating the multi-directional flow of infonnation between 
academia, companies and service providers. Connect at the University of California, San 
Diego, may be an appropriate model" [30]. The development of Connect in Scotland 
constitutes a clear answer to this recommendation and the "vision is to create and develop 
a program that will have an impact in Scotland similar to that of the Connect program is 
San Diego" [29, p.4]. 
Thus, Connect was developed against a background of the Technology Ventures 
Strategy. Technology Ventures' broad aim is to establish new businesses and jobs within 
Scotland and is based at Scottish Enterprise. Technology Ventures itself was created as a 
result of a Commercialisation Enquiry conducted jointly by the Scottish Office and the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh. 
Today, Connect Scotland is supported by Technology Ventures, the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh, the Scottish Office Education and Industry Department and the Scottish 
Higher Education Funding Council. 
5.3 Connect's objectives 
Since its inception, Connect set for itself an ambitious mission: 
"To support the creation, development and growth of technology-based 
enterprise throughout Scotland ". 
The above mission was to be achieved through a program of activities and events 
facilitating and encouraging interactions between the university sector, large 
corporations, emerging companies, service providers, regional government, economic 
development agencies and support groups. The program was to bring together a wide 
variety of communities, including entrepreneurs, technologists, scientists, banks, equity 
capital providers, business consultants, accountants, lawyers and policy-makers, helping 
to bridge the knowledge gap existing between these communities. . . 
Connect's mission followed the rationale that interaction between these communttles 
is critical for the development of high growth and high technology enterprises [29).. It 
also followed the findings and recommendations of enquiries and policies of key ScottIsh 
industrial and academic institutions, including Scottish Enterprise, SHEFC and the Royal 
Society. . 
To a large extent Connect Scotland set for itself a fundamental ch.allenge. for thIS 
Scottish knowledge economy namely to "stimulate a resource and expertIse envIronment 
for interaction, learning and opportunities for different communities interested 111 the 
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development of technologt~ased ventures and, ultimately, economic growth". Bridging 
of the knowledge gap eXIstmg between these different communities is central to this 
purpose and relates to the Connect's six key objectives, as listed below: 
I Develop and educate an expert infrastructure that understands and supports the needs 
of technology-based ventures, giving companies access to a network of expertise and 
resources essential to their success in a global market-place. 
2 Facilitate and support the transfer of technology from the Scottish science base to 
new and existing firms, either by spin-out or through collaborative projects. 
3 Complement specific initiatives in individual agencies and organisations, providing a 
resource that can be used by all participants to promote and develop related activities 
and projects [32]. 
4 Enhance the ability of new and existing firms to secure finance. 
5 Educate entrepreneurs about business development and issues germane to their 
industries. 
6 Help entrepreneurs to define new businesses and whether they should start them. 
5.4 -Gennect Organisation and delivery and communication channels 
Connect as a networking organisation is involved in managing and propagating 
communication through its events, which is the primary responsibility of Connect staff. 
Logistical and administrative activities for event delivery are major work tasks, followed 
up by event facilitation that ultimately provides the interface between Connect and its 
stakeho lder constituency. 
Notification of events is send out - through Jargon - a newsletter that keeps members 
and sponsors abreast of developments and news regarding events, workshops etc. 
An important aspect of recruiting new company members is scanning a variety of 
sources for companies that Connect staff views as relevant for membership. The Connect 
database of contact firms is thus constantly expanding. 
Figure 1 provides an approximation of the Connect network. Starting from the bottom 
right are all the members of the Connect constituency: finns, sponsors, individuals, etc. 
who are scattered across North, East and West of the country. Sponsors maybe private 
service providers, technology companies, enterprise agencies and they pay a £3000 fee. 
Virtually all Scottish universities are also sponsors. Individuals are attendants to events 
who have no organisational affiliation and firms maybe non-sponsor technology 
companies who are either paying members (at £ 150 each) or non-paying members. These 
stakeholders have regional working groups as shown to the left of Figure I and they can 
form part of the Connect Executive or National Board, where they interact more closely 
with the Connect Administration. The entire process is guided by the Connect's Advisory 
Board, made up by sponsors and regional working groups who are instrumental in 
developing the array of topics for the events. 
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Figure 2 illustrates the range the delivery and communication interface and feedback 
processes used by Connect. Most of the items are self-explanatory with exception of 
Jargon that is the newsletter of Connect. 
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5.5 Connect's support mechanisms (activities and events) 
Table I shows the activities and events that includes briefings, lectures, courses, 
workshops, conferences, technical and social support. The six Connect events shO\vn in 
Table 1 are expected to playa specific purpose for specific target audiences and they all 
combine to fulfil the targets of the overall program. 
There are threerecurring types of events that are considered core activities for 
Connect, in that they are intended to involve the greatest number of participants and 
maintain a continuous flow of learning among stakeholders: These events are enterprise 
workshops, an audience with ... , and technology briefings - the first two focused on 
enhancing general managerial skills and stimulating learning from the experience of 
others, whereas technology briefings provide a forum for actual business processes of 
collaboration to be initiated. 
Table 1 shows three additional types of events: two annual conferences (Investment 
and Partnership) and the Springboard Workshop delivered on a flexible but less than 
frequent basis. The first three core events are the main subject of the first-phase on the 
evolution of Connect, with the others left for future examination, in line with the 
scalability of the proposed methodology (see below section 6). 
Table 1 Connect's events 
Type of Event Description Objective 
Technology Forum for institutional researchers to To enhance understanding and 
briefings present their work and research facilitate technology transfer 
activities to Connect sponsors and 
technology companies. 
Enterprise Workshops bringing together To develop management skills of 
Workshops technology companies and both technological entrepreneurs 
researchers'with advisors and and entrepreneurial technologists 
business professionals 
"An Audience Technology entrepreneurs discuss the Learning from the experience of 
with ... " development of their businesses, their others and discussing 
successes and failures and their views development of their own 
of what it takes to succeed. businesses 
Springboard Forum for individuallbusinesses to To provide the entrepreneur or 
Workshops present, in confidence, their academic with practical, realistic 
technological concepts, proposed and expert advice and 
business strategy or business plans to recommendations 
an appropriate expert panel 
Investment Annual venture capital investment To provide the opportunity for 
Conference conference technology companies seeking 
finance to present to an 
international audience of 
investors. 
Partnership Annual Corporate Partnership To assist in the exploitation of the 
Conference Conference will present institutional research through partnerships, 
research to an audience of joint ventures, new company 
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5.6 Connect's committed targets 
At the start of its events and activities, Connect set for itself a number of quantitative and 
qualitative targets. These are shown in Table 2 and are the original targets established for 
Connect's first four years of operation, 1997-2000. 
Table 2 Quantifiable targets for Connect's outputs and impacts (up to end of year 200) 
Key Indicators Quantifiable Targets 
No. of events -At least 162 events; minimum of 25 participants per event; target mix is 
held 50% technology ventures; 30% academics and 20% business professionals 
No. of technology -At least 180 new and emerging technology companies will attend 
ventures the mix of workshops and briefings; 
participating in 
-Learning achieved will significantly enhance the ability oj participating ·events 
companies to increase their rate oj sustainable growth 
-Quality target is 75% of participants to rate the event as "good" or better 
on a scale measuring the perceived value of the event to the 
business/individual 
No. of -At least 216 academics/research staff will attend the mix of events 
collaborative -At least 45 collaborative projects between technology ventures and 
projects-"" university/research centres to be established in the project period 
No. of technology -At least 40 technology companies will secure developmental/growth 
ventures securing funding 
funding -Pilot has already established that technology ventures participating in 
Connect significantly improve their ability to secure development finance 
through their increased understanding oj the needs oj providers oj finance 
No. of spin-out -Connect will facilitate and enable the creation of 15 spin-out companies 
compames from the Scottish science base and established technology companies 
formed -Participation in Connect is likely to improve the survival and growth rate 
oj any spin-out company 
No. of new jobs -Minimum of 180 new high income jobs enabled by Connect 
Connect's committed targets contain six key indicators with quantifiable targets and are 
focused on three themes: 
• number of events and audience mix (stakeholder attendance expected to events) 
• number of technology companies securing development/growth funding 
e number of spin-out companies, collaborations and associated jobs created 
From Table 2, it can be seen that the nature of the committed targets increases In 
difficulty as one moves down the table. Delivering a specific number of events, for 
example, is much easier than demonstrating that a minimum of 180 new high-income 
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6 Real-time evaluation methodology for Connect Scotland 
" ... From t?e ?utset it was empha~ised to sponsors that they would be unlikely 
to see any slgmficant return on thelr investment for at least three to five years." 
(Ian MacDonald, Director of Connect, 1997) 
Connect has a broad mandate to develop a supportive infrastructure for high technology 
companies, or an 'entrepreneurial infrastructure'. Connect is a unique support program 
with its own particularities and characteristics. No off-the-shelf recipe exists to evaluate a 
program such as Connect. This section describes the main tenets of the real-time 
evaluation methodology applied to the Connect Scotland program. 
6.1 Purpose and ingredients of real-time evaluation 
It should be first stressed that the defined purpose of the evaluation of Connect is not an 
arms-length post-mortem evaluation. It is indeed intended and designed to contribute to 
the development of the program by making explicit achievements, difficulties, challenges 
and weaknesses, with the results fed back into the evolving constituency. In short, the 
Connect evaluation is, in itself, an explicit learning factor of the program. 
In addition, in line with the findings of the literature, the real-time evaluation of 
Conn~ is longitudinal, process-oriented and flexible. It includes assessment of 
achievements against committed targets, but it does not focus exclusively on them, since 
such a focus is not revealing of the development of a supportive infrastructure and the 
actual value added by the program. Indeed, it must be taken into account that Connect is 
fundamentally about 'connecting' and stimulating social, financial and knowledge flows. 
But Connect itself does not pursue the formal and systematic mentoring or nurturing of a 
newly emerging venture, collaboration or potential spin off. In this respect, Connect has 
no direct control of processes leading to new or increased numbers of collaborative 
projects, technology ventures securing funding, spin out companies, or new jobs. This 
means that exclusive focus on committed target suffers from a gap in the understanding 
of the processes between event participation and significant new venture creation. It 
seems to be assumed that such intermediate processes have simply happened if 
committed targets such as the creation of spinouts occur with clear reference an initial 
stakeholder 'connection' stimulated by Connect. A longitudinal, process-oriented 
methodology should take care of such a 'process gap', particularly by capturing the 
experience of emerging ventures through case study at firm level. 
The real time evaluation of Connect integrates four major complementary ingredients 
illustrated in the 'methodological jigsaw' of Figure 3. 
• A conceptual lens to make sense of the complexities and multiple elements involved 
in the Connect constituency building process. This framework enables an appropriate 
organisation of the problem together with continual information gathering for 
evolutionary analysis of Connect's objectives related to effect on stakeholders 
• Knowledge on the evolution of the Connect constituency at program level. This 
looks at two aspects: (a) the origins and development of the Connect program 
revealing what has happened with the implementation of its core activities and (b) 
the value-added delivered by the Connect program with reference to its original 
objectives and as judged by its stakeholders. Three types of value flows are 
-
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distinguished: social, knowledge and financial flows, each offering a gradation of 
possible outcomes from 'easier' to 'more demanding' to achieve. The two aspects 
complement each other to generate a picture of the development of Connect's and its 
impact with reference to the program's committed qualitative and quantitative 
targets. 
• Knowledge of ways in which Connect's activities is having an influence at 
individual firm or venture levels. These 'best-practice' cases complement the 
findings of the program level by seeking to reveal where and how Connect's value is 
realised through the experiences of specific stakeholders. The combined insights of 
the program and case-study levels help produce a richer picture of the evolution of 
Connect, its achievements, limitations, and lessons of practical value for both 
Connect and other similar programs. 
Figure 3 Ingredients of real-time evaluation of Connect at program and 'best-practice' venture 
level 
- f- Conceptual ~ 
Lens 
Connect . 
Real-Time Knowledge of 
Evaluation Programme 
Knowledge at Evolution and 




\) A battery of research tools combining review of secondary literature and archival 
data, survey questionnaire, semi-structured interview guides, and elements of 
participant observation through event attendance. 
6.1.1 The Conceptual Lens of Constituency-Building [34] 
To provide a unifying conceptual lens to the understanding of the Connect program, the 
real-time evaluation methodology treats the development of Connect as a process of 
constituency-building targeted on specific audiences and intent on achieving defined 
targets through the implementation of an integrated set of mechanisms and activities. In 
particular, the lens of constituency building helps to partition and organise ~he treatment 
of the mUltiple elements involved in the development of the Connect constItuency. The 
content of this constituency-building process is illustrated in Figure 4, in the form of a 
413 
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multi-layered diagram containing Connect's events and mechanl'sms C t' " , onnec s eXIstIng 
and target stakeholders, and Connect's existing and target outcomes. These layers should 
not be seen as separate from each other. In practice each of the outer la b " ' yers su sumes 
and reqUlres of the mner layers to happen. 
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A more detailed explanation of Figure 4 shows that the circle at its centre represents the 
focus of the real-time evaluation, namely, the entire process of Connect constituency-
building for the sake of supporting the creation, development and growth of technology-
based enterprise throughout Scotland. 
The first layer around the core shows the main activities, events and mechanisms 
through which the Connect constituency-process is realised. 
The second layer around the core shows the key constituents or stakeholders, either 
present or targeted by the activities, events and mechanisms of the Connect programs. 
The third and final layer around the core shows the target results expected to lead to 
the ultimate mission of growth of Scottish technology ventures and industry. 
The critical feature of the Connect constituency-building process is its facilitation and 
encouragement of interactions between the stakeholders through their activities, event 
and mechanisms. The unifying lens of constituency-building should enable the capturing 
of this process. 
--
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6.1.2 Knowledge o/Connect Program evolution and impact with reference to 
committed qualitative and quantitative targets 
This aspect of the evaluation is a continuous, flexible and scaleable process that looks at 
the evolving Connect experience, identifying strengths, weaknesses, and lessons. Three 
reports under the title of Connect's Targets, Evolution and Achievements are envisaged 
during the two-year life of the evaluation. 
An initial assessment of Connect's key indicators and quantifiable targets (see 
Section 5.6) was originally conducted by August 1999, on the basis of infonnation made 
available by the Connect office. The results can be seen in the far right column of Table 
3. Of the six key indicators, only two could be approximately quantified with the data 
available and some of the categories were not precisely defined. The number of 
collaborative projects, technology ventures securing funding, spinout companies fonned, 
and jobs, was unknown. 
This prompted the need to develop the methodology further in order to generate a 
picture with a much finer resolution of Connect's impact and value. Three value flows 
were identified from Connect's own objectives -social, knowledge and financial value 
flows. Indeed, as Table 4 shows, knowledge value is an overriding expectation of all 
Connect events, with financial value also pursued explicitly. At the same time, social 
value....is...central to Connect's mandate since informal and formal social contacts are the 
starting point for business-focused networks and developments. 
Table 3 Quantifiable committed and realized targets for Connect 
Key Indicators Quantifiable Targets Realised 
(Aug-/999) 
No. of events held -At least 162 events; minimum of25 participants - \09 events, 51 events under 25 
per event; target mix is 50% technology ventures; participants 
30% academics and 20% business professionals 32% technology ventures 




No. of technology -At least 180 new and emerging technology -this specific type of company 
ventures companies will attend the mix of workshops and was difficult to ascertain from 
participating in briefings; avail. data. 
events -Learning achieved will significantly enhance the 
ability of participating companies to increase -Quality unknown 
their rate of sustainable growth 
-Quality target is 75% of participants to rate the 
event as "good" or better on a scale measuring 
the perceived value of the event to the 
business/individual 
No. of collaborative -At least 216 academics/research staff will attend -over 400 staff 
projects the mix of events 
-At least 45 collaborative projects between -Unknown 
technology ventures and university/research 
centres to be established in the project period 
--
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Table 3 Quantifiable committed and realized targets for Connect (continued) 
No. of technology -At least 40 technology companies will secure Unknown 
ventures securing developmental/growth funding 
funding -Pilot has already established that technology 
ventures participating in Connect significantly 
improve their ability to secure development 
finance through their increased understanding of 
the needs of providers of finance 
No. of spin-out -Connect will facilitate and enable the creation of Unknown 
companies formed 15 spin-out companies from the Scottish science 
base and established technology companies 
-Participation in Connect is likely to improve the 
survival and growth rate of any spin-out 
company 
No. of jobs -Minimum of 180 new high income jobs enabled Unknown 
by Connect 
Table 4 Value focus of Connect's core events 
Type of event Objective Value/oeus 
Technology briefings To enhance understanding and facilitate Knowledge 
-- technology transfer 
Enterprise Workshops To develop the general management skills of Knowledge 
both technological entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurial technologists 
"An Audience with .... " Learning from the experience of others and Knowledge 
discussing development of their own 
businesses 
Springboard Workshops To provide the entrepreneur or academic with Knowledge 
practical, realistic and expert advice and 
recommendations 
Investment Conference To provide the opportunity for technology Finance 
companies seeking finance to present to an 
international audience of investors. 
Partnership Conference To assist in the exploitation of the research Knowledge/Finan 
through partnerships, joint ventures, new ce 
company creation 
Each of the three value flows was then decomposed into topics aimed at capturing a 
gradation of impact or value added by Connect as perceived by the program's 
stakeholders. The resulting topics are listed in Figure 5 and provide the basis for 
questions to stakeholders on where Connect has been beneficial regarding social and 
business contacts, gaining or giving relevant knowledge, and attracting or providing 
financing for new companies or ventures. 
-
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Figure 5 Topics for determining social, knowledge and financial value from Connect events 
SOCIAL VALUE 
Meeting interesting people with shared interests 
Feeling part of a network for contact, advice 
CONNECT EVENTS 
(event participation and mix of 
stakeholders) 
KNOWLEDGE VALUE 
Relevant business information 
IP~ensing, transfer of technology 
New technologies/developments 
How to partner/collaborate 
Valuation 
Management skills 
Training and support opportunities 
Writing/presenting business plans 
Learning from others in network 
Advise from supportive agents 
FINANCIAL VALUE 
Contacts 
Between companies and financiers 
Between service providers-clients 
Activities 
Provision of financial information 
Receipt of financial information 
Transactions 
Investments and developments 
Collaborations and spin-outs 
Given the complexity and mUltiplicity of elements in the Connect constituency-building 
process illustrated in Figure 4, the evaluative analysis prioritises certain aspects of this 
process over others in different reports of the entire set making up the evaluation of 
Connect. This is facilitated by the longitudinal and process-oriented character of the 
methodology that permits a flexible and scaleable application along the life of the project. 
Thus, in dealing with the first layer of Connect's activities, events and mechanisms, 
the report chooses to focus primarily on what has happened regarding Connect's three 
core recurring events (see Section 5.5 above): enterprise workshops, an audience with ... , 
and technology briefings), leaving the treatment of other Connect events and mechanisms 
for later evaluation. At least two elements of assessment are included: 
Actual_effort versus committed targets. This is a straightforward general quantifiable 
evaluation of the targets and milestones committed by the program (see Table 2). 
2 Response rates. This is focused basically on event attendance. It is mostly 
quantitative and does not inquire into the quality of the responses. 
However, in dealing with the second and third layers of Figure 4 -Connect's institutional 
constituents/stakeholders and Growth of Scottish Technology Ventures and lndustry- the 
--
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6.1.3 Knowledge of 'Best-practice' cases at firm or venture level 
As already noted, the real-time evaluation of Connect complements the findings at 
program level with 'best-practice' case studies seeking to reveal where and how 
Connect's value is realised through the experiences of specific stakeholders. 
In practice, Connect participants are likely to vary in their appreciation and 
experience of the value delivered by the Connect program. Case study evaluation helps 
precisely to capture these individual differences or unique variations from one program 
experience to another. Case studies also help to reveal more deeply the actual impact (at a 
given point in time) of the Connect program relative to its ultimate economic growth 
objectives (third layer of Figure 4). These objectives may include, for instance, 
companies' growth factors influenced by Connect and estimated impact on growth (e.g., 
capitalisation, market share). 
The cases selected for study may include spin-outs, project collaborations, business 
funding and development, technology transfer, etc. and will examine eventual success or 
failure to reach the ultimate objectives of Connect. The focus will be on selecting 
information-rich cases with the aim of capturing and describing the main issues, factors 
and type of value added by Connect to the development of the venture. 
The combined insights of program and case study levels will help produce a richer 
picture...of the evolution of the Connect constituency, its achievements, limitations, and 
lessons. This should prove of practical value not only for Connect but, also, for other 
network programs with similar characteristics to Connect. 
6.1.4 Research tool-kit 
The real-time evaluation methodology makes use of appropriate combinations of various 
research tools in order to gather the data and information necessary to generate the 
knowledge mapped out in previous sections at both program and case-study levels. This 
research tools combine review of secondary literature and archival data, survey 
questionnaire, semi-structured interview guides, and elements of participant observation 
through event attendance. 
In particular, a combination of archival data, survey questionnaire and semi-
structured interview guides is used to map the evolution of the Connect constituency and 
quantify its achievement against the committed targets. 
Qualitative information on the programmatic development of Connect as well as 
detailed data and information for the in-depth case studies is gathered primarily by means 
of in-depth interviews guided by semi-structured guides. 
In all instances, the research makes use of appropriate search and analysis of available 
archival material and secondary literature to support the analysis of the information 
coming from the interviews. 
7 Summary of first-phase results of implementing the real-time evaluation 
of Connect Scotland 
This section looks at the findings of the evaluation with particular focus on two aspects: 
--
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the fulfilment of Connect's committed target, and 
2 the perceived value delivered by the program to its stakeholders 
7.1 Program targets. Commitments vs. realisation 
Table 5 provides the quantifiable targets for Connect's outputs and impacts for the entire 
duration of the national program until the end of year 1999. 
Table 5 Quantifiable targets for Connect's outputs and impacts (up to end of year 1999) 
Key Indicators Quantifiable Targets Realised (at 0/12000) 
No. of events -At least 162 events; minimum of 25 participants per event; -over 162 events 
held target mix is 50% technology ventures; 30% academics and 62% tech ventures 
20% business professionals 
14% academic 
(universities) 




No. of -At least 180 new and emerging technology companies will -over 180 companies of all 
technorogy- attend the mix of workshops and briefings; types (104 companies have 
ventures -Learning achieved will significantly enhance the ability of become members by mid-
participating in participating companies to increase their rate of sustainable 2000) 
events growth 
-Quality target is 75% of participants to rate the event as -Good to Very Good 
"good" or better on a scale measuring the perceived value of (84% of survey 
the event to the business/individual respondents) 
No. of -At least 216 academics/research staff will attend the mix of -well over 216 
collaborative events (over 400 by August-1999) 
projects -At least 45 collaborative projects between technology 
ventures and university/research centres to be established in -Not identified 
the project period 
No. of -At least 40 tech. companies will secure -Not identified. 
technology development/growth funding 
ventures -Pilot has established that tech. ventures participating in 
securing Connect significantly improve their ability to secure 
funding developmentfinance through their increased understanding 
of the needs of providers of finance 
No. of spin-out -Connect will facilitate and enable the creation of 15 spin- -Not identified 
companies out companies from the Scottish science base and 
fonned established technology companies 
-Participation in Connect is likely to improve the survival 
and growth rate of any spin-out company 
No. of jobs -Minimum of 180 new high income jobs enabled by -Not identified 
created Connect 
7.1.1 Number of events held and quality 
The real-time evaluation has shown that Connect is meeting its quantifiable targets for 
events. The committed cumulative number of events to be held by year-end 2000 (162) 
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report concentrates on the assessment of the social knowledge d fi . I I . , an manCla va ue 
delIvered b,y the Conn~ct program as ~udged by the stakeholders. Here the methodolog) 
adopt~ the expanded flngs.' approach Illustrated in Figure 6, as a practical way to select a 
meanmgful sample of specIfic stakeholders to be approached for the research. 
Figure 6 'Expanded Rings" approach to assessment of Connect's value flows 
Heard of Connect but fail to engage 
The first ring includes those individual and institutional constituents/stakeholders who 
have participated most in the activities and events of Connect. These include stakeholders 
who are recurrent participants to Connect events (for instance, five or more events) . 
Outward from the first ring there will be a gradation of participation passing through 
those stakeholders who, for instance, have attended two to four events, right through to 
those who have attended one event only, and to those who may have heard of Connect 
but not engaged with the program yet. 
The premise is that those constituents in the first ring, by being more active, are likely 
to be the most informative about the value flows generated by the Connect program. The 
further away from the first ring, the less informative the stakeholders will be, although 
they may be highly revealing of reasons why the program has failed to engage them 
recurrently, or at all. The first-phase evaluation applied this 'expanded ring' approach to 
select a significant interview or survey sample containing stakeholder from the three 
rings illustrated in Figure 6. 
--
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will be significantly exceeded. This total includes all types of events that Connect 
delivers and not just the recurrent events that have provided the focus for this report. 
However, the target mix of participants (based on 1999 data of recurrent events only) is 
rather unbalanced, with higher-than-targeted percentages of service providers and 
technology ventures attendance and lower-than-targeted academic attendance. This 
suggests a potential difficulty regarding the objective of stimulating university spin-outs 
or university-industry collaboration. 
The target of minimum 25 participants by event had a variable success: sometimes 
above, sometimes below the target. Thus, the number of participants per recurrent event 
in 1999 was 22, compared to the committed target of 25. This average attendance to all 
three recurrent events, however, increased in the second half of 1999 - most significantly 
in enterprise workshops (from 12 to 28). 
Based on the value survey, Connect is achieving is event rating target. Eighty four 
percent of respondents rated Connect events from 'good' to 'very good' on average, 
compared to the quantifiable target: Seventy five percent oj participants to rate the el'ent 
as good or better on perceived value. 
The existing rating oj Connect events as 'good' or 'better' is too generic to be really 
useJul. The value flows and comments on the events provide a more accurate assessment 
oj event quality. 
7.1.2 Number of technology ventures participating in events 
Although the quantifiable committed target is 'At least 180 new and emerging technology 
companies will attend the mix of workshops and briefings', the criteria of 'new and 
emerging technology companies' was not precisely defined or distinguished in the 
attendance records, so that it was not possible to make a separation. If we take all 
companies however the target number of 180 is easily exceeded since, for instance, 163 
companies attended one Connect event in 1999 alone and there are currently 104 
technology companies as members, indicating that this target is being achieved. 
7.1.3 Number of ollaborative efforts and spinouts 
Connect has a target of 45 collaborative efforts and 40 spinouts. This report has not 
uncovered direct evidence of spin-outs or collaborative efforts having being facilitated or 
enabled by Connect. This is perhaps one of the most difficult targets Connect set for 
itself, as witnessed by the findings in the review of literature [44] and, particularly, by the 
low level of university-business interactions revealed by this report. However, as the 
company case study reports 4 (Spektra Systems) and 5 (Yaba Ltd.) show [45,46], 
companies are benefiting from Connect, mostly in intangible ways that may have a 
connection to collaborative efforts, spin-outs and jobs. Spektra Systems, for instance, 
credited Connect as a mechanism they effectively used to get themselves well known in 
Scotland. In turn, Yaba Ltd. considers Connect the most important support program for 
their commercialisation efforts and they attend it regularly [47]. This could be seen as 
more in line with the softer comment accompanying the committed quantifiable target in 
Table 7, namely, the Participation in Connect is likely to improve the survival alld 
growth rate oj any spinout company. 
-
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7.1.4 Number of technology ventures securingfunding 
C.onnect has a .target of 40 companies securing funding. The value survey did not uncover 
dlr~ct supportmg reference to Connect having secured funding for technology ventures 
until end-1999. Some respondents saw some connection as a result of attending the 
events but did not ascertain direct causal relationship. This could be seen to be more in 
line with the softer comment accompanying the committed quantifiable target in Table 7, 
namely, "technology ventures participating in Connect significantly improve their ability 
to secure development finance through their increased understanding of the needs of 
providers offinance. " 
7.1.5 Number of jobs created 
Connect has a target of a minimum of 180 new high-income jobs enabled by the program. 
Again, the value survey did not uncover direct supporting reference to Connect having 
enabled high-income jobs. This is consistent with the lack of evidence for direct Connect-
facilitated spinouts or collaborative efforts already discussed. 
7.1.6 Problem with the assessment of committed targets 
There is a real problem with identifying, assessing and measuring Connect's direct 
impact on targets such as new venture development, company growth and job 
enab1ement. The problem is that the causal relations for this type of outcomes are not 
simple and, definitely, they are influenced by factors beyond the direct impact of the 
activities and mechanisms of the Connect constituency-building process. As an 
interviewee put it: 
"Can Connect identify where the value conversations commence; where the 'sign-posts' 
are? Connect introduces people; what they do from there is beyond Connect, as Connect 
won't be involved, and the entrepreneur may not require anything else/rom Connect 
beyond the introduction ". 
(Scottish University Commercialisation Officer, interview, February 2000) 
7.2 Stakeholders' perception of Connect's social, knowledge and financial 
valuejlows 
As noted, the value survey decomposed each of the social, knowledge and financial value 
flows into 'value statements' aimed at capturing a gradation of impact or value added by 
Connect as perceived by the stakeholders. The following are the results, taking into 
account that the period goes until end of 1999. 
Stakeholders rated social value as the most important perceived benefit from 
attendance to Connect events (Figure 7). This suggests that at the time of the evaluation 
the greatest impact of Connect has been on social networking. This is consistent with the 
logical evolution of networks where social interactions and acquaintances tend to precede 
the exchanges and collaborations involving knowledge and financial value. Indeed, 
Gregson [22] has stressed the importance of informal social contact that evolve into 
business-focused networks, and then into strategic networks. A test for the evolution of 
-
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the Connect program will be to increase the knowledge and financial value delivered by 
the program as perceived by the stakeholders. 
Figure 7 Perceived value (%) from attendance to Connect events (n=69) 
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Figure 8 shows the vanatlOn in perceived social, knowledge and financial value of 
Connect by stakeholder category. Companies and sponsors vary the most in diversity of 
perceived value from Connect events. 
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Let us now look in greater detail at each of the Connect's social, knowledge and 
financial values as perceived by each of the key categories of institutional stakeholder : 
sponsors, companies, universities. 
7.2.1 Social value for stakeholders 
Figure 9 shows the ranking of 'social value statements' according to percentage of 
positive responses accumulated from all respondents. As expected the number of 
-. , 
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respondents perceiving value decreases as the statements imply a more demanding value 
towards the top of the graph. 
Thus 'value statements ' directly related to network formation is seen by all 
respondents as the most valuable social value of Connect participation. Likewise 
meeting interesting people that share similar interests and concerns, and a network of 
advice and contact are clearly important for all stakeholders. In particular, participant 
noted that Connect allows them to keep in touch with what is happening in Scotland as 
well as providing a unique networking venue that allows individuals to begin the proces 
of building up trust. In contrast, getting valuable advice or business assistance score 
much lower although still with a significant number of 42% and 52% respondents 
respectively. The ability to meet people willing to invest was scored the lowest. 
Figure 9 Percentage (%) of positive responses to questions relating to social value of Connect 
(n=69) 
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7.2.2 Knowledge value for stakeholders 
80 90 100 
Figure 10 shows that learning relevant information and relevant technologies for busines 
was most important for all stakeholders. Again as expected, the number of respondents 
perceiving value decreases as the statements imply a more demanding value towards the 
top of the graph. Thus, knowledge interactions for commercialisation purposes 
(patenting, licensing, etc) were ranked low in perceived value. More specifically, duri~g 
interviews stakeholders identified lack of business-specific knowledge as a problem In 
Scotland, ~ith Connect perceived as a facilita.tor of ~he 'lateral transfer o~ inloml~tioll '. 
Companies in particular saw significant value 111 heanng about other people s expenence 
in setting up businesses and the problems that they have encountered. 
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Figure 10 Percentage (%) of positive responses to questions relating to knowledge value f 
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Also, Connect helped to increase "market awareness, who are the players, angels. etc. 
and what is innovative in Scotland". Significantly, companies did not cite universi ty-
generated knowledge as highly important. This reinforces the point that university-
business interactions still require substantial development work. 
7.2.3 Financial Value for Stakeholders 
Figure II shows that making contact with both entrepreneurs and business angels/venture 
capitalists is ranked highest, yet obtaining financial backing and investing in new 
business is ranked lowest. Again, as expected the number of respondents perceiving value 
decreases as the statements imply a more demanding value towards the top of the graph. 
This suggests that contacts for financial purposes are being made but effective 
investments have been below original expectations. 
Universities and companies were the primary respondents to financial value questions 
on the survey, although service provider sponsors did indicate a desire for financial gain 
through service to new companies in the future. Interviews with commercialisation 
officers representing three universities found that seeking and securing financial support 
for university research was a prime motivation for participation in Connect. Showcasing 
and discussing commercially viable research is facilitated through Connect, yet other 
possible financial values in the survey were ranked much less in importance. 
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Figure 11 Percentage (%) of positive responses to questions relating to financial value of Connect 
(n=69) 
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Companies, on the other hand, reflect a variety of needs of which financing is one. There 
are a number of possible explanations for variations in perceived value by stakeholder 
category, amongst them 
• Stage of commercialisation of company attending event(s). Adequate financial 
support and management skills are seen as critical elements in start-ups. Other 
elements may be more important later on or depending on the industry sector. For 
instance, those with a strong social and business network are most likely to be 
seeking more specific tangibles such as financing. 
e Period of time the entrepreneur has attended Connect events. Those who have 
attended Connect events recurrently for a long period may find that value diminishes, 
particularly if the program does not refresh its content and activities and the 
predominant value-added becomes confined to social value. 
8 The overall program evolution to date 
There has been considerable growth in the size of the Connect constituency over four 
years (1996-2000), measured by the number of sponsors and members. Connect has 
clearly developed a comprehensive network of service providers and it is perceived as a 
unique event-focused forum in Scotland. However, feedback on the future of Connect 
mentioned both the need to develop stronger linkages with existing stakeholders, 
particularly universities and the need for more and wider linkages with other support 
agencies nationally and internationally. 
Connect is perceived by a number of its stakeholders as a unique event-focu ed forum 
in Scotland. A number of stakeholders stated that Connect facilitates the building of 
'connections' that no other agency at present can provide. However, some stakeholder 
-
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believe that it could be more. Thus, much of the feedback on the future of Connect both 
mentioned the need to develop stronger linkages with existing stakeholders, particularly 
universities, and the need for more and wider linkages with other support agencies 
nationally and internationally. In this respect, it is apparent that the development of a 
supportive infrastructure for Scottish technology companies involves other support 
constituencies. Assessing Connect's role in isolation from these other supportive agents 
does not really provide an accurate picture of this infrastructure's development in 
Scotland. Research is badly needed addressing the nature and value of, and inter-relations 
between, at least the key support programs in Scotland. This would help to advance the 
public policy aim of program integration and simplification for more effective delivery of 
support to users. 
All this raises the question of future strategic direction for Connect, especially as it 
comes to the end of its current period. The role of Connect is a recurring issue, and it is 
clear that there are differences in stakeholder expectations. This will demand strong 
listening and leadership abilities to balance expectations and ideas in the best possible 
way for the future. 
8.1 The issue of value for money 
Connetthas raised close to £ I million for a three-year period of activities until the end of 
May 2001. This amounts to an approximate average cost of £330K per year to finance all 
the activities, mechanisms and events. Connect has. undoubtedly created a core 
constituency and it has been growing and delivering social, knowledge and financial 
value, and laying the foundations from which to climb towards the top end of the value 
flows. This should be seen in the perspective that the present evaluation cover mostly the 
first two years until the end of 1999. And as Director Ian MacDonald made clear: 
" ... From the outset it was emphasised to sponsors that they would be unlikely 
to see any significant return on their investment for at least three to five years." 
(Ian MacDonald, Director of Connect, 1997) 
Nevertheless, the challenge remains for Connect to raise the delivery of value to the more 
demanding targets it sets for itself. These targets are not easy to achieve as testified by all 
evidence provided by the literature on support programs. They are also not easy to 
measure, particularly in the case of Connect, whose predominant role so far has been to 
'connect' . 
A different angle of the 'value for money' issue can be seen from Figure 12. This 
shows that Scottish public sources, including universities, have contributed 
approximately £270K to the three-year Connect program (about £90K per year). Without 
counting the funds from university sponsorship (£ 118K), this amounts to close to £ IS0K 
total or £SOK per year. 
-
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Figure 12 Public and private sources of Connect funding (1997-2000) 
o European Union 
• Scottish Public 
12 Scottish Private 
This money has in tum leveraged over £220K from the private sector and close to £SOOK 
from European funding for Scotland. From this point of view of value for Scottish public 
money, Connect represents a rather inexpensive program for its achievements so far. The 
issue is whether these achievements can demonstrably be taken to the superior level of its 
own most demanding targets. In the spirit of the real-time evaluation, the following four 
recommendations were made to the Connect Scotland leadership in July 1999. 
Connect should consider: 
Improving its systems of tracking and monitoring stakeholders' participation in all its 
activities and assessing the quality and value of outcomes. More precise and detailed 
categorisations are required, for instance, the category of 'new and emerging 
technology companies' should be addressed in the light of recommendations that 
Connect should focus primarily on new and small companies. The evaluators have 
developed and used a system of 'value-flow analysis' that should become a periodic 
feature of Connect's monitoring for learning purposes. 
2 Implementing further specific actions to enhance knowledge and value flows 
bridging universities and the business world relations. The evidence of the real-time 
evaluation is that the 'connecting' mechanisms implemented so far have still to 
realise their potential for fruitful interactions and new mechanisms may be 
considered. For instance, seeking to 
Q increase the number of participant researchers by focusing on post-doctoral 
researchers who may be more liable to commercialise their technologies 
" communicate directly with researchers in order to avoid potential bottleneck 
generated by information "gatekeepers." 
$ broker or offer mentoring service on the techniques and relevance of 
researchers' presentation for effective communication to business audiences 
3 Developing stronger linkages with other support agencies nationally and 
internationally on the basis of a distinctive strategy. 
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• 
Nationally, the development of an integrated supportive infrastructure for 
Scottish technology companies involves other support constituencies and a 
closer dialogue and interaction will be beneficial. This may be catalysed by a 
research program addressing the nature and value of, and inter-relations 
between, at least the key support programs in Scotland. This would also help to 
advance the public policy aim of program integration and simplification for 
more effective delivery of support to users. 
Internationally, there are a range of vibrant and emerging commercialisation 
networks in which Connect is already a player, i.e., European programs and the 
Connect Global Alliance. Enhancing and strengthening these relation for 
purposes of knowledge sharing and cross-fertilisation of learning experiences 
would be beneficial. This should help with the implementation of a systematic 
scanning for innovative and good-practice ideas for continuous refreshment of 
program's content and mechanisms. 
3 Improving clarity and understanding of the governance of Connect by stakeholders 
and particularly sponsors. A more systematic communication and consultation effort 
will enhance the constituency-building process by helping to make Connect the 
'property' of all members of the constituency. This greater inclusivity effort should 
irtctnde closer dialogue with strategic participants on ways of improving Connect 
processes and the sharing of real-time management accounts. 
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Introduction 
Connect Scotland is a national support program to assist new 
technology companies, many of them created to exploit and 
commercialise university innovations. The Connect concept conforms 
to one of the key themes in the Scottish Higher Education Funding 
Council's (SHEFC) 1 1995 Corporate Plan, namely, ''to develop the 
responsiveness and vitality of the research base in Scottish higher 
education, and to work with higher education institutions and other 
agencies in contributing to economic competitiveness and the quality 
of life." More specifically it conforms to a critical objective within this 
theme, ''to develop further links between Scottish higher education 
institutions and industry and commerce.'.2 
A wide range of factors requiring attention to help nurture a 
technology ventures culture and economy in Scotland was identified 
in the SHEFC document that was built on the earlier 
Commercialisation Enquiry conducted by Scottish Enterprise (SE) 
and the Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE). Strategies to tackle the 
problem were proposed, amongst them, the establishment of "a 
networking and business support infrastructure to generate effective 
academiC-industry links facilitating the multi-directional flow of 
information between academia, companies and service providers. 
Connect at the University of California, San Diego, may be an 
I MacDonald, I., Connect - The University of Edinburgh Programme in 
Technology and Entrepreneurship, 29 May 1996. Proposal to SHEFC detailing 
the Background, Mission Statement, Key Stakeholders, Programme 
Administration and Activities, Resource Requirements and Funding. 
2 Request for Funding from SHEFC to Support the National Development of 
the Connect Programme (1997)] 
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appropriate model.,,3 The development of Connect in Scotland 
constitutes a clear answer to this recommendation and the ''vision is 
to create and develop a programme that will have an impact in 
Scotland similar to that of the Connect programme in San Diego.',4 
Description of Connect Scotland 
Since its inception in 1996, Connect has maintained the following 
mission: To support the creation, development and growth of 
technology-based enterprise throughout Scotland". 
To a large extent Connect Scotland set for itself a fundamental 
challenge to stimulate a resource and expertise environment for 
interaction, learning and opportunities for different communities 
interested in the development of technology-based ventures and, 
ultimately, economic growth. Connect's national focus requires that it 
bring together multiple actors in different regions of Scotland that 
include universities, sponsors, entrepreneurs and companies. 
Connect's mission above follows the rationale that interaction 
between these communities is critical for the development of high 
3 The document described UCSD Connect as follows: "Run from the 
University of California San Diego and funded by the private sector, it 
promotes the development of the region's high tech industries and the 
commercialisation of the University's research. It creates networking 
opportunities, stimulating the flow of ideas and knowledge between the 
academic, business and financial communities, and offers business 
development services assisting, for example, companies to obtain finance and 
academics to commercialise their research. Within the high tech community it 
acts as a hub, linking local and global networks." (RSElSE, Technology 
Ventures: Commercialising Scotland's Science and Technology, Scottish 
Enterprise, Glasgow, 1996, p.22) The perception exists that similar conditions 
to San Diego would apply in Scotland, thus making possible the potentially 
successful implementation of a Connect programme in Scotland. 
4 MacDonald and Ritchie, 31 st October 1997, p.4. 
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growth and high technology enterprises. Bridging of the knowledge 
gap existing between these different communities is central to this 
purpose and relates to Connect's key objectives, as explained below. 
Connect Program Objectives 
1. Develop and educate an expert infrastructure that understands 
and supports the needs of technology-based ventures, giving 
companies access to networks of expertise and resources 
essential to their success in a global market-place. 
2. Facilitate and support the transfer of technology from the Scottish 
science base to new and existing firms, either by spin-out or 
through collaborative projects. 
3. Complement specific initiatives in individual agencies and 
organisations, providing a resource which can be used by all 
participants to promote and develop related activities and 
projects.5 
4. Enhance the ability of new and existing firms to secure finance. 
5. Educate entrepreneurs about business development and issues 
germane to their industries. 
6. Help entrepreneurs to define new businesses and whether they 
should start them. 
A unique feature of Connect is its independence, as it is primarily 
private sector driven, involving over 40 of Scotland's leading private 
institutions and companies. Connect itself became a private company 
in June 2001 after being based at the Edinburgh University 
5 From the beginning Connect has made it clear that the aim is not to compete 
with established activity but to provide a channel for all partiCipants, in 
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Management School since 1996. At the same time, Connect has 
broad support from the public sector, as all fourteen of Scotland's 
universities and the majority of local enterprise companies (LECs) 
that provide enterprise support throughout Scotland are Connect 
sponsors. 
Connect staff includes CEO Ian MacDonald and Program Director 
Gillian Mayman, based in Edinburgh, Director Dr. Andrew McNair, 
based in Glasgow and Director Susan Morrison in Aberdeen. The 
Edinburgh office has two program assistants and a manager of the 
web-site (www.connectonthenet.com). Governance of Connect is 
provided by a board of directors that is elected by sponsors and 
company members. 
Targeted Stakeholders and Their Potential Benefits 
The Connect program targets the networking and involvement of all 
key stakeholders interested in the development of technology-based 
ventures and, ultimately, economic growth. In particular, benefits are 
expected to accrue to technology companies, universities and 
research institutions, private service providers, public complementary 
initiatives (support agencies) and the more general community. All 
these parties are envisaged to profit from the access to a common 
network of expertise, resources, and the opportunity to interact on a 
regular and informal basis through the Connect program of briefings, 
lectures, courses, technical and social support. In particular, the 
following potential benefits per stakeholder are identified: 
particular research institutions and technology companies, to access skills, 
expertise, resources which already exist throughout Scotland. 
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Universities and Research Institutions 
• Scottish science base will benefit from facilitation and support for 
technology transfer to new and eXisting firms, either by spin-out 
or through collaborative projects; this includes increased 
interaction between campus-based researchers and industry 
scientists; 
• individual academics and researchers will benefit from an 
effective infrastructure which institutions can use to better 
understand the needs of technology-based companies and 
financial sectors and to commercialise their research. 
Technology Companies6 
Technology companies will benefit from an enhancement in their 
ability to: 
• access new markets, clients, partners, products, technology and 
finance, and their general marketing skills; including access to 
one-to-one technical and managerial assistance; 
• secure developmental/growth funding; 
• stimulate collaborative projects between technology businesses 
and universities/research centres, including access to national 
and international sources of R&D funding and capitalisation; 
• facilitate and enable the creation of spin-out companies from the 
Scottish science base and established technology companies; 
• learn about business development and issues germane to their 
industries; and receive help to define new businesses and 
whether they should start them; 
6 These are defined as companies competing on the basis of proprietary 
technology or know how. 
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• In general, technology-based ventures and companies will 
benefit from the development of an expert infrastructure that 
understands and supports, and benefits from, the needs for 
success in the global market. The overall result is envisaged to 
lead to the creation of new, additional 'high income' jobs. 
Service Providers (e.g., regional attorneys, bankers, accountants 
and marketing professionals) 
• Service providers will benefit from enhanced competence 
regarding high technology products, companies and industries. 
This happens through the provision of technical briefings and 
education about unique characteristics of high-technology 
products, financing, manufacturing and marketing. 
General Community and Complementary Initiatives 
• The general community is expected to benefit from increased 
community awareness of the issues affecting the development of 
high technology enterprises, as well as from the provision of a 
community resource for data and information on the status of 
research activities and business development in the high-
technology sectors; 
• Complementary initiatives (support agencies and programs) will 
benefit from the provision of a resource that can be used by all 
partiCipants. 
Description of Connect's Activities 
Connect's mission and objectives are to be achieved through a 
program of activities and events facilitating and encouraging 
interactions between the university sector, large corporations, 
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emerging companies, service providers, regional government, 
economic development agencies and support groups. The program 
brings together a wide variety of communities, including 
entrepreneurs, technologists, scientists, banks, equity capital 
providers, business consultants, accountants, lawyers and policy-
makers, helping to bridge the knowledge gap existing between these 
communities. To achieve its aims Connect has designed an evolving 
program of 6 events (Table 1). 
researchers to present understanding and 
Technology their work and research facilitate technology 
briefings activities to Connect transfer 
sponsors and tech 
companies. 
Workshops bringing To develop general 
together technology mgmt. skills of both 
companies and technological 
Enterprise 
researchers with advisors entrepreneurs and 
Workshops 
and business entrepreneurial 
professionals technologists 
Technology entrepreneurs Learning from the 
discuss the development experience of others and 
Meet the of their businesses, their discussing development 
Entrepreneur successes and failures of their own businesses 
and their views of what it 
takes to succeed. 
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Annual venture capital To provide the 
investment conference. opportunity for 
Investment technology companies 
Conference seeking finance to 
present to audience of 
international investors 
Forum for To provide the 
individual/businesses to entrepreneur or 
present, in confidence, academic with practical, 
Springboard 
their technological realistic and expert 
concepts, proposed advice and 
business strategy or recommendations 
business plans to an 
expert panel. 
Two-day course focused To provide a series of 
on twenty to thirty experts to discuss core 
Bootcamp companies, providing subjects; i.e. routes to 
preparation for the market, refining the 
investment conference. technology proposition. 
Table 1: Connect's Events 
Each event in Table 1 is expected to playa specific purpose for 
specific target audiences and they all together combine to fulfil the 
targets of the overall program. 
Recurrent Events 
Three recurring types of events are central to Connect's national 
constituency mandate: technology briefings, enterprise workshops 
and meet the entrepreneur events. This is because the majority of 
the Connect constituency (companies, universities and sponsors) 
come together at these three events. Through these events, Connect 
502 
Building a National Network of Support for Academic Spin-outs and 
Technology-based Companies in Scotland 
aims precisely to stimulate a resource and expertise environment for 
interaction, learning and opportunities for different communities 
interested in the development of technology-based ventures and, 
ultimately, economic growth. As will be shown in the paragraph on 
the results of connection Programme, assessment of the 
development of the Connect constituency and the identification of 
stakeholders' value is derived from patterns of attendance to these 3 
events (see par. Building A Supportive Constituency or Infrastructure, 
and Value Perceptions by Connect Stakeholders). These events are 
delivered primarily at four locations: Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh 
and Glasgow. 
Investment Events 
Although many new companies are seeking different elements in their 
involvement with the Connect network, investment is seen as a 
critical element. Connect's investment conference continues to be 
unique in Scotland as a visible achievement. Attracting investors 
from Scotland, London, other countries of Europe and the US, the 
investment conference that began in 1997 is considered Connect's 
flagship event with 25 new and emerging technology companies now 
involved annually. 
Connect now provides more direct support for technology companies 
to attract investment through two other events. To complement the 
investment conference, "springboard" is preparation for serious 
investment and a platform for the early stage spin-out type models, 
both from the private sector and from the university base. These 
technology propositions are show cased with the objective to 
generate internal leads that may be new executive money and/or 
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executive resources and advice, or in the case of most companies, 
early stage (SEED) funding. Connect intends on offering more than 
one springboard a year as the business environment develops in 
Scotland. This includes the expectation of successful student 
entrepreneurs from the Scottish Institute for Enterprise (SIE) with 
technology backgrounds that want to spin business out. 
A third investment program, "bootcamp", is similar to springboard as a 
preparation for the investment conference. Boot camp is a two-day 
course focused on twenty to thirty companies, providing a series of 
experts to discuss particular core subjects such as includes routes to 
market and refining the technology proposition. The focus of the 2001 
bootcamp is on product marketing and how to sell the business to 
potential customers or partners or investors. Boot camp sits at the 
post-seed stage, up to raising serious venture capital funding, as it is 
a specific business issue that is being showcased. 
This hands-on intervention by Connect includes a selection process 
whereby a panel of Connect sponsors choose companies they feel 
are best placed to stand as credible business propositions. Connect 
assists the chosen companies through to the preparation at 
springboard so that they are credible and confident in front of the 
audience and their message is focussed. 
Results of Connect Programme 
Results of the Connect programme are based on an assessment of 
its achievements in relation to its original objectives since 1997. One 
objective is to develop a national supportive infrastructure for new 
504 
Building a National Network of Support for Academic Spin-outs and 
Technology-based Companies in Scotland 
technology-based companies in Scotland (par. Building A Supportive 
Constituency or Infrastructure). A second objective is to provide 
benefits to Connect's various stakeholders (as previously outlined 
par. Targeted Stakeholders and Potential Benefits). Paragraph "Value 
Perceptions by Connect Stakeholders" provides the results of two 
value surveys, the first conducted in 1999 and the second in 2001, 
that establishes how universities and technology companies in 
particular assess benefits derived from Connect and how this 
perception has evolved over time between the two surveys. This 
perception of value is related to attendance to the three recurrent 
events discussed in paragraph "Recurrent Events". A third objective 
relates to the benefits derived from investment activities of Connect 
(see par. Investment Events) that focuses on bringing investors 
together with entrepreneurs and new companies. 
Building A Supportive Constituency or Infrastructure 
Growth of Supportive Constituency 
Graph 1 shows the growth of the supportive infrastructure, comprised 
of universities, private and public sponsors, companies and 
individuals from 1997 to June 2001. Overall, the size of the Connect 
constituency has grown to 169 organisations (63 sponsors and 106 
member companies) and 35 individual members. 
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Graph 1: Stakeholder Growth over 5 Years (1997-June 2001) 
The significant five-fold increase in 'subscriber' stakeholders of 
Connect since 1997 seems to suggest that the Connect program is 
delivering effective value to each category. This appears to be 
particularly the case as stakeholders have had to renew their 
subscriptions and most of them have done so. Sponsors contribute 
funding £3000 (€ 4860) fee for private companies per year. They 
are entitled to sit on the Advisory Board of Connect and are involved 
in the development of event topics for members. Members are 
companies and individuals paying a small fee of £100 (€ 162) per 
year in exchange for receipt of newsletter and the opportunity to 
present their ideas at the Springboard event and Investment 
Conference. The theme of Connect's value to stakeholders will be 
dealt with in greater detail in paragraph "Value Perceptions by 
Connect Stakeholders". 
In assessing the growth of the constituency, it was found that a critical 
mass of both private and public sponsors was secured following two 
key milestones in Connect's early evolution. The original challenge for 
Connect in 1996, according to CEO Ian MacDonald, was to get 
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people in Edinburgh to sign up to a program based on the premise 
that ''we are going to do something which is useful, will you pay for 
it"? Awareness of Connect as a program and brand was non-existent 
and initial credibility was provided by the addition of Martin Ritchie as 
Connect's Chairman. One of Scotland's most successful and visible 
entrepreneurs, Ritchie also provided Connect with management and 
leadership capabilities and access to a far-reaching business 
network. MacDonald affirms that Ritchie was key in establishing a 
core of 20 founding private sponsors and dealing with numerous 
public and private organisations to promote the concept of Connect. 
Secondly, Scotland's leading research-led universities (Edinburgh, 
Glasgow, Strathclyde and Heriott-Watt) signeq up early as Connect 
sponsors, thus 'pulling' the other Scottish universities into the network 
quite quickly. It may be that other universities did not want to miss 
out on commercialisation activities and opportunities for their 
technologies, and the establishment of a Connect network with a 
base of Scotland's top universities as public sponsors offered appeal 
to the remaining universities to join the network. 
Although universities represent the largest single 'homogenous' 
category of sponsors, professional services (accounting, law and 
financial firms) comprise the majority of the private sector companies. 
There is a broad representation of sponsors from throughout 
Scotland, particularly from the public sector (universities and local 
enterprise companies). Not surprisingly, the private sponsors are 
primarily Edinburgh and Glasgow-based or along the central Scottish 
belt where the majority of businesses are located. 
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Mix of Stakeholders and Attendance at Connect Events 
One of the key objectives for Connect is ensuring the 'mix' of 
stakeholders representing the universities, private and public 
supportive agents, entrepreneurs and technology companies. Graph 
2 illustrates the evolution of stakeholder attendance (total numbers of 
people representing each group) to recurrent events between 1997 
and 2000. It shows significant growth in all stakeholder attendance 
during this period, but growth was especially high for all stakeholder 
categories between 1998 and 1999. This reflects the fact that, during 
this time, Connect began developing the national constituency in 
Scotland. 
Sponsor University Company Individual Other 
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Graph 2: Stakeholder Attendance to Recurrent Events, 1997-2000 
Table 2 provides an overview of percentage participation by 
stakeholder against the quantitative targets originally set by Connect 
(green column) for their first 4 years. The 'percentage of stakeholder' 
targets were originally created by Connect CEO Ian MacDonald to 
ensure that there was an effective mix of stakesholders at core 
events. There is a difference between the target categories 
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(universities, technology companies and business professionals) with 
the categories used for attendance at the real events (sponsors, 
universities, technology companies, individuals and others). For 
comparative purposes, the discussion that follows equates "business 
professionals" with "sponsors" and ''technology companies" is also 
assume to include "individuals" and "others". 
Category 
























(sponsors) (sponsors) (sponsors) (sponsors) (spons) 
5.25 9% 5% 4% 3% 
Table 2: Connect's 4-Year Quantitative Event Targets and Achievements 
1997-2000. (Percentage of Attendees to Recurrent Events by Each 
Stakeholder Category) 
This pattern of attendance in Table 2 is significant and it can be 
further added that: 
• The attendance objective of the 'Meet the Entrepreneur' events is 
continuing to prove attractive to sponsors and companies, the 
primary intended target of the event. Universities and individuals 
attend the least, so this event has not developed into a platform 
for stimulating strong university-business relations. 
• The attendance objectives of 'technology briefings' are not being 
fulfilled at present given that attendance by sponsors and 
companies is quite low. The objective of technology briefings is 
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to provide a forum for institutional researchers to present their 
work and research activities to Connect sponsors and technology 
companies. The attendance patterns suggest that there is much 
to be done to stimulate closer relations and interactions between 
university and business. The challenge for this event is to find 
ways to increase the mix of attending stakeholders. On the 
positive side, this event has almost tripled in growth between 
1998 and 2000. 
• The attendance objective of 'enterprise workshops' (to bring 
together technology companies and academic researchers with 
advisors and business professionals for the purpose of 
developing general management skills) is proving highly 
attractive to all stakeholders. Sponsors, companies and 
universities display the highest level of attendance. 
Value Perceptions by Connect Stakeholders 
Connect's development of a national support constituency, involving 
multiple stakeholder groups, universities, technology companies and 
sponsors, is expected to reflect in these groups different 
perspectives, expectations and motivations for involvement in 
Connect. Three value flows were identified from Connect's own 
event objectives -social, knowledge and financial value flows. 
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and academic with practical, realistic knowledge-
Bootcamp and expert advice and Social 
recommendations 
Investment To provide the opportunity for 
Conference technology companies seeking 
finance to present to an 





Table 3: Value Focus of Connect's Recurrent Events 
Table 3 shows that knowledge value is an overriding expectation of 
all Connect events, with financial value also pursued explicitly with 
the investment events. At the same time, social value is central to 
Connect's mandate since informal and formal social contacts are the 
starting point for business-focused networks and developments. 
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Each of the three value flows was decomposed into topics aimed at 
capturing a gradation of impact or value added by Connect as 
perceived by the program's stakeholders. Resulting topics (Figure 1) 
provide the basis for questions to stakeholders on where Connect has 
been beneficial regarding social and business contacts, gaining or 
giving relevant knowledge and attracting or providing financing . 
SOCIAL VALUE 
Meeting interesting people with shared interests; 
Feeling part of a network for contact, advice 
CONNECT EVENTS 
(event participation - miX of stak~holders) 
KNOWLEDGE VALUE 
Relevant business information 
IPR, licensing, transfer of 
technology 
New technologies/developments 
How to partner/collaborate 
Valuation 
Management skills 
Training and support opportunities 
Writing/presenting business plans 
Learning from others in network 




Between companies and financiers 
Between service providers and 
potential clients 
Activities 
Provision of financial information 
Receipt of financial information 
Transactions 
investments and developments 
Collaborations and spin-outs 
Figure 1: Social, Knowledge and Financial Value from Connect Events 
Two value surveys were conducted, the first in 1999 and the second 
in 2001, that establishes how universities and technology companies 
51 2 
Building a National Network of Support for Academic Spin-outs and 
Technology-based Companies in Scot/and 
in particular assess the value of Connect and how this perception has 
evolved over time between the two surveys. 
Graph 3 shows that, from both the 1999 (n=69) and 2001 (n=44) 
surveys, social value is rated as the most important perceived benefit 
from attendance to Connect events. 
1999 2001 
II::J Social • Know ledge 0 Financial I 
Graph 3: Most Definite Perceived Value (%) from Attendance to Connect 
Events (n=113) 
The high rating of Connect as a social network is consistent with the 
logical evolution of networks where social interactions and 
acquaintances tend to precede the exchanges and collaborations 
involving knowledge and financial value. Indeed, literature research 
has stressed the importance of informal social contact that evolves 
into business-focused networks, and then into strategic networks. 
However, Graph 3 shows an upward shift in most definite perceived 
financial and knowledge value, with a downward shift in perceived 
social value in comparing the 1999 and 2001 survey results. The 
difference in perceived value between social value and knowledge 
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and financial value has reduced significantly, suggesting that Connect 
is perceived as delivering more substantial knowledge and 
particularly financial value. Indeed, Graph 3 shows that financial value 
has overtaken knowledge value in the 'most definite' category. This is 
consistent with feedback from the Investment Conference, where a 
great deal of financial value was reported. 
Similar to Graph 3, Graph 4 shows an upward shift in most definite 
and to some extent financial and knowledge value, with a downward 
shift in perceived social value. 
1999 2001 
Is Social • Knowledge 0 Financial 
Graph 4: Most Definite and To Some Extent Perceived Value (%) from 
Attendance to Connect Events (n=113) 
The results seen in Graphs 3 and 4 suggest that Connect's social 
network is evolving into knowledge and investment networks. It 
suggests that social networks have become more established and are 
perceived as less important. Established social ties provide the 
atmosphere of credibility, trust and shared that are considered 
prerequisites for knowledge sharing and development of business 
relationships that include investment. A better picture of this change 
is seen when perceived value is analysed according to stakeholder 
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categories. Graph 5 shows perceived social value has risen in 
university and individual categories and dropped in sponsor and 
company categories between 1999 and 2001. 
1999 2001 
[iJ Universities • Sponsors 0 Companies DOtherflndividuals 
Graph 5: Perceived Social Value (%) by Stakeholder Group (n=113) 
Graph 6 shows an upward shift in perceived knowledge value by all 
stakeholder groups between 1999 and 2001. 
1999 2001 
C Universities .. Sponsors 0 Companies DOtherflndividuals 
Graph 6: Perceived Knowledge Value (%) by Stakeholder Group (n=113) 
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The difference in perceived value between social value and 
knowledge and financial value has reduced significantly from the 
1999 survey, indicating that Connect is perceived as delivering more 
substantial knowledge and particularly financial value. Financial value 
has overtaken knowledge value in the 'most definite' category. 
Providing as well as obtaining knowledge is a strong theme among 
companies and sponsors, but not universities, reinforcing the findings 
that the sharing of knowledge between university and business 
remains low at Connect events. 
Graph 7 shows an upward shift in perceived financial value by all 
stakeholder groups except universities. Universities report the lowest 
knowledge and particularly financial value in 2001. 
1999 2001 
[J Universities • Sponsors [J Companies [J Other/lndlvlduals 
Graph 7: Perceived Financial Value (%) by Stakeholder Group (n=113) 
Again this is consistent with the challenge already identified for 
Connect, namely, that the relationship between universities and other 
stakeholders remain weak. The perception of financial value shows 
clear variations between stakeholder groups, in contrast to social and 
knowledge value perceptions. Individuals outperform sponsors and 
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companies regarding the response to 'obtaining investment'. It may 
be that business angels are playing a strong role in investments 
stimulated by Connect. As well, a number of individual members 
represent financial intermediaries. 
University Perceptions of Connect's Value 
University respondents in general assessed the social value of 
Connect as an informal introduction to key supporters of high 
technology in Scotland. One respondent noted that "networking is the 
start of everything, that includes the build-up of friendship and trust", 
echoing the importance that other stakeholders place on creating 
social relations for new participants initially upon entering the 
network. Another feedback focus from university respondents was 
the access to an informed network. Three universities alluded to their 
need to keep in touch with what is happening in Scotland; 'Tour] 
university needs to be there". Another respondent added that 
Connect is a valuable resource, in that 'Tone] knows Connect is there 
if you need it, as it is a group of people within a supportive 
environment". It is apparent that Connect is both a venue and vehicle 
for universities, as most university respondents have an expectation 
that social contacts can and will lead to collaboration. This is an 
important qualifier of the university view of Connect. 
University respondents commented on the importance of information 
on commercialisation issues, i.e. to gain insight into how others are 
tackling issues of commercialisation; such as where are the gaps? 
• "Connect assists in the process of making the decision of doing 
something alone or within the university." 
• "Connect facilitates a greater awareness of closed institutions." 
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With Technology Briefings, one can "get a snap-shot of a 
technology or industry sector in a single session". 
Another respondent stated that "knowledge through events is 
realised on how to do something; this differs from experience 
with the civil servant mentality". 
Jniversities are unanimous in stating their expectation to secure 
inancing through Connect events. Financial value is the most 
mportant reason for attending Connect. Universities are seeking 
nvestors for their technologies. Interviews with commercialisation 
:>fficers representing three universities found that seeking and 
:>ecuring financial support for university research was a prime 
llotivation for participation in Connect. 
• 'TOur] university already has technologies waiting to go. " 
• "Through Connect we hope to expose enough to secure financial 
backing for university technologies. " 
• "We want to meet potential funders of our technologies. " 
Showcasing and discussing commercially viable research is 
facilitated through Connect, yet other possible financial values in the 
value survey were ranked much less in importance. Three 
commercialisation officers stated that they had yet to "obtain financial 
backing for ideas/products" but expect to in the future. A fourth 
respondent on this question checked "not at all". This is further 
evidence of the still un-bridged gap between university and business 
and it is bound to show in the number of spin-outs, collaborations or 
other targets reflecting the strength of this relationship. 
In summary, university recommendations for Connect included: 
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• Increase the number of researchers at Connect events, focusing 
on post-doctoral researchers who may be more liable to 
commercialise their technologies. 
• Communicate with researchers directly to avoid potential 
bottleneck generated by information "gatekeepers". 
• Program topics of special interest to universities include a 
"showcase" for new start-ups at the universities .... a baby version 
of investment conference, and sessions on product marketing by 
sector, branding, company law and human resources issues. 
Entrepreneur and Technology Company Perceptions of 
Connect's Value 
Entrepreneurs and technology company respondents were more 
diverse in their perceived social value in attending Connect events. 
One common theme is the importance of Connect as a venue for 
initiating and developing social relationships that may lead to 
business relationships through Connect events. The following quotes 
are important qualifiers of this expectation: 
• "Networking is most important for first-time attendees to build 
relationships; then for keeping in touch and keeping those 
contacts." 
• "Connect facilitates making and keeping contact in a range of 
sectors, i.e. academic and public sectors, various industry 
sectors." 
Connect is also seen as a venue for actually doing business, due in 
part to the informal atmosphere that allows for interaction of service 
providers and companies that are potential clients. Connect's 
recurrent events provide a social environment that is conducive for 
business. 
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• "Connect is well-suited for doing business and facilitates it well; 
there is no problem flashing business cards at the events; 
Connects is good at managing these different interests. " 
• "The networking platform is vel}' important in that it provides a 
solid mechanism for the biotechnology community to network 
with other stakeholders. " 
A third social value expressed from entrepreneurs and company 
respondents was the importance of Connect as a venue for like-
minded entrepreneurs experiencing similar issues and difficulties. 
• "Connect reflects a shared vision of evel}'one of future success 
of start-ups." 
• "It is a place to meet different people that share similar 
experiences ... it's lonely as an entrepreneur." 
Knowledge value for companies was most important through shared 
business experiences with other entrepreneurs. Company 
respondents noted the value of hearing about other people's 
experiences in setting up businesses and the problems they have 
encountered. Connect is seen to also provide a cross-sectoral venue 
and relevant topics according to industry sector. 
Comments related to the learning process being facilitated through 
Connect, through an evolutionary process that involves different 
issues raised and discussed at events. A number of company 
respondents were interested in information on services, such as 
information on important business services (e.g. "last year's seminar 
on insuring businesses was informative"). It is interesting to note that 
companies do not cite university-generated knowledge as highly 
important. This reinforces the point made earlier that university-
business interactions still require SUbstantial development work. 
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Both new companies and service providers indicated their 
expectation of finding investors and investment prospects 
respectively. Introductions by third parties was noted as an important 
aspect of establishing contacts with investors at events and being 
introduced to new business prospects. A number of comments 
alluded to the quality of the investment conference. 
Recommendations included that it should be held every 6 months 
instead of annually because of the frequency of start-ups. One of the 
respondents noted that this gives a reason for foreign investors to 
come to Scotland. In summary, company recommendations for 
Connect included: 
• Monitoring and assessment of the company 'f/o w-thro ugh , will 
provide valuable information on understanding where Connect's 
value begins and ends. 
• Connects should be aware of seeking continuous refreshment of 
ideas for program's content and mechanisms. 
• Other supportive agents should be identified that can be 
recommended as companies reach the peak of their Connect 
'value curve' 
• Should Connect establish various levels of supportive agents that 
facilitate start-ups as well as growth of technology companies, or 
maintain its focus on emerging technology companies? 
Value through Investment Events 
Connect has run 4 consecutive Investment Conferences from 1997-
2000. Together these conferences have enabled a total of 89 
Scottish companies, the majority of these university spin-outs, to 
present to investors. 
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Graph 8 shows the breakdown of sectors for companies represented 
during each of the conferences. It can be seen that the 'software' 
companies have been consistently the most prominent sector in the 
four Connect investment conferences, although e-commerce (inside 
Othery reveals dramatic growth between the 1999 and 2000 
conferences. This reflects the high level of dot-com start-up activity in 
2000. Biotechnology has also had a consistent presence in the 1999 
and 2000 conferences. 
Blo-tech Medical Electronic Industrial Software Other 
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Graph 8: Connect Investment Conference Companies by Sector, 1997-2000 
(the other category (far right) is primarily e-commerce) 
The number of sectors represented at each of the 4 conferences 
provides evidence of the heterogeneous nature of new companies 
seeking funding in Scotland. With a limited investor base in Scotland, 
it can be argued that bringing together these companies and 
investors to a single event provides efficiencies in scale and 
centralises a critical mass of investors to focus on a critical mass of 
companies to make it worthwhile for both groups. 
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Technology-based Companies in Scotland 
In order to determine the level of investment generated from the 
investment conference, 65 companies that presented at 1998, 1999 
and 2000 Investment Conferences were contacted by both e-mail and 
phone. Two questions pertaining to investment were asked: (1) did 
you directly or indirectly gain investment through your participation in 
the Connect Investment Conference? And (2) is there a level of 
investment (% sought or £) attributable to your participation in the 
Conference? 
A total of 20 companies responded. Results reveal that 8 out of 20 
companies (40%) gained investment, directly or indirectly, through 
their participation in the Investment Conference. The level of 
investment ranged from 10% to 50% of original amount sought and 
(£) from £100,000 to £1.5 million. In addition, of the 12 companies 
that did not gain investment, 9 companies cited intangible gains, 
which included: 
• better understanding of the investment process 
• profile raising and PR 
• greater focus on business planning 
• process as an invaluable pre-cursor to subsequent funding 
It is evident that the Investment Conference has produced benefits to 
a significant number of companies that have been able to present 
their business case at it. Not surprisingly this event has become 
widely appealing to both companies and the financial community, with 
an increasing number of international financial participants. 
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Infrastructures for Academic Spin-off Companies 
In addition to the Investment Conference, Connect has run two 
Springboard events in 2000 and 2001 (Graph 9). Springboard 2000 
had 12 companies and 100 audience attendees while Springboard 
2001 grew to 13 companies and 140 attendees. Audience attendees 
include Cisco Systems, BP, 3Com, Scientific Generics and 3i , among 
others. 
~ies Audience 
Graph 9: Springboard Companies and Audience, 2000-01 
The intention of Springboard is to assist companies to become 
investor-ready, and involves Connect working with each company. 
Connect found that early stage companies presenting at the 
Investment Conference had developed to the point that these same 
companies came back looking for second round funding or pre-IPO 
funding. Thus in 2000, after 3 Investment Conferences, the 
Springboard Workshop was created to specifically focus on 
companies seeking early-stage financing. 
Connect is expecting to increase the frequency of Springboard events 
as a result of the success of both the Investment conferences and 
Springboard. Another factor in expanding these events is Connect's 
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Technology-based Companies in Scot/and 
involvement with the Scottish Institute for Enterprise (SIE), part of a 
UK-wide initiative focused on creating a more positive environment 
for entrepreneurship from university undergraduates and graduates. 
It is expected that a growing number of Scottish university students 
wanting to create their own businesses will use Connect events such 
as Springboard. 
Future Perspectives 
The creation and evolution of a national network of support for new 
technology companies and academic spin-outs has been championed 
by Connect since 1996 and has coincided with significant changes in 
the business climate and technology sectors in Scotland. Enthusiasm 
and support for technology throughout Scotland has grown as a result 
of a combination of factors: successful companies and investments, 
greater knowledge of the technology sector and an extensive support 
network. The evidence is quite clear that knowledge of the technology 
sector throughout Scotland and the profile raising of the entire 
technology sector has been advanced through Connect. 
Understanding how technology companies are created and issues of 
commercialisation and development and growth have been identified 
in the value surveys. 
The cyclical nature of the technology sector has not diminished 
sponsorship support for Connect based on the high level of 
membership renewals by existing sponsors. Connect's founding 
sponsors provided optimistic visions of the future of the technology 
sector back in 1996/97 that justified the decision by many to become 
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involved in Connect, according to Program Director Gillian Mayman. 
At the same time, many people in Scotland also did not understand 
the technology sector and it was this concern with not having a grasp 
of the industry that drew people to the Connect network. Connect 
CEO Ian MacDonald also sees the longer-term approach to 
expectations of the sector as an indication of the growing maturity of 
the technology sector and its support in Scotland. 
With success has come a greater cultural acceptance of the 
entrepreneur as a legitimate occupation in Scotland, according to 
Gillian Mayman. Successful entrepreneurs, with their experiences 
and lessons, now provide knowledge, social contacts and investment 
to new entrepreneurs and companies. The entrepreneurial culture 
has changed particularly at the source of technology innovations, the 
Scottish universities, according to Mayman. She suggests that the 
traditional academic focus on the technologies themselves has 
evolved to the commercial applications of these technologies. A 
number of reasons may explain this change. Successful companies 
and wealth accumulation have provided role models for other 
academics and researchers. Academics have a greater awareness 
of what is required to commercialise their innovations. And the role of 
technology transfer departments has given a greater awareness to 
the push toward applying and commercial ising university innovations 
and research. 
However, Dr. McNair, Connect Director, cautions that there is still 
much more effort needed to link the university environment with the 
commercial one in supporting spin-outs and new technology 
companies. One difficulty is trying to persuade academic institutions 
of the value of the technology-focused network of Connect. McNair 
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points out that some of the universities are very good at working with 
Connect but the larger universities tend to display a high degree of 
ownership. Glasgow and Edinburgh, for example, have a large staff 
in their technology transfer departments. These departments and 
organisations have various company development teams and 
technology teams that are responsible for commercialisation activities 
focused on maximising the university's returns from its innovations. 
The issues of ownership of projects and research aside, Connect is 
focused on trying to get academics in touch with independent expert 
advice and resources so that they may access a whole array of 
information that they can use and gain knowledge from. 
The problem of attribution remains in identifying, asseSSing and 
measuring Connect's direct impact on technology companies. A key 
factor is that the causal relations for these types of outcomes are 
influenced by factors beyond the direct impact of the activities and 
mechanisms of the Connect constituency-building process. A Scottish 
University Commercialisation Officer, in the 1999 survey interview, 
stated, " ... can Connect identify where the value conversations 
commence; where the 'sign-posts' are? Connect introduces people; 
what they do from there is beyond Connect, as Connect won't be 
involved, and the entrepreneur may not require anything else from 
Connect beyond the introduction" 
As well, important economic factors influence the creation and growth 
of technology companies. Research cites the importance of sectoral 
conditions, as well as expected profitability and the presence of entry 
barriers. External supply and demand factors are shown to be a key 
influence on new company formation. Indeed, the impact of public 
policy is an unresolved issue as it relates to new company formation, 
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and includes such factors as taxes and cost of living. Individual traits, 
motivations and skills of the entrepreneurs involved in the companies 
are also key factors. 
Other supportive agents also exist in Scotland that influence the 
growth and development of technology companies. Local enterprise 
companies (LECs) supported through Scottish Enterprise offer 
services to new companies and local entrepreneurial networks and 
technology and sector-specific associations are also available. As 
mentioned earlier, the Scottish Institute for Enterprise (SIE) is focused 
on leading the next generation of entrepreneurs from Scotland's 
leading research universities and Connect and SIE are working 
closely to provide entrepreneurial content and support initiatives for 
these students. 
A key distinguishing feature of Connect remains its focus on 
developing a private-public national support network while providing 
an important first port-of-call for young Scottish technology 
companies and academic spin-outs. According to Dr. McNair, 
Connect's achievements should be considered in the context of 
cultural and social change in Scotland that he suggests is a slow 
process or a 'drip effect' when attempting to change the status quo 
that includes a low entrepreneurial culture. However, it is evident that 
Connect needs to be bullish of successes to date. Indeed, Connect 
Scotland's model is now being emulated by other regions in the UK 
with the emergence of Connect Midlands and Connect Yorkshire in 
2001. 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the evolution of Connect Scotland, a national network of private-
public stakeholders that supports high technology start-ups and promotes regional 
entrepreneurship. The paper establishes why and how private-public sponsors 
collaborate with entrepreneurs and technology companies, the levels of interaction 
and multi-stakeholder benefits generated within the network and how this value may 
be evolving over time. Findings show key milestones in building the national 
network that include strong evidence of need for intervention and support, 
establishing early private-sector program credibility by involving a high profile 
business leader and early public sector program credibility with support from Scottish 
Enterprise and Scotland's leading research universities. The identification of clear 
benefits to be derived by stakeholders of the network and a formal, integrated set of 
events and activities bringing together stakeholders and facilitating exchange have 
also contributed to building a national network. Results from interviews with 
stakeholders and two value surveys, in 1999 and 2001, provide evidence that private-
public sponsors and company members join Connect and renew their paid 
sponsorships and memberships based on specific benefits they anticipate and realise 
through network participation. Social, knowledge, and financial value was found to 
change over time, with knowledge and financial value becoming more important as 
social interactions are developed among active network participants. Findings also 
suggest that further effort is needed to improve the exchange between university 
commercialisation stakeholders and others within the network. The paper concludes 
that Connect's success to date in creating a national enterprise support network can be 
attributed to a combination of multi-stakeholder benefits being realised and Connect's 
integrated network building events and network management activities. 
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1.0 Introduction 
This paper focuses on a regional enterprise support network in the United Kingdom _ 
Connect Scotland. Since 1996, Connect Scotland has provided a fonnal approach to 
facilitating collaboration of support agents to assist technology-based start-up 
companies and academic spin-outs. Connect is similar to other support programs that 
attempt to emulate certain characteristics found in successful technology regions such 
as Silicon Valley (Saxenian 1990, 1994). This includes the concept of the 
'entrepreneurial infrastructure' (Vaughn, 1983; Porter, 1990) that describes the 
facilities and services present within a given geographical region which encourage the 
birth and development of new enterprises. Within this theme, new enterprise creation 
will be affected by local factors that include access to capital, specialised inputs, 
proximity to customers, specialised labor and psycho-social support, among others 
(Porter 1998; Cooper and Folta 2000). 
What distinguishes Connect from many other regional support initiatives is that it is 
primarily private-sector driven, with over 50 of Scotland's leading companies, many 
of these professional service providers, acting as sponsors. In addition, all fourteen of 
Scotland's universities and Scottish Enterprise, the government agency providing 
business support throughout Scotland, are public sector sponsors. This private-public 
mix of sponsors combines with over 100 early-stage (less than 5 years) technology-
based member companies at various stages of development and other interested 
parties to make up the Connect network. 
In focusing on Connect Scotland, the paper will address some identified gaps in 
current knowledge regarding regional enterprise support networks, namely: 
establishing why and how private-public agents are involved with the network, 
establishing levels of interaction among agents; and evaluating the benefits or 'value' 
derived by agents from their network participation. These multi-stakeholder benefits 
are evaluated over a two-year period to assess possible changes to sociaL knowledge 
and financial benefits that are explicit objectives of the Connect program. 
Establishing other notable factors contributing to the building of the support network 
is a further objective of the paper. 
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2.0 Enterprise Support Networks 
The concept of enterprise support networks is based on entrepreneurial network 
theory that suggests strength, complexity and diversity of business relationships 
influence start-up performance that can result in longer-term chances of firm survival 
and growth (Shahidi 1998). Network theory includes contributions from research 
showing that entrepreneurs gain access to resources and knowledge through their 
personal networks to start-up, develop and grow enterprises (e.g. Birley 1985; Starr 
and Macmillan 1991; Dubini and Aldrich 1991; Hansen 1995; Johannisson 1995). 
In addition to resources and knowledge provision, networks are seen to provide social 
support, self-confidence and strategic capacity for entrepreneurs to organise for new 
activities (Johannisson 1995). Starr and MacMillan (1991) argue that entrepreneurs 
needs to mobilise 'social resources' due to liabilities that include size, lack of market 
legitimacy and newness. Similarly, Sharman et al (1991) found that networks 
contribute positively to gaining organisational legitimacy and to developing a 
desirable marketplace reputation. 
Research literature also stresses the importance of informal social contact as a starting 
point to knowledge acquisition for entrepreneurs. Initial contacts from social 
networks evolve into business-focused networks, and then into strategic networks, 
which allow firms to innovate and to thrive by their links to other organisations 
(Falemo 1989; Dubini and Aldrich 1991; Butler and Hansen 1991; Aldrich and 
Zimmer 1986). 
Network creation is suggested as a growing policy prescription for regions where 
networks have failed to emerge (Malechi and Todtling 1995). Justification for 
creating networks is based on the resource-based view of enterprise (e.g. Penrose, 
1959; Teece, 1996) and research on clusters and regions (Saxenian, 1994; Nelson; 
1998) that suggests that innovation, growth and competitiveness for enterprises are 
optimised when enterprises are able to identify and utilise 'knowledge-based assets' 
defined as 'competencies, skills, routines and capabilities. These assets are often 
exclusive to the enterprise and the clusters or regions in which they operate. 
Conversely, research on regional clusters by Almeida and Kogut (1997) reveals 
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inconclusive evidence that new enterprises are more successful when located in 
clusters. They claim that only when there is sufficient technological opportunity do 
benefits of clustering outweigh the costs and note that a dense population of 
enterprises have greater rivalry for resources and will co-operate less. 
In the UK context, research cited by Scottish Enterprise (1993, 1996) compared high-
technology new ventures in Massachusetts and Scotland and found that in Scotland , 
there was little networking between industry and research staff in academia and 
government laboratories, and that informal networks, mutual support and 
encouragement were low. Other Scottish-focused studies have found a lack of 
venture capital and inadequate mechanisms for investing in small firms, a shortage of 
small firm management expertise in strategic high-technology sectors, a lack of 
interaction and common purpose between academia and industry, and a weak 
'entrepreneurial culture' (Collinson, 2000, Danson, 1996, Reid, 1997, Scottish 
Enterprise 1999). The identified need for a 'critical mass' of particular knowledge 
and expertise in Scotland has provided justification for Connect and will be further 
discussed in section 3.0. 
2.1 Evaluating Enterprise Support Networks 
Literature suggests a number of methodological difficulties for evaluators of 
enterprise support networks. These difficulties include the primarily social or 
informal character of many networks (Johannisson 2000) and difficulties in tracking 
how local supportive mechanisms allow new firms to assemble resources and 
capabilities (Malecki 1997). Another issue is the potential need for a longer 
evaluation time frame to identify network effects on enterprises. Segal et al (1990) in 
their evaluation of the Cambridge (UK) phenomenon, argue that it takes a long time 
to build technology businesses. A related view is provided by Smallbone and North 
(1996) who argue that it is necessary to take a long-term view to benefits gained by 
new ventures which recognises that the economic impacts of new ventures may 
change as firms start-up and evolve in their critical early years. 
Determining cause and affect attribution contributes to difficulties in evaluating 
program 'value for money' and assessment of impact, common features of public 
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program evaluation (Rossi et al 1979). A related problem for evaluators is that 
various measurements of program 'success', i.e., job creation, company growth or 
survival rates, may not be identified as program objectives or may be inadequate to 
capture actual program effects (Gregory and Martin 1998). 
The intent of this paper is to explore 1) the evolution of the enterprise support 
network - the roles of private-public agents and network-building activities of 
Connect; and 2) the multi-stakeholder benefits from the network - rather than impact 
on new enterprises per se. Most promising for this intent is literature on process 
evaluations (Rossi et al 1979; Patton 1987; Gregory and Martin 1996). Process 
evaluations include the following criteria: 1) defining the original intent of a program 
for all stakeholders and a description of program activities; 2) identifying growth or 
change throughout the program; and 3) including a full range of stakeholder 
perspectives if evaluation results are to gain widespread acceptance and credibility in 
the public domain. 
Guided by process evaluation criteria, the methodology used for the paper includes an 
assessment of the Connect program, analysis of growth and attendance data, results 
from stakeholder interviews and two survey questionnaires (1999 and 200 1) to 
determine perceived value by stakeholders from Connect activities and how this value 
may be changing over time. 
3.0 Connect Scotland 
Since its inception in 1996, Connect has maintained the following ffilSSlOn: "To 
support the creation, development and growth of technology-based enterprise 
throughout Scotland". Connect's national focus requires that it bring together 
multiple actors in different regions of Scotland that include universities, sponsors, 
entrepreneurs and companies. Connect's mission above follows the rationale that 
interaction between these private-public communities is critical for the development 
of high growth and high technology enterprises. 
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The Connect concept confonns to one of the key themes in the Scottish Higher 
Education Funding Council's (SHEFC)1 Corporate Plan, namely, "to develop the 
responsiveness and vitality of the research base in Scottish higher education, and to 
work with higher education institutions and other agencies in contributing to 
economic competitiveness and the quality of life." More specifically it confonns to a 
critical objective within this theme, "to develop further links between Scottish higher 
education institutions and industry and commerce.,,2 
A wide range of factors requiring attention to help nurture a technology ventures 
culture and economy in Scotland was identified in the SHEFC document that was 
built on the earlier Commercialisation Enquiry conducted by Scottish Enterprise (SE) 
and the Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE). Strategies to tackle the problem were 
proposed, amongst them, the establishment of "a networking and business support 
infrastructure to generate effective academic-industry links facilitating the multi-
directional flow of infonnation between academia, companies and service providers". 
Creating a supportive environment for technology-based enterprises in Scotland is not 
perceived as a short-tenn endeavour. As the Commercialisation Enquiry document, 
Technology Ventures: Commercialising Scotland's Science and Technology, made 
clear, there are multiple challenges and these must be faced through a variety of 
initiatives ideally involving all key stakeholders3. 
3.1 Private-Public Stakeholders and Expected Benefits 
The Connect program targets involvement of identified private and public 
stakeholders, who are expected to realise benefits from participation described below. 
I MacDonald, I., Connect _ The University of Edinburgh Programme in Technology and Entrepreneurs.hip, 29. May 1996.. . . 
Proposal to SHEFC detailing the Background, Mission Statement, Key Stakeholders, Programme AdrrumstratlOn and Acuvltles, 
Resource Requirements and Funding. 
2 Request for Funding from SHEFC to Support the National Development of the Co~ne~t Programm~ (19.97). " 
J Royal Society of Edinburgh/Scottish Enterprise "Technology Ventures: Commerclailsmg Scotland s SCience and Technology. 
Glasgow: Scottish Enterprise (1996). 
535 
Universities and Research Institutions 
• Scottish science base will benefit from facilitation and support for technology 
transfer to new and existing finns, by spin-out or through collaborative projects; 
• Individual academics and researchers will benefit from an effective infrastructure 
which institutions can use to better understand the needs of technology-based 
companies and financial sectors and to commercialise their research; 
Technology Companies4 
Technology companies will benefit from an enhancement in their ability to: 
• access new markets, clients, partners, products, technology and finance, and their 
general marketing skills; including access to technical and managerial assistance; 
• secure developmental/growth funding; and stimulate collaborative projects 
between technology businesses and universitieslresearch centres; 
• facilitate creation of spin-out companies from the Scottish science base; 
• learn about business development and issues gennane to their industries; and 
benefit from the development of an expert infrastructure that understands and 
supports, and benefits from, the needs for success in the global market. 
Service Providers (e.g. attorneys, bankers, accountants, marketing professionals) 
• Service providers will benefit from enhanced competence regarding high 
technology products, companies and industries. This happens through the 
provision of technical briefings and education about unique characteristics of 
high-technology products, financing, manufacturing and marketing. 
General Community and Complementary Initiatives 
• The general community is expected to benefit from increased community 
awareness of the issues affecting the development of high technology enterprises, 
as well as from the provision of a community resource for data and infonnation on 
the status of research activities and business development in high-technology; 
• Complementary initiatives (support agencies and programs) will benefit from the 
provision of a resource that can be used by all participants. 
, These are defined by Scottish Enterprise/Connect as companies competing on the basis of proprietary technology or know-how. 
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3.2 Description of Connect's Activities 
Connect's mission and objectives are to be achieved through a program of acti ities 
and events facilitating and encouraging interactions between a wide variety of 
communities, including entrepreneurs, technologists, scientists, banks, equity capital 
providers, business consultants, accountants, lawyers and policy-makers, helping to 
bridge the knowledge gap existing between these communities. To achieve its aims 
Connect has designed an evolving program of 6 events (Table 1). 
Table 1: Connect's Events 
l)p~()&~ye~t':(~' 
~J<';i'" ' '," ,,,"i!'(ojif{;iiV " : ffJ~:~, ;r, :",w ' Description Objective 
Technology briefings Forum for institutional researchers to To enhance understanding and 
present their work and research activities facilitate technology transfer 
to Connect sponsors and tech companies. 
Enterprise Workshops Workshops bringing together technology To develop general mgmt. 
companies and researchers with advisors skills of both technological 
and business professionals entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurial technologists 
Meet the Entrepreneur Technology entrepreneurs discuss the Learning from the experience 
development of their businesses, their of others and discussing 
successes and failures and their views of development of their own 
what it takes to succeed. businesses 
Investment Conference Annual venture capital investment To provide the opportunity for 
conference. technology companies seeking 
finance to present to audience 
of international investors 
Springboard Forum for individuallbusinesses to present, To provide the entrepreneur or 
in confidence, their technological academic with practical, 
concepts, proposed business strategy or realistic and expert advice and 
business plans to an expert panel. recommendations 
Bootcamp Two-day course providing preparation for To provide a series of experts 
the investment conference. to discuss core subjects 
Each event in Table 1 is expected to play a specific purpose for specific target 
audiences and they combine to fulfil the targets of the overall program. Three 
recurring types of events are central to Connect's national constituency mandate: 
technology briefings, enterprise workshops and meet the entrepreneur events. This is 
because the majority of the Connect constituency come together at these three events 
delivered primarily at four locations: Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh and Glasgow. 
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4.0 Discussion and Results 
A key objective of the Connect programme is to develop a national supporti e 
network or infrastructure for new technology-based companies in Scotland. Graph 1 
shows the growth of the network from 1997 to June 2001. Overall, the size of the 
Connect constituency has grown to 169 organisations (63 sponsors and 106 member 
companies) and 35 individual members. The significant five-fold increase in 
'subscriber' stakeholders of Connect since 1997 seems to suggest that the Connect 
program is delivering benefits to each category. The level of renewals among 
sponsors, in particular, is almost 100%. Sponsors contribute funding - £3000 fee per 
year - while members are companies and individuals paying a small fee of £100 per 
year in exchange for receipt of newsletter and the opportunity to present their ideas at 
the Springboard event and Investment Conference. The theme of Connect's value to 
stakeholders will be dealt with in greater detail in section 4.2. 
1 
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In assessing the growth of the Connect constituency, it was found that a critical mass 
of both private and public sponsors was secured following two key milestones in 
Connect's early evolution. The original challenge for Connect back in 1997 
according to CEO Ian MacDonald, was to get people in Edinburgh to sign up to a 
program based on the premise that "we are going to do something which is useful 
will you pay for it"? Awareness of Connect as a program and brand was non-existent 
and initial credibility was provided by the addition of Martin Ritchie as Connect' 
Chairman. One of Scotland's most successful and visible entrepreneurs, Ritchie al 
provided Connect with management and leadership capabilities and acce to a far-
reaching business network. MacDonald affirms that Ritchie was key in e tabli hin a 
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core of 20 founding private sponsors and dealing with numerous public and pn ate 
organisations to promote the concept of Connect. 
Secondly, Scotland's leading research-led universities (Edinburgh, Glasgo\ 
Strathclyde and Heriott-Watt) signed up early as Connect sponsors, thus 'pulling' the 
other Scottish universities into the network quite quickly. It may be that other 
universities did not want to miss out on commercialisation activities and opportunities 
for their technologies, and the establishment of a Connect network with a base of 
Scotland's top universities as public sponsors offered appeal to the remaining 
universities to join the network. Although universities represent the largest single 
'homogenous' category of sponsors, professional services (e.g. accounting, law and 
financial) comprise the majority of the private sector companies. Private sponsors are 
primarily Edinburgh and Glasgow-based or along the central Scottish belt where the 
majority of businesses are located. 
4.1 Mix of Stakeholders and Attendance at Connect Events 
One of the key objectives for Connect is ensunng the 'mix' of stakeholders 
representing private and public supportive agents, the universities, entrepreneurs and 
technology companies. Graph 2 illustrates the evolution of stakeholder attendance 
(total numbers of people by category) to recurrent events between 1997 and 2000. 
Graph 2: Stakeholder Attendance to Recurrent Events, 1997-2000 





Graph 2 shows significant growth in all stakeholder attendance during thi period, but 
growth was especially high for all stakeholder categories between 1998 and 1 9. 
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This reflects the fact that, during this time, Connect began developing the national 
constituency in Scotland from its base in Edinburgh. 
Table 2 provides percentage participation by stakeholder against targets set by 
Connect for their first 4 years5. The percentage of university attendees is increasing 
slowly but below the 4-year target while that of technology companies is stable over 
this time period. The attendance objective of technology companies and business 
professionals has been achieved, although it can be seen that the percentage of 
business professionals in attendance is declining. Monitoring this mix of stakeholders 
to recurrent events is an important activity for Connect in achieving the value 
exchange between and among network stakeholders that contribute to Connect's 
overall program objectives. Stakeholder value will be discussed in the next section. 
Table 2: Connect's Event Targets and Achievements 1997-2000 
(Percentage of Attendees to Recurrent Events by Each Stakeholder Category) 
Category 4-Year 4-Year 2000 1999 1998 
Target Achievement 
% Universities 30% 16.25% 20% 18% 15% 
% Technology 50% 29.25% 30% 29% 27% 
Companies 
% Business 20% 23.5% 15% 23% 27% 
professionals (sponsors) (sponsors) (sponsors) (sponsors) 
% Individuals 5.25 9% 5% 4% 
% Others 25.75 26% 25% 27% 
% Compam~6, 









5 The 'percentage of stakeholder' targets were created by Connect CEO Ian MacDonald to ensure that there was an effeclive ml. 
of private and public sponsors , entrepreneurs and new enterprises. .... h lh 
6 There is a difference between the taroet categories (universities, technology compames and. bus.lDe~s. professIOnals) Wil Fe 
b . .. t hn logy comparues mdivlduals and other). or categories used for attendance at the real events (sponsors, uUlversltles , ec . .. 
• &" I" 'th" s" and "technology compame comparati ve purposes, the discussion that foJIows equates "busmess prolesslona s WI sponsor 
i also a umed to include "individuals" and "others." 
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4.2 Value Perceptions by Private-Public Stakeholders 
As described in section 3.1, specific benefits to private-public stakeholders contribute 
to meeting Connect's overall program objectives. In order to establish common 
expectations of all stakeholders, three value flows were identified from Connect's 
own event objectives -social, knowledge and financial value flows (see Table 1). 
Knowledge value is an overriding expectation of all Connect events, with financial 
value also pursued - although more explicitly with the investment events. At the 
same time, social value is central to Connect's mandate since informal and formal 
social contacts are the starting point for business-focused networks and developments. 
Each of the three value flows was decomposed into a series of topics aimed at 
capturing a gradation of impact or value added by Connect as perceived by the 
program's stakeholders. ReSUlting topics provide the basis for questions to 
stakeholders on where Connect has been beneficial regarding social and business 
contacts, gaining or giving relevant knowledge and attracting or providing financing. 
Two value surveys were conducted, the first in 1999 and the second in 2001, that 
establishes how different private and public sponsors and member companies and 
individuals assess the value of Connect at two different points in time (using a 
modified Lickert scale). A total of 113 active attendees to Connect's recurrent events 
compl~ted the survey and responded to open-ended questions on Connect's benefits. 
Graph 3 shows that, from both the 1999 (n=69) and 2001 (n=44) surveys, social value 
is rated as the most important perceived benefit from attendance to Connect events. 






The high rating of Connect as a social network is consistent with the logical evolution 
of networks where social interactions and acquaintances tend to precede the 
exchanges and collaborations involving knowledge and financial value. 
Graph 3 shows an upward shift in perceived financial and knowledge value, with a 
downward shift in perceived social value in comparing the 2001 survey results to 
1999. The difference in perceived value between social value and knowledge and 
financial value has reduced significantly, suggesting that Connect is perceived as 
delivering more substantial knowledge and particularly financial value. The shift in 
value suggests that social networks have become more established and are perceived 
as less important. Established social ties provide the atmosphere of credibility and 
trust that are considered prerequisites for knowledge sharing and development of 
business relationships that include investment. Indeed, research has stressed the 
importance of informal social contact that evolve into business-focused networks, and 
then into strategic networks. 
Stakeholder Social Value 
A better picture of this change is observed when perceived value is analysed 
according to stakeholder categories. Graph 4 shows perceived social value has risen 
in university and individual categories and dropped in sponsor and company 
categories between 1999 and 2001. 















Over the 1999 and 2001 surveys, sponsors describe Connect as an inexpen i\e 
network that creates good dialogue for support. Networking is considered critical for 
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sponsors because key and important people are at these events; and entrepreneurs as 
well as sponsor have the opportunity to draw on others' experiences. Related 
comments from sponsors include: 1) "We view Connect as an opponunity to meet 
others (advisors and companies etc.) working in the technology sector. It is a very 
useful networking forum, with a panicularly relaxed manner"; 2) "We expect to raise 
our company profile in the technology sector by being active contributors in helping 
Connect reach its goals locally". 
All Scottish universities are sponsors of Connect and there is an expectation that 
social contacts can and will lead to collaboration. As one respondent put it: "Good 
networking is pivotal." Another respondent stated: "We want to see a vigorous 
market in technology-based industries in Scotland. We expected Connect to playa 
significant part in support this market by bringing together relevant communities. 
These expectations have been met to some extent". 
University respondents rated social value actually higher in the 2001 survey, with a 
general perception given that Connect provides access to an infonned network of key 
supporters of high technology in Scotland. As one university respondent stated: 
"Networking is the start of everything, that includes the build-up of friendship and 
trust", echoing the importance that other stakeholders place on creating social 
relations for new participants initially upon entering the network. 
Another common response from universities was the access to an infonned network. 
Three universities alluded to their need to keep in touch with what is happening in 
Scotland. As one respondent stated: "[Our] university needs to be there". Another 
respondent noted Connect as a valuable resource, stating: "[One] knows Connect is 
there if you need it, as it is a group of people within a supportive environment". As a 
national program, Connect seems to be delivering social value beyond the 
conglomeration of universities in the central belt of Scotland, as noted by one 
university who stated: "In general, Connect provides a good service in Aberdeen. It 
provides a good meeting forum and helps to link those interested in technological 
innovation and providing services ". 
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Compared to the 1999 survey, company respondents in 2001 were more diverse in 
their perceived social value in attending Connect events. One common theme is the 
importance of Connect as a venue for initiating and developing social relationships 
that may lead to business opportunities. The following quotes qualify this 
expectation: 1) "Networking is most important for first-time attendees to build 
relationships; then for keeping in touch and keeping those contacts"; 2) "Connect 
facilitates making and keeping contact in a range of sectors, i.e. academic and public 
sectors, various industry sectors". 
Connect is also seen as a venue for actually doing business by some companies who 
suggest this is due in part to the informal atmosphere that allows for interaction of 
service providers and companies as potential clients. Connect's recurrent events 
provide a social environment that is conducive for business as noted by these three 
company respondents: 1) "Connect is well-suited for doing business and facilitates it 
well; there is no problem flashing business cards at the events and Connects is good 
at managing these different interests"; 2) "Connect is the most relevant network for 
potential business, because of the overlap of potential clients of [our company J and 
the Connect attendees"; 3) "The networking platform is very important in that it 
provides a solid mechanism for the biotechnology community to network with other 
stakeholders". 
A further social value expressed from company respondents was the importance of 
Connect as a venue for like-minded entrepreneurs experiencing similar issues and 
difficulties. Three comments related to these theme are noted: 1) "Connect reflects a 
shared vision of everyone of future success of start-ups"; 2) " It is a place to meet 
different people that share similar experiences ... it's lonely as an entrepreneur"; 3) 
"Our expectations are to continue to have links with other new technology 
. " companzes . 
Stakeholder Knowledge Value 
Graph 5 shows an upward shift in perceived knowledge value by all stakeholder 
groups between 1999 and 2001. The difference in perceived value between social 
value and knowledge and financial value has reduced significantly from the 1999 
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survey, indicating that Connect is perceived as delivering more substantial knowledae o 
and particularly financial value. Providing as well as obtaining knowledge is a strong 
theme among companies and sponsors, but not universities, reinforcing the findings 
that knowledge sharing between university and business remains low at events. 






There are two themes to sponsor comments on the perceived knowledge value of 
Connect. The first is the use of Connect as a training venue for staff, as noted by one 
sponsor: "Connect allows us to expose staff to industry sectors to increase their 
knowledge; with the intention of eventually giving sector advice to clients". 
The second theme for sponsors is the role of Connect as an ongoing know ledge 
provider, with Connect facilitating, as one sponsor said, the "lateral transfer of 
information". Two similar comments are noted: 1) "[Connect] breaks down the lack 
of knowledge; a key problem in Scotland"; 2) "[Connect allows for] market 
awareness, who are the players, angels, etc. and what is innovative in Scotland". 
University respondents commented on the importance of knowledge on what others 
were doing rather than the provision of knowledge on commercialisation topics per se 
(it is important to point out that university respondents were overwhelmingly 
technology transfer or commercialisation staff; scientist/entrepreneurs would more 
likely be members). One respondent stated, " Connect is important for gaining 
insight into how others are tackling issues of commercialisation; such as where are 
the gaps? Related comments include: 1) "Connect assists in the process of makill 
the decision of doing something alone or within the university"; 2) "Connect 
facilitates a greater awareness of closed institutions ... with Technology Briefing. one 
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can get a snap-shot of a technology or industry sector in a single session"; 3) 
"Knowledge through events is realised on how to do something; this differs from 
experience with the civil servant mentality". 
Knowledge value for companies was rated as most important through shared business 
experiences with other entrepreneurs. Three company respondents noted the value of 
hearing about other people's experiences in setting up businesses and the problems 
they have encountered. Companies are also interested in sector-specific information, 
although Connect provides a cross-sectoral venue as well as relevant topics according 
to industry sector. One comment related to the learning process being facilitated 
through Connect, described as an 'evolutionary process' of event delivery that tied 
together appropriate sequential themes for new company development. A number of 
company respondents were interested in information on important business services 
(e.g. "last year's seminar on insuring businesses was informative"). It is interesting 
to note that companies do not cite university-generated knowledge as highly 
important. This reinforces the point made earlier that university-business interactions 
and exchange still require substantial development work. 
Stakeholders Financial Value 
The perception of financial value in Graph 6 shows clear variations between 
stakeholder groups, in contrast to social and knowledge value perceptions. It should 
be pointed out that financial value questions in the survey include receiving and 
giving financial information as well as providing and receiving investment or new 
business through the recurrent events. Financial value does not include results of 
Connect's three investment events (Table 1) that assist a select number of technology 
company members in obtaining investment. Investment events have not been 
included here, since they are annual events that are clearly focused on select 
stakeholders and specific outcomes. The relationship between investment events and 
recurrent events can be considered an evolutionary process, where certain technology 
companies have progressed - facilitated by the network - to a level where they are 
investor-ready. This analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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The majority of Connect's private-sector sponsors are service providers that see the 
value in developing social contacts early with entrepreneurs who may eventually 
utilise their services. Sponsors, in return for access to potential clients, provide free 
business advice and important contact facilitation. This philosophy is suggested by 
the following comments: 1) "By providing business advice, it is hoped that clients 
will develop a moral obligation for a long-term relationship with us"; 2) "Connect is 
supportive of new ventures, in line with the focus of [our company}, who want to 
support and provide services for these companies". 
Two other themes emerge from sponsors' comments on financial value. The first 
stresses Connect as a shop window into investment opportunities, highlighted by these 
responses: 1) "As a sponsor, we would ideally like to get early sight of opportunities, 
and perceive of Connect as a 'shop window' for early stage opportunities"; 2) "Our 
firm expects to make contacts in the technology sector which will be a catalyst for 
new business". 
The second theme touches on Connect as a contributor to investment deals through its 
recurrent events. Here the main point is that Connect does contribute indirectly, 
although it is difficult to attribute the precise credit. As one sponsor stated, "I am 
interested overall in business development and good investment opportunities. While 
others are doing some of the things which Connect does and Connect cannot claim 
credit for all investment following its investment conferences, I do think it ha a role 
to play". 
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Sponsors generally had difficulty in tracking any new business through Connect 
recurrent events directly, as identified in the following quotes: 1) "[We} want to see 
potential clients early to develop long-term relationships; our prime motivation is to 
increase the number of clients"; 2) "Although most new ventures can't initially afford 
[us}, Connect is a link to get to know potential clients of the future"; 3) 
"Opportunities to establish potential client relationships are very limited and 
virtually all of 'new work' comes from other sources. I'm not aware of any 'new 
work' won under the Connect umbrella. That said, it is a useful medium to keep up to 
date with this sector, know what young companies are up to and to tell people what 
[ our company} is doing". 
One potential explanation for an apparent dichotomy between the low level of 
business deals realised by service providers and their high level of sponsorship 
renewal is that business deals are not the primary benefit expected from sponsorship. 
As described, other benefits are being realised by private sponsors from network 
participation. Another explanation is sponsor acceptance of a longer-term view of 
benefits, as stated by Connect CEO Ian MacDonald in 1997: "From the outset it was 
emphasised to sponsors that they would be unlikely to see any significant return on 
their investment for at least three to five years.,,7 With Connect now entering its sixth 
year of operations, securing business deals from the Connect network may begin to 
take greater precedence for sponsors when considering renewal. 
As Graph 6 shows, there is an upward shift in perceived financial value by all 
stakeholder groups except universities. This is consistent with a challenge identified 
for Connect, namely that the relationship between universities and other stakeholders 
can be improved upon. In both 1999 and 2001, university technology transfer 
respondents were unanimous in stating their expectation to secure investors for their 
technologies. Interviews with technology transfer staff representing three universities 
in 1999 found that seeking and securing financial support for university research was 
a prime motivation for participation in Connect. Related comments include: 1) 
"[Our} university already has technologies waiting to go"; 2) "Through Conllect we 
7 Request for Funding from SHEFC to Support the National Development of the Connect Programme (1997) 
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hope to expose enough to secure financial backing for university technologies "; 3) 
"We want to meet potentialfunders of our technologies". 
From the 2001 survey, Connect's financial value for universities has been below their 
expectations. As one university respondent pointed out, "/ feel that the level of 
engagement of firstly, academics talking about spin-outs and secondly, real venture 
capitalists, have been a bit lower than / expected." Another university respondent 
stated, "What / have not seen much of .. in Aberdeen, is the presence of potential 
investors at the meetings. Investors in technology and new start-ups are few 11l 
Aberdeen and even fewer seem to come to Connect meetings ". 
Three university commercialisation officers stated that they had yet to obtain financial 
backing for ideas/products but expect to in the future. This is further evidence of the 
fact that Connect still has a great deal to do to break through the challenge of 
improving significantly university-business interactions that may include a more 
active role in managing university expectations. 
Two themes emerge from companies' comments regarding financial value. The first 
relates to indirect financial benefit expectations. As one respondent stated, "Through 
membership in Connect, / expect to become part of a network of like-minded business 
professionals and expose my company to opportunities for partnership and 
development". The second relates to more direct investment expectations. Here one 
company respondent commented: "My expectations are that / will meet potential 
investors and I feel that this has been achieved. " 
Graph 6 also suggests that the individual/other stakeholder category, many of whom 
represent financial intermediaries and trading companies, are identifying the value 
they provide regarding financial advice more than the gains from receiving business 
from new companies at this time. As noted earlier, more direct financial value 
realised by stakeholders - those technology companies and spin-outs that have 
presented at Connect's investment conferences - reflect a more active role of Connect 
in linking opportunities with investment and has not been included in this study. 
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5.0 Summary 
The aim of this paper has been to describe the building of a private-public enterprise 
support network in Scotland and address identified gaps in current knowledge 
regarding enterprise support networks. The Connect network comprises key elements 
of a regional supportive infrastructure or constituency that includes over 50 private 
sponsors, public 'local enterprise companies' (LECs) of Scottish Enterprise, all 14 of 
Scotland's universities and over 100 Scottish-based technology company members 
from a cross-section of sectors. Key identified milestones in building the national 
network include strong evidence of need for intervention and support, establishing 
private··sector program credibility by involving a high profile business leader and 
establishing public sector program credibility from Scottish Enterprise and Scotland's 
core of leading research universities. 
Results from two value surveys in 1999 and 2001 provide evidence that private-public 
agents are drawn to Connect's activities and contribute to the building of a national 
enterprise support network by value they expect to derive from participation. 
Findings suggest that social, knowledge and financial value have evolved over time 
within the Connect network as perceived by active respondents. Social and 
knowledge values may be more important in earlier periods and influence 
opportunities to realise knowledge and financial value at later stages due to factors 
that include the building of trust, familiarity, learning and the formation of 
relationships among network constituents. 
Benefits being sought within the Connect network are seen to depend on the proper 
'mix' of stakeholders that facilitate a level of 'value exchange'. New technology 
companies and universities indicated their expectation of finding investors, but 
companies valued knowledge benefits more highly than universities. Private sponsor 
service providers indicated their expectation in finding business prospects but 
interestingly, the low level of generated business prospects suggest that other benefits 
maintain these sponsors' continuing engagement with the network. Introductions by 
third parties was noted as an important aspect of establishing contacts with investors 
at events and being introduced to new business prospects. Findings suggest that 
further effort is needed to link the university environment with the commercial one in 
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supporting new technology companies. This is a challenge also for Scottish policy 
makers and other key public and private institutions. Another challenge for Connect 
as a private-sector driven network is ensuring a balance of altruistic outcomes on 
behalf of entrepreneurs and new companies on the one hand and business-generating 
outcomes to private sponsors on the other hand. 
The paper has found that Connect acts as a 'co-ordinating mechanism' that facilitates 
at the national level the interactions that lead to multi-stakeholder value exchange. 
Although Connect as a program fundamentally 'connects' private-public sponsors 
with entrepreneurs and technology companies, and stimulates social, financial and 
knowledge flows, Connect itself does not pursue the formal and systematic mentoring 
of emerging technology companies. In this respect, Connect has no direct control of 
processes leading to new or increased numbers of collaborative projects, spin out 
companies, or new jobs. As mentioned, Connect more directly facilitates processes 
by which technology ventures and academic spin-outs secure funding through their 
investment events. 
The paper concludes that Connect's success to date in creating a national enterprise 
support network can be attributed to a combination of multi-stakeholder benefits 
being realised and Connect's integrated set of network building events and network 
management activities. 
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